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Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. "Name-Magic" and the Threat of Lying Strangers in Homer's <i>Odyssey</i> S. DOUGLAS OLSON, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign | 1 |
| 2. Notes on <i>Antigone</i> and <i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i> DAVID KOVACS, University of Virginia | 9 |
| 3. A Neglected Stoic Argument for Human Responsibility DAVID E. HAHM, The Ohio State University | 23 |
| 4. Seneca and the Schools of Philosophy in Early Imperial Rome VICTORIA TIETZE LARSON, Montclair State College | 49 |
| 5. Notes on Statius' <i>Thebaid</i> Books 3 and 4 J. B. HALL, University of London | 57 |
| 6. Ten Notes on Statius' <i>Silvae</i> W. S. WATT, Aberdeen, Scotland | 79 |
| 7. The Dedicatory Presentation in Late Antiquity: The Example of Ausonius HAGITH SIVAN, University of the Witwatersrand | 83 |
| 8. <i>Cyranidea</i> : Some Improvements BARRY BALDWIN, University of Calgary | 103 |
| 9. Die Aldina der Rhetores Graeci (1508-1509) und ihre handschriftlichen Vorlagen MARTIN SICHERL, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität | 109 |
| 10. An Archaeologist on the Schliemann Controversy WOLFGANG SCHINDLER, Winckelmann-Institute der Humboldt- Universität, Berlin | 135 |
| 11. The Refugee Classical Scholars in the USA: An Evaluation of their Contribution WILLIAM M. CALDER III, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign | 153 |

“Name-Magic” and the Threat of Lying Strangers in Homer’s *Odyssey**

S. DOUGLAS OLSON

Homer’s Odysseus is a man who has literally become “Nobody” (9. 366 f.) and, as Sheila Murnaghan has shown, the *Odyssey* as a whole can be read as the story of the hero’s gradual recovery of his own identity.¹ In an important and influential article, Norman Austin has traced the significance of the name “Odysseus” in the poem and has argued that Penelope, Telemachos and Eumaios all try to avoid using it. This is a form of “name-magic,” Austin insists, which has little or nothing to do with concrete practical concerns about household security or the like. Instead, Odysseus’ intimates “treat his name as a treasure which must be shielded from vulgar display, protecting the man by repressing the name.” So long as the fateful syllables “Odysseus” are hidden, the possibility that the hero may return remains open. Each time the name is pronounced, on the other hand, Odysseus’ chances for survival diminish.² Names are important and powerful things in the *Odyssey*, and the hero guards his carefully.³ The reluctance of those closest to Odysseus to name him, however, is much less general than Austin suggests. It also seems to reflect not a fear of “name-magic” but a straightforward and very practical awareness of the threat posed by the seductive lies of wandering strangers. What Austin identifies as Homeric “name-magic” is thus only another example of the calculating caution the *Odyssey* recommends in all human affairs.

As Austin has pointed out, the fact that Penelope, Telemachos and Eumaios all frequently use periphrases (such as “my husband,” “my father”

* Thanks are due David Sansone for thoughtful comments on several previous drafts of this paper.

¹ S. Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1987).

² N. Austin, “Name Magic in the *Odyssey*,” *CSCA* 5 (1972) 1–19.

³ This is true both on Scheria, where Odysseus does not identify himself by name until 9. 19–21 (see Austin [previous note] 4–5), and on Ithaca, where the hero’s survival depends specifically on his active suppression of his identity until he can take his revenge. On the power of names in the *Odyssey*, see also C. S. Brown, “Odysseus and Polyphemus: The Name and the Curse,” *Comp. Lit.* 18 (1966) 193–202; B. Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 30 (Wiesbaden 1974) 5–60; J. Peradotto, *Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1990), esp. 94–170.

or "my master") for Odysseus is in itself unremarkable and cannot be taken as evidence of a concerted effort to suppress the hero's name.⁴ Austin also insists, however, that on a number of important occasions all three characters deliberately avoid naming Odysseus. Thus Telemachos does not mention him by name to "Mentes" in 1. 158–77, 214–20, 231–44; Penelope seems to try not to name him to her women in 4. 722–41 and in her conversation with the εἰδῶλον of her sister in 4. 810–23, 831–34; Eumaios speaks of him only obliquely to the Stranger in 14. 122–47. In each case, Austin argues, we see an essentially magical attempt to protect and conceal the hero's name and thus make possible his return.⁵

This theory of Homeric "name-magic" stumbles first of all on the fact that neither Penelope, Telemachos nor Eumaios actually shows any consistent reluctance to speak the name "Odysseus." Penelope, for example, names her husband before the Suitors in the incident described at 2. 96, 19. 141, to the herald Medon at 4. 682, 689, to Telemachos and Theoklymenos at 17. 103, to Eumaios at 17. 538–39, and to the Suitors again at 16. 430, 18. 253 and 21. 74.⁶ Indeed, Ὀδυσσεύς is one of the final words in Penelope's long despairing speech in Book 4, which Austin cites as a prime example of her deliberate attempts at "circumambulation around the name" (4. 741).⁷ Telemachos too names his father over and over again: in the presence of the Suitors at 1. 354, 396, 398; 17. 402; to the Assembly of Ithacans at 2. 59, 71; to Eurykleia at 2. 352; to Nestor and his sons at 3. 84; to Helen and Menelaos at 15. 157; to Theoklymenos at 15. 267, 522; to Eumaios at 16. 34; and to Theoklymenos and Penelope at 17. 114, 131, 136. Eumaios as well refers to his master as "Odysseus" in the presence of the Stranger at 14. 144, 364, 515; 15. 337; 17. 314, to Melanthios at 17. 240, and before Penelope and her serving women at 17. 522, 525. Others who are well-disposed to Odysseus and eager that he return to Ithaca also call

⁴ Austin (above, note 2) 5.

⁵ Austin (above, note 2) 5–9.

⁶ As noted above, Austin points to the large number of circumlocutions in Penelope's conversation with the image of Iphthime (4. 810–23, 831–35) as further evidence of her eagerness to conceal Odysseus' name. Given the brevity of these speeches, the phenomenon is not necessarily significant. If it is, the fact that the εἰδῶλον as well fails to name Telemachos and Odysseus (4. 807, 826, 836) means that this is not a characteristic of Penelope's speech in particular and that we are therefore in need of some larger, more comprehensive explanation of what is going on here.

⁷ Austin (above, note 2) 5–6. Austin (7–8) is equally free with the evidence in the case of Kalypso. It is true that neither Hermes nor Kalypso names Odysseus in their brief confrontation in 5. 85–148, and if this has any significance it may well be that "Hermes' obliquity springs from the tact appropriate to his mission and to his person as the divine messenger" (Austin 7). It is simply not the case, however, that Kalypso is so deeply concerned to protect Odysseus and so aware of the power of "name-magic" that she remains "to the end . . . the Concealer," carefully protecting the hero's name even after she has lost control of the man himself (Austin 8). In fact, Kalypso names Odysseus to his face at 5. 203, and then not in the context of giving him up but as part of a final desperate attempt to keep him with her (5. 203–13).

him by name: Athena (1. 48, 57, 60, 83, 87; 5. 11); the men in the Assembly (2. 27, 163, 173, 234, 238); Eurykleia (2. 366; 19. 381); Nestor (3. 121, 126, 163); Menelaos (4. 107, 151); Helen (11. 143; 15. 176); Theoklymenos (17. 152); the old servant-woman grinding grain (20. 117); and Philoitios (20. 205, 209).

Pace Austin, therefore, characters in the *Odyssey* who are favorably disposed to the hero's return do not routinely attempt to "protect" him by resort to name-taboo. The scattered occasions on which Odysseus' intimates do avoid using his name must accordingly be accounted for in some other way. The first of these incidents occurs in Book 1, when Athena appears at the door of the palace on Ithaca (103–05, 113). Athena is disguised as a man and completely anonymous, and is therefore greeted by her host simply as ξείνε (123).⁸ Telemachos treats his visitor with perfect hospitality here (125–35) and opens their conversation by referring to his own personal troubles (159–68). At the same time, however, he holds back a number of crucial details: not only does he fail to name his father, but he also avoids identifying himself and does not mention his mother at all. Instead, he quickly brings the discussion around to the question of his guest's identity (169–70) and possible connections to the house (175–76). Athena responds to the boy's questions by identifying herself as Mentēs (180–81) and explains her visit (182–84), declaring she is Telemachos' paternal guest-friend (187–88). She supports this claim, moreover, by mentioning not only the name of Laertes (188–89) and some incidental details about him (189–93) but the name of Odysseus as well (196). In his reply, Telemachos mentions his mother for the first time (215), and Athena/Mentēs responds by supplying her name as well (223). Only now does Odysseus' son tell his visitor precisely what is going on in the household (esp. 245–51).

Telemachos thus behaves in a courteous but at the same time practical and hard-headed manner here, leavening the bread of hospitality with an obvious suspicion of his unknown visitor. As Austin has pointed out, he does conceal his father's identity. He conceals a great deal more than that, however, and he clearly does so not out of a belief that names have some sort of magical power but because he wants to know more about the

⁸ Homer's audience know this is Athena in disguise, of course, but Telemachos does not (cf. 322–23). Those listening to the poem are also already aware that Athena resembles Mentēs, leader of the Taphians (105), a fact which Telemachos (who has clearly never met the real Mentēs) only learns later (180–81).

Guests and strangers in the *Odyssey* are regularly addressed as ξείνε by those who receive them (1. 123, 214, 231; 3. 43, 71; 13. 237, 248; 14. 56; 15. 80, 145, 260, 402, 536; 16. 113, 181; 17. 163, 478; 19. 104, 124, 215, 253, 309, 509, 560, 589). Once they have been accepted or identified, they sometimes graduate to ξείνε φίλε (1. 158; 19. 350) or even φίλε (3. 103, 211, 375). The guests themselves, however, have a pronounced tendency to address their hosts immediately as φίλε (13. 228; 15. 260, 509; 16. 91; 17. 17, 152). Presumably the latter term indicates a stronger form of attachment, which guests are eager to assert and establish as early on as possible. Cf. the discussion of G. P. Rose, "The Swineherd and the Beggar," *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 288–91.

stranger before he surrenders substantial information about himself and his household to him.⁹ When "Mentes" proves capable of naming Odysseus and other members of the family on his own, Telemachos apparently concludes he can trust him. Similar caution on the part of a host confronted by the arrival of an anonymous ξείνος can be seen in Eumaios' behavior at the beginning of Book 14, in a scene which helps explain precisely what dangers are posed by situations of this sort.

When an impoverished wanderer (really Odysseus in disguise) arrives at Eumaios' hut in the countryside, the swineherd takes the old man in and feeds him (14. 45–51, 72–81) and complains to him at length about his own troubles (esp. 39–42, 68–71, 81–82, 89–108).¹⁰ As Austin has pointed out, Odysseus' servant is initially careful not to name his master and instead speaks only of κείνος (70, 90) and of his ἄναξ (40, 67; cf. 61–62). Attention to the subsequent course of the conversation, however, shows that Eumaios (like Telemachos in Book 1) speaks thus elliptically for a very clear and specific purpose, which has nothing to do with "name-magic." After the Stranger has eaten and drunk his fill (109–13), he asks the name of his host's lost master, repeating a few clues Eumaios dropped inadvertently in the course of their conversation earlier (115–17; cf. 70–71, 96–104) and intimating he may have news for him (118–20). Eumaios responds by telling the old man not to waste his time: he is obviously just another in a long line of wanderers and vagrants who have come to Ithaca and offered false tales about Odysseus in hope of getting a gift in return (122–32; cf. 378–89). Eumaios normally does his best to be a discreet and careful servant, as he shows in Book 16, when he quietly whispers the news of Telemachos' presence in his hut to Penelope and returns straight home (338–41). So too here, therefore, he brushes off his guest's prying questions and continues to refer to his master only obliquely (κείνον 14. 122; τοῦ 133; τόν and αὐτοῦ 135; ὁ μὲν 137; cf. 139). At 144, however, caught up in his sad reminiscences and his grief (esp. 138–43), Eumaios lets the fateful name Ὀδυσσεύς slip. The swineherd hastens to add that αἰδώς normally restrains him from calling his master by name (145–47).¹¹ The damage has been done, however, and Odysseus in the role of the beggar immediately picks up the vital word, uses it repeatedly in the remarks that follow (152, 159, 161) and incorporates it into the extended lies he tells a

⁹ Cf. the care Athena takes to furnish Odysseus with the name of the Phaeacian queen before he enters the palace on Scheria (6. 53–54; cf. 7. 146).

¹⁰ Eumaios is strongly characterized in the *Odyssey* as someone who takes pleasure in mulling over and describing his own troubles and in listening to those of others (esp. 14. 168–75). The autobiographical lie Odysseus manufactures for him is therefore full of troubles and disasters and thus calculated to satisfy his servant's tastes; note Eumaios' satisfied comment in 14. 361–62.

¹¹ Exactly what Eumaios means here has been a matter of considerable dispute; see the discussion of Austin (above, note 2) 11–12, and the bibliography cited there (n. 11); Fenik (above, note 3) 28–30.

little later on (321, 323; cf. 470, 484, 486), all of which are intended to show he actually knew Odysseus (esp. 484–501; cf. 237–42) and has credible news of his homecoming (esp. 321–33; cf. 118–20).¹² In the conversations which follow, Eumaios uses Odysseus' name freely (364, 515; 15. 337; 17. 240, 314).

The impoverished Stranger thus does his best to learn the name of Eumaios' long-lost master, and when he does, incorporates it into a series of elaborate (and apparently very convincing; cf. 17. 522–27) lies. The swineherd, on the other hand, who has seen this sort of thing before (14. 122–30; cf. 378–85), tries to hold his master's name back, not out of any concern for "name-magic" but because he has no intention of allowing this old beggar to tell his beloved mistress and her son (both of whom he also initially declines to name: 14. 123, 127–28; cf. 137) a more convincing lie than might otherwise be possible.¹³ That Eumaios fails in this attempt to protect his household is only consistent with the characterization of the swineherd in particular, and of servile characters generally, throughout the epic. Servants in the *Odyssey* are expected to tell the truth, and the most their masters ever demand of them in the way of deception is therefore silence in the presence of others (2. 337–81, esp. 373–77; 19. 485–90; cf. 21. 228–41). Indeed, Eurykleia immediately confesses even a passive deception of this sort when questioned by her mistress (4. 743–49; cf. 23. 1–24).¹⁴ It is accordingly a basic feature of the plot of the poem that Odysseus' servants, no matter how faithful they might be, are not allowed to participate actively in the planning for their master's revenge. Instead, they are told what they need to know at the last moment and expected to act on their orders without questioning them (e.g., 21. 188–244). Eumaios himself, moreover, is consistently characterized in the *Odyssey* as well-meaning but somewhat bumbling. It is he, after all, who almost fails to deliver the bow to Odysseus at the crucial moment in the great hall (21. 359–67), a task he only carries out when Telemachus threatens him (21. 368–79).¹⁵ That Eumaios fails in his attempt to baffle the prying Stranger in Book 14 thus comes as no real surprise. The basic strategy the swineherd

¹² Austin fails to explain why Eumaios ultimately names Odysseus if he is, in fact, aware of the power of "name-magic" and its implications for his master's return. The fact of the matter is that the swineherd has a much more immediate set of concerns here and simply makes a mistake (see below).

¹³ In the aftermath of his failure to conceal the name of Odysseus, however, Eumaios quickly surrenders those of Penelope, Telemachos and Laertes as well (14. 172–73).

¹⁴ On the one occasion on which a servant does tell an active and independent lie (Eumaios, attempting to convince the suitors he knows nothing about the arrival of the Stranger at Odysseus' palace: 17. 380–91; cf. 275–77), in fact, he is immediately found out and embarrassed (369–79) and subsequently told by his master to be quiet (392–93).

¹⁵ It is accordingly Eumaios, unlike the cowherd Philoitios (who successfully carries out his orders: 21. 388–93; cf. 240–41) but like Telemachos (who also makes a dangerous and potentially fatal mistake: 22. 154–55), who is wounded in the fighting which follows (22. 279–80; cf. 277–78).

adopts here, however, is clear: anonymous guests should be treated graciously, but should also be kept from learning more than they need to know and thus prevented from taking advantage of the master's family.

This pattern can be detected once more, in Book 16, in a passage Austin does not discuss, when Telemachos meets the Stranger for the first time. When Odysseus' son arrives at Eumaios' hut, the swineherd rushes out into the courtyard to greet him, while the old wanderer remains inside (11–16). Telemachos names Odysseus outright when he is speaking to Eumaios alone (34). Once he enters the hut and sees the Stranger sitting there (41–45), however, he becomes more cautious, asking first who this might be (57–59) and then speaking obliquely of "my mother" and "her husband" (73–75).¹⁶ Only after the anonymous ξείνος has proved capable of naming Odysseus and Laertes (100, 104) does Telemachos let down his guard and use the names himself (118–19).¹⁷

What Austin identifies as a concern for "name-magic" in the *Odyssey* can thus be more credibly explained as a concrete anxiety on the part of members of Odysseus' household about the possibility of being taken in by the lies of wandering strangers. There are many such impostors wandering the earth, Alkinoos declares in Book 11, "putting together lies from sources no-one could fathom" (363–66). The desperate desire of Odysseus' family to have any news of him (e.g., 4. 315–31) makes them particularly easy prey for men of this sort (e.g., 14. 126–30, 378–85; 19. 165–260) and they are therefore on their guard against them. The *Odyssey* regularly puts a premium on guile and verbal agility. It is precisely the hero's outstanding cleverness and deceptiveness, after all, which those who know him think of when they recall his exploits (esp. 4. 240–89; cf. 502–03) and which he claims as a central token of his identity when he reveals himself on Scheria (9. 19–20). It is this very ability in δόλοι, in fact, Athena asserts, which both protects Odysseus and makes him her favorite (13. 291–99, 330–36; cf. 8. 519–20). "He made many lies like to the truth with his words," as the poet says later, and one measure of his greatness is that he could do so

¹⁶ A nice counter-example for this sort of caution is the Sidonian slave-woman in Eumaios' story (15. 403–84), who immediately gives her father's name when asked (423–26) and naturally receives an answer calculated to please her (430–33). Her ultimate reward, of course, is death (477–81).

¹⁷ Telemachos lets down his guard so far here, in fact, that he actually names Penelope (130), something he does nowhere else in the epic (cf., e.g., 1. 248, 415; 2. 50, 131, 133, 135, 223, 358, 373, 411; 4. 321; 15. 515, 522; 16. 33, 73, 151; 17. 6, 401; 21. 103, 110, 115; note also 4. 325, where Telemachos avoids naming his grandmother as well). If there is any "name-magic" or any sort of "name-tabu" at work in the *Odyssey*, that is to say, it seems to be associated with the names of women rather than of men; cf. S. D. Olson, "Women's Names and the Reception of Odysseus on Scheria," forthcoming in *EMC/CV* 36 (1992). For similar phenomena in classical Athens, see D. Schaps, "The Woman Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names," *CQ* 27 (1977) 323–30; A. H. Sommerstein, "The Naming of Women in Greek and Roman Comedy," *Quaderni di storia* 11 (1980) 393–418.

without flinching (19. 203–12). Much of the particular genius of Penelope as well consists in her ability to put off the Suitors convincingly for years (esp. 2. 87–106; cf. 18. 282–83), to test those who bring her stories of her lost husband (19. 213–19) and ultimately to deceive even the great trickster himself (23. 177–206). It is precisely the fear of lying strangers, in fact, which the Ithacan queen gives as the reason for her cautious treatment of Odysseus at the beginning of Book 23: she has always been afraid of being taken in by the words of some plausible speaker, and has therefore tested even her own husband (215–17). Indeed, Penelope now goes so far as to convert the seduction of Helen into a mistake of precisely this sort (218–24).¹⁸

Homer's *Odyssey* puts a high value on hospitality to strangers and guests, but recognizes that this relationship can be perverted and abused by either party (e.g., 2. 55–58; 15. 67–74; 22. 22–41). The poem is also marked by an acute awareness that intelligent and resourceful people tell false stories for their own profit (e.g., 13. 254–55; 14. 378–89, 457–522, esp. 507–11; 19. 395–97) and that the ability to lie effectively is, in fact, one mark of the successful free individual.¹⁹ As Austin has shown, Odysseus' friends and family do on occasion suppress his name in conversation with others. They do so, however, not out of concern for "name-magic," but for the very specific and straightforward purpose of avoiding the deceptions of lying strangers and thus protecting themselves and their household.

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¹⁸ Cf. the observations of K. Morgan, "Odyssey 23. 218–24: Adultery, Shame, and Marriage," *AJP* 112 (1991) 1–3, esp. 2. On Penelope and her connections with Helen, along with extensive further bibliography, see now M. A. Katz, *Penelope's Renown: Meaning and Indeterminacy in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1991).

¹⁹ On Odysseus' false stories and their varying purposes, see C. R. Trahman, "Odysseus' Lies (*Odyssey*, Books 13–19)," *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 31–43; P. Walcot, "Odysseus and the Art of Lying," *Anc. Soc.* 8 (1977) 1–19; C. Emlyn-Jones, "True and Lying Tales in the *Odyssey*," *G&R* 33 (1986) 1–10.

Notes on *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*

DAVID KOVACS

Text and apparatus are quoted from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (Oxford 1990) except as noted.

Antigone 1–6

ὃ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα,
 ἄρ' οἴθ' ὅ τι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίου κακῶν
 ὁποῖον οὐχὶ νῶιν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ;
 οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀλγεινὸν οὔτ' ἥττης ἄτερ†
 οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' ἄτιμόν ἐσθ' ὁποῖον οὐ
 τῶν σῶν τε κάμῶν οὐκ ὅπωπ' ἐγὼ κακῶν.

5

2–5 totus locus vexatus

Text and apparatus are Dawe's. Prominent among the vexations of 2–3 are whether Sophocles could have written both ὅ τι (or ὅτι) and ὁποῖον, and if, as I believe, he could not have, which of these expressions needs to be replaced, and with what. A further question I have never seen satisfactorily answered is why Antigone remarks pointedly that Zeus is fulfilling the evils of Oedipus on Antigone and Ismene during their lifetime (νῶιν ἔτι ζώσαιν), as if one would naturally expect him to do so after their death.

The discussion must begin with the dogmatic assertion that the transmitted text—where interrogative ὅ τι or the conjunction ὅτι fights for mastery with relative or interrogative ὁποῖον—cannot be correct. The main lines of defense can be read in Campbell, in Jebb and (somewhat unclearly) in Kamerbeek.¹ To me they do not seem successful, and I can appeal in confirmation only to my reader's intuition.

On that premise, either ὅ τι or ὁποῖον is corrupt, and we cannot do better than to imitate the dentist and probe the edges of what is sound until we find something that yields. As I move the probe backwards from the end of line 3, I reach the beginning of the line without encountering anything

¹ See also H. Bonitz, *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Sophocles*, 2. Heft (Vienna 1857) 12–17. The most evident difficulty with Bonitz' paraphrase ἄρ' οἴσθ' ὅ τι τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίου κακῶν (sc. ἐστίν), ὁποῖον οὐχὶ Ζεὺς νῶιν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ is, as Schütz and others point out, the position of Ζεύς.

that is not absolutely sound, not clearly and demonstrably Sophoclean. For ὅποιον οὐχί we need look no further than 5. Müller's argument that ὅποιον must be corrupt because it has a qualitative sense that is out of place here is mistaken, as there is sufficient evidence to show that Sophocles used ὅποιος in place of the simple relative: see *Phil.* 659, *OC* 561 and fr. 1130. 17, quoted below on *OT* 938. For ὅποιος as indirect interrogative with a noun understood, see *Eur. Hel.* 631. That being so, suspicion falls on ὅ τι and perhaps on a neighboring word or two.²

If ὅποιον is the word that introduces the whole clause, then we must suspect not only ὅ τι but also Ζεύς. For once we remove ὅ τι, there is no way to fit the nominative of Zeus' name into the line without absurdity.³ Furthermore, if the subject of the verb τελεῖ stands directly after the verb introducing indirect question but before the indirect interrogative, intuition calls for the anticipated subject of τελεῖ to be in the accusative case as the object of οἶσθα. This is the so-called "lilies of the field" construction, formally called prolepsis, whereby the subject of an indirect question is anticipated, placed before the interrogative pronoun and made into the object of the leading verb. Like Greek authors of every period, Sophocles uses it often: cf. *OT* 224–25, quoted below, and 302, and also *Aj.* 118, *Tr.* 2, 321 and *Phil.* 573, and the discussions in Kühner–Gerth II 577 ff. and A. C. Moorhouse, *The Syntax of Sophocles* (Leiden 1982) 47–49. If it were not that zeta always makes position, we could write ἄρ' οἶσθα Ζῆνα, and the sense would be exactly what we require: "Do you know which of the evils stemming from Oedipus Zeus is not accomplishing for us during our lifetime?"

As it is, we must always be in doubt about what once stood there. As far as meter is concerned, we could write ἄρ' οἶσθα Κρονίδην, but this patronymic, not used by Aeschylus at all, is confined by Sophocles and Euripides to lyric. No other way commends itself of fitting Zeus' name into the line in the accusative once we remove ὅ τι.

At this point, the difficulties seem insoluble, and we might do well to turn away from them for a bit to the last of our queries: Why does Antigone say so pointedly that the ills of Oedipus are being accomplished on her and Ismene during their lifetime? Brown suggests that Antigone might have expected Zeus to spread the finite stock of Oedipus' ills over

² Lloyd-Jones and Wilson print ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὅ τι Ζεύς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν—/ ἄ, ποῖον οὐχὶ νῶν ἔτι ζῶσαν τελεῖ; But the interjection ἄ is found in tragedy only at sentence beginning, as a separate sentence for cries of pain and the like, or (in two doubtful cases) before a vocative. The self-interruption and anacolouthon, natural enough in conversation, seem decidedly *stilwidrig* in tragedy. This conjecture gives us the measure of the desperateness of the problem and provides part of the justification for putting forward my own somewhat drastic solution. For a different solution, see now A. L. Brown, *CQ* 41 (1991) 325–26.

³ No one will hesitate for a moment to reject ἄρ' οἶσθα δὴ Ζεύς (Meineke, cited by Schütz) with a collocation (ἄρα . . . δὴ) unknown to Denniston, or ἄρ' οἶσθά γε Ζεύς, where the emphasis is unwanted.

several generations, but he gives no reason for this supposition. Müller says that in Antigone's view the new trouble will not allow them to live any longer, but that is no reason for Antigone to say $\nu\omega\iota\nu$ $\xi\tau\iota$ $\zeta\omega\sigma\alpha\iota\nu$ but quite the opposite. Only Dawe (*Studies* III 99) faces the problem squarely: He canvasses and rejects still other answers and says, "I see no solution, and write this note only to show that the difficulties of this notorious passage may be even greater than we had imagined." He notes a further difficulty, that in $\tau\omega\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\text{Οἰδίου} \kappa\alpha\kappa\omega\nu$ the preposition is surprising.

Yet these last two difficulties may perhaps lead to the solution of the earlier problems. It may be that Antigone speaks the way she does because the subject of $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$ is one who is normally thought to bring death to the victim, not pain and disgrace in life. If both $\delta\ \tau\iota$ and Ζεὺς are under suspicion, other subjects—other supernatural agents—become available. We could fit in $\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omega\nu$, but not in the accusative grammar almost certainly calls for. Antigone could have said $\acute{\alpha}\rho'$ οἴσθα Φοῖβον , but though the god is in the right case, in this play Apollo is nowhere mentioned as the destroyer of the Labdacid line. She might have said $\acute{\alpha}\rho'$ οἴσθα πότμον or Μοῖραν , though these abstractions seem a bit feeble for the play's openings lines and for the vigorous action they are expected to perform.⁴ For my money, though, the most attractive possibility is the following:

$\delta\ \kappa\omicron\iota\nu\delta\omega\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omega\nu$ $\text{Ἰσμήνης κάρα},$
 $\acute{\alpha}\rho'$ $\text{οἴσθ' Ἐρινὺν τῶν ἅπ' Οἰδίου κακῶν}$
 $\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\omega\nu$ $\omicron\upsilon\chi\iota$ $\nu\omega\iota\nu$ $\xi\tau\iota$ $\zeta\omega\sigma\alpha\iota\nu$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota;$

Here is a fitting subject for $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$. There are Erinyes of murder victims, or even of beggars, and the Erinyes are often portrayed as carrying out the destructive plans of a god or gods.⁵ Surely, though, with $\tau\omega\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\text{Οἰδίου} \kappa\alpha\kappa\omega\nu$ in the same line, the reference must be to the curse of Oedipus against his sons. The surprising fact to which Antigone alludes

⁴ In addition, these suggestions are open to the objection that the genitive phrase in the second half of the line, which ought to go with what follows, might all too easily be taken with πότμον or Μοῖραν . An actor, to be sure, could easily make the structure plain, but a name would be better than an abstraction.

⁵ The connection between gods and Erinyes is made clear in *Iliad* 19. 87, where Zeus is accompanied by Moira and "the Erinyes who walks in darkness"; in Aesch. *Ag.* 59, where some god sends an Erinyes on the transgressors; and in *Ag.* 461–66, where the gods are mindful of those who kill many, and the black Erinyes blot out those who prosper without justice.

It is a reasonable guess that an Erinyes had played a role in connection with the destruction of the Labdacid line often in poetry before Sophocles, as she clearly does in Aeschylus' *Septem* (see 70, 574, 700, 723, 867, 887, 977, 989 and [1055]). Certainly that is the picture the second stasimon of our play paints (594 ff.), where the "last root" of the house is cut down by three agents, the last two of which (the only ones we can be sure of) are "folly of speech and the mind's Erinyes." The very next words, $\tau\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$, $\text{Ζεῦ}, \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\sigma\alpha\iota\nu$ $\tau\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\acute{\nu}\delta\rho\omega\nu$ $\text{ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι}$, imply clearly that this Erinyes-wrought destruction is, in the Chorus' view, part of the plan of Zeus to end the house of Labdacus.

here is that this curse, designed by Oedipus for the destruction of his ungrateful and unfilial sons, works on those who are still alive as well.

We can explain the corruption if we assume that as a note against line 2 someone wrote, e.g., ταύτην τὴν Ἑρινὺν ἰστέον ὅτι Ζεὺς ἐστὶν ὁ πέμψας, or ἰστέον ὅτι Ζεὺς ἄλλ' οὐκ Ἀπόλλων ἐστὶν ὁ τοὺς Λαβδακίδας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ δράματι ἀναιρῶν. Somehow ὅτι Ζεὺς stood directly above the third word in the line and was taken by a later scribe for its replacement. The theme of Ate and the Erinyes as behind the action of the play is well brought out in H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 113–17.

Antigone 648–54

μή νύν ποτ', ὦ παῖ, τὰς φρένας γ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς
 γυναικὸς οὔνεκ' ἐκβάλης εἰδῶς ὅτι
 ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισμα τοῦτο γίγνεται, 650
 γυνὴ κακὴ ξύνευνος ἐν δόμοις. τί γὰρ
 γένοιτ' ἂν ἔλκος μεῖζον ἢ φίλος κακός;
 ἀλλὰ πτύσας ὥσει τε δυσμενῇ μέθης
 τὴν παῖδ' ἐν Ἀΐδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν τινί.

653 ἀλλ' ἀποπτύσας KRZc

Text and apparatus are Dawe's. There are three problems in 653–54. The τε in 653 does not connect things of like status in the sentence. We may not take the τε to be an instance of “epic τε” in view of C. J. Ruijgh's large book on that engrossing subject.⁶ Jebb, with Ruijgh's approval, translates, “with loathing, and as if she were thine enemy, let this girl go,” but the joining of two expressions, one nominative, the other accusative, by means of τε seems difficult.

Even if we ignored this problem the translation of the couplet raises other difficulties: “But rejecting her with contempt [and] let the girl, as you would an enemy, marry some individual in the nether world.” There are lots of things one does customarily and as a matter of course to enemies, but letting them marry someone in the nether world is not one of them, that being restricted to a few situations like ours. Lastly, τινί, placed where it is, ought, one feels, to be allusive and minatory: cf. *Ant.* 751. But there is no reference.⁷

We need another participle for the τε to connect. The same participle will serve to disjoin “like an enemy” from “let her marry in the nether

⁶ *Autour de “τε épique”* (Amsterdam 1971) § 811, on ὥσειτε as foreign to tragedy.

⁷ Müller says that the pronoun has “eine verächtliche und zugleich eine ominöse Kraft.” There seems no reason to be dismissive of a “somebody or other” in the nether world. And there is no reason to take τινί as itself alluding to something painful, as if the identity of her otherworldly bridegroom were somehow a further unpleasant surprise. The combination of dismissive and ominous seems, furthermore, psychologically a near impossibility.

world," which is highly desirable. Its disappearance can be accounted for if we assume the following original:

ἀλλὰ πτύσας ὥσει τε δυσμενῇ τιθεῖς
τὴν παῖδ' ἐν "Αἰδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν μέθες.

Perhaps μέθες was copied both where it belonged and also at the end of the previous line, causing the disappearance of the participle that once stood there. Someone saw that there were two identical imperatives, and that one of them should go.⁸ He picked the wrong one and wrote τινί in its place.⁹

Lloyd-Jones and Wilson take a different approach. Noting that K, which Wilson has established as our second-oldest witness, reads ἀλλ' ἀποπτύσας, which reading also appears in R and Zc, they delete the ἀλλ' with Blaydes and read ἀποπτύσας οὖν ὥστε, the last two words being Blaydes' conjecture for ὥσει τε. This attractive solution deals with the first two of the three problems cited above. But the third (the force of τινί) is untouched. Furthermore the corruption of οὖν ὥστε to ὥσει τε seems hard to motivate. And while the authority of K must in general be rated higher now that Wilson has redated it, its reading here, ἀποπτύσας for πτύσας, represents a kind of error that is by no means uncommon, the replacement of a poetic simplex by a compound more usual in prose. See Eur. *Hipp.* 965, where the truth is ὤλεσεν and a large number of mss. read ἀπώλεσεν, *contra metrum*, as in our passage.

Antigone 726–34

- KP. οἱ τηλικοῖδε καὶ διδαξόμεσθα δὴ
φρονεῖν πρὸς ἀνδρὸς τηλικοῦδε τὴν φύσιν;
AI. μηδέν γ' ὃ μὴ δίκαιον· εἰ δ' ἐγὼ νέος,
οὐ τὸν χρόνον χρὴ μᾶλλον ἢ τᾶργα σκοπεῖν.
KP. ἔργον γάρ ἐστι τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν; 730
AI. οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς.
KP. οὐχ ἦδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ' ἐπείληπται νόσῳ;
AI. οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεώς.
KP. πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

731 οὐδ' ἂν] οὐ τὰν Schneidewin

There are several problems calling for our attention here:

⁸ A. L. Brown suggests ἀλλὰ πτύσας ὥσει τε δυσμενῇ μεθεῖς / τὴν παῖδ' ἐν "Αἰδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν <ἔα>, which gives two aorist participles in the first line and a two-letter imperative whose disappearance can be accounted for by haplography: -EINEA.

⁹ Lloyd-Jones pointed out to me that, on p. 165 of the *Anhang* to Schneidewin–Nauck, Nauck proposes a somewhat bolder solution to the same problem: "Vielleicht γένοιτ' ἂν ἔλκος μείζον; ἀλλ' ἀποπτύσας τὴν παῖδ' ἐν "Αἰδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν μέθες."

(1) Though Schneidewin's conjecture gets rid of an οὐδέ in 731 for which there is no apparent use,¹⁰ no commentator I have read remarks on the singularity of εὐσεβεῖν in the same line. The context seems to require the line to mean, "I would not, you know, urge anyone to honor the base," a reply of sorts to Creon's question ("Is it merit to reverence those who are unruly?"), which refers to Haemon's taking of Antigone's part.¹¹ Even if it could mean this, Haemon's line is a strange reply to Creon's, as I will show below. In fact, however, εὐσεβεῖν is no synonym for σέβειν, and εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς could mean nothing but "to act piously in regard to the base or the guilty." Jebb's "I could wish no one to *show respect for evil-doers*" is wishful thinking.

If we start from the phrase's literal meaning, we reach a different impasse. Haemon then says, "I would not, you know, urge anyone to act piously in regard to the guilty," Creon says, "Isn't that what she has done?" and Haemon must then reply, "Not according to the people of Thebes," attributing to the Thebans the view either that Polynices was no traitor or that the burial was no act of piety. Neither is a plausible attitude for Haemon to take.

(2) There are difficulties of a lesser gravity with οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμι. Why, in this context, should Haemon speak of "ordering" or "urging" others to εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς? Charged with committing X oneself, it is scarcely natural to reply, "I would not urge anyone to commit X," or (reflecting the force of οὐδέ) "I would not even *urge* another to commit X [much less do it myself]."¹² If 731 could mean "I would not urge anyone to act piously in regard to the base" without ending up in the impasse described in the last paragraph, Haemon would be at least saying something intelligible ("I would not have urged Antigone to act as she has"), even if it is rather weasel-like to say, "I didn't authorize it beforehand," of an act you clearly approve of afterward. But it is hard to make any sense of κελεύσαιμι on Jebb's interpretation of εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς as "to

¹⁰ Denniston, *GP* 197, cites passages in Herodotus where οὐδέ seems to mean *gar nicht* but (583) excludes our passage. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, *Sophoclea* 134, translate, following Kamerbeek, "Far from revering them, I should not even exhort another to show piety towards those who are κακοί." But Lloyd-Jones and Wilson give us no help in reading their translation: Do we stress *exhort* or *show piety*, and why are we being left in doubt? The first, which gives more plausible word-order, means a contrast between doing a thing and urging others to do it, but it is unclear why if one will not urge another to do a thing, it is a fortiori clear that one would not do it oneself. The second gives better sense (the *kakoi* are such that they do not even deserve to be treated with the decencies approved by the gods, much less shown special honor) but word-order is against it.

¹¹ "The unruly" is too mild an expression, surely, to describe Polynices, and so τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν must refer to Haemon's approval of Antigone's burial of her brother. Only this can be cast in Haemon's teeth as one of his ἔργα.

¹² The same objection applies to the interpretation of οὐδέ proposed by J. Kvíčala, *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Sophokles* (Vienna 1865) 15–18, who says it means "No, nor . . ."

honor the base." Are we to suppose that "I would not urge (anyone? you?) to honor the base" is mere elegant variation for "I would not honor the base?" Or that, in spite of the fancy footwork at the beginning of the line, we are supposed to fix our attention on the significant substitution of τοὺς κακοῦς for τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας (thus Jebb)?

(3) Lastly, there is the less than perfect clarity of 732, where some maintain stoutly that the νόσος in question is κακία and others no less stoutly that it is τὸ εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοῦς. Brown's comment sums up what many will feel: "The latter is more pointed in itself, and may be preferable, even though it makes the argument hereabout slightly less coherent." In the last paragraph but one I dilated upon this incoherence, which I think is considerable. Yet the fact that we can be pulled in one direction by considerations of style and "point" and another by logic means that all may not be well here.

If we attack (1) by itself, there is only one reasonable approach. We must find something to replace εὐσεβεῖν or εὐσεβεῖν εἰς that is capable of meaning "to honor" and then persuade ourselves that it is close enough in look to have been mistaken for what is in our MSS. The closest I can come is οὗ τὰν κελεύσαιμ' ἐναριθμήσασθαι κακοῦς (cf. Eur. *Or.* 623). It would be difficult to explain the corruption, though if we felt we had settled the biggest problem, we could persuade ourselves that the other two were the phantom images of a hyper-critical mind. And since life is short and there are other things to think about besides Soph. *Ant.* 726–34, we might well cut our losses and pass on.

Suppose, however, that we take our courage in our hands and resolve to address all three problems at once. We would like ideally a solution that gives good sense throughout while preserving as many letters as possible of the text transmitted in our MSS. As it happens, we can get unimpeachable sense while preserving every letter of the paradosis. Let us ask ourselves four questions. (a) To what action is Haemon likely to be referring by the phrase εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοῦς, and what is likely to be his moral attitude toward that action? (b) Who is it that in all probability talked about giving the order for something? (c) What must have preceded 731 for transmitted οὐδ' to make sense? (d) What must have been said before 732 for the reference in τοιγαυτε νόσω to be instantly and perfectly clear? The answers are these: (a) The phrase εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοῦς refers to Antigone's burial of the traitor Polynices, an action Haemon must be describing in *approving* terms as "showing piety (even) with regard to the base": εὐσέβεια is good almost by definition, and once a course of action is agreed to be pious, there is little that can be said against it, so that "I would not urge you to observe piety with regard to X" is not a plausible line of argument. Haemon must in some way commend piety in the case even of the guilty. (b) Creon is the most likely man to give an order. (c) Preceding the οὐδ' in 731 we need a negative to give οὐδ' the force of the connective "nor." (d) Before 732, "Has she not been tainted with this

disease," we need a reference to disobeying orders that a pious person could obey so that Creon can claim (732) that Antigone is guilty of this disease, Thebes deny it (733) and then Creon ask (734) whether the city shall tell him what orders to give. The patient can be saved in all his limbs, but the operation is messy. Here is the appalling spectacle that, if I am right, the editor must put in the text:

- KP. ἔργον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν;
 AI. < > εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς.
 KP. οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' < >
 AI. < >
 KP. οὐχ ἦδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ' ἐπείληπται νόσῳ;
 AI. οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεῶς.
 KP. πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

Below the water-line in the app. crit., the editor will have scope for creative reconstruction of the missing portions. Provisionally I suggest the following:

- KP. ἔργον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν;
 AI. <οὐκ ἔστ' ἄκοσμον> εὐσεβεῖν εἰς (οἱ κάς) τοὺς κακοὺς.
 KP. οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' <ἔργα δρᾶν θεοστύγῃ.>
 AI. <οὐδ' αἰνέσαιμ' ἂν εὐσεβεῖς συγγεῖν νόμους.>
 KP. οὐχ ἦδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ' ἐπείληπται νόσῳ;
 AI. οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεῶς.
 KP. πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

Others will be able to write more elegant and Sophoclean Greek. But the sense cannot, I think, be much improved. Note that Creon's "What? Shall the city tell me what orders I must give?" now rises naturally out of its new context.

Antigone 1277-80

- ὦ δέσποθ', ὥς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος,
 τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν τάδε φέρεις, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις
 ἔοικας ἤκειν καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι κακά. 1280

1279 φέρεις Brunck: φέρων codd.: φέρειν Hartung 1280 ἤκειν]
 ἤκων Brunck καὶ τάχ' LVZf: καὶ τὰ γ' AZo: καὶ τὰδ' RUY: καὶ
 τὰ τ' S: αὐτίκ' Blaydes

Blaydes proposed hundreds of conjectures on the texts of the tragic poets, and because their general quality is not high, there has been a tendency to ignore him in places where he is right or at least plausible.¹³ His conjecture here (adopting Brunck's ἤκων and writing αὐτίκ') is highly plausible and may well be right. The sense we require is not (paradosis), "It seems that you have come and will soon see other misfortunes in the house," but

¹³ Cf. R. D. Dawe, *Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus* (Leiden 1965) 6-7.

(conjecture), "It seems that having arrived you will soon see other misfortunes in the house." The *ratio corruptelae* is simple: ἔοικας governs an infinitive, and this led a scribe to turn a participle into the infinitive he looked for. Later someone noticed there were two infinitives in the line, interpolated the "and" this seemed to require, and adjusted the adverb to fit the metre. Brunck's φέρεις, though the corruption is harder to explain, looks very attractive as well.

I wish, however, to direct attention in this note to 1278, where attempts to interpret the paradosis seem to me to fail on two counts. First, everyone seems to take ἔχων and κεκτημένος as if they meant respectively "having present with one" and "having in store, in one's storeroom." I find this frankly incredible, and I cannot believe that any Greek hearing these two verbs, plain and unmodified by any prepositional phrase, would conclude that the one refers to things at the ready and the other to things hidden away. The two verbs are synonyms, and ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος (note the connective) looks for all the world like ordinary and unremarkable pleonasm.¹⁴

Second, attempts to account for ὥς are equally unsatisfying. Most commentators or translators ignore it. Kamerbeek makes it exclamatory, most implausibly. Jebb's translation takes it with the participles and translates "as one who," which would cause no comment if the participles were nouns. With a participle, ὥς most commonly means "on the ground that."

The only way I know of to deal with both of these objections simultaneously is to mark a lacuna after 1278. The lacuna will have the participle that forms a contrast to ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, and present possession will be contrasted with something else, perhaps future acquisition. As for the ὥς with the participle, we do not want the causal participle, "on the grounds that," which would make no contribution to the Exangelos' sentence, but an idiom that is thoroughly Sophoclean, the use of redundant ὥς in participial indirect statement after a verb of knowing or sense perception; see Moorhouse, *Syntax of Sophocles* 318. What Sophocles wrote may have looked something like this:

ὦ δέσποθ', ὥς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος
 <πένθη κάτισθι χᾶτερ' αὖ σήσω, ἐπεὶ>
 τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν τάδε φέρεις, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις
 ἔοικας ἥκων αὐτίκ' ὀψεσθαι κακά.

¹⁴ The two verbs are used as synonyms, e.g., Thuc. 1. 73. 1 (ἔχομεν ἃ κεκτήμεθα); Lys. 29. 4; Isoc. *Paneg.* 107, *Antid.* 159; Dem. 7. 26, 7. 28–29, 11. 6, 14. 28, 21. 62, 45. 80; Plato, *Crat.* 393b, *Theat.* 197b–c, *Polit.* 259a, *Symp.* 201b, *Resp.* 382b (ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτησθαι), 458c, *Criti.* 111c, *Leg.* 666e, 717b (ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει), 742b, 815e. In tragedy, see Eur. *Ion* 591–93, *Pho.* 555–56 and fr. 57. 2.

"O master, know that you have a grief and will get yet another." The contrast between present and future is then made clearer in the next two lines.

OT 223-32

ὑμῖν προφωνῶ πᾶσι Καδμείοις τάδε·
 ὅστις ποθ' ὑμῶν Λάιον τὸν Λαβδάκου
 κάτοιδεν ἀνδρὸς ἐκ τίνος διώλετο, 225
 τοῦτον κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί·
 κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται τοῦπίκλημ' ὑπεξελών

< αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ.—πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο >
 ἄστεργές οὐδέν, γῆς δ' ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής—
 εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἄλλον οἶδεν ἢ 'ξ ἄλλης χθονὸς 230
 τὸν αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπάτω· τὸ γὰρ
 κέρδος τελῶ 'γὼ χῆ χάρις προσκείσεται.

227 κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται] καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθω Blaydes et Heimsoeth
 ὑπεξελών] -ελεῖν Blaydes et Halm: -έλοι Rauchenstein post hunc
 v. lacunam statuit P. Groeneboom: possis ex. gr. <πόλεως (vel
 ἄλλων) ἐπισπᾶν θανασίμους φόνου δίκας> 230 ἢ 'ξ Vauvilliers:
 ἐξ codd.

Editors are right to posit a lacuna here, for the transmitted text is defective, and emendation does not heal the sense. Blaydes' καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθω . . . ὑπεξελεῖν, apart from other deficiencies, means an unexpected and incomprehensible shift in address in 227 from the man who knows who the killer is to the killer himself. For it is clearly the killer, not the "knower," the potential informant, who is assured that he will suffer nothing worse than exile. But with 224-26 preceding and τοῦτον in the line just before, no one would expect the subject of φοβεῖσθω to be anyone other than the informant. The same point tells against Rauchenstein's optative of wish (we might have expected a third-person imperative anyway), whose subject must be the killer, though the change of subject is not made clear.

But the same point that tells against these conjectures tells against the placement of this lacuna in the text above. The subject of φοβεῖται in 227 ought to be the informant, the τοῦτον of the previous line. By contrast, the man who speaks αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ, denounces himself, and thus suffers nothing worse than exile, is the killer, for the promise that he will suffer nothing worse than exile would be unnecessary to an informer while its appropriateness to the murderer is obvious: Oedipus has just learned that he must kill or exile the guilty (99-101), and he promises to do only the second in the case of someone who denounces himself. In between is a phrase, τοῦπίκλημ' ὑπεξελών, whose ownership is disputed, which will belong either to the one or to the other depending on where we mark the lacuna.

We should mark the lacuna within the line—ὑπεξελών definitely, and τοὔπικλημ' possibly, going with what follows—for several reasons. First, while τοὔπικλημα could refer either to the charge of murder against the killer or the charge of complicity against the informant doubtless mentioned in the lacuna, it is slightly more probable that the person engaged in "diminishing, reducing, doing away with by degrees" (ὑπεξελών: cf. *El.* 1420, *Eur. Hipp.* 633) is the murderer himself, who by denouncing himself can reduce his punishment to exile.

More important, however, is the whole context. In 224–26 Oedipus is asking any informants to come forward. In 230–32 he is still addressing informants, this time those who may know of a foreign killer.¹⁵ It seems easiest to construe the intervening lines so that they too address possible informants and so that the killer and his penalty are mentioned only to reassure *them*. The sense we look for is this: "And if he fears the charge <of complicity in the murder, I assure him most solemnly that not even the murderer himself will receive the expected penalty for murder if he denounces> himself and thereby reduces <his punishment>." (Since what the murderer reduces is not the charge but the penalty, I mark the lacuna after τοὔπικλημ'. But certainty is impossible here.) The Greek for this, though longer than one would like, writes itself:

κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται τοὔπικλημ' ὁμοῦ κτανεῖν
 συνειδέναι τε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὄμνυμ' ἐγὼ
 μηδ' ἂν τὸν ἔρξαντ' οὐ κτανεν τεῖσαι δίκην
 ἣν μαρτυρήσῃ, ζημίαν> ὑπεξελών,
 αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ. πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν κτλ.

(For the "coincident" aorist participle, describing an action contemporaneous with an aorist verb, see Barrett on *Hipp.* 289–92.) By contrast, attempts to reproduce the argument of the passage taking τοὔπικλημ' ὑπεξελών with the knower are considerably more awkward.¹⁶ This solution avoids the anacolouthon postulated by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson above. This is a gain, for to posit both a lacuna and a drastic change of construction seems a perilously expensive way of proceeding.

¹⁵ Vauvilliers' conjecture should be rejected: "if on the other hand anyone knows *someone else* <or> *from another land*" is dubious sense. Nauck's ἐλθόντ' for ἄλλον gives good sense.

¹⁶ Only two ways of proceeding suggest themselves. (1) "If he is afraid, reducing the charge against himself <of complicity, let him come forward in the knowledge that even the murderer will not receive the expected punishment if he denounces> himself, etc." (2) "If he is afraid, by doing away with the charge against him <in this fashion, that he will bring himself into trouble, let him be aware that the murderer himself will not receive the expected punishment if he denounces> himself, etc." The first is longer and more awkward than the text I argue for; the second takes τοὔπικλημ' ὑπεξελών in an unsatisfyingly conative sense which requires the unnatural suppletion of "in this fashion."

OT 609–15

οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτε τοὺς κακοὺς μάτην
 χρηστοὺς νομίζειν οὔτε τοὺς χρηστοὺς κακοὺς. 610
 [φίλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν ἐκβαλεῖν ἴσον λέγω
 καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτῷ βίοντον, ὃν πλείστον φιλεῖ.]
 ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ γνώσῃ τάδ' ἀσφαλῶς, ἐπεὶ
 χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος.
 κακὸν δὲ κἄν ἐν ἡμέραι γνοίης μιᾷ. 615

611–12 *delevimus* (611–15 *del. iam van Deventer*)

Surely 615 should be bracketed too? The argument of the passage is this: Creon wants Oedipus to conduct a proper investigation, going to Delphi to see whether his report of the oracle's words was correct. For to deem the good man bad and the bad good are both terrible errors. The safe course for avoiding both is to take the time to investigate, for it is time alone that shows up the just man.

Line 615 ("but the wicked man you may recognize in a single day") is not only irrelevant (as Kamerbeek admits) but positively ruinous. While it was said of Winston Churchill that while you could find out all his faults in half an hour's conversation, it would take a lifetime to appreciate his virtues, no such reflections are relevant here.¹⁷ In this context δίκαιον does not mean anything more general than "law-abiding, innocent of the charge," for the whole scene is not about Creon's moral character in general but about whether he is guilty of conspiring to depose his king. If it is time alone that establishes innocence, it cannot at the same time be said that a single day suffices to find out guilt. I suspect that to some actor 613–14 seemed insufficiently sententious for the end of his speech.

OT 932–38

ἀλλὰ φράζ' ὅτου
 χρήζων ἀφίξαι χῶτι σημῆναι θέλων.
 ΑΓ. ἀγαθὰ δόμοις τε καὶ πόσει τῷ σῶι, γύναι.
 ΙΟ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; πρὸς τίνος δ' ἀφιγμένος; 935
 ΑΓ. ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου. τὸ δ' ἔπος οὐξερῶ—τάχα,
 ἦδοιο μὲν, πῶς δ' οὐκ ἄν; ἀσχάλλοις δ' ἴσως.
 ΙΟ. τί δ' ἔστι; ποῖαν δύναμιν ᾧδ' ἔχει διπλῆν;

¹⁷ Wecklein's preemptive first strike against possible attackers of 615, *Ars Sophoclis emendandi* (Wurzburg 1869) 140–41, takes the passage into the realm of high morality: "Causa autem sententiae v. 615 . . . in eo posita est, quod unum malum facinus malum hominis ingenium manifestat, unum bene factum bonum animum non comprobat." But the meaning of δίκαιος (law-abiding) and κακός (guilty) is sufficiently shown by the parallel situation in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, esp. 929, 942, 1024, 1031, 1075, 1081, 1299, 1307, and the references to time as establishing guilt and innocence in 1051 and 1322.

Dawe's commentary well points out the unsatisfactory character of 938 as transmitted, where "ποῖαν cuts across ᾧδ', and the question is answered almost before it is put, lit. 'What is the double effect that it has like this?'" He rightly says that ποῖον is an attractive conjecture, well argued for by H. Reynen in *Gymnasium* 67 (1960) 533–36, but that it could not be used absolutely ("What sort of a thing?") but only as ποῖον (*sc.* ἔπος). I find such a "subaudition" hard here, and I cannot find any clear parallels in tragedy. I would much prefer to write τί δ' ἔσθ' ὁποῖον δύναμιν ᾧδ' ἔχει διπλῆν; comparing, for this use in place of simple relative, *Ant.* 5, *Phil.* 659, *OC* 561 and fr. 1130. 17 ὦν σοι λαβεῖν ἔξεστι τοῦθ' ὁποῖον ἂν / χρήζης.

OT 1303–06

φεῦ φεῦ, δύστην'· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐσιδεῖν
 δύναμαί σ', ἐθέλων πόλλ' ἀνερέσθαι,
 πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δ' ἀθρήσαι·
 τοίαν φρίκην παρέχεις μοι.

1305

Jebb: "The fate of Oedipus is a dark and dreadful mystery into which they are fain to peer (ἀνερέσθαι, πυθέσθαι: *cp.* the questions at 1299 ff., 1327): in its visible presentment it has a fascination (ἀθρήσαι) even for those whom it fills with horror." Kamerbeek: "In the reaction of the Chorus the clash of sentiments is evident and natural. Shrinking from the sight of the horror they feel at the same time the desire to know and to see." Someone who fails to detect beauties other interpreters claim to see may be thought to be lacking in literary sensitivity. In spite of that risk, I must say bluntly that I think the passage as it stands is slightly incoherent and that the second metron of 1305 should be deleted. If a poet wants to make the point, however obliquely, that a sight prevents one from looking on it even though one greatly desires to behold it, no easy point to grasp, he does not muddy things up by introducing two other infinitives—whose parallelism with the infinitive "to behold" is reinforced by anadiplosis—that take one down the path of an entirely different thought, that because of the horrible appearance of Oedipus they cannot *look* at him though they still want to ask him many *questions*. For metrical reasons we cannot delete the first two infinitives. Delete the third¹⁸ and all is in order, including 1306 (following on a series of questions): "Alas, unhappy man! But I cannot even look at you, though I have much that I would ask, much that I would learn, such is the shuddering with which you fill me." The motive for the insertion was probably some actor's feeling that a tricolon is wanted here and that three infinitives are better than two. I suspect that something similar has

¹⁸ Nauck thought that all of πόλλ' ἀνερέσθαι, πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δ' ἀθρήσαι was spurious. W. Teuffel, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie* 97 (1868) 752, deletes the last two phrases but defends the first. F. Heimsoeth, *Kritische Studien zu den griechischen Tragikern* (Bonn 1865) 227–28, anticipates my deletion.

happened at Eur. *Tro.* 110–11, where I would read τί με χρὴ σιγᾶν; [τί δὲ μὴ σιγᾶν;] τί δὲ θρηνῆσαι; Cf. similar expansions of anapaestic monometers at Aesch. *Pers.* 6 and 145 and *Cho.* 1069.¹⁹

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¹⁹ For suggestions and criticisms (not always heeded) I am grateful to Andrew Brown, Roger Dawe and Hugh Lloyd-Jones.

A Neglected Stoic Argument for Human Responsibility

DAVID E. HAHM

On two separate occasions Origen attempted to defend the proposition that human beings are personally responsible for their actions. In his comprehensive exposition of Christian theology, *On Principles*, written about A.D. 220–25, he devoted an entire chapter to the subject of free will, in the first half of which he attempted to demonstrate on philosophical grounds that human beings are responsible for their behavior and that it is within their power (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) to do right and avoid sin, as God in his justice demands (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 1–5 = *SVF* 2. 988).¹ A decade or so later in his treatise *On Prayer* Origen again defended human responsibility, this time in order to show that God does not foreordain everything that happens, thereby rendering prayer useless, but rather that human beings remain in control of and responsible for their own decisions and actions (*De Orat.* 6. 1–2 = *SVF* 2. 989).²

Origen's two arguments have long been regarded as influenced by the Stoic literature in defense of moral responsibility, an issue that was being hotly debated in the philosophical schools in the second and third centuries A.D.³ The first of these texts especially has been pressed into service for

¹ The text of *On Principles* has been edited by Koetschau (1913) and reedited by Görgemanns and Karpp (1976). Page and line numbers in my citations are those of Koetschau, which may also be found in the edition of Görgemanns and Karpp. On the date, see Butterworth vi–viii and Trigg 87.

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² The text of *On Prayer* is edited by Koetschau (1899). Page and line numbers in my citations are those of Koetschau. On the date, see Jay 72, and Trigg 156.

³ Von Arnim includes them in *SVF* 2. 988, 989 (all references to *SVF* are to fragment numbers, with page and line numbers added in square brackets when needed); and they have been used for the reconstruction of Stoic doctrine (see below, note 4). A Stoic influence on Origen's conception of human responsibility is also acknowledged in varying degrees by Koch 280–91; Pohlenz I 426; Jackson, esp. 19–21; and Trigg 116–17; as well as by the authorities cited in note 4. The Stoic influence on Origen, in general, is surveyed by Pohlenz I 423–28, II 203–07; and recent bibliography is cited by Inwood 281 n. 186. For

the illumination that it sheds on the Stoic theory of action, as well as on the Stoic defense of human responsibility in a world governed by fate.⁴ Origen's second attempt to defend responsibility, however, has received relatively little attention, either as an argument for the efficacy of prayer or as a reflection of the controversy in secular philosophy.⁵ It is cited mainly to fill in a few details that are absent from the discussion of *On Principles*.⁶ Yet even a superficial reading shows that though it begins in exactly the same way as the argument in *On Principles*, it soon turns in a noticeably different direction and eventually ranges over a series of points that are entirely absent from the account of *On Principles*. The difference between the two accounts raises the question why Origen did not simply repeat the argument he had used in *On Principles*. He cannot have forgotten what he had written earlier; the close resemblance of the first ten lines demonstrates that he was fully aware of the way he had presented the argument in *On Principles*. The version in *On Prayer*, then, must have been a deliberate revision. As such, it constitutes a distinct contribution to the discussion of the issue and needs to be analyzed and evaluated in its own right.

One can best grasp the unique approach of Origen's argument in *On Prayer* by comparing it to his earlier version in *On Principles*. There Origen had attempted to show how rational human beings differ from other things that move by locating them in a comprehensive division of everything that moves:

Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in themselves; others are moved only from outside. So the things that are carried, like wood, stones, and every material held together only by its physical state (ἔξῃς), are moved only from outside. . . . Plants and animals, on the other hand, and basically everything that is held together by nature (φύσιν) or soul (ψυχῇ), have the cause of moving in themselves. . . . And of those that have the cause of moving within themselves, some, they claim, move out of themselves (ἐξ ἑαυτῶν)

Origen's relation to the Greek philosophical tradition as a whole, see the pioneering work of Koch and, for a few examples of the recent tendency to emphasize Origen's Christian transformation of Greek philosophy, see Balas, Dillon, and Kannengiesser.

⁴ E.g., by Gould 22; Stough 206, 220–21; Inwood 21–26, 78–82; and Long and Sedley I 313.

⁵ One of the most comprehensive treatments is by Gesell 156–60, who surveys the argument and suggests a Neo-Platonic source, with only a brief allusion to the Neo-Platonic triad of Being, Life, and Thought as a parallel for the three kinds of self-motion. Typical of the treatment of the passage is Trigg 159–60 (cf. 116–17), who considers the argument in *On Prayer* similar to that of *On Principles*, basically a Middle Platonic approach. See also below, note 6.

⁶ Most frequently cited is Origen's claim in *On Prayer* that the characteristic activities of plants, animals, and human beings (viz. growth, impulse, and reasoning) are named motion "out of themselves" (ἐξ ἑαυτῶν), "from themselves" (ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν), and "through themselves" (δι' ἑαυτῶν) respectively; cf., e.g., Stough 221 and n. 34; Inwood 22–24. On the terminology see below, notes 8 and 10.

and others from themselves (ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν)—out of themselves the things without soul (ἄψυχα) [viz. plants] and from themselves the ensouled things (ἔμψυχα), for the ensouled things move when an impression (φαντασία) calls forth an impulse (ὁρμή)... The rational animal, however, in addition to the impression-producing nature also possesses reason (λόγος), which judges the impressions, rejecting some and accepting others, in order that the living thing (ζῷον) may be led in accord with them [viz. the approved impressions]. (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 3–97. 11] = *SVF* 2. 988 [287. 33–88. 10])

After this Origen goes on in some detail regarding the acceptance or rejection of impressions and finally concludes that it is precisely by virtue of this function that rational animals may be said to be responsible for their actions (esp. *De Princ.* 3. 1. 3 [198. 5–11] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 17–22]).⁷

The argument in *On Prayer* begins with exactly the same division:

Of things that move some have their mover outside, such as inanimate things held together by physical disposition (ἔξῃς) alone. (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [311. 16–17] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 37–38])

But instead of continuing the division of *things that move* in the manner of *On Principles*, Origen immediately begins to shift to a different point of view, namely, an enumeration of the different *kinds of motion* that characterize the various categories of things that move. His point of view is signaled from the beginning by the particles μὲν . . . δὲ . . . δὲ; and the shift from a division of *things that move* to an enumeration of *kinds of motion* is further facilitated by the use of the ordinal numerals “second” and “third” in his presentation of the subsequent items. The result is that while the account begins with a division and a discussion of the first category of things that move (viz. things moved from outside [τὰ μὲν τινα τὸ κινεῖν ἔχει ἔξωθεν]), this discussion is presented as if it were a discussion of the first member of a tripartite series, and the division is never mentioned again.

This procedure creates a tactical problem for Origen in his presentation of the rest of the series. The original division separated off things moved from outside, but it left things that move from within as an undifferentiated generic category, including both plants and animals. Origen's next move ought to have been to subdivide this generic category in preparation for an enumeration of its members and their motions. In his eagerness, however, to shift over to an enumeration of motions he overlooks this task and instead says:

The second class (δεύτερα δὲ) of things that move, in addition to these [externally moved objects], are the things that move by the agency of their internal nature or soul (ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης φύσεως ἢ ψυχῆς κινούμενα), which are also said to move “out of

⁷ For full discussion of this text and its relation to Stoicism see Inwood 21–26, 78–81.

them(selves)" (ἐξ αὐτῶν) by those who are more scrupulous in terminology (παρὰ τοῖς κυριώτερον χρωμένοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι). (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 1–3] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 1–3])⁸

Here he denotes the second class of things that move by the still undivided generic category ("things that move by *either* their internal nature *or* their [internal] soul"), to which he then adds a relative clause identifying their motion as "motion out of them(selves) (ἐξ αὐτῶν)"—the motion that is characteristic of things that move specifically by nature and not by soul.⁹ In this way he combines the enumeration of the second member of the series of things that move (although imprecisely described) with an identification of its specific motion.

Finally, having given the proper technical name for the characteristic motion of the second class, he ceases to enumerate the classes and concentrates entirely on the motions themselves:

Third (τρίτη δέ) is the motion in animals which is named "the motion from it(self)" (ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησις); and I believe (οἶμαι) that the motion of rational beings is [called] "motion through them(selves)" (δι' αὐτῶν). (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 3–5] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 3–6])

⁸ I have retained the non-reflexive forms as found in the only extant MS of *On Prayer*, even though the texts of *On Principles* and of Simplicius *In Cat.* (= *SVF* 2. 499) use the reflexive pronouns. The apparent inconsistency has tempted editors to emend the text of *On Prayer* in some or all of the four instances of prepositional phrases. Koetschau eventually decided to emend all four to bring them into line with the text of *On Principles* (cf. Koetschau [1926] 27 n. 1). Such emendation is unnecessary and produces a grammatically inferior text in three of the four instances. In Simplicius and *On Principles* the prepositional phrase modifies the verb and refers back to the subject of the sentence (viz. the things that move). In *On Prayer*, however, in all but one case the prepositional phrase qualifies a noun (κίνησις) and the pronoun refers back to a genitive modifier; hence it cannot be reflexive. In only one instance, where Origen is attempting to combine the second class of things that move with the name of their motion, does the pronoun refer back to the subject of the clause and the sentence, and hence only this one phrase might be expected to contain a reflexive pronoun. Yet even here, if Origen had in mind a list of motions in which the pronouns were non-reflexive (in keeping with standard grammatical practice), he might have retained the non-reflexive form of his source despite a rephrasing that called for a reflexive pronoun. One small additional point in favor of retaining the non-reflexive forms of the manuscript is the fact that when Origen did use the reflexive form in *On Principles* (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 11–97. 1] = *SVF* 2. 988 [287. 41–88. 2]), he used the uncontracted form ἐαυτῶν, removing all ambiguity even in early, unaccented uncial manuscripts. The fact that he uses the short form (αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν) in a discussion of the very same subject in *On Prayer* may indicate that Origen did not intend the term to be construed as a reflexive. It should be noted, moreover, that regardless of the form used in the Greek text, which is determined by the exigencies of Greek grammar, the reference of the pronoun is the same and the meaning is unaffected. Furthermore, in English the reflexive is more indicative of the required meaning than the non-reflexive, even for the nominal form, "motion out of itself."

⁹ Contrast the clarity with which he distinguishes the second and third categories and their motions in *On Principles* 3. 1. 2 (196. 11–97. 1) = *SVF* 2. 988 (287. 41–88. 1).

Thus in three steps Origen shifts completely from a division of *things that move* to an enumeration of *the motions with which they move*.

This procedure is surprising and suggests that Origen did not create this argument from whole cloth, but constructed it by conflating two distinct arguments. One of these, like the argument in *On Principles*, required a classification of things that move on the basis of the source of their motion, i.e., whether their motion originates from outside (as in inanimate things), or from within (specifically from nature in plants, from soul in animals, and from reason in human beings). The other account required a catalog or enumeration of the kinds of motion that characterize the various classes of things that move and designated at least the motions that arise from within by different prepositions with a (reflexive) pronoun, i.e., ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, or δι' ἑαυτοῦ.¹⁰ To meet these two requirements he grafted the list of motions onto the initial division of things that move. The result was a composite theoretical basis for his argument—a division of things that move into things moved from outside and things that move from within, but with the added stipulation that things that move from within may possess as many as three different types of motion: (1) motion *out of* themselves (presumably found in all living plants and animals), (2) motion *from* themselves (animal motion), and (3) motion *through* themselves (rational motion).

To confirm the hypothesis that Origen's argument is really a combination of two separate arguments, we must examine how the argument actually proceeds:

If we remove from the living creature (ζῷον) motion from it(self) (ἀπ' αὐτοῦ), it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried (φέρεται) by someone from outside. If it [the animal] is aware of its own motion (παρακολουθῇ τῇ ἰδίᾳ κινήσει), since it is to this that we have given the name "moving through it(self)" (δι' αὐτοῦ), this [animal] will of necessity be rational. Those people, therefore, who wish nothing to be subject to us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) will necessarily arrive at a most absurd conclusion: first, that we are not animals, and second, that we are not rational, but we might [rather] say that what we believe we [ourselves] are doing we [really] do, as it were, by the agency of an external mover (οἷον ὑπὸ ἑξωθεν κινούντος), in no way ourselves doing the moving (αὐτοὶ οὐδαμῶς κινούμενοι). (*De Orat.* 6. 1–2 [312. 5–14] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 6–13])¹¹

¹⁰ For the sake of clarity and consistency I shall use the reflexive form for both the English phrase and the corresponding Greek phrase, regardless whether the reference is to the text of *On Principles*, which used the reflexive form, or to *On Prayer*, which probably used the non-reflexive form (see above, note 8).

¹¹ Unfortunately, all editions and translations begin a new paragraph in the middle at *De Orat.* 6. 2 (312. 11) = *SVF* 2. 989 (289. 10). This breaks up the argument, which runs

Though Origen's logic may not be immediately clear, it is obvious that he is attempting to prove that determinism leads to not one, but two absurd consequences: (1) we human beings are not living creatures (ζῶα) and (2) we human beings are not rational creatures (λογικά). Working backward from this double conclusion, we see that it is preceded by two conditional sentences. These may now be recognized as supplying the two required major premises for the pair of conclusions, the first stipulating the conditions that constitute denial of our status as animals, the second stipulating the conditions for regarding an animal as rational. Origen's argument thus takes the shape of two parallel syllogisms. In the one, he argues that determinists by claiming that all our actions are done by the agency of an external mover satisfy the condition of the first premise and hence implicitly deny that we are living creatures. In the other, he argues that determinists by this very same claim deny the condition that constitutes rationality as specified in the second premise and therefore also deny that we are rational creatures.

We shall have to clarify these arguments further; but first we must observe that Origen's attack on the determinists consists of two parallel arguments based on two parallel premises, and that one of these arguments depends specifically on the distinction between motion caused by an external mover and motion arising from within, whereas the other depends on a particular concept of rational motion that Origen characterizes as "motion through itself." Hence the course of the argument shows the same pattern of conflation as did the exposition of what we may now construe as its theoretical basis, the classification of things that move and their specific motions. We may, therefore, use this pattern to disentangle the two conflated arguments for further detailed analysis:

THEORETICAL BASIS

Division of Things that Move

Of things that move some have their mover outside, such as inanimate things held together by physical disposition alone, and also things that are moved by nature and soul at times when they are not being moved as

Catalog of Self-Motions

to *De Orat.* 6. 2 (312. 18) = *SVF* 2. 989 (288. 17), and has no doubt contributed to its misunderstanding.

*Division of Things that Move**Catalog of Self-Motions*

such [viz. by nature or soul], but rather in the manner of things held together only by physical disposition. For stones that have been extracted from a mine and wood that has lost its capacity to grow, since these are [now] held together only by physical disposition, have their mover outside. In fact, even the bodies of animals and the foliage of plants when they are transported (μετατιθέμενα) by someone change place (μετατίθεται) not as animals and plants, but in the manner of stones and wood that has lost its capacity to grow. And again, if ever these things move by virtue of the fact that all things disintegrate (ῥευστὰ εἶναι) when they perish, they have the motion that occurs during perishing as an incidental result (παρακολουθητικήν) [viz. of the perishing, and thus as an externally caused motion].

class of things that move, in addition to these [externally moved objects] are the things that move by the agency of their internal nature or soul,

The second

which are also said to move "out of them(selves)" (ἐξ αὐτῶν) by those who are more scrupulous in terminology. Third is the motion in animals, which is named "the motion from it(self)" (ἢ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησις); and I believe that the motion of rational beings is [called] "motion through them (selves)" (δι' αὐτῶν).

ARGUMENTS

*Based on
Division of Things that Move*

If we remove from the living creature motion from itself, it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried by someone from outside.

*Based on
Catalog of Self-Motions*

If it [the animal] is aware of its own motion (παρακολουθῇ τῇ ἰδίᾳ κινήσει), since it is to this that we have given the name "moving through itself," this [animal] will of necessity be rational.

Those people, therefore, who wish nothing to be subject to us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) will necessarily arrive at a most absurd conclusion:

first, that we are not animals,

and second, that we are not rational,

but we might say that what we believe we [ourselves] are doing we [really] do,

as it were, by the agency of an external mover (οἷον ὑπὸ ἑξωθεν κινουντος),

in no way ourselves doing the moving (αὐτοὶ οὐδαμῶς κινούμενοι). Especially after examining his own experience let anyone see if he would not be shameless to [still] claim that he himself does not will, he himself does not eat, he himself does not walk, and, moreover, he himself does not assent and accept some beliefs, and he himself does not reject

others as false. (*De Orat.* 6. 1–2 [311. 16–12. 18] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 37–89. 17])

We shall begin by examining the argument in the left-hand column, the argument that we are not living creatures (ζῷα). This argument is based on the premise:

If we remove from the living creature (ζῷον) motion from it(self) (τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησιν), it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried by someone from outside. (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 5–8] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 5–7])

Origen laid the foundation for this premise in his presentation of the division of things that move at the very beginning. In dividing things into those moved from outside and those moving by nature or soul from within, he made it clear that this division does not entail that things moving from within are *never* moved from outside.¹² Among the things moved from outside he includes things that move by nature and soul (viz. plants and animals) at those times when they are not moving *qua* plants or animals, that is, with the *proper* motion of plants or animals (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [311. 17–24] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 37–44]). Plants, he believes, move as plants when they grow (φύειν, *De Orat.* 6. 1 [311. 19–20, 24–25] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 40–41, 43–44]); animals move as animals when they move by impulse in response to an impression (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 13–97. 1] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 1–2]). However, when a plant dies and loses its ability to grow, as in the case of wood, or when plants or animals are transported by someone or something, they are moved from outside in exactly the same way as inanimate things (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [311. 19–24] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 40–44]). Thus plants and animals are subject to externally caused motion as well as to their own proper internally caused motions.

In the actual statement of the premise Origen goes further and assumes that the various classes of things that move by an internal source also possess varying *numbers* of internally caused motions and that the number of such motions depends on their position in the scale of things that move. What he says is that if we take away (περιέλωμεν) the proper motion of an animal, i.e., motion from itself, it will no longer qualify as an animal, but will “move only by nature like a plant or be carried by someone from outside like a stone” (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 5–8] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 5–7]). This implies that an animal is capable of three kinds of motion, externally

¹² In *On Principles* he adds the word μόνον to say: “Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in themselves, others are moved *only* from outside” (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 3–4] = *SVF* 2. 988 [287. 33–35]). This makes it clear that the other divisions are moved externally as well as by one or more internal sources of motion.

caused motion and two internally caused kinds of motion, motion by nature, such as characterizes plants, and motion from itself, which is the proper motion of animals; but it is only the motion from itself that defines the animal. If this proper defining motion is removed, the animal may no longer be considered an animal. It will still, however, be left with two kinds of motion, the motion of biological growth that is the proper motion of plants, and, of course, externally caused motion, which may happen to anything at all, whether animate or inanimate. Origen's argument, therefore, entails an analysis of things that move as an ordered series in which each member possesses its own proper motion in addition to all the motions of the prior members of the series.

This conception is built into the very structure of the division, which we may abstract from the full account of it in *On Principles*. There we find the first division defined as follows:


Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in themselves; others are moved *only* from outside. (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 3–4] = *SVF* 2. 988 [287. 33–35])

This implies that things that have the cause of their motion in themselves are *also* capable of being moved from outside, an implication that Origen actually spelled out in *On Prayer*. Moreover, when Origen comes to the last division, he says:

The rational animal *in addition to* the impression-producing nature *also* possesses reason. (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 3 [197. 9–10] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 7–9])

He thereby reveals that on his analysis the internal source of motion which characterizes a specific class of things that move occurs in addition to, not in place of, the source that characterized the class from which it is being differentiated. Thus the complete division may be diagrammed as follows:¹³

¹³ I have enclosed "only" and "also" in parentheses where they do not occur in Origen's text, but must be supplied to bring the division into line with the principle of division used for the first and fourth classes. The bracketed descriptions indicate the implied distribution of descriptions that Origen consolidates into a single generic description at the prior level and does not explicitly repeat in the subdivisions of the genus. We might note that this occurs in his attempt to differentiate plants from animals, where he prefers to use the prepositional characterization of the catalog of motions.

Division of Things That Move (On Principles 3. 1. 2-3)

The structure of Origen's division is, in essence, an asymmetrical dichotomy, in which each subdivision *adds* another source of motion and another kind of motion as the defining characteristic of that class, thereby assigning the four classes of things that move to an ordered series, each member of which possesses the motions and sources of motion of all prior members of the series in addition to its own proper motion and source of motion. Specifically, the series consists of four members: (1) inanimate things, (2) plants, (3) animals, and (4) rational creatures. The first member of the series, inanimate things, move only from outside. Plants may also be moved from outside, but their proper motion is one caused by their internal nature and called "motion out of themselves." It is this motion that occurs when they grow and flourish as plants. Animals, too, as the third member of the series, have such motion by nature, enabling them to grow and reproduce in the manner of plants, but their proper motion is the motion from themselves ($\alpha\phi' \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\upsilon$), which Origen in *On Principles* identifies as the motion that arises when an impression calls forth an impulse (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 13-97. 1] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 1-2]). Animals,

therefore, are susceptible of three kinds of motion: (1) externally caused, passive transportation, (2) biological growth (motion out of themselves), and (3) motion by impulse (motion from themselves). Finally, human beings conform to the same pattern. They possess these three forms of motion, as well as a fourth, their own characteristic motion of reason, which in *On Prayer* Origen calls "motion through themselves" (δι' ἑαυτῶν).

It is this conception that forms the logical basis for Origen's first argument in *On Prayer*. Leaving aside the specific motion of rational creatures, he adopts the conception of an animal as possessing three motions, externally caused transportation, biological growth, and motion by impulse (motion from themselves). If we remove the proper motion of the animal, the motion that defines it *qua* animal, it can no longer be regarded as an animal. This, he asserts, is what the determinists do when they claim that all human actions, even those that we believe we do on our own initiative, are done "as it were, by the agency of something outside." For this argument the motion of reason is not relevant; the determinist claim that all human action is caused by an external mover denies even the animal motion by impulse in response to an impression and so "removes motion from itself." By leaving humans without the defining motion of animals, the determinist position entails the absurd consequence that we human beings are not even animals, much less rational animals.¹⁴

This analysis shows clearly the conceptual connections of the argument. Formally the argument is made on the basis of the first step in the division, viz. the division into things moved from without and things that move themselves from within. The minor premise (that determinists claim human beings are moved exclusively from outside) requires only the distinction between things moved from within and things moved from without. This distinction is fully developed in the opening lines of the argument. The major premise, however, is formulated to reflect the full range of superimposed motions to which an animal is subject:

If we remove from the living creature motion from itself, it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be *either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried by someone from outside.* (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 5–8] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 6–8])

¹⁴ The justice of Origen's criticism is a question that cannot be discussed here. Origen's critique seems simply to oppose externally caused motion to motion by impulse without taking any account of the possibility that a determinist might incorporate animal motion into his determinist scheme by claiming that not only the impulse-provoking external impression, but also the internal impulse-generating mechanism was in some way affected by external causes. It may be that Origen says οἷον ὑπὸ ἑξώθεν κινουόντος, "as it were, by an external mover," to include under this looser rubric accounts that determine the internal mechanism. If so, he would seem to be claiming that such accounts give a human being less freedom than an animal.

Though these motions are expressed in terms of the prepositional classification of the catalog, the catalog is not the theoretical ground for the conception of a living creature as possessor of the three concomitant motions. For concomitance, though not incompatible with the classification by prepositions, is neither implied by that classification nor stipulated as an additional condition in Origen's exposition. It is, on the other hand, both a necessary, logical consequence of the asymmetrical dichotomy of the division and explicitly mentioned in the full exposition of that division in *On Principles* and again in the part repeated in *On Prayer*. Thus we can safely say that the first argument against determinism is derived conceptually from the division of things that move, such as is found fully expressed in *On Principles*.

Yet at the same time we have to acknowledge that the conclusion of the first argument in *On Prayer* is unequivocally different from that of the argument of *On Principles*. In *On Principles* Origen made no attempt to defend human responsibility on the basis of the internal origin of motion in living creatures (ζῷα), but staked his entire claim of human responsibility on the capacity of the reason (λόγος) to resist the impulses provoked by impressions of the senses (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 3 [197. 1–98. 11] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 2–22]). That argument is now replaced in *On Prayer* with a new argument that even animals, and presumably some of the animal activities of humans, arise from within and so conflict with the determinist claim that all movement without exception is caused from outside.¹⁵ This clears the way for Origen to use the reason of rational creatures as the basis for a second argument that is not based on the division of things that move. Thus we can see that in constructing the composite argument in *On Prayer*, Origen has carefully introduced part, but only part, of the division on which his argument in *On Principles* was based, and then, on the basis of that part and its assumptions about the structured distribution of motions among the components of the universe, he has created a new argument, one which will not interfere with the completely different argument with which he intends to conflate it. Let us now turn to that second argument.

The second argument is presented in studied rhetorical antithesis to the first within a conventional literary structure, a ring composition centered around the conclusions:

¹⁵ This does not mean that Origen is necessarily attributing full responsibility to animals. In *On Principles* he cites spiders and bees as animals who create artistic, geometrically shaped structures without possession of reason (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [197. 2–9] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 2–7]). The impression that calls forth such creations presumably arises from within them and not entirely from some external source. Origen could take these animals as evidence that even irrational animals are not completely dependent on external causes for all their motions. Yet, as he goes on to show in *On Principles*, they are not morally responsible for their actions.

Major Premise I
 Major Premise II
 Conclusion I
 Conclusion II
 Minor Premise I
 Minor Premise II

Within this structure Origen expresses both arguments in the same grammatical form. The major premises are introduced in the form of a pair of conditional sentences (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 5–10] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 5–9]). Then the conclusion is expressed in the middle of the discussion in a single sentence with the determinists' consequences in numbered, coordinate indirect statements: first, that we are not living creatures, and second, that we are not rational beings (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 11–13] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 10–11]). Finally, the minor premises are added in the form of parallel phrases in an indirect discourse statement of the determinists' allegations: "moving, as it were, by an external mover, not by ourselves" (*De Orat.* 6. 2 [312. 13–14] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 12–13]). The parallel grammatical forms, however, embody formally antithetical premises. Whereas the major premise of the first argument draws a *negative* conclusion ("it is *not* an animal") from a *denial* of the necessary defining characteristic, the major premise of the second argument draws a *positive* conclusion ("it is rational") from the *affirmation* of the defining characteristic of this class. In the minor premises the determinists are claimed to *affirm* a source of human motion incompatible with the definition of animals, while simultaneously *denying* the kind of motion that defines rational beings. Thus Origen claims that the determinists satisfy the condition of the major premise in the first argument and so affirm its negative conclusion, whereas they fail to satisfy the condition of the major premise in the second and so deny its positive conclusion. In the end the two antithetical syllogisms converge; the affirmation of the negative conclusion of Major Premise I and the denial of the positive conclusion of Major Premise II yield the two parallel negative conclusions: We are not animals and we are not rational. This intricate antithesis clearly reveals the care with which Origen constructed the argument, as well as the importance he attached to the conflation of the two arguments. It also indicates that the remodeling of the argument from *On Principles* and the addition of the second argument was not a casual variation, but a deliberate attempt to accentuate it by antithesis and to produce a climactic focus on its central concept, namely, the rational motion of human beings.

Origen's second argument depends on the crucial claim that "being aware of" or "understanding" (παρακολουθῆ) one's own motion is the proper motion or defining characteristic of rational human beings.¹⁶ This

¹⁶ Most modern translators and interpretators, including Gesell 157–60 in his detailed analysis of the passage, have missed this technical sense of παρακολουθῆ, which was

claim he derives explicitly from the catalog of motions. In his statement of the major premise he justifies the inference from awareness to rationality with the explanation that it was such "awareness" to which he had given the name "moving through oneself" (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 8–10] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 7–9]). He had not, of course, explicitly used the term in his catalog of self-motions; but he is obviously claiming that "awareness" is the particular motion that he had in mind when he said that the motion of rational creatures is called "motion through oneself" (*De Orat.* 6. 1 [312. 5] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 5–6]). Thus he intends us to see "understanding" as the motion that specifically characterizes rational beings and differentiates them from the living things (ζῷα) that move only by impulse "from themselves" (ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν). Origen's argument, then, is that his definition of rationality is grounded in the order of nature and can be used as unimpeachable evidence of rationality.

His next step is to claim that the determinists deny that human beings possess this characteristic. This he does by spelling out the implications of the determinists' claim that he used for his first argument, i.e., that all human action is caused by an external mover, as it were. If one follows the determinists, one ought to say "that everything we *think* we do, we really do, as it were, by an external cause, *we ourselves in no way causing the motion*" (αὐτοὶ οὐδαμῶς κινούμενοι, *De Orat.* 6. 2 [312. 13–14] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 12–13]). The argumentative significance of these last words is clarified and emphasized by the subsequent sentence:

Let anyone examine his own experience and see if he would not be shameless to continue to claim that *he himself* does not will (μὴ αὐτὸς θέλειν), *he himself* does not eat, *he himself* does not walk, and, moreover, *he himself* does not assent and accept some beliefs, and *he himself* does not reject others as false. (*De Orat.* 6. 2 [312. 14–18] = *SVF* 2. 989 [288. 13–17])¹⁷

Origen wants his readers to realize that the determinists by their claim that all human actions are externally caused deny that *we ourselves* do any of these things. Origen had just established that the unimpeachable mark of rationality was "being aware of our own motion," which entails being able to distinguish what is our own action from what is imposed on us from without. The determinists, he now claims, effectively deny that we can do that. They say that what we *think* we are doing by ourselves we are doing under compulsion, as if by an outside agent, and that we are, in fact, deceived and unable to recognize our own actions. By this claim they deny παρακολούθησις and hence our rationality.

current in the second and third centuries A.D., wrongly interpreting the term simply as "follows." This interpretation makes the argument unintelligible. Inwood 22 translates correctly, but does not discuss the argument.

¹⁷ The sentence as a whole is given emphasis by the introductory words: ἄλλως τε καί.

Origen's argument is now formally complete. Animals that are aware of their own motions are rational. The determinists refuse to acknowledge this awareness. Therefore, they ask us to believe that we are not rational. But rhetorically Origen still holds his trump card. What the determinists refuse to acknowledge is something that can be verified by intuitive introspection. Anyone can examine his own experience and determine for himself whether his action is freely chosen or not. By conceiving the naturally ordained distinguishing feature of rational humanity as the ability to recognize and reflect on one's own actions Origen gives everyone access to irrefutable evidence of human freedom.¹⁸ This is no doubt why he can call what the determinists ask us to believe "something extremely foolish" (ἡλιθιώτατόν τι, *De Orat.* 6. 2 [312. 11–12] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 10]); anyone can refute it by simple introspection.

This second argument in *On Prayer* is distinctly different from the argument of *On Principles*. Its only explicit point of contact with *On Principles* is the almost parenthetical remark there that the difference between soulless self-movers (plants) and ensouled self-movers (animals) is their kind of motion: The self-motion of plants is "out of themselves" (ἐξ ἑαυτῶν), whereas the self-motion of animals is "from themselves" (ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν, *De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 11–97. 1] = *SVF* 2. 988 [287. 41–88. 2]). Thus we can hardly see the second argument as an extrapolation of the argument of *On Principles*. We must look elsewhere for its conceptual connections.

Our search quickly takes us back to the Stoa. Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* tells us that the Stoics differentiated as "different kinds" (διαφορὰς γενῶν) (1) "moving out of oneself" (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι), (2) "activating motion through oneself" (δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν), and (3) "acting from oneself" (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, *SVF* 2. 499). From this account the Stoic origin of the theoretical foundation of Origen's second argument can readily be established.¹⁹

Moreover, the conception of rational activity on which the entire argument is based, namely, self-understanding (παρακολούθησις), was adopted by the Stoics in the second century A.D. as the essential

¹⁸ He picks up this point in his next argument, where he claims there are beliefs that one cannot accept regardless of the number of persuasive arguments given in their favor (*De Orat.* 6. 2 [312. 18–20] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 17–18]). If the determinists were right that all human choices are determined by external causes, any belief presented with a plausible argument would win assent. If some person can resist assent to even a single belief, that rejection *eo ipso* constitutes an empirical refutation of the determinist claim. Thus Origen has not only intuition, but objective empirical evidence in his support.

¹⁹ On this text and its relation to Origen see Inwood 23–24 and Long and Sedley II 310. Simplicius' characterization of the three Stoic motions, however, does not agree with what we read in Origen. This has led Inwood, followed by Long and Sedley, to suspect contamination with Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic notions; but it is also possible to explain the discrepancies as due to a misleading and selective abridgement of a longer Stoic exposition. A full analysis of this text, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

characteristic of rational human beings. Both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius used παρακολούθησις to denote the term for the capacity that differentiates a rational human being from an animal.²⁰ As such it had a variety of connotations. In Epictetus these included understanding the meaning of words, following the course of an argument, comprehending the divine order that governs the universe and events in it, and, most relevantly, understanding how to use external impressions so as to act morally in harmony with the divine order and not merely to react mechanically as animals do.²¹ Thus it included not only evaluation of the impressions that call forth action, but also evaluation of the evaluative process itself and of the resulting actions in terms of their relation to the causal and moral order of the universe. It was this second-order evaluation that constituted awareness and understanding of the grounds of our own actions and that formed the basis for the use of intuitive introspection in philosophical investigation. Epictetus himself applied such introspection to the recognition of one's own moral progress and so used it, for example, of a student of philosophy who, he believed, should have been able to "understand himself," specifically, that in learning philosophy he was rejecting bad opinions and adopting new (*scil.* and better) ones, and was thereby changing his position from one in which his choices were morally indifferent to one in which he could make correct moral choices (*Diss.* 3. 5. 4).²²

But it is not only Epictetus' concept of παρακολούθησις as a mark of rationality that parallels Origen's second argument; the role of intuition entailed by that concept was also explicitly used by Epictetus as the basis for his own proof of free will. Though, in general, Epictetus simply assumed that human beings are capable of freely choosing their pursuits and actions, on several occasions he offered an actual argument (*Diss.* 1. 17. 21–28; 4. 1. 68–72, 99–100). His argument is strikingly similar to Origen's second argument in both form and content, here quoted from *Diss.* 1. 17:²³

²⁰ E.g., Epict. *Diss.* 1. 6. 1–22, esp. 12–15; 1. 28. 19–20; 2. 10. 3 (cf. 2. 14. 14–17); Marc. Ant. 3. 1; 6. 42. Cf. Bonhoeffer 74–76; Long (1971) 189–92; Long (1982) 49–53.

²¹ Understanding the meaning of words: *Diss.* 2. 14. 14–17; 2. 17. 6; following a speech, argument, or demonstration: *Diss.* 1. 5. 5; 1. 7. 11, 33; 1. 14. 11; 1. 26. 13–14; 1. 29. 26; 2. 24. 13, 19; 3. 23. 26; comprehending the divine order: 1. 9. 4; 2. 10. 3, 4; 2. 16. 33; 4. 7. 7, and specifically the will of nature (βούλημα τῆς φύσεως), 1. 17. 14–15 (cf. 18); 3. 20. 13; comprehending events (γινόμενα): 1. 6. 13; understanding the use of impressions: 1. 6. 13, 17, 18 (cf. 21); 2. 6. 6, 8; 4. 7. 32; understanding the moral implications of actions: 1. 6. 15; 1. 28. 20; 2. 26. 3; 3. 5. 4–5 (cf. 3. 24. 110; 4. 7. 7); recognizing one's actions as constituting resistance to the divine order: 3. 1. 29; 3. 10. 6 (cf. 3. 24. 110).

²² He also attributed to Socrates the sentiment that just as someone else derives joy from improving his farm or his horse, he himself derives joy from being aware of himself becoming better (παρακολουθῶν ἐμαντῷ βελτίονι γινομένῳ, 3. 5. 14).

²³ Though the argument in both discourses is logically the same and verbally similar, the context is different. In *Diss.* 4. 1. 68–75 it occurs in a dialogue on freedom and is

Therefore, I go to this interpreter and diviner (ἐξηγητὴν . . . καὶ θύτην) and say: "Examine the entrails for me and tell me what they signify (σημαίνεται) for me." He takes them and spreads them out and then interprets as follows: "Oh, man, you have choice (προαίρεσιν) by nature without hindrance and constraint. This is what is written here in the entrails. I will show this to you first in the area of assent. Can anyone prevent you from approving truth? Indeed, no one can! Can anyone force you to accept the false? Certainly not! Do you see that in this area you have the capacity to choose free of hindrance, necessity, and obstruction? What about the area of desire and impulse? Is that any different? What can overpower an impulse except another impulse and what can overpower desire or aversion except another desire or aversion? Someone might object: 'If someone threatens me with death, he compels me.' No, not the threat; the fact that it seems better to you to do that sort of thing rather than to die. So your own belief (δόγμα) has compelled you. That is, one choice has compelled the other. For if God had so constituted (κατεσκευάκει) that part which he took from himself and gave to you in such a way that it could be hindered or constrained either by himself or by someone else, he would no longer be God, nor would he be caring for us as he ought. These are the things I find in the sacrifice," he says. "These signs are given to you. If you *will* (θέλης), you are free. If you *will* (θέλης), you will have no one to blame, no one to accuse. Everything will be in accord with what is at the same time your will (γνώμην) and also God's." (*Diss.* 1. 17. 21–28)

This argument was presented by Epictetus in an imaginative metaphorical setting within a discourse (*Diss.* 1. 17) devoted to the study of the reason (λόγος). In this discourse Epictetus discussed the mental faculty that is capable of undertaking such a study, its philosophical value, and finally its goal or end.²⁴ At the very end of this discourse he depicts the

given as proof that his partner in the dialogue has something "on [his] own authority, which is subject to him alone" (αὐτεξούσιον, δ' ἐπὶ μόνῳ ἐστί σοι, *Diss.* 4. 1. 68). In *Diss.* 1. 17 it stands as the culmination of a discussion about reason (λόγος), which, he claims, yields the recognition that "you have a choice that is by nature free of hindrance and constraint" (προαίρεσιν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον, *Diss.* 1. 17. 29). Here it is claimed to be the outcome of an investigation of the reason, and is presented in a striking metaphorical mode that clarifies its epistemological basis. Since this shorter, but more suggestive, version reveals more clearly its similarity to Origen's argument, it is this version that I shall quote and examine.

²⁴ In *Diss.* 1. 17 Epictetus makes the following claims about reason, all in compressed dialogue form: (1) the reason (λόγος) studies itself (1. 17. 1–3); (2) the study of reason (λόγος), typically called "logic" (λογικά), is important because reason is the agent of understanding (ἐπισκεπτικά, δι' οὗ τὰλλα καταμανθάνεται) and the standard of judging (διακριτικά, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων κριτήριον) everything else (1. 17. 4–12); (3) its end in general terms is to understand the will or plan of nature (νοῆσαι, παρακολουθεῖν, or καταμαθεῖν τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως, 1. 17. 13–19); finally (4) the specific result of this study is the recognition that "You have a choice that is by nature free of hindrance and

concrete result of the study of the reason in the form of an elaborate metaphor, in which the philosopher is portrayed as an interpreter and diviner (ἐξηγητὴν καὶ θύτην), reading or interpreting God's will from the entrails (σπλάγχνα) of a sacrificial victim. The organs used by the diviner metaphorically represent the different psychological functions of the reason that the philosopher *qua* diviner uses as empirical evidence for his conclusions. So the philosopher looks first at the area of assent (ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαθητικοῦ τόπου) and then at the area of desire and impulse (ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ). From these "organs" of the human mind he "shows" (δείξω) the "prophecy" (μαντεῖαν): "You have a choice (προαίρεσιν) that is by nature free of hindrance and constraint. . . If you will (θέλῃς), you are free. You will have no one to blame, no one to accuse."

This is clearly an argument for human freedom and responsibility, but it is an argument that uses a metaphorical mode of presentation to lay its theoretical foundation. Epictetus' metaphorical description of the process by which the philosopher infers human freedom is that of a diviner reading God's plan from the sacred offerings (ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς), i.e., from the natural condition of the human intellect.²⁵ By this he makes it clear that he regards the argument as drawing its conclusions directly from the divinely ordained structure of the universe in accord with which human beings are endowed with the unique capacity to choose their beliefs, desires, and impulses.²⁶ Even though this metaphorical proof of freedom makes no reference to these psychic "motions" as members of a comprehensive, naturally ordered set of self-motions, as Origen did in his argument, it appeals through its imagery of divination to a divinely ordained, intellectually comprehensible natural structure as the basis for its validity.

But the similarity to Origen's argument is found not only in its theoretical basis. What is equally significant is the close similarity of its logical structure and content. Epictetus looks for evidence of freedom first in assent (ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαθητικοῦ τόπου) and in approving (ἐπινεῦσαι) the true, while not accepting (παραδέξασθαι) the false. Then he looks for evidence of freedom in desire and impulse (ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ). Finally, he describes both areas generically as "willing" (θέλῃς). Origen looks in precisely the same areas, but surveyed in reverse

constraint" (προαίρεσιν ἔχεις ἀκάλυτον φύσει καὶ ἀνάγκαστον, 1. 17. 20-29). Cf. also 1. 1. 4 for another statement of the conception of reason studying itself.

²⁵ Epictetus calls the empirical evidence for the inference "holy things" (ἱεροῖς, 1. 17. 28), a significantly ambiguous term. On the metaphorical level it denotes the parts of the sacrificial victim, which by virtue of their dedication to God have become sacred. On the philosophical level, it refers to the psychological functions of assent, desire, and impulse, which in human beings become sacred by virtue of their service to the divine part of man, the reason.

²⁶ For Epictetus' conception of human reason as diviner, reading the signs in nature, see *Diss.* 2. 7.

order. He begins with the generic activity of willing (θέλειν), then enumerates two examples of action resulting from impulse, *scil.* eating and walking, and finally looks for evidence of freedom in assenting to (συγκατατίθεσθαι) and accepting (παραδέχεσθαι) some doctrines, while disapproving (ἀνανεύειν) others as false (*De Orat.* 6. 2 [312. 15–18] = *SVF* 2. 989 [289. 14–17]). Significantly, even Origen's vocabulary echoes the argument of Epictetus.

Finally, Epictetus finds the conclusive evidence for freedom of choice in the presumably self-evident observation or intuition that there is no one who can prevent a person from assenting to the truth or who can force him to accept the false. He makes this point dramatically through the use of rhetorical questions and emphatic answers. It also underlies his reply to the objector who claims that a threat of death is an example of external compulsion to perform some undesirable act. Epictetus' "diviner" rebuts this objection, not by discursive argument, but by asking his opponent simply to reflect: What can overcome a desire or aversion except another desire or aversion? A threat of death is merely an occasion in which one is confronted with two aversions: an aversion to dying and an aversion to performing an undesirable act. As in any freely chosen act, action in these circumstances arises from a decision or belief (δόγμα). From this intuitive reflection on the process of assenting to beliefs and choosing actions, Epictetus concludes that human choice is completely free and not even God himself, who constituted human beings the way they are, can hinder or compel human action. The similarities between Epictetus' argument and Origen's are so strong as to leave little doubt that Origen derived the essential features of his second argument from the same sources as those from which Epictetus derived his own philosophy. Combined with the testimony of Simplicius regarding the Stoic origin of the three prepositional classifications of self-motion, these similarities force us to conclude that Origen's entire argument emanates from a Stoic source.

These parallels with Stoic doctrine bring into even sharper focus the essential difference between Origen's two arguments and suggest a plausible reason why Origen modified his lengthy and elaborate argument of *On Principles* for his subsequent treatise *On Prayer*. Though in both works Origen relies primarily on the rational capacity of human beings to justify his claims of human freedom and responsibility, his conception of the rational capacity differs significantly.²⁷ In *On Principles* the function of the reason (λόγος) is to evaluate impressions (φαντασίαι) and to decide whether to assent to an impression or not. An assent results in an impulse

²⁷ I say he relies *primarily* on the rational capacity because *On Prayer* also contains an argument (which I have discussed above as the first argument) that does not make use of the rational capacity, but links responsibility to the animal soul. In the overall strategy of the argument, however, it plays a relatively minor role and could not, in itself, have been the basis for Origen's revision.

to action. The essential difference between an animal and a human being is the fact that animals respond automatically and invariably to whatever impression arises in accord with their particular nature. A human being, however, does not respond automatically, but may choose to reject an impression and so refrain from acting. It is in this capacity to resist an impression that a person's moral responsibility lies. In *On Prayer*, in contrast, the function of the reason (here called "awareness" or "understanding" [παράκολουθῆ]) is to reflect on one's action; and it is this ability to reflect on one's actions that enables a person to examine his decisions and to recognize his independence and freedom from compulsion.

This difference in conception was, no doubt, a decisive factor in Origen's choice of arguments for each context. When Origen defended free will in *On Principles*, he did so for the express purpose of justifying God's judgment of sinners. He could not do this without defending a sinner's moral responsibility for his actions (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 1 [195. 4–96. 2], not in *SVF*). The argument he brings in *On Principles* was admirably suited to that purpose. There the defining characteristic of a human being was the reason whose function is to evaluate every impression and to decide whether to approve or reject it. This approval or rejection determines whether a person will act upon an impression or not. The foundation of moral responsibility in an ability to resist the lure of an impression made an ideal basis for justifying God's judgment of sinners, because it could be applied directly to the avoidance of sin. In fact, one of the illustrations that Origen used was that of a Christian monk confronted with an attractive woman (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 4 [199. 1–11] = *SVF* 2. 988 [288. 26–35]). The impression of the woman calls him to sinful action but, as a rational being, he is capable of resisting this temptation and hence he is responsible for the consequences of whatever decision he makes.

In *On Prayer* Origen was faced with a different challenge. He had to defend the value of prayer against the charge that prayer is useless on the grounds that all things happen by God's will and nothing that God determines can be changed (*De Orat.* 5. 3–6).²⁸ It was against this claim of comprehensive divine predestination that Origen directed his anti-determinist argument. In a defense of the value of prayer for affecting the course of events the argument used in *On Principles* would have been of less value. The ability to resist an impulse to inappropriate or immoral action may have been sufficient to justify moral responsibility for actions, but it possessed less efficacy for justifying a person's ability to determine his own

²⁸ Origen also had to defend against the charge that God's foreknowledge makes prayer unnecessary (6. 3–5). Against this charge he argues that God does indeed foreknow the actions people will undertake by their free will, including their prayers; but he arranges the consequences to correspond to their freely chosen actions, so that prayers are, in fact, answered. The argument for free will thus serves as a foundation for his defense against this charge as well.

destiny through prayer. For that Origen needed to establish not merely moral responsibility, but causal responsibility as well, and, what is more, a causal responsibility that is not only reactive (able to block immoral influences), but capable of initiating independent action as well.

The Stoic conception of παρακολούθησις did just that. For Epictetus, it served, like the reason in Origen's *On Principles*, to evaluate individual impressions that call forth action, but it also included the additional function of understanding the process as a whole, as well as the entire working out of divine providence in the universe (*Diss.* 1. 6. 12–22). Moreover, it included reasoning out the implications of the divine order and bringing one's own life into harmony with it (*Diss.* 1. 6. 12–22; 2. 8. 1–8; 2. 10. 1–6). This ability not only differentiated humans from animals, but also set them over the irrational animals as leaders (προηγούμενα) or masters.²⁹ With their understanding of the divine order and with their position as masters of all the lower orders of nature, rational human beings are in a position, not merely to comply with the order of nature, but even to take positive action to promote it (cf., e.g., *Diss.* 2. 10. 5–6). It is not hard to imagine why such a conception of the human mind would have seemed to offer a better basis for the kind of autonomy that Origen needed to oppose rigid divine predestination and to justify the efficacy of prayer.

If, however, this broad conception of mind made a better basis for justifying the efficacy of prayer than did the narrower conception of it as a mechanism of accepting or rejecting impressions, we are still left with the question why in *On Prayer* Origen did not completely ignore the argument that he had used in *On Principles*. Why did he jeopardize the unity and clarity of his presentation by conflating an argument based on the broad conception of mind as awareness or understanding with the first phase of the division that served to ground his argument in *On Principles*? Once again the Stoic conception as exemplified in Epictetus suggests an explanation. The conception of mind as παρακολούθησις, which raises human beings above animals and the rest of the component parts of the universe and gives them an element of control over their destiny in the universe, puts human beings on the same level as God. In fact, in the Stoic view human beings carry a "fragment of God" (ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ) around within themselves in the guise of their minds.³⁰ This, as we have seen, was Epictetus' primary basis for claiming that human choice is totally free and unhindered (*Diss.* 1. 17. 27; cf. 1. 1. 10–12). If God had not constituted human beings with total freedom from manipulation by himself or anyone else, he would not be God or he would not be caring for us as he ought. In

²⁹ The role as master is brought out in Epictetus' characterization of animals as servants (ὑπηρετικά, *Diss.* 2. 8. 6; 2. 10. 3). He also uses the verb ὑπετέτακτο of animals to denote the correlate of προηγούμενα (*Diss.* 2. 8. 8).

³⁰ E.g., *Diss.* 1. 1. 10–12; 1. 14. 1–10; 1. 17. 27; 2. 8. 1–14; cf. 1. 9. 1–6. On this Stoic doctrine see Bonhoeffer 76–80 and Rist 262–68.

reality, Epictetus claimed, whatever human beings choose by will, will actually occur in accord with a will that is their own and God's will at the same time (*Diss.* 1. 17. 27–28). Human beings, in effect, participate with God in the governance of the universe.

Such a close connection between human beings and God could not have been unwelcome to Origen when he was attempting to justify the possibility and importance of human communication with God through prayer, but it did suggest at least one unacceptable consequence. If whatever human beings will is actually in accord with God's will, then God is also in some sense responsible for sin and wrongdoing in human beings. Origen could not allow God to participate in human decisions to sin.³¹ One way to ensure this was to eliminate the Stoic conception of the human reason as a "fragment of God" within. This Origen could do only at the risk of leaving his argument bereft of its strongest basis for claiming human autonomy. To compensate for this loss Origen built his second argument on the ontological foundation of the first—the natural order of the universe. This he could construe as the product of God's creative activity, thereby grounding the existence and autonomy of the human mind, without making God personally responsible for human action, specifically, human failures and sins.

An analysis of Origen's arguments for free will shows that Origen was familiar with a variety of Stoic arguments in support of human responsibility.³² It also shows that he did not simply take over Stoic arguments indiscriminately, but was sensitive to the philosophical nuances of the arguments and selected from among them such as could support his

³¹ In *On Prayer* Origen deals with this problem in connection with the petition of the Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation" (*De Orat.* 19. 11). He resolves it by appealing to free will (*De Orat.* 19. 13). For an account of Origen's own conception of the mind and its relation to God, its creator, see Crouzel 36–50, esp. 47, and O'Laughlin. Cf. Butterworth xxxiii and Jay 66–67.

³² Whether he knew them directly from Stoic sources or received them through Middle or Neo-Platonic sources is difficult to ascertain. Origen certainly had read Chrysippus (e.g., *C. Cels.* 1. 64, 2. 12, 4. 48, 4. 63, 5. 57, 8. 51) and other early Stoics and knew of and admired Epictetus (e.g., *C. Cels.* 3. 54, 6. 2, 7. 53); see also Chadwick; Jackson 20; and Inwood 281 n. 186. The division of things that move, however, is attested only in Origen's proof in *On Principles* and in a differently structured version in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 2. 20 = *SVF* 2. 714). Another related division, but of things that are, rather than of things that move, is found in Philo of Alexandria (*Quis rer. div. her.* 137–39) and in Seneca (*Ep.* 58. 14). The preponderance of references to the division in Alexandrian Jewish and Christian writers could suggest transmission via Alexandrian Platonism. Similarly the fact that the prepositional classification of self-motions is otherwise attested only in the Neo-Platonist Simplicius, and that in the context of a discussion of Neo-Platonic conceptions of motion, points in the same direction; but we must also consider that neither Origen's division nor his catalog is paralleled exactly by any other text. At the very least, we have to assume a fluid tradition in which these conceptions were transmitted; and the possibility of direct influence of Stoic texts at different stages must be kept open.

own theological objectives most effectively without importing any conceptions incompatible with his theological presuppositions. In the case of *On Prayer* this meant adapting and combining elements from two different arguments to create a rhetorically effective double argument in support of human autonomy and freedom. Origen thereby proved himself to have been a philosophically astute, creative adapter of Stoic philosophy to Christian theology.

At the same time an analysis of his adaptation of Stoic arguments discloses at least one argument, based on a prepositional classification of motions and a self-reflective conception of mind, that is distinctly different from the Stoic arguments for human responsibility attested by Cicero, Aulus Gellius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias.³³ This argument sheds new light on the Stoic treatment of the issue of human responsibility. Its appearance in the repertory of Stoic arguments suggests that the Stoics did not limit themselves to the approach established by Chrysippus, but went beyond him to explore new ways of attacking the problem. If that is the case, the history of the Stoic treatment of this important philosophical topic and the role of the Stoa in the larger history of the subject may have to be reexamined.

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³³ These are conveniently collected in *SVF* 2. 974–1007 and in Long and Sedley I 386–91; II 382–88. For a discussion of Chrysippus' defense of human responsibility and the general Stoic treatment of the subject see Long (1971), van Straaten, Long and Sedley I 333–55, 386–94, with further bibliography at II 505.

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Seneca and the Schools of Philosophy in Early Imperial Rome

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Seneca the Younger, as author of the philosophical *Epistles*, *Dialogues*, and the *De Clementia*, takes a place in treatments of the so-called "diatribe tradition"¹ which trace the path of this somewhat nebulous phenomenon from its origins in Bion.² In so much as Seneca's philosophical works are characteristically paraenetic—favoring ethical philosophy over the other types and couched in impassioned and persuasive language—they are no doubt rightfully included therein.³ However, as scholars have pointed out, it is doubtful whether Seneca had first-hand knowledge of the fourth-century diatribists.⁴ Such knowledge as he had of them could rather have been derived from the *florilegia* of their sayings which were in common circulation,⁵ or through the philosophers of the Old and Middle Stoa.⁶ I

¹ E.g., R. Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments* 13 (Göttingen 1910) 7; H. Weber, *De Senecae philosophi dicendi genere Bioneo* (diss. Marburg 1895); A. Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne 1926) 252 ff.

² Diatribe is defined by M. T. Griffin, *Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics* (Oxford 1976) 13, as "a popular philosophical discourse invented by Bion the Borysthenite, devoted usually to a single moral theme and aimed at a wider circle than school philosophy, being loose in structure and characterized by a pointed style, vivid imagery, and colloquialisms." The problems associated with the concept of "diatribe" as used by modern scholars are discussed by H. D. Jocelyn, "Diatribes and Sermons," *LCM* 7 (1982) 3-7.

³ Cf. e.g., Oltramare (above, note 1) 13, on diatribe: "Le lecteur est sans cesse harcelé par un maître qui semble avoir pris à tâche de le persuader immédiatement et lui parle le langage le plus propre à le séduire."

⁴ Griffin (above, note 2) 14 n. 3, takes a very conclusive stance on this: "Seneca can certainly not be said to have been influenced directly by Bion or Teles." J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary*, *Studia Graeca Upsaliensia* 11 (Uppsala 1976) 86 f., concludes more tentatively that "both Plutarch and Seneca had some knowledge of the actual work of Bion and that they were not drawing exclusively on a collection of extracts. This is made even more plausible by the fact that they were both widely read."

⁵ Seneca himself complains bitterly about adults whose sole claim to the title of philosopher resides in *sententiae* and *chreiai* memorized at school (*Ep.* 33. 7 f.). Diogenes the Cynic often served as a source of *apophthegmata* for school use; cf. S. F. Bonner, *Education in ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley 1977)

would suggest, however, that for the *immediate* source of the defining characteristics of Seneca's philosophical style and interests, we need look no further than Seneca's immediate surroundings. That is to say, the qualities of his work which attract definition as "diatribe" can be attributed more directly to the influences of contemporary philosophers at Rome.

Seneca regarded himself as a Stoic, of course, receiving instruction in his youth in that philosophy from Attalus, whose teaching he enthusiastically describes.⁷ Another teacher of his early years was Papirius Fabianus. Seneca likely heard Fabianus in his capacity as a declaimer as well as instructor in philosophy, for his involvement with the rhetorical schools and parts of his declamations have been recorded by Seneca's father, Seneca the Elder.⁸ As a philosopher, Fabianus regarded himself as a member of the so-called "Sextian" school of philosophy,⁹ founded by Sextius a generation earlier. Seneca, however, for good reason, as I shall show, saw little to distinguish the Sextians from the Stoics.¹⁰ Seneca also attended the lectures of another Sextian, Sotion, who was influential in Seneca's life, but about whom we know relatively little.¹¹ Finally, Seneca was also to come into contact with Cynic philosophy in the person of Demetrius, and although this meeting occurred later in life, when Seneca was no longer an impressionable youth, he writes of Demetrius' teachings with as much enthusiasm as he shows for those of the Stoic Attalus and the Sextian Fabianus.¹²

From allusions in Seneca's prose-works to the teaching of Attalus, Sextius, Fabianus, Sotion, and Demetrius we are able to form a picture of these three philosophical schools—Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic—as they were in early Imperial Rome. What emerges, I believe, is this: that the teaching

173 ff. and G. von Wartensleben, *Begriff der griechischen Chreia und Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer Form* (Heidelberg 1901) 28 ff.

⁶ Ariston of Chios, described by O. Hense, "Ariston bei Plutarch," *RhM* (1890) 541, as "kynisch gefärbter Stoiker," appears to have been a Stoic source of Cynic imagery for Seneca; cf. my Ph.D. thesis, *The Imagery of Morality in Seneca's Prose-Works* (McMaster University 1985) 224 f. and n. 15, p. 230.

⁷ *Ep.* 108. 3 ff.

⁸ Cf. *Contr.* 2 praef. 1–5; 2. 1. 10–13, 25–26, 28; 2. 2. 4; 2. 3. 5, 9, 12; 2. 4. 3, 7, 10–11; 2. 5. 6–7, 18–19; 2. 6. 2, 4; *Suas.* 1. 4, 9–10.

⁹ Seneca the Elder, *Contr.* 2 praef. 4; Suetonius, *Gram.* 18; Quintilian 10. 1. 124.

¹⁰ *Ep.* 64. 2: "Lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid mihi credis, viri, et licet neget Stoici."

¹¹ There are several philosophers known by the name of Sotion; cf. *Der kleine Pauly*, s.v. Oltramare (above, note 1) 166 contests the usual view (e.g. E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, trans. S. F. Alleyne and E. Abbott [New York 1886] 286; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*⁴ [Göttingen 1970] 280; Griffin [above, note 2] 37) that this Sotion was a follower of Sextius.

¹² Cf. Oltramare (above, note 1) 232 n. 2: "son influence ne se manifeste que sur les écrits de Sénèque postérieurs à la retraite politique du philosophe." For the dating of Demetrius, cf. M. Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen populärphilosophie*, *Philosophia antiqua* 36 (Leiden 1979) 10.

style and concerns of these three schools were strikingly similar, in so far as they shared the elements of paraenesis, which, as I have said, typify Seneca's own philosophical prose-works. Chief among these elements is a predominating concern with ethical, rather than speculative, philosophy, presented in an eloquent and persuasive style. Cerebral speculation gives way to the voice of certainty in a direct exhortation to the soul, rendered vivid and meaningful to the audience by images or analogies¹³ drawn from everyday experience. In short, the elements of paraenesis are threefold: ethics, eloquence, and illustrative imagery.

In many passages of the prose-works, Seneca makes clear his contempt for the kind of philosophizing in which semantic casuistry takes precedence over a compelling presentation of the moral issues which face mankind.¹⁴ Such an order of priorities, he feels, is comparable to stopping to look over a game of chess when one's house is burning down or lingering to peruse notices of edicts and games on the way to summon a midwife for one's daughter (*Ep.* 117. 30):

Transcurramus sollertissimas nugas et ad illa quae nobis aliquam opem sunt latura properemus. nemo qui obstetricem parturienti filiae sollicitus accersit edictum et ludorum ordinem perlegit; nemo qui ad incendium domus suae currit tabulam latrunculariam prospicit ut sciat quomodo alligatus exeat calculus.

In contrast to Seneca's criticism of those who indulge in such *cavillationes*¹⁵ is his enthusiastic endorsement of the approach of his own teachers. Fabianus, for example, he tells us, used to say "contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum, nec minutis vulneribus sed incursu avertendam aciem; [non probat cavillationes] <vitia> enim contundi debere,

¹³ Henceforth I use the terms "image" and "imagery" to include all types of technically distinct figurative language, e.g., metaphor, simile, analogy.

¹⁴ E.g., *Ep.* 45. 4 ff., 48. 4 ff., 49. 5 ff., 71. 6, 82. 8 ff., 83. 8 ff., 85. 1 ff., 88. 42 ff., 102. 20, 108. 12, 109. 17 f., 111, 113, 117. 25 ff.

¹⁵ Among the ranks of those who indulge in such *cavillationes* Seneca places Stoics of the Old and Middle Stoa: Zeno (*Ep.* 82. 9 ff., 83. 9 ff.), Chrysippus (*Ben.* 1. 3. 8 ff.), Posidonius (*Ep.* 83. 10 ff., 87. 31 ff.) and Antipater (*Ep.* 87. 38 ff.). He also reproaches with this fault Peripatetics (*Ep.* 87. 38), Academics, Xenocrates and Speusippus (*Ep.* 85. 18), and Epicurus (*ibid.*). Seneca refers more than once to the "hairsplitting" style as a characteristic of Greek philosophers: *Ep.* 82. 8 ("ineptias Graecas"), *Ben.* 1. 3. 6 ("Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus"). By "Greek" he cannot mean ethnicity alone, as Aulus, the Greek teacher whom Seneca so much admired, had a style far removed from the casual one Seneca despises, as had most Stoics who followed in the footsteps of Panaetius (Cicero tells us that "... tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbiter sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit ..." *Fin.* 4. 28. 79). Insofar as Seneca has Stoics in mind in his criticism of the dialectical approach to philosophy, he probably alludes to members of the Old Stoa who had no connection with Rome, and whose style was quite different from that of the "Roman" Stoics. Criticism of philosophers for splitting hairs is, of course, a topos in itself: cf. the σκινδαλαμοί of Aristophanes (*Nub.* 130, *Ran.* 819).

non vellicari" (*Brev. Vit.* 10. 1). It is the absence of this aggressively protreptic approach to ethics, reflected in Fabianus' physical and military vocabulary, which Seneca criticizes in Chrysippus, picking up *ex contrario* similar physical imagery when he describes him as "magnum mehercules virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur; etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, pungit, non perforat" (*Ben.* 1. 4. 1).

The common concern of Seneca's teachers¹⁶ for the ethical problems facing mankind, and the similarity of the solutions they proposed, is illustrated by the sermons on the evil of luxury which Seneca attributes to each of Sextius (*Ep.* 108. 18), Attalus (*Ep.* 110. 14 ff.), and Demetrius (*Ben.* 7. 9. 1 ff.),¹⁷ while we have the testimony of Seneca the Elder for speeches on the topic given by Fabianus (*Contr.* 2. 1. 11 ff., 25; 2. 5. 7). Sextius, Seneca tells us (*Ep.* 108. 17), put his condemnation of luxury into practice by restricting himself to a frugal vegetarian diet; vegetarianism was also preached by Sotion, his follower, with the result that Seneca gave up eating meat for a year (*Ep.* 108. 22), while, owing to the influence of Attalus, Seneca ate no oysters or mushrooms and drank no wine (*Ep.* 108. 15 f.).¹⁸ The sermons of Attalus and Demetrius on the evil of luxury—which are presented by Seneca at considerable length—contain the topoi of criticism of luxury typical of the moralizing tradition.¹⁹ It is, perhaps, not surprising then, that we also find Fabianus in a speech remembered by Seneca the Elder, delivering the same topoi in the schools of declamation; this speech is, in turn, closely echoed by our Seneca in his prose-works.²⁰ Cross-fertilization between the schools of rhetoric and philosophy at this period is clearly a major factor in the explanation of the homogeneity of the philosophical schools at this time.²¹

¹⁶ Sextius, of course, was not directly Seneca's teacher, but, indirectly, as teacher of his teachers Fabianus and Sotion; cf. above, p. 50.

¹⁷ Billerbeck's (above, note 12) 19) comment on the speech placed in the mouth of Demetrius (*Ben.* 7. 9. 1 ff.) is well taken, and to some extent, should, perhaps, be considered in relation to all direct speech placed by Seneca in the mouth of others: "Diese von Seneca offensichtlich als ethopoeitische Oratio verfaßte Invektive wirft natürlich wiederum die grundsätzliche Frage auf, inwieweit die unter dem Namen des Demetrius aufgenommenen Ausführungen und Ansprüche authentisch sind."

¹⁸ Seneca does not explicitly describe the Cynic Demetrius as a vegetarian, although avoidance of meat is typically advocated by the Cynics; cf. Oltramare (above, note 1) 50, theme 31d, also A. C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe*, trans. B. L. Hijmans, Jr. (Assen 1962) 96 ff.

¹⁹ Cf. Oltramare (above, note 1) themes 35, 35c, 37, 38, 39a, 40 and van Geytenbeek (previous note) 111 ff.

²⁰ Cf. E. Rolland, *De l'influence de Sénèque le père et des rhéteurs sur Sénèque le philosophe* (Ghent 1906) 40 ff., for list of parallels.

²¹ Note how Seneca the Elder recommends to his son the example of Fabianus, who continued to study rhetoric along with philosophy: *Contr.* 2 praef. 4, and Tacitus, *Dial.* 19. The long-standing connection between the moralists and the schools of rhetoric was especially strengthened, according to Oltramare (above, note 1) 153 ff., by Sextius.

A dialectical approach to philosophy, which, as we have seen,²² Seneca reproaches in Old Stoics and others, is necessarily couched in a dispassionate and uninspiring style. By contrast, it is incumbent on philosophers like Seneca, who regard themselves as "teachers of mankind,"²³ to present their message in as persuasive a manner as possible. The persuasive power of Attalus' eloquence is mentioned by Seneca in relation to his exhortation to ascetism, with what results I have already mentioned (*Ep.* 108. 14):

Cum vero commendare paupertatem coeperat et ostendere quam quidquid usum excederet pondus esset supervacuum et grave ferenti, saepe exire e schola pauperi libuit. cum coeperat voluptates nostras traducere, laudare castum corpus, sobriam mensam, puram mentem non tantum ab illicitis voluptatibus sed etiam supervacuis, libebat circumscribere gulam ac ventrem.

The son's testimony is supported by the father's. Seneca the Elder describes Attalus as "magnae vir eloquentiae, ex his philosophis quos vestra aetas vidit longe et subtilissimus et facundissimus" (*Suas.* 2. 12). Seneca praises, in terms similar to those he uses for Attalus, the ability of Sextius and his follower Fabianus, to inspire the neophyte with a spirit of emulation, while, at the same time, not inducing in him despair of success. After a recent reading of a philosophical work of Sextius, Seneca comments (*Ep.* 64. 3 f.):

Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quantum animi! hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies: quorundam scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. instituunt, disputant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum quia non habent: cum legeris Sextium, dices, "vivit, viget, liber est, supra hominem est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae." in qua positione mentis sim cum hunc lego fatebor tibi: libet omnis casus provocare, libet exclamare, "quid cessas, fortuna? congregere: paratum vides." illius animum induo qui quaerit ubi se experiatur, ubi virtutem suam ostendat . . .

Similarly, with reference to the eloquence of Fabianus, Seneca says "cum audirem certe illum, talia mihi videbantur, non solida sed plena, quae adulescentem indolis bonae attollerent et ad imitationem sui evocarent *sine desperatione vincendi*, quae mihi adhortatio videtur efficacissima" (*Ep.* 100. 12).²⁴ The same spirit or *animus* and the same disregard for semantic niceties which make the Sextian style so effectively persuasive, also, Seneca tells us, characterized Demetrius' style. Seneca describes him as a man "exactae, licet neget ipse, sapientiae firmaeque in iis, quae proposuit, constantiae, eloquentiae vero eius, quae res fortissimas deceat, non

²² See above, p. 51 and n. 15.

²³ *Ep.* 89. 13: "... tamquam quidquam aliud sit sapiens quam generis humani paedagogus."

²⁴ On Fabianus' eloquence, cf. also *Ep.* 40. 12.

concinatae nec in verba sollicitae, sed ingenti animo, prout impetus tulit, res suas prosequens"²⁵ (*Ben.* 7. 8. 2).

An important aspect of the effectively persuasive style, Seneca tells us at *Ep.* 59. 6, is the image (*imagines*). Those whose prime concern is to persuade, use them "ut et dicentem et audientem in rem praesentem adducant" (*ibid.*). A particularly masterly exploitation of the image in philosophical writing, Seneca tells us, is to be found in Sextius. He cites Sextius' comparison of the wise man's preparation for adversity to a general's readiness for attack while on the march (*Ep.* 59. 7).

Elsewhere in the prose-works, references made by Seneca to images used by Attalus, Fabianus, and Demetrius show us that Sextius' follower, as well as the Stoic and Cynic, were equally aware of the persuasive power of the image in paraenesis.²⁶ Furthermore, it emerges from these references that Attalus, Fabianus, and probably Demetrius too, used, like Sextius, imagery drawn from the sphere of war. I have referred already to Fabianus' use of the image of a military onslaught on the emotions at *Brev. Vit.* 10. 1.²⁷ At *Ep.* 67. 15 Seneca quotes Attalus as saying:

malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in deliciis habeat. torqueor, sed fortiter: bene est. occidit, sed fortiter: bene est.

At *Prov.* 3. 3 Seneca illustrates an axiom of Demetrius—"mihi videtur infelicius eo cui nihil umquam evenit adversi"—with the image of a battle with Fortuna:

Non licuit enim illi se experiri. ut ex voto illi fluxerint omnia, ut ante votum, male tamen de illo di iudicaverunt: indignus visus est a quo vinceretur aliquando fortuna, quae ignavissimum quemque refugit, quasi dicat: "quid ergo? istum mihi adversarium adsumam? statim arma mittit; non opus est in illum tota potentia mea, levi comminatione pelletur, non potest sustinere vultum meum. alius circumspiciatur cum quo conferre possimus manum: pudet congregi cum homine vinci parato."

That Demetrius himself used such an image to illustrate the axiom Seneca attributes to him seems highly likely.²⁸

²⁵ The opposition which Seneca makes here between *res* and *verba* is a constant theme, implicit or explicit, in his opposition of ethical to dialectical philosophy; cf. *Ep.* 52. 8, 75. 7, 83. 27, 87. 40, 88. 32, 108. 6, 38 (*non est loquendum sed gubernandum*), 117. 33.

²⁶ In addition to those that follow, cf. *Ep.* 9. 7, 63. 5 f., 72. 8, 81. 22 (Attalus); *Ep.* 69. 17, 91. 19, *Ben.* 7. 1. 4 (Demetrius); *Ep.* 73. 15 (Sextius).

²⁷ See above, pp. 51–52.

²⁸ A similar military scenario, in which a soldier is addressed by 'Ανδρεία and Δειλία, is attributed by Stobaeus (3. 8. 20) to a Demetrius, whom P. Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*² (Tübingen 1912) 85 n. 1, in agreement with O. Hense, *RE* s.v. "Ioannes Stobaios," IX (1916) 2582 f., attributes to Demetrius the Cynic, Seneca's contemporary. For more recent discussion, cf. Billerbeck (above, note 12) 57 ff.

"Les comparaisons de la vie avec la guerre sont les plus fréquentes de la diatribe," says Oltramare,²⁹ and certainly they represent one of the largest groups of imagery in Seneca's philosophical works, rivalled only by medical images in number.³⁰ Of course the militaristic nature of Roman society meant that military imagery was part of the general currency of the language; and among philosophers its use is certainly not confined to "diatribists"—we find it, for example, in the mouth of Plato's Socrates.³¹ The fact, then, that we find this image being used by Seneca's teachers and contemporaries among the Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic schools of philosophy in first-century Rome is not so much significant in itself, but is rather one more piece of evidence which, taken with others, confirms that there were many similarities between their teaching styles and orientations.

An overriding concern with ethics, couched in a persuasive style and illustrated by imagery, was, then, common to the Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic schools with which Seneca came into contact in Rome. That Seneca's own philosophical works mirror these characteristics needs little demonstration. The points of speculative philosophy that he treats are few, and then almost always in a tone of deprecation.³² The entire thrust of his message is an insistently ethical one, as Seneca conceives of himself as a guide to lost travellers (*Ep.* 8. 3), a doctor (*Cons. Marc.* 1. 8; *Cons. Helv.* 1. 2, 2. 1 f.), or, more modestly, as a fellow-patient passing on the remedies learnt during convalescence (*Ep.* 27. 7). "Volo luxuriam obiurgari, libidinem traduci, inpotentiam frangi," Seneca tells us in a characterization, attributed to Lucilius, of the ideal philosophical homily (*Ep.* 100. 10). Such a program is rigorously pursued by Seneca. To convey his message as persuasively as possible he notoriously spares neither words nor rhetorical devices. Figuring prominently among the latter are very many images of the kind that, as we have seen, he had heard and admired in the Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic schools of Rome.³³ In particular, like Sextius, Fabianus, Attalus, and Demetrius, Seneca often uses military imagery characterizing the Stoic sage as a soldier of God, and the morally flawed as those who fight timidly or turn in flight.³⁴

Fourth-century Cynic philosophers such as Bion, as preachers for the "man in the street," undoubtedly concerned themselves with ethical

²⁹ Oltramare (above, note 1) 56. Cf. also O. Halbauer, *De diatribis Epicteti* (diss. Leipzig 1911) 32 and n. 1 and R. Bultmann (above, note 1) 36.

³⁰ Cf. my thesis (above, note 6) 176 ff., 194 ff.

³¹ Cf. H. Emonds, "Geistlicher Kriegsdienst: der Topos der militia spiritualis in der antiken Philosophie," in *Heilige Überlieferung. Ausschnitte aus der Geschichte des Mönchtums und des heiligen Kultes*, ed. O. Casel (Münster 1938) 25.

³² In *Ep.* 65, e.g., which discusses the "first cause," Seneca preempts criticism from Lucilius with: "Quid te" inquis "delectat tempus inter ista conterere, quae tibi nullum affectum eripiunt, nullam cupiditatem abigunt?" (65. 15). Cf. note 14.

³³ For a full treatment of the images used by Seneca, cf. my thesis (above, note 6).

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, s.v. M. 1, pp. 194 ff., and M. 2, pp. 198 ff.

exhortation, which they rendered more comprehensible to the crowd by means of images drawn from everyday life. Certain of these, as well as certain stock themes, are shared by generations of moralizing literature including that of Seneca and his philosophical contemporaries.³⁵ In this sense it is meaningful to place much of Seneca's extant prose in a "diatribe" tradition. An immediate explanation, however, of the paraenetic characteristics of Seneca's philosophical prose-works lies close at hand in the schools of philosophy—Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic—that Seneca attended at Rome. In each and all of these he could have heard ethical exhortation couched in impassioned and oratorical language, illustrated by images drawn from a common stock.

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³⁵ For themes, cf. Oltramare (above, note 1) 263 ff. For images, cf. my thesis (above, note 6) *passim*.

Notes on Statius' *Thebaid* Books 3 and 4

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This is the second in a projected series of six papers presenting conjectures in the text of Statius' *Thebaid*. The first of these papers appeared in *ICS* 14 (1989) 227–41; the rest will follow at intervals. As before, I take my lemmata from D. E. Hill's edition (Leiden 1983), and have regularly consulted the editions by Gevartius (1616 and 1618), Cruceus (1618), Veenhusen (1671), O. Müller (1870), Garrod (1906), Klotz (1908; revised by Klinnert, 1973) and Mozley (1928). There is a commentary on Book 3 by H. Snijder (Amsterdam 1968).

3. 6–12

"ei mihi" clamat,

"unde morae?" (nam prona ratus facilemque tot armis

Tydea, nec numero uirtutem animumque rependit)

"num regio diuersa uiae? num missus ab Argis

subsidio globus? an sceleris data fama per urbes

10

finitimas? paucosne, pater Gradiue, manuue

legimus indecores? . . . "

Through the long night the evil tyrant Eteocles broods deeply on the tardiness of his cut-throats' return. Three reasons for the delay suggest themselves to him: his men lost their way; or they met with reinforcements from Argos; or (and here we come to the problem) something involving the neighbouring cities impeded them. As Mozley renders the Latin, *an sceleris data fama per urbes / finitimas* means, "Or has news of the deed spread round the neighbouring cities?", and his rendering is faithful to the Latin. Lactantius comments first on the word *sceleris*, which he interprets to mean *uiolatae legationis sanctimonia* (but surely *sanctimoniae* is required?), *uel quod religiosum officium legati peteretur insidiis*; he then adds words which make explicit what is by no means implicit in the Latin as transmitted: *dicit quippe a finitimis ciuitatibus Tydeo aduersus insidiantes esse subuentum*. Quite so, that is what Eteocles must be wondering; but that is not the same thing as saying that "the neighbours have heard of his crime": we need to be told that they not only heard about it, but did something about it. A further point is that in line 4

nothing whatever to do with the cult-site at Dodona. His father and he would, however, both be happily accommodated by the common noun *diuo*.

3. 108-09

nunc quoque Tartareo multum diuisus Auerno
Elysias, i, carpe plagas . . .

What is the point of *quoque*? Maeon has not been to Hell before now. I would much prefer *i nunc Tartareo* . . .

3. 125-26

stat sanguineo discissus amictu
Luctus atrox caesoque inuitat pectore matres.

"Incites" is how Mozley renders *inuitat*, but his rendering rather invites *inritat*, altogether the more effective verb.

3. 127-28

scrutantur galeas frigentum inuentaue monstrant
corpora, prociduae super externosque suosque.

That the mothers should "scrutinize" the helmets of the dead warriors (in order to identify them, if possible) is altogether natural, but what would be the point of their "showing" the bodies they had found, when no distinction is here drawn between friend and foe (*externosque suosque*) and there were presumably bodies for the "showing" to be found all over the field? I suggest *lustrant*, continuing the idea of attempted identification.

3. 133-36

at uaga per dumos uacuique in puluere campi
magna parens iuuenum, gemini nunc funeris, Ide
squalentem sublata comam liuentiaque ora
ungue premens . . .

Ide appears only here in the whole of the *Thebaid*, and, unless time has denied us knowledge of a well-known story, the epithet *magna* must surely have been as mystifying to Statius' audiences as it is to me now. An effective alternative to so cryptic an adjective would be *ante*, contrasting with *nunc*. In the next line, would somebody tell me what on earth is the point of the participle *sublata*, "uplifted" (hardly *reiecta terrore*, which was how Wakefield interpreted it)? Ide will hardly get far looking for her sons unless she keeps her head down. Mozley translates as though the text read *diffusa*, and that indeed is one out of a considerable number of participles which would at least give us some sense here.

3. 160–64

sed nec bellorum in luce patenti
 conspicui fatis aeternaque gentibus ausi
 quaesistis miseræ uulnus memorabile matri,
 sed mortem obscuram †numerosaque funera passi, †
 heu quantus furto cruor et sine laude iacetis!

To obelize the whole of the second half of 163, as Hill does, is to evince an unwarranted defeatism: it is only in the word *numerosaque* (or its alternative *numerandaque*) that the fault lies; unless, that is, one can stomach Mozley's defence of *numeranda* as meaning "suffering deaths which were (only) for the counting . . . they were only two more in the list of dead." Equally silly is Lactantius' gloss: *quia inter paucos nec in magno proelio concidistis*: neither of these considerations necessarily implies an obscure death. Try *renuendaque*, which is very nearly an anagram of *nūerandaque*.

3. 165–68

quin ego non dextras miseris complexibus ausim
 diuidere et tanti consortia rumpere leti:
 ite diu fratres indiscretique supremis
 ignibus et caros urna confundite manes!

Tanti . . . leti is translated "so noble a death" by Mozley, but such a sense is gainsaid by the preceding context, which emphasises the obscurity of the young men's death. Some point would be introduced if *tanti* concealed an original *iuncti*. Nor is there any point in saying *ite diu fratres*, since, in death as in life, they will always be brothers. Perhaps *pii*?

3. 183–88

sed nec ueteris cum regia Cadmi
 fulmineum in cinerem monitis Iunonis iniquae
 consedit, neque funerea cum laude potitus 185
 infelix Athamas trepido de monte ueniret,
 semianimem heu laeto referens clamore Learchum,
 hic gemitus Thebis . . .

Does not *consedit* in 185 call for a corresponding *reuenit* in 186?

3. 229–35

"talīs mihi, nate, per Argos,
 talis abi, sic ense madens, hac nubilus ira. 230
 exturbent residues frenos et cuncta perosi
 te cupiant, tibi praecipites animasque manusque
 deuocant; rape cunctantes et foedera turba,
 cui dedimus; tibi fas ipsos incendere bello
 caelicolas pacemque meam . . ." 235

I have three suggestions to make in this passage. For *exturbent* (cf. 233 *turba*) perhaps *excutiant*; for *cuncta*, and as an alternative to *uincla*, proposed by Bentley, perhaps *pacta*; and for *cui*, which makes a sort of sense only if taken with *tibi*, and no sense at all with Hill's punctuation, perhaps *quae*: *foedera . . . quae dedimus* will then correspond to *pacem . . . meam*, just as *cunctantes* corresponds to *ipsos*.

3. 241–43

sic Fata mihi nigraeque Sororum
iurauere colus: manet haec ab origine mundi
fixa dies bello, populique in proelia nati.

How can distaffs “swear”? Could Statius conceivably have written *ius neuere*? It was in such terms (*sic*) that the Fates spun Jove's authority (*ius*). *Iam neuere* or *sic neuere* would, I feel, be less forceful.

3. 293–94

(haud mora) desiluit curru clipeoque receptam
laedit in amplexu dictisque ita mulcet amicis.

Various critics, including Peyraredus, Barthius and O. Müller, have taken exception to *laedit* and advanced conjectures designed to eliminate it. I agree with them that the idea of “harming” is out of place here (even if we contemplate a picture of a clumsy giant not knowing his own strength), and suggest *claudit*: Venus is swept snugly within Mars' shield.

3. 320–23

uolat ignea moles
saeua dei mandata ferens, caelumque trisulca
territat omne coma iamdudum aut ditibus agris
signa dare aut ponto miseros inuoluere nautas.

If anyone can believe, with Mozley, that *territat* means *terrore cogit*, μακρρίζω. But in any case, what a pathetic thought! “The thunder-bolt compels the sky in terror to give signs to the fields.” How, precisely, does a thunderbolt make the sky do anything? And are “signs” all that will be given to the fields? How much more sense there would be in

caelumque trisulca
territat omne coma, minitata aut ditibus agris
damna dare aut ponto miseros inuoluere nautas!

3. 330–32

sic nota in pascua taurus
bellator redit, aduerso cui colla suoque
sanguine proscissisque natant palearibus armi.

Perhaps *aduersi*?

3. 333–35

tunc quoque lassa tumet uirtus multumque superbit
pectore despecto; uacua iacet hostis harena
turpe gemens crudosque uetat sentire dolores.

Garrod and Snijder both objected to *pectore despecto* (which is indeed a silly thing to say, whether *despecto* be taken to mean “looked down on” or “despised”), but their conjectures are nugatory. Hill’s comment, “lassus taurus despiciens . . . uulnera a fronte passa uidet et superbit,” might have given him a clue but did not. Write *uulnere despecto*.

3. 358–60

nocte doloque uiri nudum ignarumque locorum
nequiquam clausere; iacent in sanguine mixti
ante urbem uacuam.

To say that Thebes was an “empty” city would be a lie, and a transparent one: everybody knows that Tydeus has not killed the women, children and old men. There is regular confusion on the part of scribes between *uacuu*s and *uiduus* (which are not synonyms), and it is the latter epithet which we require here.

3. 360–62

nunc o nunc tempus in hostes,
dum trepidi exanguesque metu, dum funera portant,
nunc, socer, haec dum non manus excidit; . . .

Nunc socer haec dum non is what the Puteaneus (alone) offers; the other manuscripts give *dum capulo nondum*. Mozley, strangely, thinks that *haec dum non manus excidit* has to be completed by the ablative *memoria*, notionally supplied; but could he, or anyone who accepts the reading of the Puteaneus, explain why the Argives would be likely to have short memories of Tydeus’ achievements, nay, why they might be likely to forget here and now, on the spot? *Capulo*, on the other hand, joins with *excidit* to give admirable sense; and Garrod’s *dum capulo nondum haec* misses the mark by no more than a hair’s breadth. Write *dum capulo haec nondum manus excidit*.

3. 403–04

. . . ubi maximus illi
sudor . . .

Amongst other details of the fight, Tydeus relates *ubi maximus . . . sudor*. The sweat of course is his own, not another's; O. Müller surely cannot have been the only editor of Statius to recall *Th. 2. 275 f. sed plurimus ipsi / sudor*; and I cannot but marvel that nobody has thought of introducing *ipsi* into the present passage.

3. 460

mons erat audaci seductus in aethera dorso

Not *seductus*, surely, but *subductus*?

3. 516–20

“equidem uarii, pater, omina Phoebi
saepe tuli: iam tum, prima cum pube uirentem
semideos inter pinus me Thessala reges
duceret, hic casus terraeque marisque canentem
obstipuerē duces, . . . ”

520

Hic in 519 is anything but clear, and the variant *hi*, offered by at least one manuscript (*apud* O. Müller), is useless. Perhaps *hinc* (cf. 516–17), meaning “from this source,” namely, from Phoebus.

3. 573

(te pudor et curae retinent per rura, Melampus)

Amphiaraus returns to Thebes, but Melampus stays in the country. Why? Because of “shame and cares,” say the manuscripts. Cares, they are understandable enough; but why on earth should Melampus be ashamed? All that he and Amphiaraus had done was, at Adrastus’ behest, to explore the will of heaven; and if heaven’s will was adverse, as indeed it was, that was nothing to cause him shame. *Pavor*, on the other hand, would be very much to the point.

3. 575–77

et iam suprema Tonantis
iussa fremunt agrosque uiris annosaeque uastant
oppida

Premunt, not *fremunt*?

3. 602

diu tuto superum contemptor

For *tuto* Cassellanus 164 gives *tutos*; and there might be something to be said for *tutus*, to avoid adverbs in juxtaposition.

3. 697-98

aspice res humiles, atque hanc, pater, aspice prolem
exulis; huic olim generis pudor.

Argia pleads with her father for war, and, as an argument in its favour, urges that he leave no legacy of shame to his grandson Thessandrus. Surely that argument would be properly presented if in 698 we read

huicne olim generis pudor?

3. 704-05

nescis, pater optime, nescis,
quantus amor castae misero nupsisse marito.

"Thou knowest not, good father, thou knowest not what deep affection a husband's misery implants in a loyal bride" is how Mozley renders these lines; but I see no sense in this sentiment, even if syntax permitted it: are we seriously to believe that the wives of the disadvantaged love them more than other women love husbands for whom all is going well? Surely it all depends on the individual? Let me hazard the guess that 705 originally ran

quam sit onus castae misero nupsisse marito.

That would be a true enough sentiment.

3. 718-20

tu solare uirum, neu sint dispendia iustae
dura morae: magnos cunctamur, nata, paratus.
proficitur bello.

The final parataxis here makes for a weak close to Adrastus' comforting speech. Perhaps

magnos cunctanti, nata, paratus
proficitur bello,

with a general statement about strategy by way of conclusion?

4. 38-42

rex tristis et aeger
pondere curarum propiorque abeuntibus annis
inter adhortantes uix sponte incedit Adrastus,
contentus ferro cingi latus; arma manipuli
pone ferunt, . . .

40

It is a sad fact, but true, that all our years pass away, and so perhaps somebody can tell me how the words *propior . . . abeuntibus annis*

(literally, "nearer to the passing years") convey the notion that Adrastus is now not far from death? He is moreover dreadfully unhappy about embarking on the war and, after *tristis, aeger pondere curarum* and *uix sponte incedit*, it is hard to see how he could be "content" with anything to do with the business, be it wearing his sword or (so E. H. Alton in *CQ* 17 [1923] 175) surrounding himself with a bodyguard. I suggest *non laetus ferro cingi latus*. One final observation on this passage: *manipli* may be the reading of all the manuscripts, but it is still a ludicrous reading, since the *arma* are those of the king himself, and not even one platoon, let alone several (*manipli*), would be needed to carry them. The certain correction *ministri* was advanced by Markland in his note on *Silu.* 5. 2. 154, and printed by O. Müller in his edition of 1870. Garrod and Klotz then concurred in forgetting about it altogether, and, not perhaps surprisingly, it failed to reemerge in Hill's edition of 1983. I may note, by way of confirming Markland's conjecture, that Par. lat. 13046 glosses *manipli* with *armigeri*.

4. 74-76

proxima longaeuo profert Dircaeus Adrasto
signa gener, cui bella fauent, cui commodat iras
cuncta cohors: . . .

It would be premature to say of a warrior going into uncertain battle that *bella fauent* (and of Polynices it would, of course, be ultimately untrue), and in any case the anaphoric *cui* requires that both clauses have to do with the *cohors*: hence Bentley's *gerit*, and Damsté's *fouent*, to which I will now add the small adjustment *fouet*. That the whole cohort gave full support to its leader may pass unquestioned, but it is not the unanimity of the cohort which is in point here, as the sequel shows, but the nature of its composition: the succeeding lines tell us in some detail that the *cohors* was made up partly of Theban exiles, and partly of Peloponnesian troops: a mixed company, therefore, and *mixta cohors* is needed to introduce what follows.

4. 93-95

ecce inter medios patriae ciet agmina gentis
fulmineus Tydeus, iam laetus et integer artus,
ut primae strepuere tubae: . . .

It would be something of a medical miracle for a wounded man to recover at the first sound of the trumpet's blast, but here there is no miracle: as lines 398 ff. of the previous book make clear, Idmon of Epidaurus had already attended to the wounds Tydeus had sustained. At *Ov. Ep.* 3. 86 all the manuscripts give *impiger* but the correct reading is *integer*, conjecturally retrieved by Hooffft: in the present passage the process of corruption has travelled in the opposite direction.

4. 105-06

Ioniis et fluctibus hospita portu

Chalcis

Various cities heard the tidings of war, among them Chalcis, "welcome haven from Ionian billows" (as Mozley puts it). This sense, surely the one intended by Statius, would be better expressed if the text read

Ioniisque e fluctibus.

4. 110-11

omnibus aeratae propugnant pectora crates,
pilaque saeua manu; patrius stat casside Mauors.

Saeua is, quite frankly, pitiful, just about the last adjective that a master composer would think of. Better by far would be *sueta*, after which *patrius* . . . *Mauors* will figure now as an elegant complementation.

4. 121-24

quos celer ambit
Asterion Dryopumque trahens Erasinus aristas,
et qui rura domant Epidauria (dexter Iaccho
collis at Hennaeae Cereri negat); . . .

The Dorian contingent assembles, amongst its number being those who dwell by the rivers Asterion and Erasinus. The picture of "Erasinus sweeping on his flood Dryopian harvests" bodes no good at all for the locals: if he carries away their crops on a regular basis, perhaps they should contemplate emigration! But no: what the river drags along are the *harenas* of Dryopia. The inhabitants of Epidaurus, on the other hand, live in hilly terrain, whereas *rura* are quintessentially *Cerealia* (Ov. *Fast.* 1. 683). Perhaps *saxa*, or possibly *lustra*?

4. 131-32

umeros ac pectora late
flammeus orbis habet

Habet is distinctly dull and inexplicit. Try *obit*.

4. 152-54

dat tamen haec iuuenum tercentum pectora, uulgos
innumerus bello, quibus haud ammenta nec enses
triste micant.

Lactantius' silly comment on *innumerum bello* should make everyone chuckle; everyone, that is, except those who edit the *Thebaid*. Hear what he says: "INNVMERVM BELLO expositio, quid sit ter centum pectora, uulgu innumerum: quia tam fortes erant, ut multorum facta fortia sua uirtute pensarent." First we have three hundred represented as "countless" when Adrastus' own Argive contingent alone had amounted to three thousand (4. 63); then we have the suggestion that The Magnificent Three Hundred could counterbalance "the brave deeds of many," for all that (as the succeeding context states) they were not armed with javelins or swords, but only with pine-wood staffs and arrows (a second-class military accoutrement, in other words)! The mistake made by Lactantius, and indeed by all editors of the *Thebaid*, stems from failure to see that Statius intended *in numerum*, "to make up the number," and, not least because everybody appears to have made that same mistake, I am inclined to think that Statius separated *in* from *numerum*. Either therefore *in numerum bello*, or, as I should myself prefer, *in belli numerum*. The lads from Tiryns, to be blunt, are no more than a make-weight in the host from the Peloponnese.

4. 154-56

flauae capiti tergoque leonum
exuuiae, gentilis honos; et pineus armat
stipes, inexhaustis artantur tela pharetris.

Perhaps *inexhaustisque*?

4. 168-71

squalet triplici ramosa corona
Hydra recens obitu: pars anguibus aspera uiuis
argento caelata micat, pars arte reperta
conditur et fuluo moriens nigrascit in auro.

In his apparatus criticus to 170 Hill argues that the transmitted form of words *arte reperta* may without any difficulty be retained if one understands *arte* to refer, not to the maker of the shield, but to Hercules and Iolaus who used a stratagem to kill the Hydra. By the same token, presumably, these two then embalm the Hydra in gold, as they also engrave it in silver? How very singular! As the thinking student of the *Thebaid* has for centuries observed, however, there is a fault in *reperta*, and conjectures proliferate like the suckers of the Hydra (*torre repressa*, *arte reposta*, *retorta*, *repressa*, *aere perempta*, *altera reptans*, etc.). "Part by a cunning device is sunken" translates Mozley, noting that "*reperta must be corrupt, but no emendation seems convincing*." He and the others have missed the obvious: *arte perita*, which is almost invited by Mozley's own translation.

4. 173-75

at laterum tractus spatiosaque pectora seruat
 nexilis innumero Chalybum subtemine thorax,
 horrendum, non matris opus.

I am sure we should all be relieved to hear that it was not Capaneus' mother who knitted his corselet; but then wrought-ironwork is not to many women's taste as an evening occupation. Strange that no one, not even Barthius (who expostulated on this "*stulta lectio*"), spotted

horrendum Mauortis opus.

4. 182-86

hic fretus doctas anteire canendo
 Aonidas mutos Thamyris damnatus in annos
 ore simul citharaque (quis obuia numina temnat?)
 conticuit praeceps, qui non certamina Phoebi 185
 nosset et inlustres Satyro pendente Celaenas.

I find a difficulty here in *conticuit praeceps*, and the lack of any obvious or necessary connexion with the *qui*-clause which follows. "Fell on the instant mute . . . for that he knew not what it was to strive with Phoebus . . ." is how Mozley translates, but his translation signifies naught to me: is there any sense in saying (in almost so many words) that, *because* he was no Marsyas, Thamyris fell silent? I feel pretty certain that Statius did not write *praeceps* here, but what he did write for the moment eludes me. The kind of sentiment that seems to be called for is

conticuit, felix qui non certamina Phoebi
 nosset et inlustres Satyro pendente Celaenas.

To be rendered mute is good luck by comparison with being hung up and flayed.

4. 196-99

illa libens (nam regum animos et pondera belli
 hac nutare uidet, pariter si prouidus heros
 militet) ipsa sacros gremio Polynicis amati
 exuerat cultus haud maesta atque insuper addit: . . .

I have to say that I do not follow Hill's defence of *si* against the alternative reading *ni(si)* in 197: "alii bellare recusabunt si Amphiarus pariter . . . militabit, i.e. contradicet": Argia (*illa* 196) wants war for the sake of her husband Polynices, and she sees that the war effort will fail if . . . if what? Amphiarus, the *prouidus heros*, has already been compelled to war by Fate (189 f. Atropos had thrust arms into his reluctant hand), and Eriphyle's treachery has merely clinched his doom. Surely in this context, with Argia

determined to bring on the war and Amphiaraus already committed to it against his will, there is no point in canvassing the possibility that he might not in fact take part in the action to come. *Ni* or *nisi*, therefore, is required here. In line 198 the feminine pronoun *ipsa* is quite superfluous: of course no one else is going to remove Argia's necklace. *Militet ipse*, on the other hand, would add welcome emphasis to Amphiaraus' hoped-for involvement. Here, therefore, *ipsa* should be changed to *ipse*, just as, conversely, *ipse* was changed to *ipsa* in line 193 by Sandstroem, with the justified approbation of subsequent editors. Finally, in line 199 I should say that there is much to be said for reading *exuerat nexus*, in other words taking the verb from the Puteaneus and the noun from the other manuscripts.

4. 204–05

cum tu claudare minanti
casside ferratusque sones

Perhaps *ferratumque*?

4. 214–17

Taenariis hic celsus equis, quam dispare coetu
Cyllarus ignaro generarat Castore prolem,
quassat humum;

Taenariis begins a new paragraph in modern editions, and the reader's attention is now turned back from Argia and Eriphyle to the doomed prophet. In this context *hinc* would be better than *hic*.

4. 282–84

hi lucis stupuisse uices noctisque feruntur
nubila et occiduum longe Titana secuti
desperasse diem.

The primitive Arcadians were terrified by eclipses is what Statius is saying here, but the expression as given by the manuscripts is awkward, with *lucis* . . . *uices* an ambivalent phrase as well able to signify the return of light as its departure, and *nubila* lacking point as a qualification of *noctis*. Clearer by far, and not, I venture to suggest, appreciably less attractive, would be *fugam* for *uices* and *solis* for *noctis*.

4. 292–94

uenit et Idaeis ululatibus aemulus Azan
Parrhasique duces, et quae risistis, Amores,
grata pharetrato Nonacria rura Tonanti.

I do not understand *risistis* here. Contingents come from many regions to aid Parthenopaeus, and among them is Nonacris, a region "pleasing to the Thunderer" because it was there that he seduced Callisto. Very well, but why should the Loves smile or laugh at the countryside itself? If Jove had had an affair in Golders Green or Pratts Bottom, would the Loves smile or laugh at Golders Green or Pratts Bottom? The idea is idiotic. The verb needed here is *quaesistis*.

4. 299–303

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Arcades hi, gens una uiris, sed dissona cultu | |
| scinditur: hi Paphias myrtos a stirpe recurvant | 300 |
| et pastorali meditantur proelia trunco, | |
| his arcus, his tela sudes, his cassida crines | |
| integit, . . . | |

Hi in 299 strikes me as an inept anticipation of the string of demonstratives which peppers 300 to 303, and the jump from *Arcades* to *uiris* is distinctly inelegant. A smoother, and a clearer, run would be provided by *Arcadibus*.

4. 360–62

. . . tamen et Boeotis urbibus ultrix
adspirat ferri rabies, nec regis iniqui
subsidio quantum socia pro gente mouentur.

In 356 we were told that the people of Thebes itself were anything but eager for the war (*bellator nulli caluit deus*), so what is the point of *et* in 360? Surely that must imply that the Thebans too were in the grip of *ferri rabies*, and that, as the preceding lines make abundantly clear, is just not the case. Perhaps *tantum Boeotis urbibus*: only the cities of Boeotia were eager for war, and then not so much on behalf of the king as on behalf of their kinsfolk.

4. 387–88

aut tumidum Gangen aut claustra nouissima Rubrae
Tethyos Eoasque domos flagrante triumpho
perfuris, . . .

In 387 I fancy the second *aut* should be *et*.

4. 403–04

a miseri morum! bellastis sanguine tanto
et saltum dux alter habet.

Thus ends the prophetic ranting of the leader of the Bacchanals. The two bulls fight to the death, and another lords it over the mountain pastures, the

clause in 404 referring, as Lactantius informs us, to Creon, who took over after the death of Eteocles and Polynices. Of preceding scholars, only Baehrens, so far as I can discover, was troubled by *morum*, but his *quorum* is plainly wrong. "Miserable and wicked" is Mozley's translation, and a very free one it is too! Furthermore, it is not the character of the two brothers that needs emphasis at this point, but the sad outcome of their fighting. *Mortis*, I suppose, is a possibility, but *sortis*, or even *euentus*, would accord better with the sequel.

4. 409–18

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| <p> ille deos non larga caede iuuen- cum, non alacri penna aut uerum salientibus extis, nec tripode implicito numerisque sequentibus astra, turea nec supra uolitante altaria fumo tam penitus, durae quam Mortis limite manes elicitos, patuisse refert; Lethaeaeque sacra et mersum Ismeni subter confinia ponto miscentis parat ante ducem, circumque bidentum uisceribus laceris et odori sulphuris aura graminibusque nouis et longo murmure purgat. </p> | <p>410</p> <p>415</p> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|

W. S. Watt, in *Eranos* 85 (1987) 50, proposes to read *uiuum* for *uerum* in 410, and this seems to me right; but other difficulties remain, I believe, and they concern the word *elicitos* in 414 and the words *parat ante* in 416. Consider first the overall syntactical structure of 409 to 414: *ille* (sc. Tiresias) *refert deos non tam penitus caede iuuen- cum patuisse quam manes elicitos* fails because *manes elicitos* does not properly answer to the sequence of ablatives introduced by *caede iuuen- cum*: indeed, it breaks the structure completely. What is required is not *elicitos* but rather *si cieat*, which leads the thought naturally and easily to the calling up of Laius (414–18). "‘Parat’ must be taken both with ‘Lethaeaeque sacra,’ and with ‘ducem,’ i.e., Laius," says Mozley in his note on these lines, but *parat ducem* strikes me as an exceedingly odd expression. I suggest that what Statius wrote was not *parat ante ducem* but *petit arte ducem*, with *arte* replacing the gratuitous *ante* as an introduction to the rituals described in 416 to 418.

4. 434–42

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| <p> extra inmane patent, tellus Mauortia, campi; fetus ager Cadmo, durus qui uomere primo post consanguineas acies sulcosque nocentes ausus humum uersare et putria sanguine prata eruit; ingentes infelix terra tumultus lucis adhuc medio solaque in nocte per umbras expirat, nigri cum uana in proelia surgunt terrigenae; fugit incepto tremibundus ab aruo agricola insanique domum rediere iuuen- ci. </p> | <p>435</p> <p>440</p> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|

Hill makes much of his heavier punctuation after *campi* in 434, but makes nothing of his lighter punctuation after *Cadmo* in 435, when the former is just wrong, but the latter disastrous. If a comma only follows *Cadmo*, then Cadmus becomes the subject of the relative clause which follows, and we are confronted with an extraordinary inversion of events, whereby Cadmus' ploughing of this patch of earth comes after, not before, the war between Eteocles and Polynices, and, what is yet more remarkable, after his own sowing of the Spartoi! At the very least, a full stop is required after *Cadmo* (as was proposed first by Barthius); but that, I believe, is not enough. To save time and space, let me come straight to what I think is needed in 434–35, and that is:

extra inmane patet tellus Mauortia Cadmi,
fetus ager bello.

Patet indeed is given by a number of manuscripts, but *tellus, campi* and *ager* is too much of one thing, and *fetus* calls out for an ablative indicating the bloody crop produced by the *ager*. The subject of the relative clause now becomes, as become it must, the *agricola* of 442. One further correction is needed, and that is *eruere* for *eruit* in 438.

4. 455–57

trunca dehinc nemora aduoluunt, maestusque sacerdos
tres Hecatae totidemque satis Acheronte nefasto
uirginibus iubet esse focos.

Maestus is disquietingly pointless: Tiresias is here merely doing his job, and emotion will not be a help at this juncture, only a hindrance. I think Statius wrote *ternaeque* or *triplicique*.

4. 473–79

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| "Tartarae sedes et formidabile regnum Mortis inxpletae, tuque, o saeuissime fratrum, . . . | 474 |
| soluite pulsanti loca muta et inane seuerae Persephones uulgasque caua sub nocte repostum elicio, et plena redeat Styga portitor alno. | 477 |

Two comments on 479. First, let me commend the tentative suggestion made by Rubenbauer in *ThLL*, s.v. "elicio," that Statius might have written *elicite*; and I commend it the more warmly since it was with *elicite* already in mind as a possibility that I made my way to his article in search of evidence (which I did not find) that *elicere* might be used, not of calling out, but of casting out. Then there is *redeat*, defended against conjecture by Klotz ("*quasi redire Styga non latinum esset*"—well, is it?) and by Hill, who adduces the Virgilian *redire uiam* and its Statian imitation, together with

Hor. *Sat.* 1. 6. 94, where the verb is not *redire* but *remeare*. Apropos of which, it was a pity that no one told Garrod that the third person singular of the present subjunctive of *remeare* is not *remeat*.

4. 514-15

scimus enim et quidquid dici noscique timetis
et turbare Hecaten . . .

Perhaps *poscique* for *noscique*? After all, if something is said, it may be presumed to be known.

4. 614-15

iacet ille in funere longo,
quem fremis, et iunctae sentit confinia mortis.

Longo seems a strangely pointless adjective in this context: of course death is long, but how is that fact relevant to the still living Oedipus? Much more to the point would be *uiuo*.

4. 664-66

isque ubi puluerea Nemeen efferuere nube
conspicit et solem radiis ignescere ferri,
necdum compositas belli in certamina Thebas, . . .

Madvig, Koestlin, Baehrens, Slater and Garrod had all taken offence at the phrase *solem radiis ignescere ferri*, but all of them, according to Klotz, "diminish the poetic force of the passage," and Hill is evidently of the same opinion as Klotz. It is thus "poetical," in their view, to say that "the sun grows hot with the rays of the iron"; others, however, might say that it was not so much "poetical" as "lunatic." The various conjectures so far propounded may be found in the apparatus criticus of Klotz's edition (for Hill has time only for Madvig's suggestion, and then, one suspects, simply because it is also found as a reading in a manuscript). To them let me add one more: for *et solem* read *atque solum*.

4. 686-87

Argolicos paulum mihi fontibus amnes
stagnaue et errantes obducite puluere riuos.

Fontibus is absolutely pointless. What is needed is a word which will correspond to *puluere*, and that is *sordibus*.

4. 691-92

uim coeptis indulgent astra, meaeque
aestifer Erigones spumat canis.

Sirius is indeed represented in Latin literature as suffering from hydrophobia (see *OLD* s.v.), but any suggestion here of a liquid secretion in the form of saliva would be at odds with Bacchus' insistence that the stars also are helping to dry Argos up completely. The conjecture I propose is one of the easiest in the book: read *spirat* for *spumat*.

4. 723–24

una tamen tacitas, sed iussu numinis, undas,
haec quoque, secreta nutrit Langia sub umbra.

I do not see the force of *haec quoque*, and note that Mozley, revealingly, takes no account of it; *sed*, moreover, is not the word we want in 723, as Mozley's "and she" makes clear. I suggest that we read:

una tamen tacitas ut iussu numinis undas
sic quoque secreta nutrit Langia sub umbra:

although her waters are silenced by Bacchus' command, even so Langia keeps them flowing on in secret.

4. 725–27

nondum illi raptus dederat lacrimabile nomen
Archemorus, nec fama deae; tamen auia seruat
et nemus et fluuium; manet ingens gloria nympham.

Tantum for *tamen*? The fact that Langia is not yet famous is no impediment to her preserving her grove and her river; but preserving her grove and her river is all that she can do at present.

4. 753–56

"diua potens nemorum (nam te uultusque pudorque
mortali de stirpe negant), quae laeta sub isto
igne poli non quaeris aquas, succurre propinquis
gentibus; . . . "

And so mortals are denied the feelings of modesty (*pudor*), are they? What a very novel twist to the traditional view, of Jove, for example, and Venus, those paragons of immodesty! Of course it was not Hypsipyle's modesty that seemed to deny her mortality, but her *decor*. And it is her *decor*, as expressed in the adjective *pulchro* (747) which leads us to the second problem in this passage, for Hypsipyle is not cheerful (*laeta*) but sad (*pulchro in maerore*). Appreciably more appropriate to this context than *laeta* would be *sola*.

4. 772–73

dixit, et orantis media inter anhelitus ardens

uerba rapit, cursuque animae labat arida lingua.

Where is the object of *rapit*? It cannot be *uerba*, for that forms part of the phrase *media inter . . . uerba* and cannot be coerced into performing a second function. Why not *orantem*, therefore? Then there is the question of the aptness of *rapit*, apt enough indeed as long as *uerba* was imagined to be its object, but not if the object is *orantem*. *Capit*, on the other hand, would suit well enough.

4. 779–80

at nostris an quis sinus, uberaque ulla,
scit deus;

I cannot remember ever coming across *an quis* as an alternative to *numquis* or (though less credibly in this passage) *ecquis* in subordinate clauses, and Kühner–Stegmann, *Lat. Gramm.* I 634 offers only the slightest attestation, and that in the comic writers, for the use of *an quis* in primary clauses. I am inclined to think that Statius here wrote *numquis*.

4. 805–06

pars cingunt, pars arta plebe sequuntur
praeaccelerantque ducem.

I cannot imagine why nobody, apparently, has proposed *praeaccelerantue*.

4. 816–20

incubuere uadis passim discrimine nullo
turba simul primique, nequit secernere mixtos
aequa sitis, frenata suis in curribus intrans
armenta, et pleni dominis armisque feruntur
quadripedes;

820

For *frenata suis in curribus . . . armenta* Mozley gives “bridled horses with their chariots,” and the question at once arises why Statius should have preferred *in* to *cum*; to which question the answer is that *in* was not Statius’ preference but came in as a scribal aberration. Then, there is the matter of the quadrupeds described as “full” of riders and armour: did anyone ever consciously so describe a mounted charger? The right word here is *proni*, not *pleni*.

4. 820–24

hos turbo rapax, hos lubrica fallunt
saxa, nec implicitos fluuio reuerentia reges
proterere aut mersisse uado clamantis amici
ora. fremunt undae, longusque a fontibus amnis
diripitur;

820

Fremunt undae—what is this to the business? No statement about this river could be less relevant at a time when men and beasts are hurling themselves into the water all along the length of the river, right back to its source, and the noise of the river must have been drowned by the noise of men, beasts and clanking metal. Perhaps *ferunt undas*, or *premunt undas*?

* * *

Let me end by listing a number of unpublished conjectures by Gilbert Wakefield (1756–1801) and Jeremiah Markland (1693–1776). Those by Wakefield in Books 1 and 2 I presented in my previous paper (231 n. 7); I now add those in Books 3 to 12. The conjectures by Markland, which I now give for all twelve books, may be found in a British Library copy of Gronovius, shelfmark 1067. a. 17.

First then, Wakefield's contributions: 3. 109 *amnis*; 207 *lumina*; 257 *fruges*; 375 *nuptis*; 379 *blanditusque*; 505 *pacabile* (?); 531 *fuluos*; 644 *uictos*; 4. 55 *toto*; 217 *intermicat*; 224 *euittata*; 254 *deas*; 255 *intulit*; 308 *his*; 314 *corrupta*; 327 *albis*; 366 *turgida*; 434 *campis*; 464 *sanguen* (= P); 550 *quo legit et*; 608 *albumue*; 731 *arida* (= Schrader *apud* Haupt); 734 *et caecis*; 5. 45 *ulua*; 95 *tremetem*; 100 *it Pallados*; 161 *coniectis* (= Schrader); 329 *et tutum*; 489 *accensa* 'st; 497 *iacentem* (= Peyraredus); 586 *fronti*; 708 *calenti*; 727 *numine*; 731 *prior* (= δ); 732 *arrexerat*; 6. 26 *pollentis*; 97 *tremetes*; 196 *tenera ora*; 208 *exundat*; 303 *tenero*; 678 *arida*; 7. 69 *in tegmine*; 202 *terras* . . . *impetat*; 311 *feruent ingentia*; 453 *parantum*; 471 *rubet*; 565 *coeli quondam*; 595 *illi*; 626 *uexat uel uersat*; 634 *fassa manum uel missa manu*; 650 *ueritus* . . . *et mansisse*; 8. 70 *alterni* . . . *leti*; 398 *clipei clipeis*; 575 *raptat*; 689 *iam saeuior*; 712 *permixtis*; 9. 72 *torta*; 114 *corpus agit*; 215 *sic saltem*; 350 *flamina*; 419 *iraque* (?); 621 *lacrimisque*; 873 *aspera*; 10. 308 *colla reducta*; 523 *mirantur agri*; 735 *alta*; 762 *at uos o! superi*; 823 *saeuit*; 833 *acta Iouem*; 11. 165 *gerentem*; 285 *primitiae*; 562 *peractus*; 12. 69 *sortis* (= Ntδ Schrader); 232 *rumpit iter*; 361 *qui uacat*.

The contributions by Markland are as follows: 1. 65 *explicui*; 130 *socii* . . . *regni*; 202 *omnia nutu*; 226 *Aoniae* . . . *Thebes*; 298 *hic Tyrio*; 517 *comantes*; 2. 325 *longum*; 347 *difficilemque suis*; 412 *inertes*; 520 *damnatusque*; 573 *confessus* (= Dδ); 609 *minitantem uana*; 3. 250 *uergam*; 329 *torquet* . . . *sitis*; 365 *extant*; 654 *et aram* (?); 4. 114 *animis* (?); 353 *praemisere*; 522 *liuentesque*; 746 *ferebat*; 5. 20 *tu tamen*; 554 *adiacet*; 612 *uersantem*; 616 *et blanda*; 668 *meritus*; 6. 150 *uigemus*; 513 *qui mortis*; 829 *cara labores*; 847 *perfusa*; 7. 13 *propera*; 8. 40 *superis quin*; 46 *pandam mea regna*; 217 *obrepere*; 392 *regentum*; 654 *in uulnera*; 9. 159 *is functis*; 319 *Ismenide cretus*; 370 *nunc ponto submersa*; 385 *heu* (= various manuscripts); 415 *riuus*; 419 *simulque*; 514 *Mycene*; 780 *miseros* (= Ntδ); 824 *mersum tacito*; 897 *it sonus*; 10. 46 *balatusque repens*; 129 *iura* (= various manuscripts); 167 *it furor*; 470 *qui tremor elisa*; 522 *inque*

immane; 671 *i prior*; 819 *refixos* (?); 824 *omnis, eunt*; 907 *superum*
chorus; 11. 667 *confessus tacuit*; 12. 249 *magnae strident*; 587 *rogantes*.

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Ten Notes on Statius' *Silvae*

W. S. WATT

The following editions are referred to: J. Markland (1728); E. Baehrens (1876); F. Vollmer (1898); A. Klotz (2nd ed., 1911); J. H. Mozley (Loeb ed., 1928); H. Frère and H. J. Izaac (Budé ed., 1944); E. Courtney (OCT, 1990); H. J. van Dam (Book 2, 1984); K. M. Coleman (Book 4, 1988).

1. 4. 22-25

ipse ueni uiresque nouas animumque ministra
qui caneris; *docto* nec enim sine numine *tantus*
Ausoniae decora ampla togae centumque dedisti
iudicium mentemque uiris.

Statius asks Rutilius Gallicus, the subject of his poem, to be his inspiration, for he brings distinction to the Roman courts.

Both *docto* and *tantus* have aroused suspicion. The former was emended by Markland to *dextro* (he compared, among other passages, 66 below, *dextro sine numine cretam*), an emendation which does not deserve the oblivion which has recently befallen it. *Tantus* ("als ein so gewaltiger Redner," Vollmer), is difficult to accept, but the conjectures listed by Klotz and by Courtney are scarcely more convincing. I suggest *natus*, which would correspond closely to *cretam* in 66.

2. 6. 10-12

sed famulum gemis, Vrse, pium, sed amore fideque
has meritum lacrimas, cui maior stemmate *iuncto*
libertas ex mente fuit.

Flavius Ursus mourns the death of a favourite slave "whose spirit knew a freedom that no line of ancestry could give" (Mozley).

If *iuncto* refers to the lines joining the *imagines* of the family-tree, then, as van Dam says, "a *stemma non iunctum* does not exist." Hence Courtney adopts the old conjecture *cuncto*. For the singular *cunctus* in the sense of *quisque*, *ThLL* IV 1398. 7 ff. quotes only three instances from pre-Apuleian literature, all three from Statius, but in our passage *cuncto* would have to mean not "every single one" but "any," presumably on the analogy

of the singular of *omnis*. How possible this is I do not know, but I should consider changing one letter to produce *iusto* (OLD sense 8); I note that *cunctis* and *iustis* are variants at *Theb.* 9. 633.

2. 6. 93–95

quid terga dolori,
Vrse, damus? quid damna foues et pectore iniquo
uulnus amas? ubi nota reis facundia *raptis*?

Statius urges Ursus to cease mourning for his slave. I have discussed this passage in *WJA* 14 (1988) 165. Since *raptis* is not convincing either in the sense of “dragged into court” or in that of “rescued from court” (i.e. acquitted), I suggested <f>*ractis*, “crushed,” i.e. either “condemned” or “dejected.” Another possibility might be <g>*ratis*, “grateful” for their acquittal. The opposite corruption may have occurred at Silius 13. 335, where Heinsius’ *rapta* (for *grata*) is very attractive.

3. 5. 48–49

questa est Aegiale, questa est Meliboea relinqui,
et *quam quam* saeui fecerunt maenada planctus.

Wives who complained about being left behind by their husbands, Aegiale, Meliboea and Laodamia.

It has been usual to read *quam saeui* as a parenthetic exclamation, but the double *quam* remains objectionable. Courtney adopts the old emendation *tam saeui*, but the demonstrative is no great improvement. I suggest *atque ea quam saeui*.

4. 1. 27–32

quid tale, precor, *prior annus* habebat?
dic age, Roma potens, et mecum, longa Vetustas,
dinumera fastos, nec parua exempla recense
sed quae sola meus dignetur uincere Caesar. 30
ter Latio deciesque tulit labentibus annis
Augustus fasces . . .

This poem celebrates the seventeenth consulship of Domitian in A.D. 95.

“*Prior annus* . . . is usually understood ‘the year just passed’ but the question then has no point. It must mean ‘any former year.’ No one . . . had been consul XVII before” (D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *HSCP* 91 [1987] 278). By searching Rome’s annals the speaker (Janus) confirms that no previous year, not even that in which Augustus had been consul XIII, could show anything like (*quid tale*) a seventeenth consulship. Although *quid* makes good sense, I suspect that Statius wrote *quis*, which has been assimilated to the gender of *tale*.

4. 2. 5-11

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------|----|
| ast ego, cui sacrae Caesar noua gaudia cenae | 5 |
| nunc primum dominaque dedit <i>consurgere</i> mensa, | |
| qua celebrem mea uota lyra, quas soluere grates | |
| sufficiam? . . . | 8 |
| . . . mediis uideor <i>discumbere</i> in astris | 10 |
| cum Ioue. | |

Statius celebrates a banquet given by Domitian to which he had been invited.

Consurgere mensa can only mean "rise from table" at the end of the banquet, whereas what is required at this point in the poem is a word meaning "sit down at table" for the beginning of the banquet. Baehrens emended *consurgere* to *concumbere*, but it is more than doubtful whether that verb could have the required sense; see *ThLL* IV 102. 23 ff. The obvious word is *discumbere*, which is not ruled out by its occurrence in line 10; rather, I think, the repetition emphasizes the parallelism between *domina discumbere mensa* and *mediis discumbere in astris*, between the table of the emperor and the table of the gods. The corruption of *discumbere* to *consurgere* is not inconceivable in view of the ending of line 4, *consumpsit Vlixem*.

Markland's emendation of *consurgere* to *non surgere*, adopted by Courtney, is rightly ruled out by Coleman as anticipating the climax in line 17, *non adsurgere fas est?*

4. 9. 48-50

| |
|-----------------------------------|
| quid si, cum bene mane semicrudus |
| †inlatam† tibi dixero salutem, |
| et tu me uicibus domi salutes? |

Inlatam salutem presumably means "the greeting which I have brought to your home." Despite Vollmer's claim that *inlatam* is confirmed by the following *domi*, the word is quite otiose. I suspect that editors tolerate it merely because they are not satisfied with the available conjectures (of which five are listed by Klotz and by Coleman). Better than any of these, I suggest, would be *in<g>ratam*.

5. 1. 4-6

| |
|-------------------------------------------|
| namque egregia pietate meretur |
| ut uel Apelleo uultus signata colore |
| Phidiaca uel †uata† manu reddare dolenti. |

Abascantus deserves to have a first-class likeness of his late wife, either a portrait painted by Apelles or a statue executed by Phidias.

For *uata* editors read *nata* (a correction already found in M), but this cannot mean "given life" or "given fresh birth," as it is usually translated. One looks for a word which can correspond to *signata colore* (= *picta*), and the obvious partner for *picta* is *ficta*; for the confusion of *f* and *u* cf. 1. 1. 65, *uincit* > *figit*.

5. 2. 164–67

sed uenies *melior* (uatum non inrita currunt
omina), quique aquilas tibi nunc et castra recludet
idem omnes perferre gradus cingique superbis
fascibus et patrias dabit insedis curules.

165 *recludet* Courtney: *recludit* M

Statius prophesies that, on his return from military service, Crispinus will be promoted by the emperor to the highest offices of state.

"Mais tu reviendra plus grand" (Frère-Izaac). But "plus grand" is *maior* rather than *melior*; the two words are frequently confused.

5. 3. 262–64

quos ego tunc gemitus (comitum manus anxia uidit,
uidit et exemplum genetrix *gauisaeque nouit*),
quae lamenta tuli!

Statius wept so much for his father that his friends were afraid of his committing suicide; his mother marked the precedent he was setting (an indication of what he would do for her when the time came).

Although line 263 can be construed (*uidit manus anxia et uidit genetrix*), it would be improved by the omission of the *-que* which follows *gauisa*. I suggest *gauisa notauit*. Statius is fond of *notare*; I would in particular compare 2. 6. 21, *uidi ipse habitusque notauit*, where it reinforces *uidere* in the same way as in our passage.

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The Dedicatory Presentation in Late Antiquity: The Example of Ausonius

HAGITH SIVAN

In a well-known analysis of the function of dedicatory pieces in Martial and Statius (whose title is here deliberately echoed), Peter White showed that the Roman concept of dedication was flexible in the extreme and well suited to a variety of purposes.¹ Some of his conclusions are borne out by the work of the fourth-century poet Ausonius, who was greatly influenced by these two predecessors.² Indeed, an examination of Ausonius' poems offers an ideal point of departure for an exploration of the topic of the dedicatory presentation in the literature of late antiquity.³ For example, one of the questions raised addresses the nature of the relationship between the dedication and the text to which it was attached: What can be deduced from the inclusion or omission of a dedicatory preface concerning the poet's working methods, his intended audience(s), the circulation and publication of his works? What sort of information is provided by the dedication about the chronological stages of the composition? Were dedications intended to function as proper prefaces as well as dedicatory addresses? Where multiple dedications were used, how do they relate to one another?

Several points can be made at the very start.⁴ Ausonius' surviving dedicatory work ranges from single to multiple dedications. This sort of variety follows obvious precedents, not the least Martial's four dedications in the first book of his *Epigrams*. The dedicatees include specific addressees, general readership and, on one occasion, even the poem's dead subjects (*Professores, Poeta*). Where Ausonius appended an "epilogue," it often

¹ P. White, "The Presentation and Dedication of the *Silvae* and the *Epigrams*," *JRS* 64 (1974) 40–61.

² See the edition of Schenkl (below, note 7) for precise references; on Martial's influence, R. E. Colton, *CB* 51 (1974–75) 27–30; 52 (1976) 66–67; 54 (1977) 8–10; on Statius' influence, Z. Pavlovskis, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 1962, and *PP* 20 (1965) 281–97.

³ For a recent general survey of Ausonius' works, R. Herzog and P. L. Schmidt (edd.), *Handbuch der lateinischen Literatur der Antike V* (Munich 1989) 268–308, with vast bibliography.

⁴ Z. Pavlovskis, "From Statius to Ennodius. A Brief History of Prose Prefaces to Poems," *Rend. Istituto Lombardo* 101 (1967) 535–67, esp. 545–52.

serves, in conjunction with the prefatory pieces, as a frame to enclose the text. Still in the manner of Martial, the dedications of Ausonius are written in both prose and verse, and they all precede poetic works. These multiple dedications correspond to each other either by complementing or by simple overlapping. They also touch on a question of aesthetics, essentially the inner proportions of the whole, and the literary intention of this amalgam. In what follows I divide the dedications, for convenience's sake, according to their number, from "floating" compositions, unattached to a surviving poem or corpus, to multiple dedications. Of course, other divisions could also be used, from contents to form, or through types of dedicatees.

A word of caution first. The difficulties of dealing with the process of the publication of Ausonius' poems cannot be overstated.⁵ To date, no single edition has commanded universal consensus, and "the edition to end all editions" is still awaited.⁶ In the meantime, one has to contend with a different order of works and a different numbering system in every edition.⁷ The debate concerning the number of editions issued in Ausonius' lifetime and the affiliation of each of the families of manuscripts with these putative editions has been a long and wearisome affair.⁸ In addition, we are now in possession of a list which gives the titles of several lost works, from a versified version of a lost history by Eusebius (of Nantes) to a *libellus* on the names of the months of the Hebrew and Athenian calendars.⁹ It is not my intention here to deal with any of the problems raised by the transmission of the Ausonian corpus, but merely to point out the useful information contained in the dedications, particularly with regard to the chronological sequence and stages of composition.

⁵ M. D. Reeve in L. D. Reynolds (ed.), *Texts and Transmission* (Oxford 1983) 26–28, for a brief summary.

⁶ Reeve, review of Prete's 1978 Teubner edition, *Gnomon* 52 (1980) 444–51 (448 for the quotation).

⁷ The standard modern editions include: Schenkl (*MGH AA V.2*, 1883); Peiper (Teubner 1886); Pastorino (Torino 1971); Prete (Teubner 1978); Green (Oxford 1991). Unless otherwise stated, all references and quotations are from the edition of Schenkl.

⁸ To mention but few, O. Seeck, review of Peiper, *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* 13 (1887) 497–520; M. J. Byrne, *Prolegomena to an Edition of the Works of Ausonius* (New York 1916); G. Jachmann, "Das Problem der Urvariante in der Antiken und die Grundlagen der Ausoniuskritik," *Festschrift der Universität Köln zum 10 J. Bestehen des Deutsch-Italienischen Kulturinstituts Petrarcahaus* (Köln 1941) 47–104; and the introductions to the various editions.

⁹ R. Weiss, "Ausonius in the Fourteenth Century," in R. R. Bolgar (ed.), *Classical Influences on European Culture* (Cambridge 1971) 62–72; M. D. Reeve, "Some Manuscripts of Ausonius," *Prometheus* 3 (1977) 112–20; H. Sivan, "The Historian Eusebius (of Nantes)," *JHS* (forthcoming).

Dedications Without Texts

Several verse dedications have been transmitted without an attached text. One was prompted by an imperial letter, preserved in a collection of dedicatory prefaces, sent by the emperor Theodosius I (379–95).¹⁰ In it the emperor asked the poet to send him his works, and more specifically, two types of works: those which had already been “published,” and others which “rumor” had added to the corpus (*postulans . . . ne fraudari me scriptorum tuorum lectione patiaris. quae olim mihi cognita et iam per tempus oblita rursum desidero, non solum ut, quae sunt nota, recolantur, sed etiam ut ea, quae fama celebri adiecta memorantur, accipiam*). The words *scripta*, *cognita* and *nota* seem to indicate some kind of published edition of collected works, while those designated as *adiecta* may have been more recent additions, not yet officially presented to the public. Until the emperor’s request sent the poet to rummage through his drawers the latter had been stored away.¹¹ The date of the imperial letter cannot be ascertained, but it may have been written between 389 and 392, during Theodosius’ longest stay in the west. By then Ausonius was living in leisurely retirement on his Aquitanian estates.¹²

That Theodosius knew of these poems need not come as a surprise. Ausonius, like his predecessors, regularly sent copies to friends, some of whom he also expected to come forth with suggestions for revisions. One of these, Pacatus, to whom several poems are dedicated, was a fellow rhetor of Ausonius from Bordeaux.¹³ Pacatus travelled to Italy in 389 to deliver a panegyric in honor of Theodosius. In Italy, acquaintances of Ausonius, like Symmachus, with access to the imperial court, were also well informed and able to report on the state of Ausonius’ poetic productivity.¹⁴

The choice of the words *fama celebri* to mark the emperor’s source of information merits attention. We know that, in addition to poems circulating informally with the author’s permission, there were also unauthorised copies which, in spite of the poet’s wish, somehow reached an unintended audience. One such poem was the *Griphus*, ninety contrived verses on the number three. Before its formal dedication to the Italian senator Symmachus in the form of a long prose letter (below), the *Griphus*

¹⁰ *Epistula Theodosi Augusti* (Sch. I).

¹¹ *Quae tu de promptuario scriniorum tuorum . . . libens inperities* (ibid.).

¹² See L. A. A. Jouai, *De magistraat Ausonius* (Nijmegen 1938) for a detailed biography; R. Etienne, “Ausone ou les ambitions d’un notable aquitain,” in *Ausone, humaniste aquitain* (Bordeaux 1986) 1–90.

¹³ C. E. V. Nixon, *Pacatus. Panegyric to the Emperor Theodosius* (Liverpool 1987).

¹⁴ On Ausonius’ contacts in Theodosius’ court, see J. F. Matthews, “Gallic Supporters of Theodosius,” *Latomus* 30 (1971) 1073–99. Recently, G. W. Bowersock, “Symmachus and Ausonius,” in *Colloque genevois sur Symmaque*, ed. F. Pachoud (Paris 1986) 1–14; R. P. H. Green, “The Correspondence of Ausonius,” *AC* 49 (1980) 199 f.

had been for a long time in "secret" or informal circulation.¹⁵ What irritated Ausonius above all was that as a result of his lack of control, the poem underwent several changes of which he disapproved. These unexpected alterations may be attributed to overzealous admirers eager to share in the poetic fame of Ausonius even before the poems were formally presented to the public. To reconstruct the process: A private copy is sent to a friend with a request for perusal and suggestions for revisions; the poem is then copied by friends of the original dedicatee, but the copiers reproduce not the "original" but the "corrected" poem. As a result, the work acquires a slightly different form owing to these unauthorised revisions. When accused of such a practice, Symmachus replied that once a poem was complete and left the author's desk it became public property.¹⁶

Complying with Theodosius' request, Ausonius prefaced the poetic corpus sent to the emperor with a personal dedication in which he expressed his "relief" at having thus been "forced" to part with his work.¹⁷ The imperial command, asserted the poet, came just in time to put an end to a long series of ever-worsening revisions (18–20: *quis nolit Caesaris esse liber, / ne ferat indignum vatem centumque lituras, / mutandas semper deteriore nota?*). If these words are to be taken seriously, they point to the introduction of revisions, Ausonius' own or other people's alterations of his work, either as a matter of course, in the process of re-writing, or when asked to publish an "official" version. In either case the final version of each work would have differed from previous drafts. There is also an element of the apologetic cliché in these words, as well as echoes of Martial's address to his book (1. 3) and of Horace's views on the process of poetic creativity (*Ars Poetica* 289–94, 438–41).

Both the emperor's letter to Ausonius and Ausonius' dedication to Theodosius have been transmitted by one family of manuscripts (P).¹⁸ It is unclear whether the imperial request was attached to a corpus dedicated to the emperor, in addition to the dedication itself. Authors often referred in their dedicatory preface to the prompting of the addressee.¹⁹ If indeed the letter in its original form did head a collection of Ausonius' poems, the gesture appears to constitute a novelty. While a later editorial hand may not be altogether excluded, Ausonius was vain enough to breach stylistic rules, if such a transgression contributed to his poetic reputation. There is no indication, however, in the verse dedication to the emperor of the scope and

¹⁵ *Griphus* (Sch. XXVI. 1), *Ausonius Symmacho: igitur iste nugator libellus, iam diu secreta quidem, sed vulgi lectione laceratus, perveniet tandem in manus tuas* (8–9).

¹⁶ *Cum semel a te profectum carmen est, ius omne posuisti*, *Ep.* 1 Peiper = I. 31. 2 *Callu* (*Symmaque. Lettres* [Budé 1972]).

¹⁷ *Domino meo et omnium Theodosio augusto Ausonius tuus* (Sch. II). Note the "timely coincidence" of *non iussa parant erumpere dudum carmina* (17–18).

¹⁸ The latter also in V.

¹⁹ T. Janson, *Latin Prose Prefaces: Studies in Literary Conventions* (Stockholm 1964) 117–20.

contents of the "imperial corpus." The correspondence between Theodosius and Ausonius seems to have extended to at least one other item. A list of contents of Ausonius' works names a prose letter, now lost, sent to the emperor.²⁰ One wonders whether this letter was also appended to this corpus or to another collection, perhaps an earlier one.²¹

Among other "detached" prefaces, there is one addressed to "the reader" in which the author called upon his audience to act as patrons for his poems.²² This is, of course, a topos, as is, to an extent, the autobiographical sketch which constitutes the bulk of the dedication. Horace and Ovid often inserted autobiographical details into their poems, the latter minutely following an established pattern based on a description of home, descent and education.²³ Nor can one deny that the age of Ausonius saw the beginning of Christian self-revelation and self-examination, which culminated in Augustine's *Confessions*. Ausonian influence, for example, can be detected in the works of Prudentius, whose *praefatio*, a general proemium to his collected works, is cast in the form of a biography detailing his career and his spiritual progress towards "poetic conversion."²⁴ But there is hardly a doubt that in the hands of Ausonius the poet's self-presentation attained considerable proportions. Not only are his home, parents and career described at great length, but the subject matter was amplified in a series of poems devoted to family members, in another, describing his school colleagues, and in several other works (*Parentalia*; *Professores*; *Epicedion*; *Liber Protrepticus*).

This sort of personal introduction, in the form of a dedication to the general public, left little doubt of the poet's social status.²⁵ Unlike his earlier models, Ausonius did not have to live from the sale of his books, nor

²⁰ Reeve (above, note 9) 116, no. 4: *item epistolas prosaicas ad Theodosium imperatore . . .*, not, I think, to be confused with the existing verse dedicatory preface.

²¹ The relations between Ausonius and Theodosius are far from clear. Having been labelled as a supporter of T. in the late 370s (Matthews [above, note 14]), Ausonius is strangely silent about the eastern emperor during the early 380s. Even in an obvious place such as the *Gratiarum actio* there is no mention of Theodosius or his connection with Gratian. The correspondence with Theodosius must, therefore, belong to the late 380s, when Ausonius, no longer in a position of power at the court, may have tried to court imperial favor.

²² *Ausonius lectori salutem*, Sch. III. 39–40: *tu ne temne, quod ultro / patronum nostris te paro carminibus*.

²³ Horace, *Ep.* 1. 20. 19 f.; *Serm.*, *passim*; Ovid, *Tristia* 4. 10; G. Misch, *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity*, trans. E. W. Dicks (London 1973).

²⁴ J.-L. Charlet, *L'influence d'Ausone sur la poésie de Prudence* (Aix-en-Provence 1980) for a basic comprehensive analysis; A. M. Palmer, *Prudentius on the Martyrs* (Oxford 1989) 6 f. on Prudentius' *praefatio* and its literary antecedents.

²⁵ K. M. Hopkins, "Social Mobility in the later Roman Empire. The Evidence of Ausonius," *CQ* 11 (1961) 239–49.

was he in need of the type of literary patronage sought by earlier poets.²⁶ Any doubt to the contrary was immediately dispelled upon reading of the dedications. Not that the system of patronage ceased to function in later antiquity, but Ausonius had far-reaching ambitions, well beyond a solid literary repute and a comfortable living. As soon as he gained access to the imperial court in Trier (A.D. 366/7), he set about to employ his poetic talents in extolling the imperial house (*Mosella* 420–31; *Cento*, praef.). When given the opportunity, he courted the favors of the most powerful aristocrat of the day, Sextus Petronius Probus (*Ep.* 16). As a result, even by the standards of an age which set an inordinately high premium on literacy, Ausonius did exceptionally well. Already under Valentinian I he became the quaestor in charge of imperial legislation (A.D. 375) and during the reign of his pupil Gratian, Ausonius, his family and his protégés regularly occupied the highest civil offices.²⁷

Like the dedication to Theodosius, the one to the reader does not provide a clue regarding the contents of the works to which it was attached. Perhaps it comprised one of the prefatory pieces which preceded the above-mentioned collection sent to the emperor, in addition to the emperor's letter and the verse dedication. This hypothetical juxtaposition would have served the purpose of introducing the author as well as highlighting his unique poetic status. What came afterwards may have been of lesser importance by comparison. This sort of personal introduction also served to bring poet and audience into a direct and immediate contact. In addition to the customary *captatio benevolentiae*, the information provided in the prefatory dedication would surely have raised great interest and expectations.

Two other verse dedications, one transmitted among the prefatory pieces together with the dedication to Theodosius and the reader, the other transmitted with Ausonius' epigrams, were addressed to two political associates of Ausonius, Syagrius and Proculus.²⁸ No surviving texts can be attached to them. The one to Proculus bears two titles: *ad libellum suum* (Sch. *Epig.* 35) and *prosopopoia in chartam* (Peiper *Epig.* 1). Ausonius playfully debates there whether to consign his verses to the worms or to send them to Proculus. Not surprisingly he opts for the latter course, which he describes as a sweet revenge on a fellow-poet who refuses to part with his own poems (11–12: *prompta est ultio vati./ qui sua non edit carmina, nostra legat*). Proculus himself, then, was a poet, but an unpublished one by his own choice. He is to be identified with the Prefect of the Gauls in 382 and a consular candidate for 384. It is not clear which poems were sent to him;

²⁶ R. P. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire* (Cambridge 1982) and "Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London 1989) 49–62.

²⁷ See Etienne (above, note 12) for the details.

²⁸ *PLRE* I 404 (G 9), Proculus Gregorius; *PLRE* I 862 (S 2 or S 3) for Afranius Syagrius, presumably the one here.

the work is described as *charta*, a *libellus* (3) and *carmina* (12). One wonders if this was a collection of epigrams. Be that as it may, Proculus was expected to give his approval, presumably with a view to publication (13–14: *huius in arbitrio est, seu te iuvenescere cedro, / seu iubeat duris vermibus esse cibum*). The request is a topos, and a form of literary courtesy in the period. The point here is that the importance of the addressee as well as his literary judgement are given due prominence (9–10: *irascor Proculo, cuius facundia tanta est, / quantus honos*).

Like Proculus Gregorius, Syagrius was a notable Gallic politician and a protégé of Ausonius. He is the addressee of four lines which mention a *liber* sent to him.²⁹ Perhaps he received a number of poems, although the scope of the presentation cannot be determined (3–4: *nostro praeatus habebere libro, / differat ut nihilo, sit tuus anne meus*). The case is interesting. Syagrius is not asked to come up with revisions or editorial suggestions, an omission which implies several possibilities: (a) The work sent to Syagrius may have been a final presentation copy rather than an informal one. This does not mean that everyone who was ever sent a “pre-publication copy” was asked to criticise it, but that such a request depended on the identity of the recipient. Literary men were natural candidates for such requests, whether made in earnest or in jest. (b) Ausonius sent Syagrius what he initially considered a final version, as a token of *amicitia*, but subsequently decided to revise and “re-publish” it in another form. This, in turn, implies that the verses to Syagrius merely accompanied the act of the dispatch and cannot be regarded as a dedicatory preface in the full sense of the word.

Among the epigrams of Ausonius, one other seems to have functioned as a dedication although it has reached us without an attached text (*commendatio codicis*, Sch. 2; Peiper 25). It is cast as a general address to “the reader,” and explains the nature of his poetry, which Ausonius terms a mixture of the grave and the light.³⁰ The message is clear: Ausonius had written verses for all occasions, a versatility to be commended (3–4: *non unus vitae color est nec carminis unus / lector*), nor has he forgotten, even in lighter moments, the good old manners (*veteres mores*). There is nothing unusual or novel in these words. A word of “warning” regarding the nature of one’s poetry had accompanied a good number of works in antiquity, including another Ausonian work (*Bissula*, below). What is interesting is the choice of modern editors who, like Schenkl, placed this poem, together with another (Sch. *Epig.* 1), at the head of the entire collection of epigrams,

²⁹ Ausonius’ Syagrius is identified by Evelyn White (Loeb I 7) as Apanius (*sic*) Syagrius, cos. 382. It is virtually impossible to determine which of the two eminent Syagrii of the late fourth century is the man. On the problems involved, Martindale in *Historia* 16 (1967) 254–56; Demandt, *BZ* 64 (1971) 38–45; and more recently, R. Bagnall et alii, *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire* (Atlanta 1987) 649–50.

³⁰ *Commendatio codicis*, Sch. *Epigrammata* 2. 1–2: *laetis / seria miscuimus*.

or, like Peiper, before the so-called "imperial" epigrams which Ausonius devoted to Valentinian I and Gratian (nos. 26–31). Perhaps this brief "*recommendatio*" headed a published collection of several poems, or collections of poems, including at least some that were of an erotic or frivolous nature. So far this is the only detached dedicatory preface which refers to the nature of Ausonius' poetry.

Finally, the untitled epigram with which Schenkl chose to head his edited collection of Ausonian epigrams is addressed to one Augustus, presumably Gratian (Peiper 26). Evelyn White regards it as the dedicatory poem of the first "edition" of Ausonius' works.³¹ The verses hardly read as a dedication but rather as a mini-panegyric of an emperor who, in spite of wars, found time to exercise his pen. "Rejoice, thou son of Aeacus! Thou art sung once more by a lofty bard and thou art blessed with a Roman Homer."³² Such words were better suited to preface a poem by the emperor than a collected edition of poems by his former tutor. Perhaps it was an epigram sent to Gratian.³³

To sum up, the "detached" dedications that survived in the Ausonian corpus conform, to an extent, to classical patterns while also displaying some divergent traits. None of them discloses the contents of the works which they accompanied, in the manner of Statius, for example. All the prefaces exhibit the poet's self-importance either through autobiographical details or by the emphasis given to the personality of the dedicatee. In this way it appears that poetic successors like Prudentius almost deliberately revelled in display of humility and contempt for worldly achievements. Ausonius' dedications also reveal something of his working methods; these included several stages of composition, revisions, informal and formal circulation. One can envisage drafts of all sorts sent to literary friends for their comments, with a dedicatory note requesting this service in the name of *amicitia*. At some point a collection would be made, whether of older poems or more recent pieces, with a "final" address, either to a specific individual like the emperor, and or to the general reader. In such cases, it is necessary to distinguish between the date of the prefatory pieces and that of the work itself.

So important did the dedicatory preface appear to have become that an editorial decision, possibly later than Ausonius', deemed them worthy of separate publication. In other words, by a process which remains obscure, these short poems were detached from the text(s) which they were intended to accompany. Thus, the literary unity of the two, which ancient writers

³¹ Loeb I xxxvi; II 168.

³² *Exulta, Aeacide, celebraris vote superbo / rursum Romanusque tibi contingit Homerus* (16–17), translation of Evelyn White.

³³ Its date can be indicated by references to the Goths, Huns and Sarmatians (7–9), which place its composition in 379, when the *Precatio consulis designati* of the same year mentions the same tribes (36–37).

were careful to insist on, was no longer important. In this respect, there is need to draw a clear distinction between a preface proper and a dedicatory one.

Texts Without Specific Dedications

In his dedications Ausonius used a variety of terms to characterise his work: *opusculum* and *libellus* (*Parentalia*; *Epitaphs*; *Tech.*; *Griphus*; *Cento*; *Ecl.* 1); *liber*, *charta* (*Prof.* 25); and *carmen* (*Prof.* 26). *Libellus* is by far the most common. If, as White has suggested, *libelli* refer primarily to private and informal copies, to be distinguished from the formal published text, then the majority of Ausonius' poems which have come down to us do not necessarily represent a "final" version.³⁴ That this is feasible can be gathered from a brief examination of Ausonius' most famous poem, the *Moselle*.³⁵

As it stands, the *Moselle* lacks a personal dedication. Such a dedication, as far as I can see, was never composed, since the poem was first recited orally at the court in Trier. We have, however, a letter written by a contemporary which attests to the poem's fame and wide circulation (Symmachus, *Ep.* 1. 14). The appearance of this letter in the corpus of Ausonius' work raises a question concerning the circumstances in which it became attached to the *Moselle*. We may assume that either Ausonius arbitrarily added it at some point, even though the *Moselle* was not dedicated to Symmachus, or, more likely, it was added by a later editor who recognised the literary-historical connection, in itself rather plainly stated in the letter. In this letter, the Italian senator and litterateur Symmachus complains about Ausonius' failure to send him a personal copy of the *Moselle*. He is particularly chagrined since the *Moselle* had apparently reached many other hands in Italy before he was able to read it. Most significantly, Symmachus praises two parts of the poem: the famed fish-catalogue, presently occupying 66 lines (85–150), and, more surprisingly, a section on the source of the Moselle, which seems to be altogether missing from the version that has come down to us.³⁶ One must conclude, then, that between the time of its first oral presentation at the court at about A.D. 368 and the poem's "publication," the *Moselle* had been revised. A gap of about ten years can be postulated between the two events, the first taking place during the early campaigns of Valentinian I against the Alamanni, and

³⁴ White (above, note 1) 44–45.

³⁵ The following is based on H. Sivan, "Redating Ausonius' *Moselle*," *AJP* 111 (1990) 383–94, with some modifications.

³⁶ Symmachus 1. 14. 3–4, esp. *nequaquam tibi crederem de Mosellae ortu ac meatu multa narranti*. The phrase is difficult. The most recent commentator on Symmachus conceded a single line (470–71) on the topic of *ortus ac meatus* (Callu [Budé] 78 n. 3). On the other hand, these words could be taken to belong naturally together, and as such either would apply to virtually the entire poem.

the latter, around 378, when Ausonius' political eminence at the court ensured instant popularity for his work. The question remains whether one is here dealing with two editions or with a lacuna in the text. At present, I have no answer.

Although lacking a personal dedication, the *Moselle* is prefaced by a brief description of the physical and poetic journey which led to its composition (1–22). The reader is thus informed of the source of inspiration before the praises of the river commence. More significantly the *Moselle* concludes with a lengthy epilogue (438–83) which is divided into an autobiographical component (438–68) and a section consisting of a poetic farewell (469–83). The latter connects with the preface to form a ring-composition that frames the whole piece. These sections follow well-known paths and act as an exposition of the subject, its importance and its *raison d'être*. Within this tightly constructed progression the rather lengthy autobiography seems somewhat misplaced. It holds two further promises, one of future success for the poet himself, the other of future poems. The former was possibly made on the eve of his consulship, the latter never fulfilled.³⁷ Both were composed for the formal publication and circulation of the *Moselle*.

Ausonius' most personal poems, the *Parentalia* and the *Professores*, have been transmitted without a specific personal dedication. They have, however, formal prefaces (and epilogues) which serve a variety of functions. The *Parentalia*, a collection of brief poems commemorating dead relatives, is preceded by two prefaces, one in prose and one in verse, each explaining the nature of the poems. Both were obviously intended for the general reader who, so Ausonius piously hoped, would be spared the sorrow which had motivated the *Parentalia*. The prose preface warns the reader of the solemn and sober tone of the work, indicates its contents and explains the somewhat unusual title of the collection.³⁸ In the verse preface, although the title could not be scanned in dactylic verse, Ausonius expands on the meaning of the act of commemoration, and prepares the reader for the scale of the poetic undertaking which embraces near as well as remote kin.

In spite of some repetition, the two prefaces complement each other. It remains to clarify whether they were written on separate occasions or conceived of as an entity. The thirty poems of the *Parentalia*, each devoted to one or two relatives, cover a period of over forty years.³⁹ Even if

³⁷ Upon reflection, I wonder if the correct reading of vs. 450 (*Augustus, pater et nati*, Sch.; Peiper) is not that of the ms. (*pater et natus*), referring not to Valentinian I and Gratian (plus/minus Valentinian II), but to Gratian and a hypothetical son, the much longed-for dynastic heir. Comp. Claudian envisaging the pregnancy of Maria, *Epithalamium* 340–41 and *Cons. Stil.* 2. 236 f., 341 f.

³⁸ Comp. the *Epicedion's* prose preface, surprisingly, in view of the long tradition of Latin epicedia.

³⁹ Very few events in the *Parentalia* can be dated. One is the death of Ausonius' maternal uncle in 337; Sivan, "A Forerunner of Ausonius: Notes on Aemilius Magnus

Ausonius kept family records, the composition made little sense as a leisurely exercise well over fifty years after the death of some of the persons included. More logically, it must be viewed in conjunction with his career. I would propose at least two stages of assembling and "publishing" the *Parentalia*: one, upon that momentous turning point with Ausonius' departure from Bordeaux to Trier in 366/7, the other, as part of his consular propaganda.⁴⁰ Already in his *Gratiarum actio* for his consulship in 379 Ausonius briefly refers to his family and his city, topics which he duly enlarges upon in the *Parentalia* and the *Professores*.⁴¹

Similarly, a traditional type of *praefatio* in verse heads the *Professores*, a collection of poems commemorating dead colleagues at the schools of Bordeaux. It is addressed to the dead subjects of the poems, but is meant to explain the rationale which dictated the selection of some teachers and the exclusion of others.⁴² Like the verse preface to the *Parentalia*, this one also ends with the poet's pious hope that one day he would also be commemorated by a colleague. In addition, the poem ends with two concluding verse portions, one (*Coronis*), addressed to the general reader, the other (*Poeta*), a farewell to those commemorated.⁴³ In the *Coronis* Ausonius recapitulates the main points of what precedes while justifying possible stylistic faults on the grounds of sentiment. The *Poeta* (no. 26, Peiper), is cast as a personal farewell from a kindred spirit soon to join those whom he had so piously commemorated. Both epilogues connect thematically with the preface; the *Coronis* is also composed in the same metre. A period of at least fifty years, from the 310s to the 360s, is covered by the careers recorded in the *Professores*.⁴⁴ Its initial presentation, I would

Arboreus, Ausonius' Uncle," *Ancient History Bulletin* 2.6 (1988) 145–49. Another is the death of Ausonius' father in 377/8. The subject of *Parentalia* 32, Pomponia Urbica, has been identified as a supporter of Priscillian and a victim of mob agitation in Bordeaux in 385; R. H. P. Green, "Prosopographical Notes on the Family and Friends of Ausonius," *BICS* 25 (1978) 22, on the basis of Prosper, *Chron. s.a.* This is attractive but hypothetical. Nothing in Ausonius' words (discretion allowed) about her death implies either violent or untimely death, least of all a connection with an heretic. The one secure last date is Ausonius' own consulship in 379 (6. 32).

⁴⁰ J. F. Mauhews, *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court* (Oxford 1975) 51 f. for career sequence.

⁴¹ *Gratiarum actio* 8. 36: *non possum fidei causa ostendere imagines maiorum meorum ... non deductum ab heroibus genus vel adeo deorum stemma replicare ... sed ... dicere ... patriam non obscuram, familiam non paenitentiam.*

⁴² *Commemoratio Professorum Burdigalensium*, praef. 1–3: *vos etiam, quos nulla mihi cognatio iunxit, sed fama et carae religio partiae et studium in libris et sedula cura docenti* (not strictly adhered to in the poem itself).

⁴³ R. P. H. Green, "The Text of Ausonius: Fifty Emendations and Twelve," *Rh. Mus.* 125 (1982) 350, regards the *Poeta* as the second half of the *Coronis*, and the whole as a bipartite address to the reader and to the dead.

⁴⁴ A. D. Booth, "The Academic Career of Ausonius," *Phoenix* 36 (1982) 329–43, esp. 339, 341, extending in one case to the 370s; R. P. H. Green, "Still Waters Run Deep: A New Study of the *Professores of Bordeaux*," *CQ* 35 (1985) 491–506; R. A. Kaster,

suggest, belongs to the end of Ausonius' teaching career at Bordeaux and serves the dual purpose of paying homage to his city and colleagues as well as commemorating his own departure for greener pastures. It was then appropriately concluded with the *Coronis*. Years later, perhaps during his retirement in Aquitania, when the prospect of his own death was not far off, Ausonius updated and possibly revised the poem.⁴⁵ At that point, the *Poeta*, strongly reminiscent of contemporary funerary epitaphs, was added.⁴⁶

Lack of specific dedicatory preambles deprived the poet of an opportunity to throw around famous names and to indulge in self-glorification. These particular functions were discharged, in the case of the *Moselle*, through an epilogue and the addition of Symmachus' letter. The *Parentalia* and the *Professores* in themselves served as self-advertisement. That these personal poems were never dedicated, or at least transmitted without a specific dedication, is hardly surprising in view of their nature. They would have been inappropriate subjects of dedication unless addressed to a close family member.⁴⁷ Other aspects of a dedication, such as an apology about the style and an explanation of the poem's topic and circumstances were incorporated in the prefaces proper or the epilogues. In Ausonius' hands, then, the prefaces *per se* and the prefatory dedication became indistinguishable, each appended as it suited the poet's fancy rather than the dictates of the text.

Poems With Specific Dedications

To comply with Symmachus' desire to receive a work specially dedicated to him, Ausonius sent him the *Griphus*, a short poem on the number three, composed long before Symmachus' request and prefaced, upon dispatch, by a long prose letter. The dedication is important, as it throws light on the question of the circulation of "official" and unofficial copies. Ausonius

Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley 1988) 459, for grammarians only.

⁴⁵ *Prof.* 6. 35–39 provides, rather obliquely, the last datable reference, which mentions the execution of Delphidius' wife, a supporter of Priscillian, in 385: Sulpicius Severus, *Chron.* 2. 48; *Dial.* 3. 11.

⁴⁶ R. A. Latimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana 1942; repr. 1962); G. Sanders, "Les chrétiens face à l'épigraphie funéraire latine," in *Assimilation et résistance à la culture gréco-romaine dans le monde ancien* (VI Cong. Inter. d'Études Classiques, Madrid 1974), ed. D. M. Pippidi (Bucarest–Paris 1976) 283–99.

⁴⁷ By comparison, one may observe the *Ordo Urbium Nobilium*, a catalogue of well-known cities, likewise transmitted without a dedication. There are indications that the *Ordo* had been originally conceived as a work rather limited in scope and only expanded later on. In one manuscript (T) only eleven cities are included, while two others (VP) include a much fuller list which all modern editors prefer. Ausonius himself stated that the city of Aquileia had been added as an afterthought (*non erat iste locus, merito tamen aucta recenti* 64). Perhaps he never found an occasion to dedicate such an eclectic work and it has remained, as it now stands, without a dedication or a preface.

explains the genesis of the *Griphus*, a work which he had composed on a festive evening during a military campaign of the emperor Valentinian I in 367/8.⁴⁸ Before the *Griphus* was formally sent with a dedication to Symmachus it had been in wide circulation for some time, although without the author's permission. In the course of this process various hands introduced into the text revisions of which Ausonius apparently disapproved.⁴⁹ The lengthy preface also enabled Ausonius to display his erudition by referring to examples which he deliberately forbore to include in the poem itself. Most significantly, perhaps, a dedication of the *Griphus* type enabled the poet to bridge the gap between the time of composition and the dispatch of the poem.

On occasions of informal circulation some chosen addressees were expected to react with words of encouragement and admiration, as well as with suggestions for revision. Even when a poem had been in public hands for some time, like the *Griphus*, Ausonius still included the classic request which referred to the judgement of his dedicatee.⁵⁰ Whether or not the recipients exercised the authority invested so trustingly in them remains a matter of speculation. Although requests of this sort have generally acquired the force of a cliché, some addressees may have taken them seriously. At any rate, Ausonius' prefatory letter to Symmachus implies that the *Griphus* was finally about to be "formally" launched.

Latinus Drepanius Pacatus, a rhetor from the schools of Bordeaux and the author of the last speech in the collection known as the Latin Panegyrics, is Ausonius' most frequent addressee in the dedicatory prefaces. A collection of poems, the *Eclogues*, had been sent to him with a verse dedication headed by a quotation from Catullus' well-known dedication to Cornelius.⁵¹ This act of *imitatio* placed Ausonius within a long and venerable tradition of dedicatory prefaces, and enabled him at the same time to produce an apology for any defects in the text (*cui dono lepidum novum*

⁴⁸ *Griphus* 1: *in expeditione, quod tempus, ut scis, licentiae militaris est, super mensam meam facta est invitatio . . .*

⁴⁹ See above, pp. 85–86.

⁵⁰ *Griphus* 1: *iste nugator libellus . . . quem tu aut ut Aesculapius redintegrabis ad vitam aut ut Plato iuvante Vulcano liberabis infamia, si pervenire non debet ad famam.*

⁵¹ Schenkl and Peiper differ markedly in their reconstruction of the *Eclogues*. Peiper assembled twenty-six poems under the title of *Eclogarum liber*, of which twenty deal with the calendar (no. VII. 8–23, 25–26 = Schenkl V. 1–18). In addition, there are three "philosophical" poems (Peiper VII. 2–4 = Sch. XXVIII–XXXI), one based on Hesiod (Peiper VII. 5 = Sch. XXXII), one on weights (P. VII. 6 = Sch. XXX), one on the toils of Heracles (P. VII. 24 = Sch. XXXIII) and one on childbirth (P. VII. 7 = Sch. XXXV). What Peiper and Evelyn White regard as the dedicatory poem of the *Eclogues*, P. VII. 1, Schenkl edited as a separate poem, namely a dedication without an attached text, Sch. XXIII. While it is true that the poem to Pacatus does not disclose the nature of the text originally attached to it, I would tend in this case to support Peiper and Evelyn White in regarding all these poems as parts of one collection, as does Pastorino. This is not to exclude the possibility that some poems did circulate at some point separately, as the content list of the lost Veronensis seems to imply (Reeve [above, note 9] 117, nos. 8, 12–14).

libellum? . . . *at nos inlepidum, rudem libellum* 1, 4). In the address to Pacatus, Ausonius asked his trusted friend to "cover up" the poem's shortcomings.⁵² The request for revisions was probably not an idle one or a "polite farce."⁵³ Pacatus was surely in a position to appreciate and improve on the drafts sent to him. Be that as it may, Ausonius did not feel the need to supply the text with a proper preface and the dedication hints at neither the contents nor the form of what was to follow.

Yet the need to include both a proper preface and a dedicatory one did arise with the *Ludus Septem Sapientum*. Pacatus, the dedicatee, is consulted about the issue of "publish or perish," but the request is couched in so many puns that its seriousness is undermined.⁵⁴ Not that Pacatus was unable to offer just such criticism. He had been a colleague and a friend of many years and would have performed the task with discretion and efficiency. No indication of the date of dispatch is given in the dedication, aside from its title which points to a terminus post quem of 389, after Pacatus' proconsulship of Africa. But the poem itself may have been the product of the years of teaching in Bordeaux, and hence composed long before it was sent to Pacatus. Indeed, the *Ludus* has a verse preface of its own which follows the basic guidelines of presenting the subject matter of the text with a brief erudite digression on the ancient theatre. This seems necessary if indeed the *Ludus* had originated as a school material, for the Greek theatre was obviously unfamiliar to students in late Roman Gaul. The dedication to Pacatus, then, forges a link between author and public and between the time of the poem's composition and its first "public" presentation. The preface, on the other hand, fills the gap of information regarding the form and contents of the poem.

All these functions were performed through the composition of a single prose dedication to a poem entitled *Cupido Cruciatu*s. A letter to Proculus Gregorius, a consular candidate in 383, describes the circumstances of the poem's composition, its source of poetic inspiration, and even its genre, an eclogue.⁵⁵ In spite of the usual protestation of modesty (*mihi praeter lemma nihil placet*), Ausonius clearly expected the praises of his addressee (*certus sum, quodcumque meum scieris, amabis: quod magis spero quam ut laudes*). Gregorius may not have possessed the literary qualification necessary for the type of constructive (and flattering) criticism which Ausonius usually sought. Needless to say, after this dedication, the story of

⁵² Ausonius *Drepanio filio*, Sch. XXIII. 17-18: *ignoscenda teget, probata tradet./ post hunc iudicium time*te nulla, noting the playful tone throughout.

⁵³ Pace Evelyn White, Loeb I xxxv.

⁵⁴ 1-4: *ignoscenda istaec an cognoscenda rearis / adtento, Drepani, perlege iudicio./ aequanimus fiam te iudice, sive legenda, / sive tegenda putes carmina, quae dedimus; 15: correct*a magis quam condemnata vocabo; 18: *optabo, ut placeam, si minus, ut lateam*.

⁵⁵ The letter even describes the stages of poetical inspiration and composition: (1) A. sees the picture; (2) A. translates visual impressions into verbal forms; (3) A. sends copies to friends.

the punishment of Cupid starts without further ado. Like the first lines of the *Moselle*, the words of the dedication create an atmosphere in which poet and reader could share in the initial visual experience which had set in motion the process of verbal creativity. In this respect, the dedication and the text complement each other, the one leading into the other.

Specific addressees, as one may surmise, were the recipients of both informal and formal/final copies of Ausonius' poems. One of their functions was to offer criticism with a view to revisions before publication; another was simply to afford the poet an opportunity to preface his works with either an explanation of its genesis or its vicissitudes. Literary patronage, such as that sought by Martial and Statius, was hardly ever an issue, for by the time Ausonius came to circulate his poems, either privately or publicly, his political, social and economic position guaranteed his work a kindly reception. The dedication rather indicates the spread of a literary network in which the sending, dedicating and the exchange of works acted as an instrument of maintaining *amicitia*.

Multiple Dedications

When the *Cento Nuptialis* was sent to Paulus, Ausonius decided to frame it with a lengthy prose dedication at the beginning and a conclusion in which verse and prose sections alternate. This somewhat curious imbalance echoes the work itself in which the pastiche of Virgilian verses is "relieved" by a brief prose interlude preceding the most erotic section of the poem. The *Cento*, as the dedicatory epistle indicates, has an interesting history: It was composed in one day as a response to a challenge by no less a person than the emperor Valentinian I. When the *Cento* was first presented, in the form of an oral recitation, it was suitably headed by a verse dedication to the emperor and his son Gratian. When it was finally dedicated to a fellow poet (Paulus), the *Cento* was preceded by a long exposition on the meaning and the history of the genre, both of which seem quite superfluous as far as Paulus, himself a poet, was concerned. But there was considerable interest among contemporaries in the *Cento* and its possible adaptations to a variety of purposes.⁵⁶

The lengthy dedication to Paulus enabled its author to explain the circumstances of the poem's initial presentation when it had been dedicated to the two reigning Augusti. This was surely the prime motivation of the long dedication, written years after the events described. The poem itself may have been written as early as 367/8, at a time when the type of flattery in the preface was particularly useful to poet and addressees alike. In August 367, after a brief illness, Valentinian I promoted his eight-year old son to

⁵⁶ Proba's *Cento* is the best known example of Christian adaptation of Virgil in the fourth century. In general, F. E. Consolino, "Da Osidio Geta ad Ausonio e Proba: le molte possibilità del centone," *Atene e Roma* 28 (1983) 133-51.

the rank of an Augustus, a constitutional novelty as Ammianus Marcellinus remarked.⁵⁷ In view of the availability of older and much more experienced candidates, and the lack of decisive military victories over the enemies of the empire, the dynasty just established needed all the support it could get. Ausonius' preface to the *Cento* served therefore as propaganda for the Augusti, and as advertisement for a poet who could exercise both talent and discretion. The dedication, composed when circumstances changed, and possibly after the death of Valentinian I in 375 and during the reign of Gratian (375–383), allowed the vain author to name-drop in a "humble" and socially accepted manner, and illustrated his own position and poetic reputation.

By way of apology for trivialising Virgil, Ausonius concluded the *Cento* by citing all the poets who, like himself, mixed the serious with the frivolous. He craved the indulgence of his potential readers by offering Martial's well-known apology of blameless life in spite of blameworthy erotic verses (1. 48). With this ending Ausonius included an autobiographical element which further reinforces the image fostered in the dedication while imbedding in the reader's mind the *jeu d'esprit* in which, after all, the poem had been conceived.

Perhaps the most spectacular example of the use of multiple prefatory pieces is the *Bissula*. The three short poems, and a fragment of a fourth, which at present constitute the whole of the *Bissula*, are prefaced by no less than three dedications, two to the same person (one in prose and one in verse) and one to the general reader. The first is a letter explaining the act of dispatch and offering an apology for stylistic faults, two matters which Ausonius briefly repeats in his verse *praefatio* addressed, like the prose letter, to Paulus. Luckily for Ausonius, the name of his Germanic mistress scans, as does that of her tribe (the Suebi), facts which enabled the poet to introduce her twice, once in each of the dedications. The relatively long prose letter, somewhat out of proportion to the length of the poems enclosed, also introduces Paulus as one initiated into the "mysteries" of Ausonius' poetic sanctuary. Owing to these terms of intimacy Paulus had access to the most private compositions of his "mentor," one of which was now dedicated to him.⁵⁸

If this was not enough to alert potential readers to the nature of the *Bissula*, Ausonius appended a third dedication, *ad lectorem huius libelli*, in which the public is enjoined to read these verses in the spirit in which they had been written, and preferably after a cup or two of some suitable drink. Under the combined influence of alcohol and light words, even the most sober of readers would be happily plunged into a sleep from which the

⁵⁷ Amm. 27. 6. 16.

⁵⁸ *Bissula* 1, Ausonius Paulo: poematia, quae in alumnam meam luseram, rudia et incohata ad domesticae solacium cantilinae, cum sine metu et arcana securitate fruerentur, proferri ad lucem caligantia coegisti.

experience would emerge as a bygone dream. One wonders if this triple dedication had been conceived as a parody on the process of initiation into a *mysterium*, and a series of formal warnings aimed at different levels of *profani*. In the poems themselves, however, there is no trace of parody although it may appear idle to deny that the whole may well have been written tongue in cheek. Be the intent serious or light, the dedications to Paulus reflect the close relationship between author and addressee, particularly in view of the private nature of the verses enclosed. It seems hardly surprising that the *Bissula* and the *Cento*, both the most "erotic" of Ausonius' poems, were eventually dedicated to Paulus. They would have been ill suited to any of the "political" addressees, when the act of dedication was a calculated move to gain prestige rather than a gesture of friendship.

The collection of poems on various school topics known as the *Technopaegnon* presents a complication. It was dedicated at least twice, once to Pacatus (V) and once to Paulinus (Z), a pupil and friend, and later bishop of Nola, both in prose (XXVII. 1 and 2). This last is now followed by a short poem (3) whose verses start and end with a monosyllable, and by another poem (4), variously entitled *versus monosyllabis terminati exordio libero praefatio* (Sch. XXVII. 4) or *praefatio monosyllabarum tantum in fine positarum* (Peiper XII. 4) and composed in both prose and verse.⁵⁹ In fact, this is a second dedication to Pacatus who is once more addressed at the very end of the collection, on a final note of polite apology.⁶⁰

Through the confusion it seems possible to discern several stages of composition and circulation: (a) A poem composed of verses starting and ending with the same syllable (3) was sent with a dedication to a beloved pupil (Paulinus), perhaps when Ausonius was teaching him at Bordeaux, before 366/7.⁶¹ The dedication is a model of its sort, organised along the best guidelines of the classical rhetorical preface, stating the title of the work enclosed, its contents, the difficulties involved in the composition, an apology for imperfections, and an invitation to imitate this type of literary effort: indeed, just what one might expect from a teacher to a student. (b) A dedicatory preface (4), not dissimilar in contents and form, was composed in honor of Pacatus, and preceded a collection of poems ending with a monosyllable. Since, however, Pacatus was a colleague and not a pupil, the act of dispatch was anticipating a similar gesture on the part of the dedicatee. The concluding verses of this dedication serve as a sample of what was to

⁵⁹ Following Schenkl's arrangement (XXVII. 4) rather than Peiper's division of the dedication into two distinct sections, XII. 4 + 5.

⁶⁰ Sch. XXVII. 13 (*Grammaticomastix*) 21–22: *indulge, Pacate, bonus, doctus, facilis vir, I totum opus hoc sparsum, crinis velut Antiphilae. pax* (reading of V: *Pauline Z*). For Evelyn White, Loeb I xl, these are indications of a "deliberate revision."

⁶¹ The phrase *inertis mei inutile opusculum* (*Tech.* 3) does not refer to the years of leisurely retirement in the 380s and early 390s, as is usually assumed. To judge by Ausonius' usual facility of composition, he would have needed no more than one peaceful weekend to put together sixteen verses.

follow. Both dedications, then, conform to school-book rules and precedents, each discharging the functions usually associated with a rhetorical preface. (c) Years later, the poem sent to Paulinus was combined with those sent to Pacatus to form the present *Technopaegnion*, which was headed by a second prefatory dedication to Pacatus. Why this was necessary remains unclear since, like its predecessors, this epistolary preface comments on the nature of the text enclosed and specifies the title of the entire collection, now extended from a single poem to several poems. If the title of this third dedication (*Ausonius Pacato Proconsuli*) is original and contemporary with the time of composition, the *Technopaegnion* could not have been sent to Pacatus before 389, the date of Pacatus' African proconsulship. On the whole, the amount of repetition in all three is remarkable, particularly as each is conceived as a smooth and direct transition into the main body of the work.

Just how flexible and virtually autonomous the vehicle of personal dedication or dedicatory preface has become in late antiquity is borne out by the example of Ausonius. For him, the composition and dispatch of a dedication offered an opportunity to "tell the world" about the author, to vaunt his highly-placed contacts, and to impress the readers with poetic versatility if not with context—so much so that many of the dedications can be read on their own, independently of the text to which they were attached. In this respect, it seems useful, if not essential, to draw a clear distinction between the time of the dedicatory presentation and that of the text's composition. And this is not as self-evident as may at first appear. Editors of Ausonius have traditionally adopted a system of dating which invariably relies on the last datable reference either in the dedications, prefaces, or the texts themselves. Yet, such a method does not take into account all the factors involved in the process of composition, dedication, publication and dissemination.

By way of a brief conclusion, contemporary prefaces by two authors influenced by Ausonius can offer some useful correlations and a point of departure for further study. Prudentius' preface has already been mentioned. Cast as an autobiography, it fails (deliberately) to refer to the author's own name, his home and his family. It does contain, albeit in a vague manner, a list of his "earthly" achievements as well as a reference to his written works, such as the *Cathemerion*. Poetry, in the hands of Prudentius, is regarded not as a tool for displaying one's own status or talent, but as a religious vocation. Nor, obviously, is the preface dedicated to a mortal but to God alone. It is as though Ausonian prefaces were recast as anti-heroic compositions with the author submerging his personality and even individuality in a sea of humility and modesty.

Ausonius' own grandson, perhaps the dedicatee of the *Protrepicon*, Paulinus of Pella, combined in his prose preface elements found in the prefaces of both Ausonius and Prudentius. The *Eucharisticon*, moulded as a confession and profession of faith, is dedicated to the public, or general

reader, and attempts to explain the reasons behind its composition. As Paulinus explains in the preface, the *Eucharisticon* is an autobiography of an essentially unworthy subject, with no claim to fame in any sense of the word. But the true source of inspiration was God's unmistakable presence throughout the vicissitudes of his life and in this alone lies the justification of the act of writing. For, in spite of wasted years, this act has in itself the redeeming virtue of reconciling poetry with piety.

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Cyranidea: Some Improvements

BARRY BALDWIN

There is much of value in George Panayiotou's (henceforth P.) recent lexical study of the *Cyranides*.¹ However, a good deal requires correction or deserves supplement. And some of P.'s philological history may be vitiated by his cavalier acceptance² of a 1st- or 2nd-century A.D. date for the work. P. seems altogether unaware of the detailed and cogent study by Klaus Alpers³ which assigns the *Cyranides* to the late 4th century, a fair amount of the book being a redaction of the work of Harpocraton, an iatrosophist of the period. On this reckoning,⁴ the vocabulary of the *Cyranides* will often follow where P. has it lead. Alpers' dating is strongly enhanced by Martin West's disclosure⁵ of acrostic references in the *Cyranides* to Magnus and Marcellinus, also unknown to P. Magnus is now generally and plausibly taken to be the celebrated 4th-century doctor Magnus of Nisibis; Marcellinus may or may not be the historian Ammianus Marcellinus.⁶ Finally, P. nowhere acknowledges the serious shortcomings⁷ of the edition of the *Cyranides* by Dimitris Kaimakis (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) which he uses.

¹ "Paralipomena Lexicographica Cyranidea," *ICS* 15 (1990) 295-338.

² In his own words, P. simply takes the date from LSJ and the cognate *Canon of Greek Authors and Works*² (New York 1986) designed for the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* by L. Berkowitz and K. A. Squitier.

³ "Untersuchungen zum griechischen Physiologus und den Kyraniden," *Vestigia Bibliae (Jahrbuch des deutschen Bibel-Archivs, Hamburg)* 6 (1984) 13-84.

⁴ Alpers' dating is accepted by the two latest writers on the work: D. Bain, "'Treading Birds': An Unnoticed use of πατέω (*Cyranides* 1. 10. 27, 1. 19. 9)," in E. M. Craik (ed.), *Owls To Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford 1990) 295-304; G. W. Bowersock, review of J. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus*, *JRS* 80 (1990) 247-48. The Harpocraton in question would appear to be the medical writer from Alexandria, possibly to be conflated with the homonymous poet and rhetorician attested at Constantinople in the years 358-63; cf. *PLRE* I 408.

⁵ "Magnus and Marcellinus: Unnoticed Acrostics in the *Cyranides*," *CQ* 32 (1982) 480-81.

⁶ Bain and West are tempted by the identification; Bowersock finds it implausible.

⁷ Trenchantly exposed by Bain 298-99.

ἀγνώστω: This adverb is far commoner in patristic Greek than P. implies, and is there used in senses very close to that of "unawares" or "unknowingly" which P. claims to be unique to the *Cyranides* (henceforth *Cyran.*).

ἀγριολάχανον: P. ignores a probable occurrence of this rare noun in Palladius, *Hist. Laus.* 26; true, there is a variant reading, but Lampe accepts our word.

ἀειθαλῆς βοτάνη: P. may well be right in taking these words to signify a particular plant (the houseleek) rather than any kind of green vegetable. But he is perhaps too dogmatic on the matter; also, one should consider such locutions as τῆς ἀειθαλοῦς ἀκάνθης, applied by Clement (*Paed.* 2. 8) to Christ's crown of thorns.

ἀερόθεν: According to P., "Cyran. antedates by some centuries the authors cited for this word in the lexica." Perhaps so. But it ought to be made clear that this adverb is hardly in the lexica; LSJ and Stephanus adduce only Eustathius, and it is not in Lampe, Sophocles, or Du Cange.

ἀμέθυσος: It can be added that this word occurs as a feminine noun in Michael Psellus, *De lapidum virtutibus* (p. 72, line 20, ed. P. Galigani [Florence 1980]).

ἀπειθέω: P. claims that the construction of this verb with the infinitive in the sense of "to refuse to obey an order to" is unattested in the lexica. But cf. Lampe s.v. 3 and 4 for close parallels in *Hom. Clem.* and Cyril of Alexandria.

ἀράχνιος: This may not be a new word, as P. maintains, since it is a variant reading at Basil, *Hex.* 6. 6. It can also be observed that in one form or another the epithet is something of a favourite with Gregory Nazianzenus.

ἀρμενίζω: Even if *Cyran.* does belong to the 1st or 2nd century, P. is not justified in saying that this word is in "much later" Christian sources: It occurs in *Test. Neph.* 6. 2 in the *Testamenta XII Patriarchum*, the Greek version of which is tentatively dated by Lampe (xl) to c. A.D. 50.

ἀρρενοτόκος: P. translates "associated with the birth of male children," calling it a new meaning, but in point of fact this does not much differ from the sense comported by the epithet in the passages from Aristotle and Christian writers adduced by LSJ and Lampe.

ἀρσενόθηλυ: P. censures LSJ for restricting the meaning of this compound to "hermaphrodite," but overlooks patristic examples (on parade in Lampe) of the requisite sense of considering male and female together.

ἀχειμάστω: P. correctly observes that this adverbial form is not in the lexica, but might have noted the cognate ἀχειμαστί from Methodius, *Symp.* 11. 3.

βαμβάκινο: All that P. says about this word is correct. In view of the recorded allotropes and sketchiness of the entries in, say, Stephanus and Du Cange mentioned by P., it is worth subjoining the word's survival into modern Greek, also the Albanian equivalent, *pambuk*.

βολβός: P. complains that, of the lexica, only Stephanus records the sense of "eye-ball," although it is the first meaning given in Lampe's entry for the word, taken from a work wrongly attributed to John Damascene.

γαλλικόν: P. says that only Sophocles of modern lexicographers records this word, but the same passage from Theophanes the chronicler is adduced by Lampe.

δενδροκολάπτης: For completeness' sake, add the equally rare cognate δενδροκόλαψ on show once in the late (perhaps 9th-century) writer Meletius, *Nat. Hom.* 27.

διακλύζομαι: What P. says about the novelty of this verb's passive use of a lotion used for washing out the mouth seems correct, but one should note the relative frequency in medical writers of the cognate noun διάκλυσμα for a mouth-wash, also the term διάκλυσις, not in LSJ, apparently unique to Theodore Stud., *Epp.* 2. 219.

διωκτικόν: P. regards this substantive use in the sense of an apotropaic amulet as new. The claim is not wrong, but the novelty may be tempered by the occurrence of the adjectival form meaning "able to drive away" in the *Const. App.* 8. 29. 3, a document of the 4th century.

ἐνηδόνως: It should be added to P.'s otherwise adequate account that this adverb occurs at least three times in Johannes Climacus (*Scal.* 15, 22, 30), clearly something of a personal favourite with this author. Lampe records no other user; the cognate adjective is also infrequent, but has a wider distribution over pagan and Christian writers.

ἐπτάπολος: P. appears correct in calling this a new word. One may detect something of a Christian and/or late Greek influence, given the large number of compounds with this prefix to be found in patristic authors but missing from LSJ.

εὐστομαχία: It is worth noting that Isidore of Pelusium (*Epp.* 4. 49) has the cognate adjective in the sense of "having a good digestion"; this slightly tempers the novelty claimed by P. for Cyran.'s use of the noun.

ζωογονέω: P.'s claim that the transitive use of this verb in the sense of "resuscitate" is new is amply refuted by a glance at Lampe's many entries for the word.

ἡδύλαλος: P. classifies this proparoxytone adjective as a new word, bearing a passive sense in contrast with the active meaning of the paroxytone form which is equally rare, being reported by LSJ only from an inscription at Amorgos. However, Lampe registers (it is his only example) the proparoxytone in an active sense from Ephraem the Syrian.

καστόριον: For the Latin equivalent of this Greek term for the testicles of a beaver (used for magic and medicine), P. reproduces from Stephanus a passage from Pliny, *NH* 32. 26. One may add from the same author *NH* 8. 109: *easdem partes sibi ipsi Pontici amputant fibri periculo urgente, ob hoc se peti gnari: castoreum id vocant medici.*

κογχύλη: P.'s information is in order, though the presence of the word in the requisite sense in such vernacular authors as John Malalas and the *Paschal Chronicle* suggests it was commoner than his notice implies.

κροτών: P. finds the unparalleled meaning of "young dog" in this word, since both lemma and entry in this passage (2. 20) of Cyran. have to do with puppies. But he confesses to "serious doubts" about the soundness of the reading. In my opinion, the word (if correct) comports its primary sense of "tick" and the author will be talking about the delousing of dogs. If P. is on the right lines, one might invoke the Albanian word *kone* for "puppy" to justify a Greek equivalent.

λύσις: P. claims novelty for employment of this noun in the sense of a magical or medicinal antidote, but it is in fact very similar to one of its patristic meanings of a remedy for trouble or difficulties.

μοιρικός: It is not true that this term in the sense of "ordained by destiny" is unique to Cyran.; Lampe gives an example from John Malalas.

μονανδρία: Not a new word, as P. says, since it occurs in John Chrysostom, *Ad Vit. Jun.* 2 tit. Notice also the cognate verb and adjective, featuring in both pagan and Christian Greek. In addition to the passages jointly adduced by LSJ and Lampe, the adjective can be seen in *AP* 15. 33. 9 (Arethas).

ὄνειριάζω: P. might have noted the patristic verb ὄνειράζομαι (not in LSJ) in this connection.

πατέω: The sexual sense of this verb (of roosters mounting hens), apparently unique to Cyran., is independently pointed out by Bain (above, note 4), who also surmises that the usage must have been common and this lonely example only a freak of circumstance.

πελεκᾱνος: P.'s argument that at least one bird of this name must have been a species with a large beak could have been enhanced by the patristic use of this word (recorded by Lampe) in the figurative sense of an aggressive person.

σπεκλᾱριον: A propos this word's sense of "window" in Cyran., P. might have noted the same meaning in patristic Greek of the cognate σπέκλον.

συντυχία: P. says that the meaning of "chance encounter" is a new one for this noun, an odd claim since this is the very first usage recorded in Lampe's entry, and it is very common in related meanings in patristic Greek.

τεκνοσπορέω: The uniqueness of this verb is probably a statistical freak in view of the existence of cognate noun and adjective.

τριχοποιέω: P.'s documentation of this verb can be strengthened by the lone occurrence of the cognate adjective, in the requisite sense of "hair-producing," in Gregory of Nyssa, *Hom. Opif.* 30. 27.

χαριτήσιος: For epigraphic and papyrological examples of this adjective, claimed as a new word by P., see L. R. Palmer, *A Grammar of the Post-Ptolemaic Papyri* (London 1945) 31, 33.

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Die Aldina der Rhetores Graeci (1508–1509) und ihre handschriftlichen Vorlagen

MARTIN SICHERL

*Dem Andenken an Alexander Turyn
zu seinem 90. Geburtstage*

Die Editio princeps zahlreicher rhetorischer Traktate und Kommentare, eine Folioausgabe in zwei Bänden,¹ von denen der erste das Impressum des Aldus Manutius vom November 1508, der zweite vom Mai 1509 trägt, ist von dem Kreter Demetrios Dukas² besorgt. In seiner griechischen Vorrede an seinen Landsmann Markos Musuros im ersten Band³ sagt er, daß er die Rhetorik des Hermogenes zusammen mit Aldus emendiert habe. Wieweit die Mitarbeit des Aldus über Hermogenes hinaus bei der Gestaltung des Textes ging, ist nicht auszumachen, es gibt aber Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß er an der Auswahl der Texte beteiligt war. Das legen auch seine Vorreden an Ianos Laskaris im ersten und an Markos Musuros im zweiten Bande⁴ nahe. Die Widmung des ersten Bandes an Ianos Laskaris⁵ begründet er damit, daß

¹ A. A. Renouard, *Annales de l'imprimerie des Alde*³ (Paris 1834 [ND Bologna 1950]) 54 f.; E. Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique ou description raisonnée des ouvrages publiés en grec aux XV^e et XVI^e siècles* 1 (Paris 1885 [ND Bruxelles 1963]) 82 ff.; S. F. W. Hoffmann, *Bibliographisches Lexicon der gesamten Literatur der Griechen* 3 (Leipzig 1845 [ND Amsterdam 1961]) 340 f. Ich habe das Exemplar der Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris benutzt (Inv. Rés. X. 611–12; unter der Signatur Rés. X. 1656 des *Catalogue des imprimés* 41 [1931] 766, die auch Legrand angibt, ist es nicht zu finden). Bei Legrand fehlt auf dem Titelblatt *Menandri Rhetoris divisio causarum in genere demonstrativo*, das im Original auf die *Adnotationes innominati de figuris Rhetoricis* folgt. Aber der letzte Titel (Minukianos) fehlt auch im Original, ist aber im πίναξ verzeichnet: Μινουκιανοῦ περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων. Ἐν ἄλλῳ Νικαγόρου.

² D. J. Geanakoplos, *Greek scholars in Venice. Studies in the dissemination of Greek learning from Byzantium to Western Europe* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962) 223–55.

³ Legrand 85–88.

⁴ Abgedruckt bei B. Botfield, *Praefationes et epistolae editionibus principibus auctorum veterum praepositae* (Cantabrigiis 1861) 275–78; Legrand 1, 83–85 und 88 f.; G. Orlandi, *Aldo Manuzio editore. Dediche, prefazioni, note ai testi*. Introduzione di C. Dionisotti (Milano 1976) 97–99 (die an Laskaris).

⁵ Zu diesem vgl. Legrand 1, S. CXXXI–CLXII; B. Knös, *Un ambassadeur de l'hellénisme: Janus Lascaris et la tradition greco-byzantine dans l'humanisme français* (Upsala–Paris 1945); *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Paläologenzeit* 6, 14536.

er bei seinem schweren, sorgen- und mühevollen Werk schon früher und nun in den letzten fünf Jahren, als Laskaris Legat des Königs von Frankreich war,⁶ von ihm mit Rat und Tat unterstützt wurde. Dieser stelle ihm nicht nur die Bücher seiner reichhaltigen Bibliothek zur Verfügung, sondern ermuntere ihn unablässig zum Drucke der besten. Die *Praecepta de componendis declamationibus* (Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων), die in die Ausgabe aufgenommen sind, habe er wie auch viele andere lesenswerteste Bücher aus Griechenland nach Italien gebracht. Dazu kämen (im zweiten Bande) Syrianus, Marcellinus und Sopater mit ihrem gründlichen und gelehrten Kommentar zur Rhetorik des Hermogenes, die ihm Laskaris zur Besorgung des Druckes übergeben habe. Außerdem sei nichts passender, als ihm, dem gelehrten Botschafter des Königs (*regio oratori*), dem gelehrtesten Griechen seiner Zeit, die gelehrtesten Lehrer der Beredsamkeit zu widmen.

Daß auch Musuros, der wichtigste Mitarbeiter des Aldus,⁷ der für eine Reihe von Aldinen verantwortlich zeichnete, an der Ausgabe mitgearbeitet habe, ist weder der Vorrede des Demetrios Dukas zum ersten Bande noch denen des Aldus zu entnehmen. Vielmehr rühmt ihn Dukas als Lehrer des Griechischen an der Universität Padua, wo er eine zahlreiche Schülerschar um sich versammle, um ihnen die Kenntnis des Griechischen zu vermitteln. So solle er auch die Rhetorik des Hermogenes seinen Freunden und Schülern erklären, die sie als die nützlichste und brauchbarste für den Unterricht begierig aufnehmen werden. Dazu konnte es freilich nicht mehr kommen. Gleich nach dem Datum des zweiten Bandes mußte die Universität Padua infolge des Krieges der Liga von Cambrai gegen Venedig, auf den Aldus in seinem Vorwort Bezug nimmt, ihre Pforten schließen, und damit endete die Professur des Musuros; eben dieses Vorwort ist das letzte Zeugnis seines Wirkens an der Universität Padua. Dukas nennt dann die *Rhetorica* des Aristoteles, den er als τὸν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευταῖα τῆς σοφίας ἀπενεγκάμενον, ἐν ᾧ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔδειξε δύναμιν ἢ φύσιν rühmt. Danach komme des Sopatros Ζητημάτων διαίρεσις, ein sehr seltenes und schwer auffindbares Buch, das Ianos Laskaris neben vielen anderen als erster nach Italien gebracht habe. Ihn feiert Dukas ähnlich wie Aldus als den allerbesten Mann oder besser Heros Griechenlands, Abkömmling königlichen Geschlechts und Lehrer des Adressaten Musuros. Als letzten erwähnt er Dionysios von Halikarnaß, auf den in der Aldina allerdings noch viele andere folgen. Sein Buch, in dem sich wie in einem

⁶ Ianos Laskaris war in den Jahren 1504–1509 Botschafter (*orator*) des Königs von Frankreich bei der Republik Venedig, nachdem er dorthin im Jahre 1503 bereits zweimal in besonderer Mission vom König entsandt worden war, Legrand CXLIV–CXLIX; Knös 102–33. Laskaris hatte Venedig vor dem 14. März 1509 verlassen, um sich zum König nach Frankreich zu begeben, aber nach dem Vorwort des Aldus zum 2. Band der *Rhetores Graeci* scheint damit seine Funktion als *orator regius* noch nicht zu Ende gewesen zu sein.

⁷ Geanakoplos 111–66; er war seit 1503 Vertreter des griechischen Lehrstuhls der Universität Padua, von 1505 bis gegen Mitte 1509, als die Universität geschlossen wurde, dessen Inhaber.

weiten Auffangbecken die Ströme der Rhetorik gesammelt hätten, "haben wir, mein lieber Musuros, mit viel Arbeit und Mühe an Hand der Abschriften, auf die wir gestoßen sind, für die Philologen emendiert."

Die Erstausgabe der *Rhetores Graeci*, die Renouard als die wohl wertvollste aller Aldinen bezeichnet, ist in einigen ihrer Teile bis ins 17. und selbst bis ins 19. Jh. unersetzt geblieben. Aristoteles, Alexander (Numeniu) und Minukianos wurden erst in den Jahren 1688–1690 von Laurentius Norrmannus in Upsala neu herausgegeben, Menander 1785 von A. H. L. Heeren in Göttingen; Sopatros' *Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων* und Kyros, Phoibammon und Apsines (wenn man von dem Kapitel *περὶ μνήμης* absieht, von dem F. Morelli 1618 in Paris eine Sonderausgabe mit lateinischer Übersetzung und Noten veranstaltete), und der gesamte Inhalt des zweiten Bandes sind erst wieder von Christian Walz in seiner monumentalen Ausgabe der *Rhetores Graeci* (Stuttgart 1832–1836) neu herausgegeben worden. Anders ist es bei Aphthonios, dessen *Progymnasmata* auch in der Renaissance sehr beliebt waren; er ist schon 1515 bei Iunta in Florenz neu herausgekommen und in der Folge oft gedruckt worden.⁸ Das gleiche gilt auch für Aristoteles und die Alexander-Rhetorik, die schon im 16. Jh. zahlreiche Ausgaben erlebten.⁹ Geringer war das Interesse an Hermogenes, der noch in der Antike zum Grundbuch der Rhetorik geworden war und wiederholt kommentiert wurde und diese Stellung auch im byzantinischen Mittelalter behauptete;¹⁰ er wurde erstmals wieder 1569 von F. Portus in Genf gedruckt. Auch die fälschlich dem Dionysios von Halikarnaß zugeschriebene Rhetorik wurde bereits 1586 von F. Sylburg zusammen mit der *Epistula ad Ammaeum de Thucydidis idiomate* und *De compositione verborum* herausgegeben, dann freilich erst wieder 1804 von H. A. Schott in Leipzig. Aber auch die der Aldina folgenden Ausgaben stehen weitgehend noch auf deren Fundament, und damit wirkt sie zum Teil bis heute nach. Erst durch die von Hugo Rabe initiierte, aber bis heute unvollendet gebliebene Neuausgabe der *Rhetores Graeci* und bei einigen Sonderausgaben wurde ein neues Fundament durch die Aufarbeitung der handschriftlichen Überlieferung gelegt.

Von den Handschriften, die der Herausgeber der Aldina zugrunde gelegt hat, haben sich vier in der Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris gefunden, darunter die, die Ianos Laskaris dem Aldus Manutius als Druckvorlage übergeben hatte; die vierte freilich ist nur der Rest eines umfassenderen Manuskripts, aus dem der größere Teil für den Druck herausgelöst wurde und dann verloren ging. Aber auch von den fehlenden kann der Ort in der Überlieferung noch

⁸ Vgl. H. Rabe, *Aphthonii Progymnasmata, Rhetores Graeci* 10 (Lipsiae 1926) S. IX.

⁹ Hoffmann 1 (1838 [ND 1961]) 280–83; Kassel (unten A. 21) 98 ff.; Fuhrmann (unten A. 17) 24 f.

¹⁰ Zum Corpus Planudeum und seiner Nachwirkung vgl. H. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 67 (1912) 332 ff.; C. Wendel, *RE* 20. 2 (1950) 2230–32; H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* 1, Handbuch d. Altertumswiss. 12. 5. 1 (München 1978) 79–85.

recht genau bestimmt werden. An Hand der authentischen Druckvorlagen läßt sich die Arbeitsweise des Herausgebers genau verfolgen. Sie werden im folgenden in der Reihe, in der die Autoren in der Aldina erscheinen, behandelt.

I. Der erste Band der Aldina (1508)

1. Aphthonios und Hermogenes

An der Spitze des ersten Bandes der Aldina stehen die Progymnasmata des Aphthonios (pp. 1–17), ed. Walz 1, 55–120; H. Rabe, *Rhetores Graeci* 10 (Lipsiae 1926), und die unter dem Namen des Hermogenes laufenden Schriften *Περὶ τῶν στάσεων* (pp. 19–38), *Περὶ εὐρέσεως* (pp. 38–78), *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* (pp. 78–148), *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* (pp. 149–60), ed. Walz 3, 1–445; H. Rabe, *Rhetores Graeci* 6 (Lipsiae 1913). Diese fünf Schriften, die seit dem Ausgang des Altertums als Inbegriff alles rhetorischen Wissens kanonisches Ansehen genossen,¹¹ bildeten das Kernstück des Corpus rhetoricum, dessen Hauptvertreter die Paris. gr. 1983 (10./11. Jh.) und 2977 (11. Jh.) sind.¹²

Nach Rabe (S. XXIV) war die Vorlage der Aldina im Hermogenes eine Handschrift, die dem Laur. 60, 25 (14. Jh.) sehr ähnlich war. Der Laurentianus ist ein Vertreter der Ausgabe des Maximos Planudes, der ff. 6^r–307^v alle Teile des Maximos-Corpus¹³ in ihrer Reihenfolge, darunter den Text der Progymnasmata des Aphthonios (ff. 19^v–49^r) enthält.¹⁴ Wie in diesem wird auch in der Druckvorlage der Aldina dem Hermogenes Aphthonios vorangegangen sein, und so sind beide auch abgedruckt. Man kann vermuten, daß das Druckmanuskript eine Abschrift des Laurentianus war. Da für Aldus die Marciani, unter denen er beide Autoren hätte finden können, nicht zugänglich waren,¹⁵ hat er sich nachweislich für die Aristoteles-Ausgabe eine Abschrift der *Historia philosophia* Ps.-Galens nach einem Laurentianus besorgt, und dort ließ er auch nach einem vollständigen Exemplar der *Ökonomik* suchen.¹⁶ So kann es auch hier gewesen sein.

¹¹ Wendel 2230.

¹² H. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 67 (1912) 323 ff.

¹³ Rabe 333.

¹⁴ A. M. Bandini, *Catalogus codicum graecorum bibliothecae Laurentianae* 2 (Florentiae 1768 [ND Lipsiae 1961]) 613–15.

¹⁵ S. unten S. 134 mit A. 91.

¹⁶ *Handschriftliche Vorlagen der Editio princeps des Aristoteles*, Abh. Akad. Mainz, Geistes- u. Sozialwiss. Kl. 1976, Nr. 8, S. 14 f., 59 ff.

2. Die Rhetorik und Poetik des Aristoteles und die Alexander-Rhetorik

Diese drei Schriften hat Aldus nicht in die große Aristoteles-Ausgabe (1495–1498) aufgenommen, also von Anfang an für die geplante Ausgabe der *Rhetores Graeci* vorgesehen. Sie stehen in dieser in der Reihenfolge Rhetorik (pp. 161–234), Alexander-Rhetorik (pp. 235–68) und Poetik (pp. 269–86). Die Alexander-Rhetorik, als deren Verfasser Anaximenes von Lampsakos neuerdings von M. Fuhrmann¹⁷ gegen die Einwände von V. Buchheit¹⁸ verteidigt wurde, galt für Aldus natürlich als ein echtes Werk des Aristoteles. Erste Zweifel an dessen Verfasserschaft äußerte erst Erasmus in der Praefatio seiner Aristoteles-Ausgabe 1531, und bald darauf wies sie Petrus Victorius dem Anaximenes zu.

Den drei Schriften lag, wie die Textuntersuchungen gezeigt haben, ein und dieselbe Handschrift zugrunde, aber die Kritiker stimmen nicht darin überein, welche es gewesen ist. So hat Lobel¹⁹ festgestellt, daß sie in der Poetik eine Abschrift des Paris. gr. 2038 gewesen sei, die nach dem Ambros. B 78 sup. korrigiert wurde,²⁰ Fuhrmann dagegen kommt (S. 88) zu dem Ergebnis, daß für die Alexander-Rhetorik der Vat. gr. 1580 der Aldina als Vorlage diene und außerdem eine Handschrift der Gruppe des Paris. 2038, wahrscheinlich dieser selbst, für den Erstdruck zu Gebote stand. Kassel²¹ schließlich fand, daß in der Rhetorik neben dem Paris. 2038 der Vat. 1580 herangezogen wurde.

Wie so oft führen auch hier die kodikologischen Fakten zum richtigen Ergebnis. Zunächst ist festzuhalten, daß Ianos Laskaris Aldus Manutius mit Handschriften für den Druck belieferte, wie letzterer in seinem Vorwort zum ersten Band der *Rhetores Graeci* sagt; ausdrücklich genannt wird zwar nur eine, der Kommentar des Syrianos, Sopatros und Markellinos zu Hermogenes, aber daß dazu auch der Paris. gr. 2038 gehörte, der aus dem Besitz des Laskaris kommt,²² kann bei der Nähe der Aldina zu dieser

¹⁷ *Untersuchungen zur Textgeschichte der pseudoaristotelischen Alexander-Rhetorik*, Abh. Akad. Mainz, Geistes- u. Sozialwiss. Kl. 1964, Nr. 7, S. 143 ff.

¹⁸ *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles* (München 1960) 191 ff.

¹⁹ E. Lobel, *The Greek manuscripts of Aristotle's Poetics*, Supplement to the Bibliographical Society's *Transactions* 9 (Oxford 1933) 31 ff.

²⁰ Zurückhaltend A. Gudeman, *Philologus* 100 (1935) 441: "was sie [Paris. gr. 2038] besonders interessant macht, ist die Tatsache, daß sie die Kenntnis von R' [Ricc. 46] und A^m [Ambros. B 78 sup.] verrät, deren Lesarten später in die Aldina übergingen, obwohl nicht geleugnet werden kann, daß Dukas die letztere selbst eingesehen haben mag."

²¹ R. Kassel, *Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik*, *Peripatoi* 3 (Berlin–New York 1971) 61 ff.

²² Besitzvermerk und Signatur auf f. II^r: *Nº 7 della X cassa . . . Aº*; vgl. Νίκη Παπατριανταφύλλου-Θεοδωρίδης, *Ο Ιανός Λάσκαρις και οι τύχες της βιβλιοθήκης του: Μνήμη Λίνου Πολίτη* (Θεσσαλονίκη 1988) 129, Nr. 69. Die

Handschrift nicht bezweifelt werden. Sodann empfahl sich dieser Codex als Primärvorlage des Druckes, weil er anders als der Vaticanus und der Ambrosianus alle drei Schriften enthält und einer philologischen Bearbeitung unterzogen worden war, und schließlich stammte er von einem Schreiber, auf dessen Kopien auch andere Ausgaben des Aldus beruhen. Er ist nicht, wie Lobel meinte, der Georgius Cretensis, also Georgios Trivizias, von dem Marc. gr. 191, 245, ff. 1–74^v, Barocc. gr. 63, f. 166^r und 164^{rv} stammen,²³ sondern der Schreiber der Marc. gr. 190 und 198, des Bodl. D'Orville 115 sowie des Kolophons von Paris. gr. 1908 (f. 213^v),²⁴ den Aubrey Diller²⁵ als Andronikos Kallistos identifiziert hat. Diese Identifizierung wurde vor kurzem von Ole Langwitz Smith²⁶ bestritten, aber die Verfasser des Repertoriums, E. Gamillscheg, der sie schon vorher verteidigt hatte,²⁷ und D. Harlfinger, wollen trotz der Differenzen des Duktus zwischen dem 1441 in Padua subskribierten Vat. gr. 1314 und den fraglichen Handschriften festhalten. Vom selben Schreiber stammt auch der Ambros. I 56 sup., das Antigraphon der Druckvorlage des Aldus Manutius im rückwärtigen Teil der *Historia animalium* in der großen Aristoteles-Ausgabe von 1495–1498 und Korrektiv des vorangehenden Teils,²⁸ ebenso das Antigraphon der Druckvorlage der botanischen Werke des Theophrast im vierten Band derselben Ausgabe, Paris. gr. 2069, der aus dem Besitz des Nicolaus Leoniceus (Nicolò da Lonigo) kommt, eines Freundes des Aldus

Randnoten sind nach *Repertorium* (nächste Anm.) 2, Nr. 197 nicht, wie Lobel und Gudeman meinten, von Ianos Laskaris.

²³ E. Gamillscheg–D. Harlfinger, *Repertorium der griechischen Kopisten 800–1600*, 1. *Handschriften aus Bibliotheken Großbritanniens*. A. *Verzeichnis der Kopisten* (Österr. Akad. der Wiss., Veröff. d. Komm. f. Byzantinistik III/1A) (Wien 1981) Nr. 73; 2. *Handschriften aus den Bibliotheken Frankreichs*. A. *Verzeichnis der Kopisten* (III/2A) (Wien 1989) Nr. 94; E. Mioni, *Codices graeci manuscripti Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum, Thesaurus antiquus* 1 (Indici e cataloghi, N.S. 6) (Roma 1981) 303, 360.

²⁴ *Repertorium* 1, Nr. 18; 2, Nr. 25; Mioni 302, 310. Lobel 51 hat wie schon Morelli (danach Vogel–Gardthausen 79 unter Γεώργιος θύτης Κρής) beide Schreiber unter dem Namen George the Cretan zusammengeworfen, ebenso Fuhrmann S. 17, Nr. 20 (nach Lobel). Der Duktus der beiden Schreiber läßt sich durch die beiden Tafeln XIV (Marc. gr. 198 Andronikos Kallistos) und XVII (Marc. gr. 191 Georgios Trivizias) bei E. Mioni, "Bessarione scriba e alcuni suoi collaboratori," in: *Miscellanea Marciana di studi Bessarionei* (Medioevo e Umanesimo 24) (Padova 1976) 263–318 leicht vergleichen.

²⁵ "Three scribes working for Bessarion, Trivizias, Callistus, Hermonymus," *Italia Med. e Uman.* 10 (1967) 403–10. Die von Diller mit einiger Reserve vorgetragene These hat Mioni ("Bessarione scriba" 297, 3) bekräftigt.

²⁶ *Classica & Mediaevalia* 33 (1981–82) 256–58 (unter Zustimmung von J. Irigoin, *Scriptorium* 37 [1983] 146; vgl. auch Ph. Hoffmann, *Mél. École Franç. de Rome, Moyen âge. Temps mod.* 97 [1985] 132; 37 [1986] 255–58. Auch ich hatte meine Zweifel, habe mich aber einigermaßen damit beruhigt, daß für den Unterschied des Duktus der zeitliche Abstand verantwortlich sein könnte.

²⁷ *Röm. Hist. Mitteilungen* 25 (1983) 333–37.

²⁸ *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 24 ff.

Manutius, der diesem nach eigenem Bekunden die Handschrift für die Aristoteles-Ausgabe zur Verfügung gestellt hatte.²⁹

Lobel meint, daß Paris. gr. 2038 nicht die eigentliche Druckvorlage gewesen sein könne, mit Verweis auf die von ihm in Appendix IX (Printer's copy) verzeichneten Druckvorlagen. Ich war deshalb mit ihm der Ansicht, daß die eigentliche Druckvorlage eine Abschrift davon gewesen sein müsse,³⁰ bis mich O. L. Smith brieflich (8. 2. 1982) darauf hinwies, daß sich im ganzen Codex, den ich bis dahin nicht in der Hand gehabt hatte, Vermerke des Typus L 1, L 2 usw. bis L 15, dann M 1 fänden, deren Bedeutung ihm nicht ganz klar geworden sei. Auch er war der Ansicht, daß der Codex nie Druckvorlage gewesen ist, aber diese Vermerke vielleicht darauf hindeuten, daß er gelegentlich von einem Setzer gebraucht worden ist, hielt es aber später (1986, S. 258) für wahrscheinlich, daß er die Druckvorlage für die Aldina war. So ist es in der Tat; wie ich bei der Untersuchung des Codex im Juli 1990 feststellen konnte, stimmen die von Smith beobachteten Vermerke mit der Lagen/Seitenfoliierung der Aldina überein. Sie gehen von L 2 bis S 14 (aber sonst immer bis 16), stehen am äußersten Außenrand und sind teilweise beim Binden abgeschnitten worden. Gelegentlich findet sich an der entsprechenden Zeile ein waagrechter Strich, auf f. 128^v ist 13 S durchgestrichen und erscheint dann erneut auf f. 129^r bei Zeile 3, und so ist auch schon auf f. 127^v S 12 von Zeile 10 nach Zeile 20 verschoben. Solche Verschiebungen des Umbruchs finden sich auch bei anderen Druckvorlagen der Aldinen;³¹ sie schließen auch in unserem Falle aus, daß die Vermerke erst nach der Aldina in den Codex eingetragen wurden. Das Fehlen von Fingerabdrücken mit Druckerschwärze ist in der Tat auffällig, aber nicht singulär. Auch in der Druckvorlage der *Metaphysik* des Aristoteles, Paris. gr. 1848, fehlen sie anscheinend zwar nicht ganz, sind dann aber selten und nur schwach, und auch hier stehen die Seitenzahlen der Aldina auf den äußersten Rändern ohne Zeichen im Text.³² Der Setzer wollte also in beiden Fällen sein Manuskript möglichst schonen. Anscheinend sind die beiden Handschriften nicht wie üblich in der Druckerei

²⁹ Ebenda 45. B. Einarson, "The manuscripts of Theophrastus' *Historia plantarum*," *Class. Phil.* 71 (1976) 74 hält Paris. gr. 2069 und Harv. gr. 17 irrtümlich für Brüder.

³⁰ *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 79 zu S. 75. Vgl. dazu auch A. Gudeman, *Philologus* 90 (1935) 441: "Man wird auch mit der Möglichkeit rechnen müssen, daß Laskaris eine Abschrift von P² [Paris. gr. 2038] in Florenz genommen hatte und diese unter Einfügung aller Änderungen dem Aldus zur Verfügung stellte."

³¹ So bei Aristoteles und Theophrast, *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 21, 43 mit Taf. I und III; bei Aristophanes, vgl. M. Sicherl, "Die Editio princeps des Aristophanes," in: *Erläutes aus der Welt des Buches* 1 (Wiesbaden 1979) 204 mit Abb. S. 205; zu Euripides vgl. M. Sicherl, "Die Editio princeps Aldina des Euripides und ihre Vorlagen," *Rhein. Mus.* 118 (1975) 215 f. mit Abb. Alle Abbildungen auch bei D. Harlfinger-M. Sicherl, *Griechische Handschriften und Aldinen* (*Ausstellungskatalog der Herzog August Bibliothek* 24) (Wolfenbüttel 1978), Abb. 48b, 50b und 53.

³² *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 31 f.

aufgelöst worden und deshalb anders als die Druckvorlagen des Aristoteles, des Euripides und anderer vollständig erhalten geblieben.³³

Wenn Paris. gr. 2038 die Primärvorlage der drei Traktate gewesen ist, so müssen die Varianten des Korrektivs in den stehenden Satz eingeführt worden sein, wie es bei den Aldinen wiederholt der Fall ist.³⁴ Dieses war dann für die Rhetorik und die Alexander-Rhetorik der Vat. gr. 1580, der die Poetik nicht enthält. Nach einem Vermerk auf f. 167^{v35} könnte er im 15. Jh. im Besitz eines Venezianers gewesen sein und war dann für Aldus leicht zu erreichen. Auch das Korrektiv der Poetik, der von Michael Suliardos geschriebene Ambrosianus, der sich nachmals im Besitze des Gian-Vincenzo Pinelli (†1601) in Padua befand, kann für Aldus leicht zugänglich gewesen sein.

3. Sopatros und Kyros

Auf die Ars poetica des Aristoteles folgt in der Aldina (pp. 287–455) Σωπάτρου διαίρεσις ζητημάτων und auf diesen wie meist in den Handschriften (pp. 456–60) Κύρου περὶ διαφορᾶς στάσεως, ed. Walz 8, 1–385 und 386–99. Ihre Druckvorlage war, wie schon Stephan Glöckner, der eine Neuausgabe vorbereitete, gesehen hat,³⁶ der Paris. gr. 2924, ff. 1–142^v.

Dieser Papiercodex (320 × 215 mm, scr. 205 × 130 mm, ll. 30) setzt sich aus zwei Teilen zusammen, die von zwei verschiedenen Schreibern stammen, der erste (ff. 1–143) von Kaiser Strategos,³⁷ der f. 142^v subskribierte (Majuskeln in Gold): θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον ἡδὲ Καίσαρος πόνος, der zweite (ff. 144–240) von Bartolomeo Zanetti.³⁸ Hier interessiert nur der erste. Er besteht aus vierzehn Quinionen (α^{ov}–ιδ^{ov}), deren erstem das letzte Blatt fehlt (ff. 1–139); die ff. 140–43 waren ursprünglich gewiß ein Binio. Die Blätter sind im Falz durch Papierstreifen verstärkt. Am unteren Rand rechts ist er von späterer Hand nach Lagen und Blättern von A–A 8, B–B 8 usw. bis S 7 (= f. 139) foliiert. Das erste Blatt des ersten Quaternio fehlte also bereits, als diese Folierung vorgenommen wurde. Sie ist

³³ Vgl. dazu *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* a. O. und meine *Griechischen Erstaussgaben des Vettore Trincavelli* (im Druck) unter Arrian, Ioannes Philoponos in *Physica* (Marc. IV 20), Stobaios, Alexander Aphrod. *Quaestiones* und auch Hesiod. Es sind die aus SS. Giovanni e Paolo in Venedig stammenden Marc. gr. VII 9, IV 20, IV 29, IV 10 und IX 6.

³⁴ So bei den meisten Druckvorlagen der Aristoteles-Ausgabe (vgl. *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 33, 39 f., 44, 52) und der Aristophanes-Ausgabe (vgl. "Die Editio princeps des Aristophanes" 212 f.).

³⁵ C. Giannelli, *Codices Vaticani Graeci: Codices 1485–1683*, Bybliotheca Vaticana 1950, 187.

³⁶ "Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων des Sopatros," *Wissensch. Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Kgl. Gymnasiums zu Bunzlau* (Ostern 1913) Kirchhain, N.-L. 1913, 8 f.

³⁷ *Repertorium* 2, Nr. 292.

³⁸ *Repertorium* 2, Nr. 45.

kennzeichnend für die Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano,³⁹ dessen Exlibris *A me Io. Francisco Asulano* auf f. 1^r unten zu lesen ist. Durch die Wasserzeichen wird die Entstehung des Codex in die Zeit um 1500 verwiesen: 1. ff. 1–109, 140–43 Kreis mit Stern; am nächsten kommt Briquet 3057 (30 × 42r. Regensburg 1496; Venedig 1493); 2. ff. 110–39 (3 Quinionen) Ochsenkopf ähnlich Briquet 15376 (33 × 44. Ratenberg 1498), aber mit Kontermarke M in der Blattecke. Der Text ist von Kaiser Strategos wie üblich sorgfältig geschrieben, mit breiten Rändern. Zierleisten (f. 1^r, 142^r), Titel, Zwischentitel und Initialen in Gold. Keine manus correctrix.

Dieser Teil des Codex erweist sich als Druckvorlage nicht nur durch die üblichen Umbruchvermerke und Fingerabdrücke mit Druckerschwärze, sondern auch durch Anweisungen an den Setzer. Die Seitenumbrüche, die den ganzen Text des Sopatros und Kyros durchziehen, haben die Form von gebrochenen Linien (Alineas) quer durch den ganzen Schriftspiegel, die Seiten sind mit Griffel und Tinte notiert. Auch hier gibt es Verschiebungen,⁴⁰ so bei t 10 und t 12; die Aldina stimmt dann mit der Verschiebung überein. Interessanter sind die Anweisungen für den Setzer, alle auf italienisch (vermutlich weil er Latein nicht verstand). Sie beziehen sich auf die äußere Gestaltung des Schriftbildes und Auszeichnung durch Majuskeln. Letztere wird angewiesen durch Einrahmung der betreffenden Wörter und beigeschriebenes *Maius(cole)*, *Mai* oder einfach *M* (ff. 1^r, 4^v, 5^v). Bei der Initiale auf f. 1^r steht *principio*, im Druck der in den Aldinen freie Raum, darin α als Initiale. Auf f. 86^r ist der goldene Titel (in der Zeile) in der üblichen Weise eingerahmt und am Rand mit dem Vermerk *una riga da per si* versehen; entsprechend bildet er in der Aldina in Majuskeln eine Zeile für sich, ebenso f. 102^v, ähnlich f. 136^r (Randtitel). Auf f. 89^r ist bei dem eingerahmten goldenen Titel auf dem Rand vermerkt: *Con quadrantini*; in der Aldina steht der Titel in Majuskeln in einer Zeile für sich. Auf f. 17^v ist bei dem eingerahmten und mit *M* versehenen ἐμπίπτων στοχασμός auf dem Rand ebenfalls *Quadrantini* zu lesen, beides ist aber durchgestrichen, in der Aldina steht es aber doch in Majuskeln; ebenso ist f. 18^v verfahren. Auf f. 139^r ist τέλος τῶν τοῦ σω(πάτρου) eingerahmt, auf dem Rand steht *Una c(od)a*, in der Aldina das Ganze in Majuskeln; ebenso ist es auf f. 142^v, nur ist hier bei der letzten Zeile des Kyrostextes auf dem Rand *Coda* und darunter vom Anweiser selbst τέλος Κύρου περὶ διαφορᾶς στάσεως geschrieben und eingerahmt. Diese Anweisungen stammen offenbar von Demetrios Dukas wie in Paris. gr. 2921.

Eine Probekollation von ff. 1^r–2^r (ἔκφυγε τὴν ἀθηναίων) ergab außer κατορθώμασι cod. κατορθώμασιν Ald. keine Abweichungen des Druckes

³⁹ S. unten S. 131 und *Griechische Erstaufgaben des Vettore Trincavelli* (oben A. 33) unter Themistios zu Paris. gr. 1886 und 1891.

⁴⁰ S. oben S. 115 mit Anm. 31.

von der Handschrift. Es sind also auch im stehenden Satz keine Korrekturen nach einem anderen Textzeugen vorgenommen worden.

Schon Stephan Glöckner hatte gesehen,⁴¹ daß der von Ianos Laskaris von seiner zweiten Reise nach Griechenland, zu der er im Frühjahr 1491 aufgebrochen war, mitgebrachte Sopatros im heutigen Laur. 58, 21 enthalten ist. Er bildet darin den zweiten, ursprünglich selbständigen Teil (ff. 36–191, später richtig foliiert 37–192). Dieser ist eine von zwei Schreibern stammende Papierhandschrift des 14., vielleicht auch noch des 13. Jh. mit eigener Kustodenzählung, deren letzte Lage ein Binio ist. Das f. 36 bzw. 37 ist in einer Weise beschädigt, wie sie bei ungebundenen Manuskripten zu beobachten ist. Die Auffindung dieser Handschrift hatte Laskaris schon im Juli 1491 dem Inhaber des griechischen Lehrstuhls am Gymnasium von Florenz brieflich angezeigt; in der Aufzählung der Bücher, auf die er auf dieser Reise gestoßen ist, wird er so beschrieben: Σωπάτρου διαίρεσις τῶν ζητημάτων, βιβλίον ἀξιολογώτατον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἶπερ τι ῥητορευομένων, und hinzugefügt: καὶ τούτων τὸν μὲν Σόπατρόν ἐσμεν ἐωνημένοι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀντίγραφα λαβεῖν οὐκ ἡμελήσαμεν.⁴² Im Reisetagebuch des Ianos Laskaris, Vat. gr. 1412, ist er auf f. 67^v im πίναξ τῶν βιβλίων τοῦ Λασκάρως ἅπερ ἔχει παρ' ἐαυτοῦ als Σωπάτρου διαίρεσις ζητημάτων verzeichnet.⁴³ Aus dieser Handschrift stammt der Paris. gr. 2976, eine Papierhandschrift aus dem Ende des 15. Jh. mit der Subskription (f. 321^v) τέλος εἴληφεν ἐν φλωρεντίᾳ, und einem Adler, sehr ähnlich Harlfinger Aigle 29 (aus dem Jahre 1489), als Wasserzeichen. Der Schreiber ist nicht, wie Omont und danach Glöckner meinen, Ianos Laskaris, sondern nach dem Urteil von E. Gamillscheg sein Schüler Markos Musuros;⁴⁴ Laskaris war nur sein Besitzer, wie sein Vermerk auf dem Recto des ersten Papiervorsatzblattes zeigt: Α^σ. No XI X^α,⁴⁵ und auch gewiß der Auftraggeber. Anscheinend zu diesem Zweck hatte Laskaris das Antigraphon aus der Mediceischen Bibliothek ausgeliehen, in deren Leihregister am 25. August 1492 vermerkt ist: *hebi io Joanni Lascari ad impresti li infrascripti libri*, darunter unter Nr. 91 *Sopatrum*.⁴⁶ Von diesem Parisinus stammen alle übrigen Renaissance-Handschriften ab, darunter unser Paris. gr. 2924, den Kaiser Strategos gewiß ebenfalls in Florenz geschrieben hat.⁴⁷ Mit etwa 80 weiteren Handschriften aus dem

⁴¹ Das Folgende gibt im wesentlichen die Ausführungen von Glöckner S. 15–17 wieder; sie werden aber, wo nötig, berichtigt oder ergänzt.

⁴² Legrand 2, 323 f.

⁴³ K. K. Müller, "Neue Mitteilungen über Ianos Lascaris und die Mediceische Bibliothek," *Centralbl. f. Bibliothekswesen* 1 (1884) 408.

⁴⁴ *Repertorium* 2, Nr. 359.

⁴⁵ Nicht identifiziert von N. Παπατριανταφύλλου-Θεοδωρίδη (oben A. 22), S. 129, Nr. 75.

⁴⁶ *Archivio Storico Italiano* ser. III, 21 (1875) 289.

⁴⁷ Vgl. M. Sicherl, "Musuros-Handschriften," in: *Serta Turyniana. Studies in Greek literature and palaeography in honor of Alexander Turyn* (Urbana, Ill. 1974) 596 f.

Besitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano, darunter den noch zu behandelnden Druckvorlagen der Kommentare zu Hermogenes, Paris. gr. 2921 und 2960, wurde er 1542 durch Guillaume Pélicier, den Botschafter Franz' I. von Frankreich in Venedig (1539–1542), für die Bibliothèque du Roi erworben;⁴⁸ unter Heinrich II. (1547–1559) erhielt er seinen heutigen Einband.⁴⁹

4. Die übrigen Schriften des ersten Bandes

Den letzten Teil des ersten Bandes der Aldina nehmen 17 meist kleinere rhetorische Schriften verschiedener Verfasser, zumeist Spezialschriften zu Teilgebieten der Rhetorik, ein:

1. Die unechte, dem Dionysios von Halikarnassos zugeschriebene *Τέχνη ῥητορική* (pp. 461–502), ed. H. Usener, *Dionysii Halicarnasei quae fertur Ars rhetorica* (Lipsiae 1895).

2. Der Brief des Dionysios von Halikarnassos *Περὶ τῶν Θουκυδίδου ἰδιωμάτων* an Ammaios (pp. 502–07), edd. H. Usener und L. Rademacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula* 1 (Lipsiae 1899) 421–38.

3. Dionysios von Halikarnassos, *Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων* (pp. 507–44), edd. H. Usener und L. Rademacher, *Opuscula* 2 (Lipsiae 1904) 1–143.

4. Die fälschlich dem Demetrios von Phaleron zugeschriebene Schrift *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας, ὃ ἐστὶ περὶ φράσεως* (pp. 545–73), ed. Walz 9, 1–126; L. Rademacher, *Demetrii Phalerei qui dicitur De elocutione libellus* (Lipsiae 1901).

5. Des Alexandros (Numeniu) Schrift *Περὶ τῶν τῆς διανοίας σχημάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς λέξεως σχημάτων* (pp. 574–88), ed. Walz 8, 421–86; Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* 3 (Lipsiae 1856) 7–40.

6. <Phoibammon> *Σχόλια περὶ σχημάτων ῥητορικῶν* (pp. 588–93), ed. Walz 8, 492–519; Spengel 3, 41–56. Bei Aldus ist die Schrift anonym. Daß sie von dem aus Ägypten stammenden Rhetor Phoibammon herrührt, hat schon Thomas Gale gesehen, und danach hat sie L. Norrmann unter seinem Namen herausgegeben (Upsala 1690).

7. Menandros Rhetor, *Γενεθλίων διαίρεσις τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν* (pp. 594–691), am Ende verstümmelt, des. τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀρχόμενος αὐτοῦ, λείπει, ed. Walz 9, 127–330; Spengel 3, 331–441, 6; neueste Ausgabe: Menander Rhetor, ed. with translation and commentary by D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson (Oxford 1981). Schon Walz hat aus der Aldina 610–12 ein Stück des Alexander herausgelöst und in 9, 331–39 abgedruckt unter dem Titel *Ἐκ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου περὶ ῥητορικῶν ἀφορμῶν*. Spengel 3, 1–6 hat es Alexander vorangestellt.

⁴⁸ H. Omont, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 46 (1885) 624; *Catalogues des manuscrits de Fontainebleau sous François I et Henri II* (Paris 1889) VI, XXIV; S. 161, Nr. 483; L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits* 1 (Paris 1868) 158.

⁴⁹ Vgl. J. Guigard, *Nouvel armorial du bibliophile* 1 (Paris 1890) 96.

8. Aristeides, *Περὶ πολιτικοῦ λόγου* und *Περὶ ἀφελοῦς λόγου* (pp. 641–82), ed. Walz 9, 340–466; Spengel 3, 459–554; *Aristidis qui feruntur libri rhetorici II*, ed. Guil. Schmid (*Rhetores Graeci* 5) (Lipsiae 1926). Die Unechtheit der beiden unter dem Titel *Τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν* (sic Ald.) als A' und B' zusammengefaßten Schriften hat Spengel (2, S. XIX) erkannt.

9. Apsines, *Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ περὶ προοιμίου* (pp. 682–726) und *Περὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων προβλημάτων* (pp. 727–30), ed. Walz 9, 467–533, 534–42; Spengel–Hammer, *Rhetores Graeci* 1 (Lipsiae 1894) 217–329, 330–39. Walz hat den letzten Teil der *Τέχνη* (299, 6–329 Spengel–Hammer) als nicht dem Apsines gehörig herausgelöst und unter dem Titel *Ἐκ τῶν Λογγίνου περὶ εὐρέσεως* dem Apsines nachgestellt (9, 543–96). Die genaue Abgrenzung des eingedrungenen Textes (Walz 552, 2–579, 18) durch Finckh wurde durch den Paris. gr. 1874 glänzend bestätigt; er fehlt demnach bei Spengel–Hammer 309, 3.

10. Minukianos, *Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων, ἐν ἄλλῳ Νικαγόρου* (pp. 731–34), ed. Walz 9, 601–13; Spengel–Hammer 1, 340–51.

Schon Usener⁵⁰ hat gesehen, daß die Quelle der Überlieferung aller dieser Schriften der berühmte Paris. gr. 1741 ist und daß der Aldina ein Codex zugrundeliegt, der alle diese Schriften und nur diese enthielt. Er gehörte zu einer Gruppe von Handschriften, die gebildet wird von Paris. gr. 1656, Vind. phil. gr. 60, Marc. gr. 429 und Pal. gr. 66, alles junge Handschriften aus dem 15.–16. Jh. In allen diesen Handschriften ist die Reihenfolge dieselbe wie in der Aldina, aber der Parisinus und der Palatinus enthalten nicht Phoibammon. W. Tröbst,⁵¹ der den Palatinus und den Marcianus nicht kannte, läßt die Aldina im Alexander mit dem Parisinus aus einer gemeinsamen Vorlage hervorgehen und ebenso diese und den Vindobonensis. W. Schmid,⁵² der alle vier kannte, leitet zögernd den Parisinus, den Palatinus und den Marcianus aus dem Vindobonensis her; die Aldina sei mit dem Vindobonensis nächstverwandt und habe außer den Akzenten nur sehr wenige leichte Verbesserungen. Nun stammt aber der Vindobonensis von der Hand des Georgios Trivizias (vor 1423–1485),⁵³ der, aus Kreta kommend, als Priester der griechischen Gemeinde von Venedig tätig war, zum Kreis des Bessarion gehörte und mit 'Andronikos Kallistos' zusammenarbeitete, von dem wiederholt das Antigraphon der Druckvorlage des Aldus oder diese selbst geschrieben ist.⁵⁴ Er war im Besitze des Johannes Baptista Posthumus de Leone aus Padua, wo ihn Joh. Sambucus

⁵⁰ H. Usener, "De Dionysii Halicarnassensis libris manuscriptis," in: *Index scholarum Bonnensium aest. a. 1878; Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula*, edd. H. Usener–L. Radermacher 1 (Lipsiae 1899) S. IX f.

⁵¹ "Quaestiones Hyperideae et Dinarchae. Pars I," *Programm Hameln 1881*, 9–20; vgl. dazu E. Drerup, *Philologus* 71 (1912) 392, 1.

⁵² *Rhein. Mus.* 72 (1917/18) 121; Ausgabe S. VIII f.

⁵³ *Repertorium* 1, Nr. 73.

⁵⁴ S. oben S. 114.

1554 wahrscheinlich erworben hat.⁵⁵ Der Parisinus wiederum stammt von Zacharias Kallierges,⁵⁶ der um die Jahrhundertwende in Venedig und Padua als Drucker und Kopist tätig war. Man wird danach vermuten, daß Aldus als Vorlage, da ihm der Marcianus nicht zugänglich war,⁵⁷ eine Kopie des Vindobonensis hatte, wenn nicht diesen selbst, den ich nicht gesehen habe.⁵⁸

Die Vorlage der Aldina gehört von den aus zwei Abschriften des Paris. 1741 geflossenen Klassen der schlechteren an. Zur Qualität der Aldina urteilt Tröbst S. 18:

Veterum scriptorum editiones principes ab Aldo Manutio comparatas constat nihil usquam boni sibi proprium habere praeter manifestorum et plerumque levium vitiorum emendationes a correctoribus Aldinis factas.⁵⁹ Hoc etiam in Alexandri editionem cadit, cuius circiter octoginta proprias lectiones memoratu dignas supra notavimus. E quorum locorum numero 55 in libris manuscriptis sani, in Aldina depravati leguntur, quindecim qui in libris manuscriptis corrupti sunt, Aldina emendatos exhibet. Sed ejusmodi tantum locos correctoris manus tetigit, ad quorum medelam reperiendam neque altiore nec reconditiore doctrina opus erat.

II. Der zweite Band der Aldina (1509)

Der zweite Band der Aldina ist ganz den Kommentaren gewidmet. Er umfaßt die Prolegomena zu Aphthonios, die Eisagoge zu den Prolegomena der Rhetorik des Hermogenes, den 'Dreimänner-Kommentar' (Syrianos, Sopatros, Markellinos) zu den *στάσεις* des Hermogenes und den Kommentar des Maximos Planudes zu Hermogenes mit Ausnahme der *στάσεις*. Er enthält ein kurzes Vorwort von Aldus Manutius an Markos Musuros, Professor des Griechischen an der Universität Padua, das gegenüber den Vorreden des ersten Bandes nichts Neues bringt.

⁵⁵ H. Hunger, *Katalog der griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek* 1. *Codices historici. Codices philosophici et philologici* (Museion N. F. 4, 1, 1) (Wien 1961) 179.

⁵⁶ *Repertorium* 1, Nr. 156.

⁵⁷ S. unten S. 134 mit A. 91.

⁵⁸ C. Hammer, "De Apsine rhetore," *Progr. Günzburg* 1876, 21, glaubt, daß es eher der Marc. gr. VIII 10 gewesen sei: *ex codice Vindobonensi, vel potius ex Veneto B* [VIII 10], aber dieser gehört zur anderen Familie (vgl. Usener S. VIII f.) und enthält nicht Alexander und Phoibammon. Schon Walz 9, S. X f., der die beiden Familien nicht unterscheidet, hatte gesehen, daß die Aldina zu Vindob. phil. gr. 60, Marc. gr. 429, Laur. 59, 11 gehört und hat den Vindobonensis ganz kollationiert, ohne daraus großen Vorteil zu ziehen, da er ja die Aldina hatte.

⁵⁹ Dieses Urteil bedarf einer Modifizierung, vgl. *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 66. Man denke etwa an die Ausgaben des Athenaios, Aristophanes und Hesych, die Musuros bearbeitet hat.

1. Die Prolegomena zu Aphthonios

Die Προλεγόμενα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀφθονίου τῆς ῥητορικῆς προγυμνάσματα, die Walz 2, 1–68 neu herausgegeben hat, setzt sich aus zwei Teilen zusammen, die verschiedenen Überlieferungen entnommen sind.⁶⁰ Der erste Teil, die Προλεγόμενα und der ὁρισμὸς τοῦ καθόλου προγυμνάσματος (pp. 1–9), geht in der Überlieferung den ἕτερα προλεγόμενα τῶν στάσεων (Walz 7, 49–51) voran, der zweite, die ἐξήγησις (pp. 9–68), geht mit dem Kommentar des Maximos Planudes zu Hermogenes (Walz 5, 231–576), den, abgesehen von den στάσεις, Aldus aus dem Paris. 2960 ediert hat.⁶¹ Aber weder in diesem noch in dem mit ihm nahe verwandten Paris. gr. 2926 noch auch im Laur. 60, 25, dessen Hermogenes-Text der Aldina sehr nahe steht⁶² und auch vom Kommentar des Maximos Planudes begleitet ist, stehen diese Prolegomena. Der Laurentianus hat zwar auch den Aphthonios, und diesem gehen (f. 19^v) Prolegomena voran, aber nicht die der Aldina. Aldus muß sie also von anderswoher geholt haben, und zwar erst, als der 'Dreimänner-Kommentar' und wohl auch der Kommentar des Maximos Planudes, die den ganzen übrigen Teil des zweiten Bandes füllen, schon gesetzt und ihre Vorlagen möglicherweise bereits der Vernichtung preisgegeben waren.⁶³ Das geht daraus hervor, daß die reguläre Paginierung des Bandes (1–417) mit der Eisagoge beginnt. Sie befindet sich rechts oben. Außerdem hat dieser Teil eine Foliiierung unter dem Schriftspiegel rechts nach Lagen und Seiten von A 1 bis B 5 (= p. 409); das ergibt 25 regelmäßige Quaternionen und einen Quinio am Ende (= B 1–5) und die folgenden 5 Blätter (pp. 411–17 + [418] und ein weiteres, auf dessen Rückseite der Aldus-Anker steht, Vorderseite leer). Die Prolegomena haben die Paginierung nicht, aber unten eine Zählung nach Lagen und Blättern, beides in arabischen Ziffern von 1/2 bis 2/3, worauf drei leere Blätter folgen. Das Titelblatt mit dem Aldus-Anker und dem Vorwort des Aldus an Musuros auf der Rückseite gehört also zur ersten Lage, einem Quaternio, die zweite Lage, einschließlich der leeren Blätter, bildet einen Ternio. Dem kodikologischen Befund entspricht die Angabe des Aldus vor dem Impressum am Ende: *Omnes quaterniones, praeter secundum, ternionem & ultimum, quinternionem*.⁶⁴ Das Papier dieser beiden Lagen ist dasselbe wie

⁶⁰ Vgl. Walz 2, S. III f.

⁶¹ S. unten S. 130 ff.

⁶² S. oben S. 112.

⁶³ Auf diese Weise sind uns nur Bruchstücke der Druckvorlagen der Ausgaben des Aristoteles und Theophrast (1495–1498), des Aristophanes (1498), des Euripides (1503), und auch sie nur durch einen besonderen Umstand erhalten geblieben, vgl. dazu die in Anm. 31 aufgeführten Arbeiten.

⁶⁴ Ungenau sagt Walz (2, S. III): *Primo loco posui eum [commentarium], quem Aldus secundo Rhetorum Graecorum volumini iredecim foliis pagina destituitis praefixit*, und numeriert in seiner Ausgabe diese 13 Blätter durchlaufend, das Recto jeweils mit A, das Verso mit B.

anscheinend im ganzen Band, jedenfalls in dem Pariser Exemplar; Aldus wird davon einen großen Vorrat gehabt haben. Auf die spätere Beigabe scheint auch das Vorwort des Aldus zu deuten: *Dedicamus igitur tibi hos Syriani, Sopatri ac Marcellini in Hermogenis Rhetorica et Aphthonii Progymnasmata commentarios*, wenn die Umkehrung der Reihenfolge nicht a parte potiori erfolgte. Der Grund für die nachträgliche Einschaltung der Aphthonios-Prolegomena dürfte gewesen sein, daß der Verwandte des Laur. 60, 25, nach dem der Text des Aphthonios und des Hermogenes gesetzt wurde, die Kommentare nicht enthielt. So würde sich auch erklären, daß der Planudes-Kommentar nicht diesem, sondern dem Paris. gr. 2960 entnommen wurde.

2. Die Scholien zu den Prolegomena des Hermogenes und der 'Dreimänner-Kommentar'

Auf die Prolegomena zu Aphthonios folgt die Ἰσαγωγὴ σχολίων ἐκ διαφορῶν τεχνογράφων εἰς τὰ προλεγόμενα τῆς Ἑρμογένους ῥητορικῆς (pp. 1–16), ed. Walz 4, 1–38; H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge (Rhetores Graeci 14)* (Lipsiae 1931) 258–96; daran schließt sich Συριανοῦ καὶ Σωπάτρου καὶ Μαρκελλίνου εἰς στάσεις τοῦ Ἑρμογένους (pp. 16–351), des. mutilum 351, 4 διαφέρει. ὅτι ἐν, ed. Walz 4, 39–846.

Der Kommentar des Syrianos, Sopatros und Markellinos zu den στάσεις des Hermogenes ist eine Katene aus dem im Marc. gr. 433 (14. Jh.) erhaltenen Kommentar des Syrianos,⁶⁵ dem von Walz (5, 1–211) edierten des Sopatros⁶⁶ und dem selbständig nicht erhaltenen des Markellinos. Der Redaktor hat die Katene in der Weise hergestellt, daß er jeweils zu einem Textabschnitt (der immer ganz ausgeschrieben wird) die Erklärungen der drei Kommentatoren hintereinander anführt und so einen einheitlichen kontinuierlichen Kommentar schuf. Dabei ging er mit seinen Quellen sehr willkürlich um, gab oft, was Syrianos gehört, dem Sopatros, zog Kommentare des Syrianos und Sopatros zusammen und ließ längere Exkurse, vor allem des Sopatros, einfach weg; andererseits reicherte er ihn mit Bruchstücken aus Porphyrios und anderen an.⁶⁷ Etwas anders verhält es

⁶⁵ *Syriani in Hermogenem commentaria*, ed. H. Rabe, vol. II: *Commentarium in librum Περὶ στάσεων* (Lipsiae 1893). Walz hat ihn anders als den des Sopatros nicht ediert, aber die Abweichungen des Marc. gr. 433 der Edition des 'Dreimänner-Kommentars' im Apparat beigegeben.

⁶⁶ Der Kommentar des Sopatros liegt in zwei Fassungen vor, die eine im Marc. gr. 433, die andere, erweiterte, im Paris. gr. 2923 und seinen Nachkommen, also im 'Dreimänner-Kommentar'; vgl. Rabe, *Hermogenes* S. XX; St. Glöckner, *Quaestiones rhetoricae*, Breslauer Philol. Abh. 8, 2 (Vratislaviae 1901) 2; L. Spengel, *Münchener Gelehrte Anzeigen* 1835, 2.

⁶⁷ Walz 4, S. VI; Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 64 (1909) 584 ff.; *Prolegomenon Sylloge (Rhetores Graeci 14)* (Lipsiae 1931) S. LXXVIII f.

sich mit der Eisagoge; sie scheint auf Markellinos zu beruhen.⁶⁸ Der Archetyp der Katene ist Paris. gr. 2923 (s. XI),⁶⁹ der aus dem Besitz des Ianos Laskaris kommt;⁷⁰ aus ihm sind Paris. gr. 2921, Ambros. I 54 sup. (= 461 Martini-Bassi), Laur. 55, 20 und 59, 7 sowie Ricc. gr. 43 geflossen. Walz gab sie auf der Grundlage der Aldina unter ständiger Benutzung des Paris. gr. 2923 und gelegentlicher Heranziehung des Ambrosianus und des Paris. gr. 2921, ohne zu erkennen, daß er in dem letzteren die authentische Druckvorlage der Aldina in der Hand hatte. Auch Rabe ist dies offenbar entgangen.

Der Paris. gr. 2921 ist ein Papiercodex im Format 335 × 225 bis 230 mm, bestehend aus I + 355 + III Blättern. Mit dem Einband Heinrichs II. von Frankreich (1518–1559)⁷¹ wurden vorne drei Vorsatzblätter zugegeben. Er setzt sich zusammen aus 35 Quinionen (I. 1–335 + 3 unnummerierte Blätter und ein viertes, das an den Deckel geklebt ist; der Heftfaden des letzten Quinio ist nach f. 334 zu sehen). Eine alte Folierung in der äußersten Ecke rechts oben von 2–[356] (= 1–355 der heutigen Folierung) ist oft ganz oder teilweise abgeschnitten, ebenso die Kustoden von der Hand des Librarius in der äußersten inneren Ecke des Recto des ersten und des Verso des letzten Blattes jeder Lage. Neben den Kustoden gibt es jeweils am Ende jeder Lage senkrechte Reklamanten. Das Papier weist zwei Wasserzeichen auf: 1. einen Anker mit Stern fast = Briquet 481 (29 × 44. Arnoldstein 1510–14. Var. ident. Laibach 1514. Var. simil. Treviso 1514–19), ähnlich dem der Druckvorlagen der Paraphrasen des Themistios zu den *Analytica posteriora* und der *Parva naturalia* im Paris. gr. 1886, ff. 1–40 und 92–119 sowie zur Physik im Paris. gr. 1891, ff. 1–172 für die Aldina von 1534;⁷² 2. (ff. 321, 322, 323) zwei gekreuzte Pfeile fast = Briquet 6274 (29,5 × 44. Treviso 1477); etwas größer ist Briquet 6281 (40 × 57r. Florenz 1515–16. Varianten davon 1501–13); fast = Harlfinger (unten A. 86) Flèche 15 (1504–05, von Bartolomeo Zamberto); vgl. auch Harlfinger, Flèche 16

⁶⁸ H. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 64 (1909) 584; *Prolegomenon Sylloge* S. LXXVII ff.; Analyse der Eisagoge bei Rabe 578–84.

⁶⁹ Dies hatte bereits Walz erkannt (4, S. VII); so auch Rabe 585 und *Prolegomenon Sylloge* S. LXXVI. Die wenigen Textzeugen führt Walz darauf zurück, daß sich der dicke Wälzer für die Schule als wenig geeignet herausstellte. Anders der viel kürzere Kommentar des Maximos Planudes, von dem es viele Handschriften gibt; vgl. St. Glöckner, "Die Handschriften der Προβλήματα ῥητορικά εἰς τὰς στάσεις," *Progr. Gymnasium Bunzlau* 1914, 3–5, 11–13; Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* S. XLV; vgl. auch Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 67 (1912) 332–37.

⁷⁰ Es war die *Nº 3 de la X^{ma}*; nicht identifiziert von N. Παπατριανταφύλλου-Θεοδωρίδη (oben A. 22) S. 130, Nr. 131. Im Πίναξ τῶν βιβλίων τοῦ Λασκάρεως, ἅπερ ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῦ (K. K. Müller, *Centralbl. f. Bibliothekswesen* 1 [1884] 407), ist er der 5. Titel: Συριανός, Σώπατρος, Μαρκελλίνος εἰς τὰς στάσεις, περ<γαμηνόν>; vgl. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 64 (1909) 585; *Prolegomenon Sylloge* S. LXXVI.

⁷¹ Er ist nicht ganz identisch mit dem von Paris. gr. 2924, oben A. 49.

⁷² Vgl. meine Abhandlung *Die griechischen Erstaussagen des Vettore Trincavelli* (im Druck).

(1505, ebenfalls von Bartolomeo Zamberto). Durch die Wasserzeichen würde das Papier in das zweite Jahrzehnt des 16. Jh. verwiesen, genauer in die Zeit um 1510–14. Sehr wahrscheinlich ist der Codex also kurz vor dem Druck des zweiten Bandes der Aldina (1509) geschrieben, vermutlich für den Druck. Wie die Druckvorlage des Sopatros und Kyros, Paris. gr. 2924, kommt auch Paris. 2921 aus dem Besitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano, der seinen Besitzvermerk *A me Jo. Francisco Asulano* wie üblich auf dem unteren Rand von f. 1^r eingetragen hat, und wie jener kam auch der unsere im Jahre 1542 in die Bibliothèque du Roi.⁷³

Der Codex enthält ff. 1^r–16^r die Εἰσαγωγή ('Ἰσαγωγή cod.) σχολίων ἐκ διαφόρων τεχνογράφων εἰς τὰ προλεγόμενα τῆς Ἑρμογένους ῥητορικῆς, ed. Walz 4, 1–38; ff. 16^r–355^r Συριανοῦ καὶ Σωπάτρου καὶ Μαркеλλίνου εἰς στάσεις τοῦ Ἑρμογένους; der Text endet mitten im Satz mit διαφέρει. ὅτι ἐν, ed. Walz 4, 39–845, 5. Diese Verstümmelung beruht ebenso wie Textlücken ff. 264^v (danach 265 und 266 leer), 332^v (danach 333^r leer) und 340^v (danach 341 leer) auf Blattausfall im Archetypus, Paris. gr. 2923. Er ist das erste Mal von erster Hand mit λείπει bezeichnet, das dritte Mal mit λείπει φύλλον. Bei der zweiten Lücke steht von derselben Hand wie die übrigen Anweisungen für den Setzer (unten S. 129) auf italienisch, er solle eine Zeile freilassen, dann λείπει schreiben und danach mit dem Verso (*carta volta*) von f. 333 fortfahren, bei der dritten von derselben Hand λείπει und τὴν ἐμᾶντοῦ, womit der Text auf f. 342^r einsetzt, bei der vierten (355^r) λείπει und ἀμφιβολία, womit auf das anonyme Scholion in 2960 verwiesen wird (dazu unten S. 130). Diese Textlücken sind entsprechend der Anweisung im Druck pp. 259, 328, 337 und 351 durch λείπει in einer Zeile für sich angezeigt und nur das dritte Mal im freien Rest einer Zeile; vgl. Walz 4, 620, 792, 813, 845.

Daß der Codex als Druckvorlage gedient hat, zeigen außer den Anweisungen für den Setzer dessen übliche Umbruchvermerke und zahlreiche leichtere und größere Fingerabdrucke durch Druckerschwärze, die über Strecken, besonders im Anfang, auch fehlen. Die Vermerke sind schonender vorgenommen als beim Sopatros- und Kyros-Text im Paris. gr. 2924 und scheinen teilweise zu fehlen. Der Setzer bediente sich dazu eines Griffels, mit dem er im Text den Seitenumbruch durch das Zeichen Γ markiert und auf dem Rand mit arabischen Ziffern die Seiten der einzelnen Lagen vermerkt. Nur bei der ersten Seite der neuen Lage gibt er auch die Lagenzahl, so auf f. 16^v p^ab = prima (pagina) der zweiten Lage. Wie hier so stimmt auch sonst meist der Vermerk mit dem Seitenumbruch der Aldina überein, aber des öfteren ist der Umbruch auch verschoben worden, so bei (a)5, bei (a)16, wo er zwei Zeilen zu früh steht; bei (b)10 ist er um sechs Zeilen verschoben.

⁷³ Vgl. Omont, *Catalogue des manuscrits de Fontainebleau* (oben A. 48), S. 68, Nr. 195.

Im Druck weggelassen sind außer den roten Argumenta auf dem Rand des Codex auch jeweils jene Scholien, die wie schon im Paris. gr. 2923 in kleinerer Schrift auf den Rändern stehen, aus dem sie Walz im Apparat abgedruckt hat, vgl. Walz 4, S. VII und 72 f., A. 6, 8, 9; 79, A. 40; 85, A. 8; 90, A. 10; 95, A. 7; 126, A. 1; 152, A. 5; 159, A. 1; 171, A. 1; 173, A. 2 (omisso κακόπλαστον); 213, A. 9; 215, A. 11. Es folgen bis 709, A. 35 noch weitere acht Stellen. Hingegen wurden die roten Verfasseramen (συριανοῦ, σωπάτρου, μαρκελλίνου, meist abgekürzt) in den Text gemäß der Anweisung des Editors in Majuskeln inkorporiert.

Der Herausgeber, Demetrios Dukas, hat das Manuskript für den Druck textkritisch bearbeitet. Schon vor mehr als hundert Jahren hat Max Treu eines der Druckmanuskripte der *Moralia* Plutarchs, das der gleiche Demetrios Dukas für die Aldina von 1509, also um dieselbe Zeit wie die *Rhetores Graeci*, bearbeitet hat,⁷⁴ entdeckt, den Ambros. C 195 sup. Zu einigen der darin enthaltenen Schriften habe er nach Treu Korrekturen geholt, er habe aber den Text an vielen Stellen auch konjunktural zu emendieren versucht. Seine Kritik sei sehr ungleich; oft sorgfältig, oft flüchtig; manche offenkundigen Schreibfehler habe er einfach stehen gelassen.⁷⁵ Eine ähnliche Verfahrensweise läßt sich im Paris. gr. 2921 feststellen. Seine Eingriffe in den Text erscheinen, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, erst mit dem Kapitel Διαίρεσις τῶν στάσεων (f. 81^r = 203, 19 Walz; S. 36, 6 Rabe). Bis dahin ist die Aldina ein einfacher Abdruck der Vorlage samt allen ihren Fehlern (einschließlich von Itazismen), denen sie neue hinzufügt; von S. 1–20, 21 W. habe ich deren mehr als ein Dutzend gezählt. Die dann einsetzenden und sich bis zum Ende des Codex durchziehenden Eingriffe finden sich im Text und auf den Rändern, sowohl in den Hermogenes-Abschnitten wie im Kommentar. Die einfachsten sind neben Streichungen von Dittographien⁷⁶ die Auflösungen der paläographischen Sigel für μάρτυρες (325, 5, 12; 326, 16, 21, 27), für ὁ ἄνδρες ἀθηναῖοι (205, 20; 206, 2; 421, 24; 524, 17; 539, 8; 736, 13; 752, 3 f.; 752, 18 f.); für ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί (517, 16); für κεφαλαίοις (737, 18).

Die Varianten sind nicht selten mit Zusätzen versehen, die sie als Konjekturen erscheinen lassen; solche Zusätze finden sich ausschließlich bei Textvarianten zum Kommentar, nicht zu den Hermogenes-Abschnitten.

⁷⁴ Vgl. das Vorwort des Dukas bei Botfield 281 f.; Legrand 1, 92 f.; darin heißt es: Τοιαύτης μὲν οὖν ἡξιώθητε δωρεᾶς (der Ausgabe der *Moralia*) Ἄλδου χορηγοῦντος, ἡμῶν τε διορθούντων.

⁷⁵ "Zur Geschichte der Überlieferung von Plutarchs *Moralia* III. 119," *Programm des Kgl. Friedrichs-Gymnasiums zu Breslau 1884*, 25 f.

⁷⁶ So f. 85^v (214, 18–22) τὸ μὲν γὰρ — ἀδήλων ὁ ἔλεγχος mit dem Vermerk *idem bis positum est*; f. 91^v (227, 23) ἀλλὰ φαμεν — ζήτησις; f. 191^r (288, 26) τὸ πρᾶγμα γὰρ μεταλαμβάνοντες u. a. Interessant ist bei der erstgenannten die Genese der Dittographie durch das wiederholte ἔλεγχος des Textes. Der Schreiber sprang von 214, 24 ἀλλ' ἔλεγχος zurück auf 18 ἔλεγχος und fuhr fort mit τὸ μὲν γὰρ bis 22 ἀδήλων ὁ ἔλεγχος; von hier sprang er auf 24 ἔλεγχος und fuhr dementsprechend fort mit ὁ μὲν ἔλεγχος.

Besonders häufig ist *m(ich)i v(idetu)r*, gelegentlich ausgeschrieben, meist aber abgekürzt: 206, 10 οὐκ ἐλάττων: οὐκ ἐλάττω; 228, 24 γέννηται: γεγέννηται; 283, 5 ἦττον (fehlt im Codex); 307, 8 ἐχούση: ἔχουσιν; 328, 14 ἐξασθενεῖ: ἐξασθενεῖσθαι; 427, 30 ἐπίγεται: ἐπιγίνεται; 443, 31 σκέψασθαι: σκέψασθε; 447, 13 τοιούτω: τοιοῦτον; 452, 14 αὐτὸν: αὐτοῦ; 466, 11 ταῦτα: ταύτης; 519, 18 παραλλομένον: παραβαλλόμενον; dann *sic v(idetu)r*: 228, 26 ἱερείαν εἶναι ἀποκτείνει: *vel* οὖσαν ἀποτείνει, *vel* εἶναι καὶ, ἀπο-; 737, 14 εἴλυσεν: εἰλύσῃσι; *sic iudico*: 286, 1 λεγὰρ ἔχει: λέγει γὰρ ἔχει; *sic est opus leg(ere)*: 273, 13 συμβαλὼν: συλλαβὼν; 222, 25 ist das erste οὐ gestrichen, und auf dem Rand ist vermerkt: *m(ich)i v(idetu)r sine negatione rectius legi*; ferner *forsitan*: 558, 28 δεινοῦς: δεινός; 592, 15 οἰωδήποτε: τοιῶδέ ποτε; 592, 25 ἀλλ' ἐξισο ἦν: ἀλλ' ἐξῆν; 598, 27 ἡ ῥήτωρσιν πω: ἡ ῥήτωρσιωπῶν; *fortasis*: 507, 10 βλέψαι (Minuskelverlesung): κλέψαι. Auch den sachlichen Fehler des Kommentars 752, 13–14 δευτέρῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθιακῶν kann Dukas von sich aus richtiggestellt haben: πρώτῳ κατὰ Φιλίππου.

Auch die übrigen Korrekturen im Kommentar konnte Dukas selber finden. Sie sind im übrigen nicht sehr zahlreich; ich habe von f. 211, 20–355, 12 etwa 20 gezählt, und größtenteils sind es ganz leichte Eingriffe wie Orthographica oder kleine Ergänzungen: 212, 15 θάπτον τὸ: θάπτοντος; 226, 26 εἰ δὴ: εἰ δεῖ; 230, 15 βούλονται: βουλευόνται; 232, 5/6 ὁ δικαστὴ: ὁ δικαστῆς; 249, 26 ἡ τὸν: εἰ τὸν; 250, 10 αἰτὴ: αἰτεῖν (αἰτῇ Walz); 256, 28 ἄγνοια: διάνοια (nach dem Hermogenes-Abschnitt 256, 5–7 und dem Kommentar ebd. 14, 17, 18, 20); 261, 15 ἀπολαβεῖν: ἀποβαλεῖν; 261, 31 χρῆται: χρῆσθαι; 267, 16 τῇ μῆρς: τῆς μητρὸς; 283, 14 ἐχροὶ: ἐχθροὶ; 285, 11 δίκας suppl.; 290, 11 μοῦσα: μυοῦσα (nach Z. 7); 318, 1 ἡ τιὸν: ἡ τοιὸν; 322, 9 τις post συκοφαντῶν suppl.; 331, 31 πρωῶν: προῶν; 333, 12/13 οἷον μνωμένῳ τινὶ κόρην del. (om. Ald., habet Walz e cod. 2923); 351, 5 τοῦ προσώπου τὰ κεφάλαια post οικειότερόν ἐστι (cf. 351, 10) del.; 355, 12 ἄχρι suppl. (nach dem Hermogenes-Abschnitt 354, 12, 17, 19, 26). Daß Dukas aufs Konjizieren angewiesen war, ergibt sich schon aus der geringen Zahl von Kopien des dicken Wälzers; er hatte offenbar kein Korrektiv zur Verfügung. Gelegentlich freilich schlug er auch ein Zitat nach; so, wenn er 206, 6 ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μοι durch ἀνάγκη κάμοι (Dem. 18, 34; vgl. Syrianus ed. Rabe 52, 21/2) ersetzt.

Der Herausgeber hat jeweils angezeigt, wo die Namen der Kommentatoren, die im Codex in Rot auf dem Rande stehen, in den Text gesetzt werden sollten. Er hat aber auch nicht selten diese Namen in Schwarz ergänzt; sie fehlen dann regelmäßig schon im Archetyp, dem Paris.

gr. 2923.⁷⁷ Ihr konjekturaler Ursprung erhellt aber auch aus ähnlichen Zusätzen, wie wir sie bei den Textvarianten gefunden haben: 590, 21 *si v(idetu)r* συριανοῦ; 591, 10 συριανοῦ *si v(idetu)r*; 594, 31 σωπάτρου *si v(idetu)r*; 542, 14 σωπάτρου καὶ μαρκελλίνου *si v(idetu)r*; 531, 24 *quod videtur ponendum . . . ut alibi* συριανοῦ, σωπάτρου καὶ μαρκελλίνου; 430, 23 *hic deficit sive Sopatri sive Marcellini*; 444, 6 *hic vel Sopatri vel Syriani*; 466, 30 *hic Syriani sive Sopatri*. Eine andere Hand, wohl die des Aldus Manutius selbst,⁷⁸ schrieb auf f. 16^v (39, 1–3) in den Zwischenraum zwischen der Eisagoge und dem Kommentar zu den στάσεις den schon im Archetypus, Paris. gr. 2923, fehlenden Titel Συριανοῦ καὶ Σωπάτρου καὶ Μαρκελλίνου εἰς στάσεις τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, ebenso auf f. 107^r (259, 11) Συριανοῦ καὶ Σωπάτρου.

Anders steht es mit den Korrekturen in den Hermogenes-Abschnitten, wo solche Zusätze gänzlich fehlen und sich Streichungen und Hinzufügungen finden, die nur durch Vergleich mit einer anderen Handschrift erklärbar sind. Schlagende Beispiele sind die Ergänzungen von Ausfällen infolge von Homoioteleuta wie 399, 28–29 W. = 50, 21–22 R. τοῦ εἶναι — σημείους und 738, 6 W. = 77, 14–15 R., wo καὶ τὰ οὐκ ὄντα οὐ προσληψόμεθα ausgefallen war. Die Korrekturen der Hermogenes-Abschnitte stimmen mit dem Text des Planudes-Corpus überein. Ich gebe davon zwei markante Beispiele: 275, 27 W. = 42, 10 R. ist τὸν ἀγῶνα εἰσελθεῖν vom Korrektor durchgestrichen und auf dem Rand durch ζητῆσαι τι τούτων ersetzt. Letzteres findet sich in den ältesten Vertretern des Corpus rhetoricum P, das Maximos Planudes vorlag, Paris. gr. 1983 (= Pa), 2977 (= Pc), ersteres im Archetypus des 'Dreimänner-Kommentars,' Paris. gr. 2923, und damit auch im Paris. gr. 2921; 637, 3–4 W. = 69, 2 R. fehlt im Paris. 2923 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδέναι μεταχειρίζεσθαι und dementsprechend in 2921, wo es der Korrektor ergänzt; es steht wieder in Paris. 1983 und 2977.

Die Planudes-Handschrift, die Dukas als Korrektiv der Hermogenes-Abschnitte des Paris. gr. 2921 benutzt hat, ist der Paris. gr. 2960. Wir werden weiter unten (S. 130 ff.) sehen, daß aus ihm vier 'anonyme' Scholien zu den στάσεις in den 'Dreimänner-Kommentar' der Aldina eingefügt und nach dem heute fehlenden Teil dieses Codex der Planudes-Kommentar gedruckt wurde. Ich habe die Korrekturen des Dukas in 2921 von 203, 20–400, 11 W. = 36, 7–51, 17 R. mit 2960 verglichen; von drei Ausnahmen abgesehen, stimmen sie immer überein. Von diesen drei Ausnahmen ist die erste 215, 26 W. = 37, 5 R., wo 2921 ποιήσει, Vc und Dukas ποιεῖται, 2960 aber ποιεῖ hat; Dukas hat ποιήσει nach Maßgabe von 2960 korrigiert. In den beiden anderen Fällen hat Dukas die Lesung von

⁷⁷ Vgl. H. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 64 (1909) 587–89. Aus dem Vergleich mit Paris. gr. 2923 hatte Rabe auch ersehen, daß die vier anonymen Scholien nichts mit dem 'Dreimänner-Kommentar' zu tun haben, ohne freilich ihre Herkunft zu erkennen.

⁷⁸ Vgl. damit die Seiten- und Buchtitel in den Vorlagen der Editio princeps des Aristoteles, *Handschriftliche Vorlagen A.* 79 zu S. 31.

2960 nicht übernommen, sondern konjiziert: 245, 7 W. = 39, 9 R. εἰς 2921, 2960, Rabe: ὡς Dukas, Walz; 275, 24 W. = 42, 8 R. ἔστι 2921, 2960, Rabe: ἔσται Vc, Dukas, Walz. Daß Dukas im ersten und dritten Fall seine Lesungen nicht aus Vc oder einem anderen Zeugen der V-Klasse übernommen hat, sondern Koinzidenz vorliegt, geht daraus hervor, daß nicht 2960 mit der V-Klasse geht, sondern, wie schon Rabe gesehen hat,⁷⁹ 2923 und damit auch 2921.

Da die Druckvorlage der Aldina im Hermogenes ein *simillimus* des Laur. 60, 25 war und auch dieser ein Zeuge des Corpus Planudeum ist, erhebt sich die Frage, ob Hermogenes nicht nach Paris. 2960, nach dem die Hermogenes-Abschnitte des 'Dreimänner-Kommentars' korrigiert wurden, gedruckt wurde. Das ist jedoch sicher nicht der Fall; er hat nicht wie 60, 25 und die Planudes-Codices sonst den Aphthonios enthalten,⁸⁰ jedenfalls nicht als integrierenden Bestandteil, weil sein Planudes-Kommentar mit der Lage α' einsetzt. Und da, wie die Aldina zeigt, im rückwärtigen Teil die vollständigen Hermogenes-Abschnitte gefehlt haben, konnte aus ihm nicht der vollständige Hermogenes-Text ausgezogen werden.⁸¹

Der Gestaltung des Druckbildes ist größere Aufmerksamkeit zugewandt worden als in der Druckvorlage des Sopatros Διαίρεσις ζητημάτων und des Kyros, Paris. gr. 2924. Die Hermogenes-Abschnitte sind schon im Codex eingerückt und regelmäßig schon vom Schreiber durch doppelte Anführungszeichen links von jeder Zeile gekennzeichnet; in der Aldina stehen einfache Anführungszeichen, aber ohne Einrückung des Textes. Zahlreiche weitere Anführungszeichen auf den Rändern des Codex hat der Herausgeber getilgt. Häufig hat er vor den Hermogenes-Zitaten, aber auch sonst oft vor einem Wort zwei Schrägstriche gesetzt; in der Aldina ist dann jedesmal ein kleiner Zwischenraum gelassen. Mit waagrechten gestreckten Rechtecken füllt der Herausgeber Fenster, die durch Unleserlichkeit des Archetyps entstanden sind, viermal auf f. 229^r (535, 21, 27, 30; 536, 6), fünfmal auf f. 229^v (337, 1, 3, 5, 7, 10), einmal auf f. 187^v (442, 23) in der Länge von 1 1/4 Zeilen, auf f. 35^r (91, 23) und f. 236^v (553, 10). Im Druck erscheinen dann jedesmal die Fenster.

Neben diesen Zeichen gibt es des öfteren auch schriftliche Anweisungen für den Setzer von derselben Hand wie im Paris. gr. 2924 (oben S. 117) und die an den Lücken unseres Codex (oben S. 125). Neben der Überschrift unter einer Zierleiste f. 277^v (647, 10), 323^v (766, 19), 342^r (813, 15) und 354^r (843, 5) steht am Rand *Capitulo*. Im Druck ist dann der Anfangsbuchstabe des ersten Wortes ausgerückt. Des öfteren wird mit *riga da per si* (f. 296^r = 691, 5 f. zweimal; 297^v = 696, 1; 298^r = 698, 14; 298^v = 699, 13) angezeigt, daß sie eine Zeile für sich bilden soll. Wiederholt werden Hermogenes-Abschnitte oder -Zitate neben den üblichen Anführungs-

⁷⁹ Rhein. Mus. 64 (1909) 587.

⁸⁰ S. oben S. 112.

⁸¹ Dazu unten S. 134.

zeichen mit *testo* gekennzeichnet, so 223, 3; 224, 5 f., 18, 20 f.; 309, 7; 482, 27; 486, 23; 217, 29 ist οὐδὲ μίαν unterstrichen, daneben steht *non est in testu*.

3. Der Hermogenes-Kommentar des Maximos Planudes

Dem Text des Paris. gr. 2921 wurden vier 'anonyme' Scholien beigegeben, die sich in der Aldina auf pp. 261/62, 329/30, 337/38 und 351 (= Walz 4, 626, 5–628, 19; 795, 3–797, 9; 813, 16–815, 11 und 845, 19–846, 30) befinden und sich auf die ἀντίθεσις, die προβολή, die στάσις κατὰ ῥητόν und die ἀμφιβολία beziehen. Sie stammen aus dem Hermogenes-Kommentar des Maximos Planudes (Walz 5, 222–590).⁸² Nach dem Vorgang der Aldina, in der der Kommentar des Planudes im zweiten Band die Seiten 352–576 einnimmt, hat auch Walz diese vier Scholien darin weggelassen,⁸³ weil sie in den 'Dreimänner-Kommentar' übernommen waren. Diese 'anonymen' Scholien stimmen nach Walz (4, 626, 3) in der Aldina *ferè prorsus* mit dem Paris. gr. 2926 überein. Sie sind aber nicht diesem, sondern dem Paris. gr. 2960 entnommen.

Der Paris. gr. 2960 ist ein Papiercodex von 328 × 226 mm und enthält ff. 1–39 die vier Reden des Dion Chrysostomos περὶ βασιλείας (f. 39^r ist fast ganz, 39^v ganz leer); ff. 40–65^v [Longinos] De sublimi (f. 65 leer); ff. 66–93 Themistios, Reden 7, 10, 9, 5, 4; ff. 94–97^v, Z. 3 Προλεγόμενα τῶν στάσεων [des Maximos Planudes] = Walz 5, 222–30; daran schließt sich ohne Überschrift der Text Πῶς ἐπιγνωσόμεθα τὰς στάσεις, Walz 5, 231, 2–29;⁸⁴ der Rest von f. 97^v und f. 98 ist leer; auf f. 99^r in Rot ein dichotomisches Schema, beginnend mit ἐν ταῖς ζητήμασι (dazu unten S. 132); f. 99^v–164^v Ἑρμογένους τέχνη ῥητορική (rot, in Majuskeln) περὶ στάσεων, der Kommentar des Maximos Planudes, Walz 5, 232–363, mit den vier 'anonymen' Scholien (s. oben) und vollständigen Textabschnitten des Hermogenes (S. 28, 1–92, 2 Rabe); ff. 165–66 eine Erklärung rhetorischer Termini, inc. mutilum πορθμὸν καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς, des. μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων; was fehlt, ist aus dem inhaltlich verwandten Paris. gr. 2926 zu ersehen, wo das Fehlende auf f. 264^v Z. 1 steht, inc. στρογγύλον σχῆμα, des. καὶ κατασκάπτων; ff. 167^r–70^v Προβλήματα ῥητορικά εἰς τὰς στάσεις, ed. Walz 8, 400–13.⁸⁵

Der Codex setzt sich aus heterogenen Teilen zusammen, die alle aus dem Besitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano kommen, wie sein üblicher Besitzvermerk *A me Francisco Asulano* auf f. 1^r, 40^r, 66^r und 94^r, anzeigt.

⁸² Zum Verfasser vgl. Walz 4, S. VIII f.; Rabe war zunächst (*Rhein. Mus.* 63 [1908] 524 mit A. 1) zurückhaltend, aber später auch überzeugt, daß er von Maximos Planudes stammt.

⁸³ Vgl. Walz 4, S. IX f.

⁸⁴ Vgl. dazu Walz 5, S. 231, A. 1.

⁸⁵ Der Verfasser ist vielleicht Maximos Planudes, vgl. H. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 67 (1912) 321; zu den Handschriften s. oben A. 69.

Die Vermerke sind zwar ausgekratzt, aber noch erkennbar. Die Lagen sind, wie wir es auch sonst aus Handschriften Asolanos kennen, auf dem unteren Rand mit lateinischen Großbuchstaben mit beigeschriebener Blattzahl von A 1 bis Y 1 numeriert. Obwohl die ff. 1–93 schon durch die Besitzvermerke als drei ursprünglich selbständige Teile gekennzeichnet werden, sind sie doch zur selben Zeit und teilweise vom selben Schreiber geschrieben; ff. 1–31^v, 36^r–39^r (Dion Chrysostomos) und ff. 66–93^v (Themistios) stammen von Ioannes Mauromates, von einem zweiten Schreiber die ff. 32^r–35^v, von einem dritten ff. 40–64^v (De sublimi). Ersterer verwendet ein Papier mit einer Armbrust = Briquet 761 (33 × 46r. Udine 1533. Var. ident. Laibach 1534) als Wasserzeichen, letzterer ein Papier mit einer Variante der Buchstabengruppe JB (vgl. Briquet 2555) in der Blattecke, aber auch das Papier mit der Armbrust (ff. 40, 42, 52, 53). Beide Papiere sind uns aus venezianischen Handschriften aus der Zeit um 1540 wohlbekannt.⁸⁶ Diese Teile müssen also zu dieser Zeit im selben Scriptorium entstanden sein und jedenfalls vor 1542, als der Codex mit vielen anderen von Guillaume Pélicier, dem Botschafter Franz' I. von Frankreich in Venedig, an diesen vermittelt wurde.⁸⁷ Wie Paris. gr. 2924 und 2921 erhielt er den Einband Heinrichs II.

Um mehrere Jahrzehnte früher ist der Rest des Codex geschrieben, der die rhetorischen Schriften enthält und hier in erster Linie interessiert. Die einstige Selbständigkeit dieses Teils, der die ff. 94–170 (+ 170a, leer und unnummeriert) umfaßt (scr. 225 × ca. 120, II. 32), erhellt auch aus einer alten Follierung, die wie im Paris. gr. 2921 in der äußersten Ecke rechts oben steht, aber größtenteils dem Messer des Buchbinders zum Opfer gefallen ist. Er setzt sich aus Lagen wechselnden Umfangs zusammen, die außer der erwähnten Zählung noch Reste von griechischen Kustoden des Schreibers mit Blattzahlen aufweisen; ff. 94–103 (P 1) Quinio; 104–15 (Q 1; β) Senio, vielleicht mit unregelmäßiger Zusammensetzung; 116–25 (R 1; γ, γ III) Quinio; 126–35 (S 1; δ, δ II, δ III) Quinio; 136–43 (T 1; ε) Quaternio; 144–55 (V 1, ζ, ζ VI) Senio; 156–65 (X 1, X 2, X 10; ζ, ζ II, ζ III, ζ IIII, ζ V) Quinio; 166–[170a] (Y 1; κζ, κζ II, κζ III) Ternio. Das Wasserzeichen ist ein schwach sichtbarer, aber einwandfrei identifizierbarer Vogel = Briquet 12135 (34,5 × 47r. Verona 1491. Var. ident. Verona 1492–1502) = Harlfinger, Oiseau 13, nur auf f. 165 ein Vogel = 12190 (44 × 59r.

⁸⁶ Sie finden sich in zahlreichen Handschriften von Schreibern, die um 1540 in Venedig für Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, den Botschafter Karls V. in Venedig (1539–1547), tätig waren (Ioannes Mauromates, Petros Karnabakes, Nikolaus Murruris, Andronikos Nuntzios) und sich heute meist im Escorial befinden. Vgl. meine "Handschriften . . . von Iamblichos De mysteriis," Register 6. Wasserzeichen, und G. de Andrés, *Catálogo de los códices griegos de la Real Biblioteca de el Escorial* 3 (Madrid 1967) 356, Indices IX: Filigranas, Letras BI, 7B, IB. Zur Form unserer Buchstabengruppe vgl. D. & J. Harlfinger, *Wasserzeichen aus griechischen Handschriften* 1–2 (Berlin 1974–80) Lettres 66 links oben (von Nikolaus Murruris aus dem Jahre 1543).

⁸⁷ Omont, *Catalogue des mss. grecs de Fontainebleau* (oben A. 48) Nr. 173 (S. 61).

Verona 1499). Geschrieben ist der ganze Teil vom selben Kopisten, wenn auch wohl nicht in einem Zuge; die ff. 94–164, also der Kommentar zu den *στάσεις*, mit hellerer, der Rest mit dunklerer Tinte. Es ist nach Subskription auf f. 170^v Franciscus Bernardus (aus Brescia), der seine Kopie im August 1491 in Verona beendete.⁸⁸

Der Inhalt der ff. 94–97^v, 99^v–164^v sind Teile des *Corpus Planudeum*, ff. 167^r–70^v gehört zu dessen Anhang.⁸⁹ Das Schema auf f. 99^r entstammt dem *στάσεις*-Kommentar des Syrianos (ed. Rabe S. 54 aus Marc. gr. 433; vgl. Walz 4, 207, A. 33), mit dem er in der Sache übereinstimmt (es fehlt das gesonderte Schema der *μετάληψις*), in den Formulierungen aber ausführlicher ist. An Stelle von *κρινόμενον* an der Spitze tritt *ἐν τοῖς ζητήμασι*. Mit 2960 identisch auch in den Beischriften ist 2926, f. 44^r, wo es wie in 2960 an Walz 4, 231, 2–29 ohne Überschrift nur mit einer Zeile Zwischenraum anschließt. An Stelle der in 2960 fehlenden Dichotomie der *μετάληψις* steht in 2926 *ἡ δὲ μετάληψις ἐστὶ παραγραφικὴ*. Die beiden Handschriften sind wahrscheinlich voneinander unabhängig aus derselben Vorlage geflossen; 2960 hat infolge von *Homoïarkton ἐὰν τι τῶν δεόντων — μετὰστασιν* (Z. 11/12), das 2926 hat, übersprungen, andererseits hat 2960 nach Z. 27 *μετάληψιν* in Rot τέλος τοῦ πῶς ἐπιγνωσόμεθα τὰς στάσεις, was in 2926 fehlt, worauf dann aber noch wie in 2926, Z. 28–29 folgt. Inhaltlich folgen in 2926 auf die *Definitiones rhetoricae* (ff. 264^v–66^v *στρογγύλλον — αἰσχίστων* und 266^v–70^v *νόμος ἐκέλευε — κρίνεται παρανομίας*) noch wie im *Corpus Planudeum* die *Epitome* von Dionysios v. Halikarnaß, *Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων* (und 287^v–91^v *γεωργίου πλήθωνος συντομὴ περὶ τινων μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς*).

Daß dieser Teil des Codex in der Druckerei gewesen ist, ergibt sich aus einer Umbruchanzeige auf f. 159^r und Fingerabdrücken mit Druckerschwärze auf den ff. 157^r, 163^v, 164^r, 164^v und vielleicht schon 133^r. Der Umbruchvermerk besteht in einem waagrechten Strich unter der neunten Zeile, der nach *ἱεροῖς μοιχεῖα τὰς ἰδιωτικὰς οἰκίας κατα* (Walz 4, 796, 18) über die Zeile springt und dabei *καταλιπόντες* durchschneidet; am Rand steht X/10. Der Schnitt entspricht genau dem Umbruch pp. 329/30 der Aldina (im Druck sind die Seiten 328 und 329 irrtümlich mit 228 und 229 bezeichnet). Aber schon nach der vierten Zeile finden sich links und rechts ein Querstrich und auf dem Rand X 10 mit Bleistift oder besser Griffel. Der Umbruch ist also, wie oft in den Vorlagen der Aldinen zu beobachten,⁹⁰ verschoben worden. Das Textstück, in dem der Umbruch vermerkt ist, ist das Scholion zum Abschnitt 81, 1–82, 3 Rabe und steht

⁸⁸ *Repertorium* 2, 518. Die Subskription steht in ungewöhnlicher Weise in einer kreisförmigen Schleife um τέλος σὺν θεῷ und lautet: διὰ χειρὸς φραγγίσκου βερνάρδου αὐγῶς μηνὸς αὐγούστου ἐν βηρώνῃ.

⁸⁹ Vgl. H. Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 67 (1912) 333; C. Wendel, *RE* 20. 2 (1950) 2231.

⁹⁰ S. oben S. 115 mit A. 31.

wie in der Aldina im Kommentar des Syrianos, Sopatros und Markellinos bei Walz 4, 795, 3–797, 9 unter der Überschrift καὶ ἄλλως, ἀνωνύμου. Eben dies steht auf f. 158^v auf dem Rand. Das ganze Stück ist auf dem Rand bis zu seinem Ende auf f. 159^r mit einer senkrechten Wellenlinie gekennzeichnet. Im Paris. gr. 2921 wird an der Stelle, wo das Scholion eingeschoben werden sollte (f. 334^r, Walz 795, 2) auf *quella carta nella quale e ἄλλως ἀνωνύμου* verwiesen. Das Scholion Walz 4, 813, 16–815, 11, das im Paris. 2960 auf ff. 159^v–60^v, 1 steht, ist wieder mit der Beischrift καὶ ἄλλως ἀνωνύμου versehen, und auch hier wird im Paris. gr. 2921, f. 342^r mit dem Vermerk ἡ κατὰ angezeigt, wo das Scholion einzufügen ist. Ebenso steht καὶ ἄλλως ἀνωνύμου bei dem Scholion zur ἀμφιβολία (2960, f. 164^r–65^v, Walz 4, 845, 20–846, 30), und auch hier ist in 2921 die Stelle, wo es angefügt werden soll, mit dem Hinweis ἡ ἀμφιβολία bezeichnet; es bildet den Schluß des Kommentars. In diesen beiden Fällen fehlt der Umbruchvermerk, im letzteren schon deshalb, weil das Stück in der Aldina ganz auf p. 351 unterkam.

Das letzte der vier erwähnten 'anonymen' Scholien, in der Aldina pp. 261/63, bei Walz 4, 626, 5–628, 19, findet sich nicht im Paris. gr. 2960, muß ihm aber ebenfalls entnommen sein, da es ebenfalls dem Planudes-Kommentar entstammt; es ist einem Blattaussfall zwischen f. 137 und 138, der den Text Walz 5, 308, 20 -χεία ὁ δὲ διώκων bis 311, 24 καὶ πρῶτος verschlang, zum Opfer gefallen. Ausgefallen ist das Doppelblatt 137a/41a, auf dessen zweiter Hälfte der heute fehlende Text Walz 5, 319, 23 -λομένους παριέναι bis 320, 16 τὸ παραγραφικὸν gestanden hat. Man wird das Doppelblatt in der Druckerei aus dem noch ungebundenen Manuskript herausgenommen, es aber unterlassen haben, es nach erfolgtem Satz wieder einzufügen, worauf es dann verloren ging.

Die ff. 94–170^v des Paris. gr. 2960 sind, wie der Vergleich mit 2926 zeigt, der Rest eines weit umfangreicheren Manuskripts. Es mußte wie dieser den ganzen Kommentar des Planudes enthalten haben, an den sich dann wie in 2926 das Stück στρογγύλον σχῆμα — μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων und die Problemata rhetorica anschlossen. Wie das erwähnte Doppelblatt ist dann auch der größere Rest des Planudes-Kommentars, nämlich der zu den εὐρέσεις, den ιδέαι und περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος mit den entsprechenden Einleitungen aus der Druckerei nicht zurückgekehrt und mit ihm auch der Anfang des Stückes στρογγύλον σχῆμα, der heute in 2960 fehlt; der Rest davon und die Problemata rhetorica aber blieben zurück, da man diese beiden Stücke nicht druckte. Das heutige f. 165 ist also nur scheinbar das letzte des Quinio ff. 156–65. In Wirklichkeit ist es das letzte der verlorenen Lage κζ', das an die Stelle des verlorenen letzten Blattes der Lage ζ' trat. Der Kommentar zu den στάσεις wurde nicht gebraucht, weil man zu diesen den sehr viel umfangreicheren Kommentar des Syrianos, Sopatros und Markellinos hatte. Ihm entnahm man nur die vier erwähnten Scholien zu seiner Ergänzung. Das Druckmanuskript des Planudes-Kommentars zu den εὐρέσεις, den ιδέαι und περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος

scheint ebenso verloren zu sein wie jenes Doppelblatt, auf dem das 'anonyme' Scholion Walz 4, 626, 5–628, 19 stand; es ist jedenfalls nicht mit den Handschriften des Gianfrancesco d'Asola nach Paris gekommen.

Der verlorene Teil des Planudes-Kommentars umfaßte im Paris. gr. 2960 das letzte Blatt der Lage ζ', die Lagen η' bis κε' und die ersten neun Blätter der Lage κζ', also rein rechnerisch 19 Lagen. Bei regelmäßigen Quinionen wären das $19 \times 10 = 190$ Blätter. Das gibt ein Verhältnis des Kommentars zu den στάσεις zu dem verlorenen Teil von 1: 1,14. Im Paris. gr. 2926 ist das analoge Verhältnis 1: 2,65. Die Differenz erklärt sich durch die erheblichen Kürzungen im verlorenen Teil von 2960, wie ein flüchtiger Vergleich des Anfangs des Kommentars zu περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος der Aldina mit 2926 zeigt. Insbesondere fehlen auch die vollständigen Hermogenes-Abschnitte, die 2926 hat.

Hier bestätigt sich ein weiteres Mal, daß Aldus Manutius keinen Zugang zu den Codices Bessarions im Dogenpalast von Venedig hatte.⁹¹ Die Rhetorik und Poetik des Aristoteles und die Alexander-Rhetorik hätte er in den Marciani graeci 200 und 215 finden können, wenn schon nicht als unmittelbare Druckvorlagen, so doch als Antigrapha für solche, für Aphthonios und die Ars rhetorica des Hermogenes die Marciani 430 und 432. Aber auch die Codices von SS. Giovanni e Paolo, aus denen etwa drei Jahrzehnte später Vettore Trincavelli Druckvorlagen für seine Erstausgaben holte,⁹² standen ihm nicht zur Verfügung, oder er wollte auf sie nicht rekurrieren, weil er andere zur Hand hatte, mit denen in der Druckerei nach Belieben verfahren werden konnte. Er hätte dort sicher schon Sopatros und Kyros und die in der Aldina darauf folgenden Werke des Dionysios von Halikarnaß, Demetrios, Menander, Aristoteles, Apsines und Minukianos im heutigen Marc. gr. VIII 10 finden können, also alle, die er einem heute verlorenen Codex aus der Gruppe des Marc. gr. 429 entnahm, außer Alexander und Phoibammon. Hermogenes mit dem Kommentar des Maximus Planudes stand dort in dem heutigen Marc. gr. XI 2.

Alle erhaltenen Druckvorlagen blieben im Familienbesitz. Daß Gianfrancesco Asolano Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Aldus Manutius geerbt hat, sagt er selbst im Vorwort zur Lukian-Ausgabe von 1522: *Exemplar igitur manu illius [des Aldus] castigatum cum inter alia pulcherrima monimenta, quae nobis reliquit, invenissemus, illud librariis nostris dedimus.*⁹³

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⁹¹ Vgl. *Handschriftliche Vorlagen* 68 ff.

⁹² S. oben A. 33.

⁹³ Zur Bibliothek des Aldus Manutius, die besonders reich an griechischen Büchern war, vgl. Geanakoplos (oben A. 2) 263.

An Archaeologist on the Schliemann Controversy*

WOLFGANG SCHINDLER

I

Heinrich Schliemann (1822–1890) was a product of the nineteenth century who remains unforgotten today. It is remarkable that until the early 1970s he was admired in precisely the way which he had sought in his own lifetime. For decades, for almost a century, his accomplishments were repeatedly praised. He had risen from the most modest origins to become a man of great wealth and the companion of kings, queens, an emperor and the Prime Minister of England. And, as the excavator of Troy and Mycenae, he became the founder of a new scholarly discipline, modern archaeology, that is field-archaeology. Along with Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–1768), the founder of archaeology as art history, a permanent place of honor has been reserved for him in the history of scholarship.¹

I wish to state at the start that this place of honor will never be denied him, not even by those who, since the 150th birthday of Schliemann, began to interpret critically his autobiographical writings. The new impetus thus given to Schliemann research, its discoveries and the resulting controversies, which the American archaeologist Machteld Mellinck in 1985 termed “psychological warfare against Schliemann,”² will be the center of my address.

For my part I do not speak as an uncommitted observer. I am involved in these controversies. The disagreements aroused by them have by no means subsided. The best proofs of this assertion are the two international conferences, one held at Bad Homburg in December 1989 and the other at Athens during Easter 1990, in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of

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¹ This place in the history of his discipline was not disputed by his first critic: see W. M. Calder III, “Schliemann on Schliemann: A Study in the Use of Sources,” *GRBS* 13 (1972) 335–53.

² M. J. Mellinck, *AJA* 89 (1985) 553.

Schliemann's death.³ I shall evaluate the results of the first two conferences here.

II

To better understand the two conferences it will be useful to sketch briefly the progress of Schliemann research during the 70s and 80s. Before the early 70s, when attention was directed to the life and work of this man, it meant admiration for his accomplishments and trust in his writings.⁴ For the brilliant impulse to a new evaluation of the man which the famous Jewish biographer Emil Ludwig had presented in his Schliemann life of 1932⁵ had been forgotten. The whitewashing of the hero demanded by Nazi ideologists, and carried out by the Mecklenburg schoolmaster Ernst Meyer, had destroyed the opportunity for an historical view of Schliemann for more than forty years. How very much this process was influenced by Meyer's biography⁶ and his editions of selected letters⁷ (that is, the sources) was made clear by W. M. Calder in his Bad Homburg paper.⁸ No defender of Meyer in this regard has yet emerged, if one ignores the swarm of uncritical Schliemann defenders who preserve the picture of Meyer's hero that has now become canonical and deny every critical attack against it.⁹

A decisive new impetus for a realistic conception of the context in which Schliemann constructed his understanding of himself began with the now legendary midnight lecture in the pastor's house in Neubukow on 6 January 1972, the 150th birthday of Heinrich Schliemann. It was given by

³ Bad Homburg: Heinrich Schliemann nach 100 Jahren: Symposium in der Werner-Reimers-Stiftung Bad Homburg 5-9 December 1989; Athens: Archaeology and Heinrich Schliemann a Century after his Death, International Congress in Athens, 14-22 April 1990. A third congress was held at Berlin 3-6 December 1990: see *Resümées zur internationalen Tagung: Heinrich Schliemann: Grundlagen und Ergebnisse moderner Archäologie. 100 Jahre nach Schliemanns Tod vom 3. bis 16. Dezember 1990 in Berlin* (Berlin 1990).

⁴ Proof of this continued admiration for Schliemann and his accomplishments among much else is H. A. Stoll, *Der Traum von Troja: Lebensroman Heinrich Schliemanns* (Leipzig 1956).

⁵ Emil Ludwig, *Schliemann: Geschichte eines Goldsuchers* (Berlin-Vienna-Leipzig 1932); reprinted with changed title as *Schliemann: Die Geschichte der Entdeckung des Alten Troja* (Bem 1952).

⁶ E. Meyer, *Heinrich Schliemann: Kaufmann und Forscher* (Göttingen 1969). Typically, no critical review of the book exists.

⁷ E. Meyer, *Briefe von Heinrich Schliemann* (Berlin-Leipzig 1936) and *Heinrich Schliemann, Briefwechsel I* (Berlin 1953); II (Berlin 1958).

⁸ W. M. Calder III, "Apocolocyntosis: The Biographers and the Archaeologists," *Heinrich Schliemann nach 100 Jahren*, ed. W. M. Calder III and J. Cobet (Frankfurt/Main 1990) 360-78.

⁹ See for example E. F. Bloedow, "Schliemann on his Accusers," *Tyche* 1 (1986) 30-40; "Schliemann on his Accusers II: A Study in the Reuse of Sources," *L'Antiquité Classique* 57 (1988) 5-30; "Schliemann at Mycenae," *Classical Views* 8 (1989) 147-65.

Professor W. M. Calder III, a leading pioneer of the new Schliemann research.¹⁰ The lecture was delivered by Calder after Heinrich Alexander Stoll (the Schliemann biographer) had earlier on the same evening in the Marktgastrstätte presented the official anniversary address.¹¹

What was exciting and new was that Calder under the title "Schliemann on Schliemann"¹² first checked critically what Schliemann wrote about himself. First he looked at what Schliemann said and then sought to control it by adducing independent contemporary sources. What emerged was exciting. The historicity of "The Dream of Troy" was put in doubt.¹³ Schliemann maintained that already in his childhood in Ankershagen, where he lived from the age of two until nine, he had sharpened his pick and spade to dig out Troy. Already in these youthful years he had formed the plan later to excavate Troy and his whole life long had pursued this dream. Suddenly this was no longer the truth. On February 2nd of the same year in Berlin voices were raised that doubted the historicity of the Dream of Troy during a colloquium held at the Academy there.¹⁴

To this youthful romance belonged the tale of his love for Minna Meincke, his young playmate, whose role Schliemann later exaggerated.¹⁵ What was most striking was the fact that in Rostock there existed no dissertation written in ancient Greek with which in 1869 Schliemann could have earned his doctorate.¹⁶ There was only a *vita* of about eight pages written in Greek, Latin and French. The latter was part of his book about Ithaca, the Peloponnesus and Troy.¹⁷ This publication served as the dissertation and secured the degree.

With these fancies were found others. Calder proved that the granting of Schliemann's U.S. citizenship did not occur in 1850 but in 1869.¹⁸ Further, the visit to President Fillmore at the White House 21 February 1851 in fact never took place but was made up by Schliemann and inserted into his diary.¹⁹ Apparently his visit with the Governor of Panama was similarly an invention.²⁰

¹⁰ The address, first delivered in German, was published in English; see above, note 1.

¹¹ At the request of the audience H. A. Stoll read aloud selections from his book *Der Traum von Troja*.

¹² See above, note 1.

¹³ Calder (above, note 1) 343 f.

¹⁴ The views advanced by J. Herrmann at this colloquium were incorporated into his book, *Heinrich Schliemann: Wegbereiter einer neuen Wissenschaft* (Berlin 1974) 9.

¹⁵ Calder (above, note 1) 344 f.

¹⁶ Calder (above, note 1) 336 f.

¹⁷ Heinrich Schliemann, *Ithaque, le Péloponnèse, Troie: Recherches archéologiques* (Paris 1869) = *Ithaka, der Peloponnes und Troja* (Leipzig 1869; repr. Darmstadt 1973).

¹⁸ Calder (above, note 1) 337 f.

¹⁹ Calder (above, note 1) 338 ff.

²⁰ Calder (above, note 1) 342.

Calder had very quickly carried his discoveries to the point that he called Schliemann "a pathological liar."²¹ He meant a man who lied by nature, who could not distinguish between true and false. This conclusion enraged the defenders of Schliemann, who soon entered the discussion. One has the impression that not all of them were really clear as to what the expression, "pathological liar," meant. Because Calder had bestowed this title on the hero Schliemann, the controversy burst forth in all its virulence.²²

I rather inclined to an historical explanation for what Schliemann had done rather than a psychological one, in part probably because I am a European and not an American. I sought to explain the fabrications and distortions of fact in Schliemann's narrative as a symptom of his *Sitz im Leben*.²³ At first I was convinced that one must see Schliemann's great efforts and persistence to excavate Hisarlik as a part of this creative fantasy-world. But I saw later that, along with his archaeological energy, his businessman's insistence quickly to reach his goal also played a decisive role. As far as the identification of Hisarlik with Troy goes, we know now that he owes this entirely to Frank Calvert, an Englishman who served as American Consul in the Dardanelles and had purchased part of Hisarlik with the intention of excavating it.²⁴ But at the end it was Schliemann who dug through the various levels and began the excavation on a scale which Calvert simply could not have managed.

Calder's discoveries were to be carried further. Professor David A. Traill of the University of California at Davis succeeded in proving that Schliemann's alleged eyewitness account of the burning of San Francisco on the night of 3-4 June 1851 was a fiction based on a Sacramento newspaper account.²⁵ He further showed that his allegation that he had to leave Sacramento suddenly because of illness in March 1852 was untrue. In fact he had been shortweighting his partner's gold and was found out.²⁶ Traill later confirmed from contemporary sources that Schliemann's American

²¹ Calder (above, note 1) 352.

²² See W. Schindler, "Dichtung und Wahrheit: Schliemanns Selbstbiographie im Kontext," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 152 n. 1 for bibliography.

²³ W. Schindler, "Heinrich Schliemann: Leben und Werk im Spiegel der neueren biographischen Forschungen," *Philologus* 120 (1976) 271-89 and in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 152-69.

²⁴ D. A. Traill, "Further Evidence of Fraudulent Reporting in Schliemann's Archaeological Works," *Boreas* 7 (1984) 295-316. Already in his memorial address on 1 March 1891 R. Virchow had alluded to the independence of Schliemann from F. Calvert in locating Troy at Hisarlik; see J. Hermann, *Heinrich Schliemann: Wegbereiter einer neuen Wissenschaft*² (Berlin 1990) 251 n. 7.

²⁵ D. A. Traill, "Schliemann's Mendacity: Fire and Fever in California," *CJ* 74 (1979) 348-55.

²⁶ See previous note.

citizenship and Indianapolis divorce in 1869 were gained through bribery, misrepresentation and perjury.²⁷

In this way the outlines of the picture began to take on a clearer form. All these inventions of Schliemann fit beautifully the image of the self-made man. He presented himself to his audience as the perfect social climber, the romantic parvenu, at the same time as the successful businessman and fortunate adventurer. In his anger Traill brought the verdict of moral condemnation against Schliemann. In his contribution to the Colorado volume on "Schliemann's Helios Metope and Psychopathic Tendencies" he applied to Schliemann's life the symptoms of psychopathy derived from the *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior* and explained all his peculiarities in terms of mental illness.²⁸ Unfortunately, this paper has damaged the critical investigation of Schliemann. In spite of Traill's invaluable contributions to our understanding of the historical Schliemann, one simply must admit this. The reaction of the press confirms my assertion.²⁹ This medical diagnosis of Schliemann as far as scholarship goes has reached a dead end. Nonetheless, now as before, as one could see in both the Homburg and Athens conferences, the Schliemann phenomenon has remained a favorite wrestling arena for psychologists and psychoanalysts.³⁰

III

Meanwhile, there has been continued progress in the understanding of the cultural milieu of Schliemann's life, of the period during which he made his business career and began his excavations. The Homburg Symposium has added a great deal to our knowledge here. German enthusiasm for Homer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been carefully investigated. Professor Wohlleben spoke on the subject at Bad Homburg and at the University of Illinois.³¹ One must understand Schliemann's love for

²⁷ D. A. Traill, "Schliemann's American Citizenship and Divorce," *CJ* 77 (1982) 336-42.

²⁸ D. A. Traill, "Schliemann's Acquisition of the Helios Metope and his Psychopathic Tendencies," *Myth, Scandal and History: The Heinrich Schliemann Controversy and a First Edition of the Mycenaean Diary*, ed. W. M. Calder III and D. A. Traill (Detroit 1986) 48-80, esp. 62-73.

²⁹ Note particularly the attacks of Bloedow (above, note 9) and D. Easton, "Schliemann's Discovery of 'Priam's Treasure': Two Enigmas," *Antiquity* 55 (1981) 179-83 and "Schliemann's Mendacity: A False Traill?" *Antiquity* 58 (1984) 197-204.

³⁰ S. Goldmann, "Die Homerische Welt als Symbol verschütteter Kindheit: Literaturpsychoanalytische Untersuchung von Heinrich Schliemanns Autobiographie (1869)," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 191-205.

³¹ See J. Wohlleben, "Homer in German Classicism: Goethe, Friedrich Schlegel, Hölderlin and Schelling," *ICS* 15 (1990) 197-211 and *Die Sonne Homers: Zehn Kapitel deutscher Homer-Begeisterung von Winckelmann bis Schliemann* (Göttingen 1990). This latter is an expansion of Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 27-30.

Homer as part of this tradition, although Schliemann himself had no interest in the aesthetic appreciation of Homer. For him Homer was poetry with a kernel of real history which he believed one could discover archaeologically.

The reception of ancient history in Europe at this time played a decisive role. History was seen to be a medium for self-description. The quest for historical reality was practiced on a wide scale, not least in the matter of archaeological confirmation. This was articulated at Homburg up to the point of explaining the history of archaeology as "Myth and Sensation."³² With his search for Troy Schliemann is a typical example, also in regard to the historical coloring of his own existence. Think only of his domestic life in the Iliou Melathron, his residence at Athens, where he lived with his children Agamemnon and Andromache.

Schliemann's approach to ancient history in his formative decades was also elucidated at Bad Homburg from the side of art history.³³ Realistic historical description to the point of creating a model for self-identification in place of the earlier classicistic and romantic conceptions was stressed. This agrees with the contemporary patterns of historical description. We find an allegorical variant on this in the painted *putti* of the Iliou Melathron, who are portrayed engaged in the very pursuits of Schliemann and Sophia.³⁴

Nineteenth-century jewelry and the harmless imitation of ancient pieces were carefully discussed at Bad Homburg.³⁵ Schliemann's intention to have an exact copy of his Trojan treasures made in Paris (this is attested by his letter to Beaurain in Paris) fit easily into such a context, but they are not proof that an object such as the so-called Mask of Agamemnon is a forgery buried by Schliemann at Mycenae. Unfortunately Calder and Traill were a bit too bold in this regard.³⁶ The two requests to have scientific tests of the mask made were both refused. Greek national pride here understandably played a role.

³² See B. Patzek, "Schliemann und die Geschichte der Archäologie im neunzehnten Jahrhundert," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 311–55.

³³ See H. Hammer-Schenk, "Das Bild der griechischen Antike in der Malerei um die Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 335–45.

³⁴ See S. Tarantou, "Iliou Melathron," *Katoikia* 30 (1987) 68–75; G. S. Korres, *Das Altertum* 34 (1988) 164–73 and "Heinrich Schliemanns 'Iliou Melathron' in Athen," *Antike Welt* 19.1 (1988) 62–64.

³⁵ See C. Gere and G. C. Munn, *Artists' Jewellery, Pre-Raphaelite to Arts and Crafts* (Woodbridge 1989) and G. C. Munn, "The Archaeologist, the Collector and the Jeweller, 1820–1900," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 326–34. One may add now that in September 1879 Schliemann ordered from Carlo Giuliano in London "einen Halschmuck und ein Armband" as gifts for Virchow's daughter: see J. Herrmann and E. Maaß (edd.), *Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow 1876–90* (Berlin 1990) 142, where for "Ginliano" read "Giuliano."

³⁶ See "CU Prof seeks to debunk legend: Famous mask may be fake, too," *Colorado Daily* 30 Nr. 239 (12 October 1982); "Archaeological Liar: Scholars discredit archaeologist's fantastic legend," *Rocky Mountain News* (15 February 1982) 6; and D. A. Traill, "Priam's Treasure: Schliemann's Plan to Make Duplicates for Illicit Purposes," in Calder and Traill (above, note 28) 110–21.

A further important point to come out of the Homburg Conference was the idea of a "collective biography" of the middle class between 1850 and 1870.³⁷ The economic success and scholarly and cultural interests of this class were stressed. These factors were not only inherent in Schliemann's life, but they colored above anything else the repeated claims found in his autobiography, which became a mirror of these inclinations. Hans-Werner Hahn, a specialist in nineteenth-century intellectual history, observed:³⁸

The fact is that numerous aspects of this biography are to be brought into close contact with the general development of the bourgeoisie. That goes for the economic rise of the "self-made man" as well as for the early joining of business activity and scholarly and cultural interests, the meaning of bourgeois work ethic and efficiency, the mixing of progressive optimism with the fear of crisis, the reforming of one's own life-goals as a result of economic crisis and the reversion to the past that was connected with this.

Along with the historical examination of autobiography, an attempt was made to understand from the point of view of the history of literature Schliemann's autobiographical assertions.³⁹ The interesting observation was made that two genres of autobiography must be distinguished. There is biographical information presented after the life was lived. There is also the autobiography that is programmatically conceived, written as motivation for what has not yet been realized. This was so in the case of Schliemann.

IV

In this context lie too those earliest revelations of Schliemann in which he sought to work through his early years. The great document for this is his still not fully published monster-letter of 1842 to his sisters. It is in the Gennadeion Library of the American School in Athens and is over sixty pages in length. In his edition of the selected correspondence Ernst Meyer published much of the letter.⁴⁰ But its usefulness suffered from his censorship. We are not certain that Schliemann ever sent it.

I sought with very few exceptions to edit those parts of the letter omitted by Meyer and with this new information to determine the parallels between the letter and the *topoi* of contemporary literature, particularly

³⁷ See H. Scheuer, "Heinrich Schliemanns 'Selbstbiographie': Zur Gattungstypologie der Autobiographik in der zweiten Hälfte des neunzehnten Jahrhundert," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 346-59.

³⁸ See his contribution, "Wirtschaftliche Erfolge und wissenschaftlichkulturelle Interessen: Entwicklungsprozesse im mitteleuropäische Bürgertum vor dem Hintergrund der Biographie Heinrich Schliemanns," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 309-25 (citation from 323).

³⁹ Contribution to the discussion by J. Wohlleben after the paper of H. Scheuer (above, note 37).

⁴⁰ E. Meyer, *Briefwechsel I* (above, note 7) 9-33.

trivial-literature.⁴¹ For example, the topos of the portrayal of women: Schliemann portrays them on the one hand as romantic fairytale figures, but on the other hand with crassest realism. One need only cite the description of Sophie Schwartz, the Ankershagen housemaid and lover of his father who brought so much misfortune to his early life. He describes her in a way that stresses the vulgarity of this poor wretch.⁴² Alleging that he met her in Hamburg, he gives her a defense speech in which one finds a lofty level of moral and philosophical argument of a sort she never could have used.⁴³ This is a further topos that can be paralleled in contemporary literature and sermons.

Further it is noteworthy—I have sought to show that in his description of the shipwreck off Texel—that Schliemann, in spite of all his attention to detail, a trait of the successful businessman, nonetheless is able to vary the report of what he experienced. In this regard one should compare the version of his letter to his sisters in 1842⁴⁴ with the version of the shipwreck in his autobiography of 1880 in *Ilios*.⁴⁵ There are considerable discrepancies of such magnitude that one thinks of a dramatic composition rather than the reporting of what really happened.⁴⁶

Comparable was the critical analysis of the editing of the book about China and Japan which he submitted as part of material for his doctorate in Rostock in 1869. When one compares the text of the diary of 1865 with the published version, there are similar discrepancies, omissions and changes.⁴⁷ Unfortunately the guide books used by Schliemann could not be compared with his narrative and so we do not know how much he owed to them.

In another case such a comparison was revealing. In *BSA* 1989 David Turner compared the Ithaca book with which Schliemann received his doctorate with the diary and with Murray's guidebook.⁴⁸ It turned out that Schliemann combined what he had recorded in his diary with what he read in

⁴¹ W. Schindler in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 161 f.

⁴² W. Schindler (previous note) 157 f.

⁴³ W. Schindler (above, note 41) 160.

⁴⁴ E. Meyer, *Briefwechsel* I (above, note 7) 22–24.

⁴⁵ Heinrich Schliemann, *Ilios: Stadt und Land der Trojaner* (Leipzig 1881) 9 f. There exists an external confirmation for the shipwreck from the Dutch side: see *The Americanization of Edward Bok: The Autobiography of a Dutch Boy Fifty Years After* (New York 1922) xxi–xxii. Bok relates how a relative of his had rescued the boy Schliemann on the beach at Texel.

⁴⁶ W. Schindler (above, note 41) 162–64.

⁴⁷ See P. Keyser, "The Composition of *La Chine et le Japon*: An Introduction to Tendentious Editing," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 225–36.

⁴⁸ See M. Lehrer and D. Turner, "The Making of an Homeric Archaeologist: Schliemann's Diary of 1868," *BSA* 84 (1989) 221–68.

the guidebook to create a third version. Heinrich Alexander Stoll, the Schliemann biographer, in the year 1973 wrote to Calder:⁴⁹

The Ithaca-book expresses more the *Wunschbild* than what Schliemann really experienced . . . Please look at the names borne by the citizens of Ithaca, who enter into Schliemann's narrative . . . The whole book is not a diary about Ithaca. It is a novel. One might easily say the same about *La Chine et le Japon*.

Let Stoll have the last word until further research determines the relation of his early publications with the diary entries and guidebooks.

V

Calder in 1972 in his pioneer article, "Schliemann on Schliemann," already asked the question, "How did his psychopathy affect his archaeology?"⁵⁰ This opened a new field for investigation. Traill followed the suggestion and pointed his finger to a weak point of central importance, namely to the various archaeological reports by Schliemann concerning the Treasure of Priam.⁵¹ With this treasure he had crowned his first Trojan campaign (1871–73). The first suspicious discrepancy which Traill found was Schliemann's allegation that Sophia was at Troy and shared in the discovery of the treasure. It can be proven (Schliemann later admitted it) that at this time she had already returned to Athens.⁵² With the exposure of this fiction in Schliemann, the Treasure itself fell under suspicion. Sophia had been inserted as an eyewitness for what she never saw. Comparison of the report of the find in the Trojan diary with the letter to his publisher Brockhaus and the published version of the excavations revealed that first only in Athens after the completion of the campaign did he write up the description of the whole Treasure. Traill hastened to present Schliemann in the light of a forger.⁵³ The excavator of Troy had possibly purchased new pieces or even had them made. The "warfare" against Schliemann had been carried so far that his scholarly reputation was now in jeopardy.

Finally at this point the defenders of Schliemann entered the arena. They were determined not only to contain the vilifications of Schliemann but to refute them.⁵⁴ Now these tendencies too have reached inflationary

⁴⁹ See W. M. Calder III (above, note 8) 374 f.

⁵⁰ Calder (above, note 1) 349.

⁵¹ D. A. Traill, "Schliemann's Discovery of 'Priam's Treasure'," *Antiquity* 57 (1983) 181–86 and "Schliemann's Discovery of Priam's Treasure: A Reexamination of the Evidence," *JHS* 104 (1984) 96–115.

⁵² Traill, *JHS* 104 (1984) 109 f.

⁵³ Traill, *JHS* 104 (1984) 114 f. and "Priam's Treasure" (above, note 36) 116.

⁵⁴ See especially D. Easton, "Schliemann's Discovery" (above, note 29); "Schliemann's Mendacity" (above, note 29); and "Priam's Treasure," *Anat. St.* 34 (1984) 141–69.

level.⁵⁵ Instead of providing a catalogue of all these excesses, exaggerations, unjustified allegations and accusations, matters which particularly in the last years of our century provide unwelcome evidence for the hysteria of so-called objective scholarship, instead of adding to this, I should like to report a debate from the recent Homburg Conference. Its results serve to clarify the ambivalence of the arguments pro and contra Heinrich Schliemann.

It is a matter here of the *rencontre* between David Traill and the Cambridge defender of Schliemann, Donald Easton. Traill had accused Schliemann of unscrupulously planting together pieces from the 1872 and 1878 excavations.⁵⁶ This seemed to him to be a further example of Schliemann's deceit. Easton put his finger again on this passage and could show that Schliemann had put together objects from different excavations in Troy without maintaining that he had excavated them at the same time. The duel between the two scholars ended fairly and exemplified English fair play. The indictment was unsuccessful and the trial ended with the Scots' verdict "not proven."

This discussion once again showed how careful one must be when interpreting what Schliemann says in order to avoid repeated and unprovable accusations. Some critics and defenders of Schliemann have extended the "psychological warfare" pro and contra Schliemann to a similar campaign against one another. It would be beneficial for everyone if as part of the 100th anniversary of Schliemann's death all these exaggerations, which have their positive side, could be reduced to a justifiable dimension. The first steps toward a reduction took place at the Schliemann Congress in Athens during Easter 1990 in which I participated. I shall return to these results later.

VI

I want to add a further example intended to illustrate how careful we must be in Schliemann research. The example brings us back to his autobiography. It is concerned with the dissertation written in ancient Greek with which he supposedly gained his doctorate at the University of Rostock in 1869.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ See especially the writings of Bloedow (above, note 9).

⁵⁶ See H. Schmidt, *Heinrich Schliemanns Sammlung Trojanischer Altertümer* (Berlin 1902) 245 (N); H. Schliemann, *Trojanische Altertümer: Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Troja* (Leipzig 1874) 117 = (1990) 102 and *Ilios* (above, note 45) 547. Compare Easton, "Schliemann's Mendacity" (above, note 29) 201 and D. A. Traill, "Heinrich Schliemann," *Classical Scholarship: A Biographical Encyclopedia*, ed. W. W. Briggs and W. M. Calder III (New York-London 1990) 436: "If it was found as Schliemann reports, it must have been planted." Easton defends Schliemann against the accusation that he planted finds of 1872 to be found again in 1878.

⁵⁷ Schliemann, *Ilios* (above, note 45) 24 f. For the Latin *vita* accompanying the dissertation, see W. M. Calder III, "Heinrich Schliemann, An Unpublished Latin *Vita*," *CW*

Calder searched for this Greek dissertation and concluded that it had never existed. What he found were two more or less eight-page autobiographies composed in Latin and Greek. In fact they were translations of the original French life in the Ithaca book that earned him the doctorate. Calder seemed to be right with his exciting discovery that the "dissertation written in ancient Greek" was a fiction.⁵⁸

If one investigates the matter more carefully, one finds that the myth of the Greek dissertation arose gradually. In the first autobiography of 1880 that begins *Ilios*, Schliemann writes of the Ithaca book:⁵⁹

One copy of this work along with a dissertation written in ancient Greek I sent in to the University of Rostock and was rewarded by being granted the degree of doctor of philosophy of that university.

That at this time by the word dissertation Schliemann meant, rather than the actual thesis with which he gained his degree, a kind of written proof of his knowledge of Greek, one sees in his letter to the American Philological Association, written from Indianapolis on 29 May 1869. There he discusses the correct way to learn a foreign language. He writes:⁶⁰

[It is necessary] to read much aloud, never to make translations, to write always dissertations on subjects that interest us.

In the same letter he speaks of a sixth-form boy who masters classical Greek in twelve months. The boy has

to write fluently a tolerably good dissertation and to translate—unprepared—any one of the classical Greek authors . . .

Clearly "dissertation" here means a written proof of linguistic competence. One must obviously ask why Schliemann did not speak of the dissertation written in Latin as well as the one in Greek. With use of the word "dissertation" he must have known that in German-speaking countries there would be a misunderstanding. Readers would naturally assume that the thesis itself was written in ancient Greek. Carl Schuchhardt, in his famous book, translated into English, on Schliemann's excavations, still in 1890 distinguishes the Ithaca book from "a treatise written in ancient Greek."⁶¹

67 (1973/74) 271–82 with corrections at CW 69 (1975/76) 117–18. The Greek *Vita* remains unpublished.

⁵⁸ Calder (above, note 1) 336 f.

⁵⁹ Schliemann, *Ilios* (above, note 45) 24 f.

⁶⁰ E. Meyer, *Briefwechsel I* (above, note 7) 154 and 155.

⁶¹ C. Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Ausgrabungen in Troja, Tiryns, Mykenä, Orchomenos, Ithaka im Licht der heutigen Wissenschaft* (Leipzig 1890) 9.

Emil Ludwig in 1932 first spoke of "a *biography* written in ancient Greek."⁶²

Professor Bachmann, instructed by the Dean Hermann Karsten to evaluate the Ithaca book, wrote as well about the Greek autobiography which he tore to pieces (the Latin *vita* he approved). He wrote of the Ithaca book:⁶³

... the efforts of Mr. Schliemann on archaeological and topographical matters, by which he worthily continues his learned predecessors, apart from several criticisms of details, are so noteworthy that I have no hesitation to vote for the awarding of the doctoral degree.

It is a half truth if one allows Schliemann to gain his doctorate on the basis of a dissertation written in ancient Greek. Calder's criticism must be corrected in that Schliemann used the word dissertation to mean a linguistic exercise rather than a thesis. If this exercise had in fact been his thesis, he would have failed miserably. He did not quite lie but he wrote ambiguously.

VII

With this problem, which may serve as a further example to warn against too quick a criticism of Schliemann, we find ourselves again in the midst of the biographical quarrels for and against Schliemann. At Bad Homburg Calder critically examined the efforts of the three leading Schliemann biographers: the already mentioned life by Emil Ludwig (1932), next that of Ernst Meyer (1969) and finally the biographical novel by Heinrich Alexander Stoll (1956).⁶⁴

Calder expressed the highest admiration for the pioneer, critical work of Emil Ludwig, who was the founder of our modern understanding of the *Lebensproblematik* of Schliemann. He sought on the one hand to clarify the enormous influence of Ludwig on the historical biographical literature of his time. He explained his success through the discarding of historicism because of his conception of cultural history. That is a breakthrough which Calder had already detected in the distancing between Wilamowitz and his great pupils, especially Paul Friedländer and Werner Jaeger. Emil Ludwig similarly belonged to the generation after historicism, who, although they made use of that movement, advanced to new horizons of cultural history by seeking a deeper understanding of their subject.

⁶² Ludwig (above, note 5) 124: "In der Tat dürfte der Indigohändler als erster, ohne doch Alphilologe zu sein, auf dieser Universität mit einem altgriechisch geschriebenen Lebenslauf promoviert worden sein."

⁶³ H. A. Stoll, *Der Traum von Troja*¹⁰ (Leipzig 1974) 268 = *Der Traum von Troja*⁶ (Halle-Leipzig 1990) 250.

⁶⁴ E. Ludwig (above, note 5); E. Meyer (above, note 8), H. A. Stoll (above, note 4).

On the other hand Calder discovered a sharing of deep similarities between Ludwig and Schliemann that went so far that he described Ludwig's Schliemann biography as an *apologia pro vita sua*.⁶⁵ The amateur Ludwig, attacked by the professors of history, saw in Schliemann, attacked by the German professors of his time, an anticipation of his own predicament. Not everyone will accept this suggestion. What seems to me more important is the stressing of the brutal realism in Ludwig's biography. He had scratched the heroic portrait of the founder of modern archaeology. The reaction of the archaeologists was immediate. Theodor Wiegand wrote to Wilhelm Dörpfeld on 17 May 1932:⁶⁶

I have read the Schliemann-book of Ludwig and find it disgusting. Was it necessary to stress so many little unattractive traits in the life of the man? And on the other hand he is supposed to be a hero . . . I absolutely cannot understand Mrs. Schliemann. She certainly has served poorly the memory of her husband. Quite the opposite.

Calder remarks about this: "The scholar Wiegand prefers myth to truth!"⁶⁷ Such an opinion reveals the similarity between the way Calder and Ludwig approach their hero. Certainly Ludwig's biography had breached the fortress of Schliemann's admirers. The reason Ludwig's results had such little influence on subsequent research lay in the problem of Germany in the 1930s. After the establishment of National Socialism in Germany in 1933, the work of the Jew Emil Ludwig, born Cohn, was ignored and disparaged and the need arose to whitewash the damaged image of the hero Schliemann.

The biographer that was needed was quickly discovered. He was Dr. Ernst Meyer, since 1919 a teacher at a boys' school in Neustrelitz-Mecklenburg. He was relieved of his teaching duties in 1937 and given the task of freeing Schliemann from the slanders of the Jew Ludwig. Meyer worked for some time in Athens and had access to the Schliemann papers (by then in the Gennadeion there). This is why he knows the sources so well and in some ways this aided further research. Take for example Meyer's, admittedly problematic, editions of selected letters. We can read about him in a Mecklenburg newspaper of 31 May 1937:⁶⁸

The schoolteacher Dr. Ernst Meyer of Mecklenburg has been in Athens for some time, commissioned by the Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter, Friedrich Hildebrandt, to set in order the papers of the famous archaeologist and Trojan expert Heinrich Schliemann . . .

From the whole *Nachlaß* there can be gained a reliable and thoroughly documented portrait of Schliemann that is free from the misrepresentations which are found for example in the biography of

⁶⁵ Calder (above, note 8) 365.

⁶⁶ Calder (above, note 8) 368; cf. E. Meyer, *Schliemann* (above, note 6) 426 n. 98.

⁶⁷ Calder (above, note 8) 368.

⁶⁸ Calder (above, note 8) 370, citing *Landeszeitung für Mecklenburg Beilage zu Nr. 123* (31 May 1937).

Emil Ludwig Cohn, entitled *The Goldseeker*, and based on capitalistic conceptions.

The critical insights into Schliemann's life, begun by Ludwig, were blocked by the whitewashing of Ernst Meyer. The quarrel about the "Goldseeker Schliemann" was never the turning point that it ought to have been. Meyer fully discarded this approach to the man, and writes that he misses wholly in Ludwig⁶⁹

the organ for the German in Schliemann, particularly for his romantic idealism. Ludwig lacks entirely (one need only look at the humorous introductory sentences of his biography) the feeling for the unique values of the people of Mecklenburg and of the Low German landscape.

These aims of Ernst Meyer which may also be traced in his appendix to the new editions of Schliemann's autobiography, are perhaps too strongly stressed by Calder. But at Bad Homburg his views were not attacked. And who would dare to defend Meyer in this context?

In contrast Calder places the writer Heinrich Alexander Stoll on a higher level. This admiration of Stoll lies partly in the fact that for years the two communicated both orally and in letters. I myself was a witness of this and can only confirm it. Calder for the first time presented to the public at Bad Homburg the letter, cited earlier, to him of 8 October 1973.⁷⁰ This letter attests clearly the distance gained in the 1970s by Stoll from the romantic elaborations of Schliemann's life. In his notes to his *Dream of Troy*, certainly by the tenth edition of 1974, he writes clearly:⁷¹

The earliest autobiography of Schliemann, the foreword to *Ithaka, der Peloponnes und Troja*, 1869, is more spontaneous than the one in *Ilios* and not yet written from the summit of his greatness and as proof that all experienced and attained had been anticipated from the beginning. From this need, many of the romantic elaborations certainly resulted.

The critical attitude of Stoll regarding Schliemann's descriptions crystalized in the 1970s, years that were decisive for Schliemann research. In the introduction which Stoll wrote to Schliemann's Ithaca-book in 1974 we find the following critical formulation:⁷²

The modern reader too . . . will be inclined to add critical question marks and surprised exclamation points in the margins. In a number of places he will have serious doubts whether a real diary has been published or a romanticized reworking by an otherwise sober businessman which allows him to see and hear things belonging more

⁶⁹ Calder (above, note 8) 371 and E. Meyer, *Briefe* (above, note 7) 25, 49 n. 1.

⁷⁰ Calder (above, note 8) 374 f. The Calder-Stoll correspondence is now in the archives of the Heinrich Schliemann Museum at Ankershagen.

⁷¹ H. A. Stoll, *Der Traum von Troja*¹⁰ (Leipzig 1974) 544.

⁷² H. A. Stoll, *Auf den Spuren der Antike: Heinrich Schliemanns Berichte über seine Entdeckungen in der griechischen Welt* (Berlin 1974) 26.

to his imagination and wish-fulfilment than to the sober reality of Ithacan daily life.

David Turner's critical analysis of the Ithaca book, published in the *Annual of the British School at Athens* of 1989,⁷³ is the best proof of Stoll's suspicions. One can, therefore, only agree with Calder's high estimation of Stoll's service in investigating Schliemann's writings and hope that these first critical steps will be permanently acknowledged especially in the balancing of research in this anniversary year.

The first steps in this direction have already been made by Wilfried Bölke, the Director of the Schliemann Museum in Ankershagen-Mecklenburg.⁷⁴ But that was not the theme of his contribution to the Homburg Colloquium. He spoke there rather of new sources that can clarify the years of Schliemann's childhood and apprenticeship.⁷⁵ They especially concern the role of Schliemann's father in Ankershagen and their effect on the early education of his son. With the interpretation of these new sources we have gained a fresh insight into Schliemann's conception of his father. That allows us to grasp more profoundly the childhood pattern and the motivation for his restless energy.

VIII

If we seek to survey the work on Schliemann from the seventies until the anniversary year 1990, we can distinguish the following currents.

Further critical attention to the autobiographical assertions continues unabated. New sources are always becoming available. The hasty critical attacks have become milder and more careful. Out of the allegedly notorious deceiver the self-made man of the *Gründerzeit* has emerged. His businessman's cleverness and brilliant gift for public relations have been understood in the light of his historical and cultural context. Not to speak of his pioneer effort for scholarship, all the more admirable because attained by a professional outsider and obsessed dilettante.

We come now to the question of what he did for scholarship. He was not the very first field archaeologist. But because of his organizational gifts, his ability to pay for his excavations and his growing improvement in excavation techniques, he became the real founder of field archaeology. Donald Easton of Cambridge sought to compare and synthesize the results of the excavations of Schliemann, Dörpfeld and Blegen at Troy.⁷⁶ He

⁷³ See above, note 48.

⁷⁴ W. Bölke, *Mitteilungen aus dem Heinrich-Schliemann-Museum Ankershagen*² (Ankershagen 1988).

⁷⁵ W. Bölke, "Schliemanns Kindheit in Ankershagen," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 170-90.

⁷⁶ D. F. Easton, "Reconstructing Schliemann's Troy," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 431-47.

showed that they fit. That is splendid proof that Schliemann's records are in large part trustworthy.

Regarding Mycenae: Since Traill's publication of Schliemann's Mycenaean diary there remains uncertainty. The authenticity of the Mask of Agamemnon is still in question. Stylistic considerations prove that the mask is not like the others found at Mycenae but are not sufficient to deny authenticity.⁷⁷ Schliemann's letter to his Parisian colleague Beaurain with the request to ask a discreet goldsmith to make exact copies of the Treasure of Priam is not an argument of sufficient cogency to question the authenticity of the mask.⁷⁸ A testing of the gold might decide the problem but the request to do so has twice been refused by the Greek Archaeological Service.⁷⁹

A further aspect of recent research concerns Schliemann's aims in editing his early travel diaries. I have already discussed the Ithaca book, the travels in China and Japan and the monster-letter of 1842 to his sisters. We should not underestimate Schliemann's ability to embroider experience. Just how far this tendency infected his scholarly publications must be more carefully investigated. One thing seems certain: his reports about his life and travels are always subject to exaggeration. Because of this Goethe's formulation, *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (*Poetry and Truth*), has long been applied to Schliemann's efforts.⁸⁰ In the introduction to Goethe's autobiography we already find the integration of the author's development as an individual with the history and culture of his age.⁸¹ There is already the need to color experience with poetic elaboration. We must allow Schliemann this if we are just to him. In the post-Goethean period the tendencies we observe in Goethe's autobiography are exaggerated so that provable falsehoods may be detected not only in Schliemann but in Richard Wagner's or Bismarck's autobiographies as well. They are not always historical in the precise sense. They contain romantic elaborations of truth. But to impose modern ideas of historical veracity upon them would be anachronistic.

At the Athens Congress I tried to establish this precisely in the cases of Wagner and Bismarck.⁸² I added the case of the railroad tycoon Henry Bethel Strousberg, whose career of business swindels often reminds us of Schliemann.

⁷⁷ See Calder (above, note 36) and "Heinrich Schliemann: Ein neues Bild," *Journal für Geschichte* (January/February 1986) 14-25.

⁷⁸ See Traill (above, note 36).

⁷⁹ See D. A. Traill in Calder and Traill (above, note 28) 140 n. 47.

⁸⁰ See, e.g., H. Stoll (ed.), *Abenteuer meines Lebens: Heinrich Schliemann erzählt*² (Leipzig 1982) 7 (St. Grunert).

⁸¹ H. Kurz (ed.), *Goethes Werke IX: Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit I* (Leipzig-Wien 1910) 9 (Vorwort).

⁸² W. Schindler, "Schliemann als Zeitgenosse," *Proceedings of the Schliemann Conference at Athens* (forthcoming).

IX

In my summary I have only touched upon selected points of the new Schliemann research. Another question is the effect of Schliemann's pioneer work within archaeology. This was discussed at great length at the recent Athens conference in regard to the continuing excavations at Troy, Mycenae and Tiryns.⁸³ They were examined in the contexts of geological, topographical and other scientific points of view. In comparison with these contributions, to which may be added discussions of the dispersion of Schliemann's finds, little time was left for Schliemann the man of his time or for his publications.

The Berlin Academy of Science has planned a final Schliemann Congress for December of 1990 which will also concentrate on "The Foundations and Results of Modern Archaeology."⁸⁴ But the proposed program allows us to hope that along with the focus which is shared with Athens, the other aspects of Schliemann research, which I have discussed here, will receive their due. I find it a good omen that the pioneers of the modern critical research on Schliemann will all participate in the Berlin Conference. It guarantees that the effort to make Schliemann more historical will go forward.⁸⁵

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⁸³ At the Athens conference three days were devoted to "The Excavations of Heinrich Schliemann." Only half a day was given to "Philological Observations." The remaining contributions were put into the last day and a half. See the program for details: *International Congress: Archaeology and Heinrich Schliemann* (Athens 1990).

⁸⁴ The Conference was entitled: "Heinrich Schliemann: Grundlagen und Ergebnisse moderner Archäologie. 100 Jahre nach Schliemanns Tod, vom 3.-6. Dezember 1990 in Berlin." The Acta are to be published in 1992.

⁸⁵ I wish to express my thanks to Professor William M. Calder III for translating my original into English and to Professor Miroslav Marcovich for publishing the paper in *Illinois Classical Studies*.

[The editors note with sorrow the death of Wolfgang Schindler in Berlin on 9 December 1991.]

The Refugee Classical Scholars in the USA: An Evaluation of their Contribution

WILLIAM M. CALDER III

Because the best American classical scholarship has never shed its German origins and because American classical scholarship has never outdistanced parallel German effort in the sense that American medicine and natural sciences have, it provides a particularly revealing, albeit neglected, specimen of cross-cultural influence, well documented, often productive, and with a lifespan of some 150 years. For purposes of historical presentation I suggest four periods in the history of German influence on American classics. Because the third period, that of the refugee scholars of the 1930s, is understandable only within the context of the other three, I shall, therefore, discuss the whole with obvious emphasis on the third period. The four periods briefly are:¹

1. Teutonomania: 1853 (B. L. Gildersleeve's Göttingen doctorate) to 1914 (outbreak of European War);

2. The Reaction against Germany: 7 May 1915 (sinking of the Lusitania) to 15 September 1935 (the Nuremberg Laws for "the protection of German blood and honor");

¹ See my "Die Geschichte der klassischen Philologie in den Vereinigten Staaten," *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 11 (1966) 213–40, where I first suggested these divisions and first listed the refugee scholars and sought to evaluate their influence. An important supplement from the German side is W. Ludwig, "Amtsenthebung und Emigration klassischer Philologen," *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 7 (1984) 161–78. For a welcome recent study that sees the refugee scholars in an historical context see A. Bertini Malgarini, "I classicisti tedeschi in America fra il 1933 e il 1942: Aspetti storici e metodologici," *La Cultura* 27 (1989) 155–66. L. A. Coser, "Werner Jaeger (1888–1961) and the Impact of European Refugees on American Classical Scholarship," in *Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experiences* (New Haven and London 1984) 271–77, is derivative but valuable because classics are seen in the context of the wider immigration. For a rare autobiographical account from a neighboring field (linguistics) see H. Kahane, "The Refugee of the Thirties: A Personal Memoir," *Tennessee Linguistics* 6.2 (1986) 8–17. Two recently published memoirs by emigrant scholars deserve notice: F. Gilbert, *A European Past: Memoirs 1905–45* (New York and London 1988) and E. Voegelin, *Autobiographical Reflections*, ed. with an introduction by E. Sandoz (Baton Rouge and London 1989).

3. Adolf Hitler and American Classics: 1935 to 1968 (the so-called "Reform" of the West German Universities);
4. The Second Emigration: 1968 to 1990.

My exposition will proceed within the framework of these four periods. The subject is much in flux. All sorts of archival material is coming to light almost weekly. Interest in the subject is burgeoning. For the first time there is attention from the German side. I think especially of the work of Volker Losemann and Bernhard vom Brocke.² Let us turn to the formative period 1853–1914.

The two general studies on the rise of graduate education in the United States in the nineteenth century, Storr (1953) and Diehl (1978), a prematurely published Yale doctoral dissertation, suffer fatally from the fact that neither knows Greek or Latin and so both miss the crucial role of German-educated classical scholars in establishing American graduate schools. The three great formative figures are: Basil L. Gildersleeve (1831–1924), Paul Shorey (1857–1934) and William Abbott Oldfather (1880–1945). This is not the place to discuss their publications. Oldfather alone wrote over 500 articles for Pauly–Wissowa, proof of his colossal industry and breadth. Why did they go to Germany?³

First, it was impossible to study at the doctoral level in the United States. There were no research libraries. Only the later purchase of German private libraries made such study feasible. Oldfather arranged that Illinois buy the libraries of Johannes Vahlen and Wilhelm Dittenberger. The rather silly but well-intentioned Ernst Sihler, whose autobiography *From Maumee to Thames and Tiber: The Life-Story of an American Classical Scholar* (New York 1930) preserves facts, arranged that New York University buy that of his teacher Emil Hübner. Paul de Lagarde's library ended up there

² See V. Losemann, *Nationalsozialismus und Antike: Studien zur Entwicklung des Faches Alte Geschichte 1933–45*, Historische Perspektiven 7 (Hamburg 1977), with my review at CP 76 (1981) 166–69, and B. vom Brocke, "Der deutsch-amerikanische Professoren Austausch," *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* 31 (1981) 128–82. For Eduard Meyer at Harvard in 1909/10 see M. H. Chambers, "The 'Most Eminent Living Historian, the One Final Authority': Meyer in America," in *Eduard Meyer: Leben und Leistung eines Universalhistorikers*, ed. W. M. Calder III and A. Demandt, *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 112 (Leiden 1990) 97–131.

³ See C. Diehl, *Americans and German Scholarship 1770–1870* (New Haven and London 1978), R. J. Storr, *The Beginnings of Graduate Education in America* (Chicago 1953), L. R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago and London 1965) and, for an honest presentation of the positive influence of Germany on American classics and the reaction against it, see E. C. Kopff, "Wilamowitz and Classical Philology in the United States of America: An Interpretation," *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren*, ed. W. M. Calder III, H. Flashar and T. Lindken (Darmstadt 1985) 558–80. For Gildersleeve, Oldfather and Shorey see Ward W. Briggs, Jr., "Basil L. Gildersleeve," *Classical Scholarship: A Biographical Encyclopedia*, ed. Ward W. Briggs, Jr. and W. M. Calder III (New York and London 1990) 93–118; J. Buckler, "William Abbott Oldfather," *ibid.* 346–52; E. C. Kopff, "Paul Shorey," *ibid.* 447–53.

too. Hermann Sauppe, Wilamowitz' predecessor at Göttingen, left his library to Columbia because the king who founded Columbia had earlier been the elector who had founded the Georgia Augusta. Some of it ended in Bryn Mawr. More recently the Center for Hellenic Studies purchased Werner Jaeger's library from his widow. McMaster has purchased Karl Barwick's (Jena), Tulane Margarete Bieber's and some American college Walter Marg's.

There were no libraries. There were no scholars. The best source for the anti-intellectualism of American colleges before the Hopkins and Chicago is Henry Seidel Canby, *Alma Mater* (New York 1936; repr. 1975). The outlook is that of an English public school. In starkest contrast to the Pforte of Wilamowitz' day, the hero is the athlete. Neither scholarship nor even the intellectual life exists. Dr. Thomas Arnold, the Headmaster of Rugby and apostle of muscular Christianity, would thoroughly have approved.

The first American doctorate in classics was earned nonetheless at Yale in 1861 by James Morris Whiton, with a six page handwritten dissertation, entitled *Brevis Vita, Ars Longa*, the sort of essay Nietzsche and Wilamowitz wrote in an afternoon at Schulpforte.⁴ But why Germany and not England? The ancient universities were provincial finishing schools for the sons of clergy and the ruling class.⁵ Compare Mark Pattison's reminiscences of undergraduate Oxford with Gibbon's. No change. They remind us of Gildersleeve on Princeton. Or E. F. Benson, *As We Were* for Cambridge ca. 1890. Theodor Mommsen acknowledged only one scholar in England, Henry Bradshaw. Or indeed Eduard Fraenkel's despair at Oxford preserved in Jaeger's letter to Lietzmann of 29 November 1936.⁶ But it was not only the lack of scholarship at Oxford and Cambridge. Hatred of the English sent young Americans into the arms of the Germans. Gildersleeve's candor here is invaluable (*AJP* 37 [1916] 496):

In the fifties an American Anglomaniac was a rarity and the German attitude towards English scholars gave no offence to the patriotic American neophyte, for I was brought up on the memories of my revolutionary ancestors. I bore a deep-seated hereditary grudge against those whose forbears were responsible for the expulsion of the Acadians, the sufferings of Valley Forge, the burning of Norwalk, the

⁴ See R. P. Rosenberg, "The First American Doctor of Philosophy Degree," *Journal of Higher Education* 32 (1961) 387-94.

⁵ See especially A. J. Engel, *From Clergyman to Don: The Rise of the Academic Profession in Nineteenth Century England*² (Oxford 1984) and J. A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School* (Cambridge 1981).

⁶ See G. W. Prothero, *A Memoir of Henry Bradshaw, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and University Librarian* (London 1888) 314-15, 333-34 and W. Jaeger in *Glanz und Niedergang der deutschen Universität: 50 Jahre deutscher Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Briefen an und von Hans Lietzmann (1899-1942)*, ed. K. Aland (Berlin and New York 1979) 846.

insolent behavior of British officers during the occupation of Charleston, and I was quite ready to be impressed by the judgments of my German masters.

These young men sat at the feet of titans, men like August Boeckh, Jacob Bernays, Friedrich Ritschl, Johannes Vahlen, Otto Crusius, Wilhelm Christ. A later one, Edward Fitch, at Göttingen heard Friedrich Leo and wrote his dissertation on Apollonius Rhodius under Wilamowitz, whom later at Berlin Grace Macurdy and William Scott Ferguson heard.

The number of American students studying at German universities in the second half of the nineteenth century steadily rose. Until the middle of the nineties they formed the largest foreign group, followed by the Russians. Whole parts of the American educational system were remodeled after the German, from kindergarten to graduate school. By 1900 whole faculties at American universities were made up largely of professors with German doctorates. The theologian Francis G. Peabody at Harvard, the first American exchange-professor in Germany on 30 October 1905 in his Antrittsvorlesung in the presence of the Kaiser revealed that 22 Harvard professors had taken a German doctorate.⁷ These men returned to their country. Many formed graduate faculties after the German model (with teaching by lectures and seminars and division into departments) and produced streams of doctoral students. Gildersleeve directed 67 dissertations, Shorey 57, and Oldfather 47. That means 171 scholars, the last of whom, Revilo P. Oliver (Urbana), still lives in retirement. For some 100 years 171 American scholars trained by German-trained men filled key positions in the United States in classics. Long German hegemony over American classical studies gave them an enduring seriousness and exactitude that until very recently was in stark contrast to insular British dilettantism. Contrast Gilbert Murray and Gildersleeve, Sir John Sheppard and Oldfather, Henry Jackson and Paul Shorey. Two general points deserve notice regarding the formative German period.

1. Most unfortunately, with the notable exception of Gildersleeve, who still heard Boeckh, a narrow post-Humboldtian university, well on the way to overspecialization and pedantry, influenced the creators of American graduate schools⁸ and in the case of philology the undistinguished generation between Boeckh–Hermann–K. O. Müller and Wilamowitz. Dissertations like H. W. Smyth, later Eliot Professor of Greek at Harvard, *Der Diphthong EI im Griechischen* (Diss. Göttingen 1884) (he missed Wilamowitz by one semester!) and Alfredus Gudemann, *De Heroidum Ovidii codice Planudeo* (Diss. Berlin 1888) under Vahlen, whose example later inspired his own commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*, were not just the norm but the best. Some were the kernel of later work on a large scale, Shorey on Plato's *Laws* or Oldfather on Locris, which later became the great Pauly–Wissowa article.

⁷ See vom Brocke (above, note 2) 137.

⁸ See P. R. Sweet, *Wilhelm von Humboldt. A Biography* II (Columbus, OH 1980) 70.

These exceptions cannot alleviate the incalculable damage bequeathed to American classical scholarship because of the chronology of its origins. We missed both Wilhelm von Humboldt and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.

2. There is an important difference between English and American attraction to German Wissenschaft in the second half of the nineteenth century. The repressive burden of religious orthodoxy turned young English liberals, like Jowett, who introduced Hegel to Oxford, and especially the Scot, William Robertson Smith, whose heresy trials (1877–81) stemming from his post-Mosaic dating of Deuteronomy in the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, “Bible,” won international notoriety, to German higher criticism of the Bible. Smith’s friendship with Albrecht Ritschl and Julius Wellhausen is famous. At Balliol in the fifties it became an affectation of liberals to employ German for what could just as well have been said in English.⁹ English intellectuals adored Germany until the proclamation of the Second Reich in 1871. Prussia suddenly had become a rival. Contrarily young American *conservatives*, many of the best Southerners, were attracted still to Prussia.

Notice should be taken of the professorial exchange between Prussia and the USA beginning in 1905 largely through the initiative of Friedrich Althoff and encouraged by Theodore Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm II (both liked hunting). Benjamin I. Wheeler was Theodore Roosevelt Professor at Berlin in 1909–10, although he lectured on “Kulturgeschichte der USA” and not classics, and Paul Shorey with unfortunate consequences in 1913–14. Under this program Eduard Meyer was guest-professor at Harvard in 1909–10, when he began his famous book on the origin of the Mormons. Recall also that at this time Chicago was the third largest German-speaking city in the world. German visiting lecturers had begun earlier: Wilhelm Dörpfeld in 1909. He needed money to install central heating in his Ithaca home.

I have not seen discussed a neglected phenomenon, the anti-Germanism of American academics before World War I. Part was due to vestigial Puritanism, the shock and rage that greeted Eduard Meyer’s lectures on cheerful, beer-drinking German students. Part grew from pride. American scholarship is old enough to stand alone and not remain a step-child of the German. One finds traces of this in Gildersleeve but the *locus classicus* is Shorey’s essay in *The Nation* of 1911:

Our task is to redefine and so far as may be to harmonize the aims of culture and scholarship without undue concessions to the gushing dilettante, and to emancipate ourselves from slavish subservience to German influence without losing the lessons or forgetting the debt of gratitude that we owe to Germany.

⁹ See N. C. Chaudhuri, *Scholar Extraordinary: The Life of Professor the Rt. Hon. Friedrich Max Müller, P.C.* (London 1974) 100. For the change, see P. M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914*³ (London 1990).

That I find moderate, sensible, indeed expected. But at Harvard there was trouble brewing and its name was Charles Eliot Norton (1827–1908). This is not the place to praise his known services to classics, founder of the American Institute of Archaeology, one of the founders of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. With John Williams White he secured for American classics their greatest benefactor, James Loeb. A liberal, he allowed his politics to pervert his scholarship. I recall only his interpretation of the Cathedral of Orvieto as a monument to liberalism. His biographer, Kermit Vanderbilt, candidly remarks:¹⁰

The academic reputation of his books, in fact, is hard to describe accurately since his own friends usually wrote the reviews.

Norton was a rabid and influential anglophile, friend of Charles Dickens, close friend and literary executor of John Ruskin, literary executor of Thomas Carlyle, honorary doctor of Oxford and Cambridge. He had the patronizing love of Italians that has characterized many later American classicists. But he was a Germanophobe. He never learned the language well enough to speak it. He never studied at a German university. He never earned a doctorate. He was in Italy during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) and shared English disapproval of the German initiative. In autumn 1871 he settled in Dresden (a natural choice for an art-historian). He did not like the Germans, who rightly thought him a dilettante. He writes from Dresden 17 November 1871 to George Curtis:¹¹

In Italy one feels as if one had had experience . . . had learnt to know *something*, if but very little, and could at least enjoy *much*. Here, on the contrary, one is convicted of inexperience and ignorance at every turn, everybody is hard at work learning and knows already a vast deal, and you are forced to begin to go to school again with the sense of having much lost time to make up for, and of the impropriety of enjoyment unless the pleasure is united with instruction.

Norton detests the Germans because they demand that he know something and work hard. Later in the same letter:

The German has been surfeited with metaphysics and ontology till he has taken a disgust to them. Nothing that has not material value pleases him. Ideas he despises; facts are his treasure.

This after some six weeks in a country whose language he cannot speak. Things were made worse by the death of his wife after the birth of their sixth child in Dresden in February. The German experience for Norton was unpleasant and painful. Until the year of his death he retained the view that

¹⁰ K. Vanderbilt, *Charles Eliot Norton: Apostle of Culture in a Democracy* (Cambridge 1959) 182–83.

¹¹ *Letters of Charles Eliot Norton with Biographical Comment*, ed. S. Norton and M. A. Dewolf Howe (Boston and New York 1913) I 410, 412.

Germans are stupid pedants who avoid the important and soil the beautiful. In December 1901 he writes of American graduate students returning from Germany (Vanderbilt, p. 182): "Germanized pedants . . . ill-taught in Germany by the masters of the art of useless learning." In May 1907 after Gilbert Murray's and S. H. Butcher's Harvard lectures he writes to James Loeb (*Letters* II 376):

These two Englishmen have illustrated the worth of good English scholarship, exhibiting not merely thorough learning, but an admirable sense of the true ends to which learning should be devoted. It is a great pity that so many of our American scholars, old and young, have preferred the methods which lead only to the acquisition of facts often of no importance, to those which lead to the nobler cultivation of the intelligence and of the taste, and to the appreciation of the true ends of the study of language and of literature . . .

Ruskin would have approved. The facts, not unimportant, are that Murray's and Butcher's lectures are deservedly forgotten today and that Norton had never read through a first-rate book of German classical scholarship. Norton's ignorant praise of dilettantism and *aperçu* at the expense of hard work and facts gave pseudo-respectability to a poison that until today has befouled the waters of American classical scholarship. One might investigate the influence of Norton on T. S. Eliot and the Norton-Eliot *Vorbild* on the Harvard Hellenist, J. H. Finley, friend of C. M. Bowra and vehement critic of Eduard Fraenkel, who taught Dante from Norton's translation and in many ways saw himself as Norton's successor. In short, academic anti-Germanism had begun in this country before World War I. We now turn to the second period, the Reaction against Germany, 7 May 1915 (sinking of the *Lusitania*) until 15 September 1935 (the Nuremberg Laws).

Paul Shorey's hysterical racist harangue of 1919 opens the new era, the Jubilee Address of the American Philological Association held at their meeting in Pittsburgh on 30 December 1919, six months after the Treaty of Versailles, where Woodrow Wilson set the stage for National Socialism. John Adams Scott was in the President's chair. Gildersleeve was in the audience. Shorey stated publicly (*TAPA* 50 [1919] 39):

I would be willing to maintain against any comer the paradox that Wilamowitz' recent edition of the *Agamemnon* is no improvement on the little Harper text of Paley that I used to carry in my pocket.

Or (58):

In what may be called the virtuosity of scholarship Jebb is easily first . . . of all European scholars since the Renaissance.

Or finally—and how this must have embarrassed Gildersleeve (59):

If [Gildersleeve's] scattered and too often overlooked work could be

collected and systematized the tomes of Wilamowitz would not outweigh it in any judicious scales.

I am more ashamed of Shorey than of Norton. Norton was vain, ignorant and superficial. Shorey was too learned and intelligent not to have known that he was lying, that he put politics, hate and revenge before truth.

Sides were quickly drawn up: the octogenarian Gildersleeve, almost a *Denkmal der Wissenschaft*, the loyal and not entirely ineffective Edward Fitch, Wilamowitz' only American doctoral student,¹² and Oldfather, powerful and a fighter, against Shorey, Scott and their followers. Oldfather believed that the *res publica litterarum* transcended national boundaries and political conflicts. This was itself a German idea rather than an English or French one. The French expelled Wilamowitz from their Academy after the outbreak of hostilities. Wilamowitz as Rector signed his diplomas (*Erinnerungen*² 316): *plerarumque in hoc orbe academiarum socius, e Parisina honoris causa eiectus*. Just so King George V struck Wilhelm II from the Order of the Garter and removed his banners from the Chapel at Windsor with those of five other Prussian royals. Wilhelm stripped no hostile sovereign of orders. The Prussian Academy expelled no member on political grounds. The politicization of the Academy under the Nazis was different and petit bourgeois. An international, aristocratic ruling class was gone.

Only with difficulty today can one imagine the criticism that Oldfather met. In 1917 in the midst of war hysteria he was informally but publicly charged with pro-German sentiments and disloyalty to the United States. He demanded and received a public hearing where he proved that the accusations were baseless. As late as 1920 he was rebuked by Wallace Lindsay for seeking international collaboration in order to save the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, a German enterprise. My own teacher, the New Testament scholar and Quaker historian, Henry Joel Cadbury (1883–1974), was fired in 1919 from the Quaker college Haverford for advocating mercy toward the defeated adversary.¹³ But irreparable damage had been done. American entry into World War I had brought overnight abolishment of German in schools. Spanish filled the vacuum. The endowment and growing prestige of the Rhodes Scholarships with what E. C. Kopff has called their "steady production of college presidents, presidents, politicians, and bureaucrats" allowed an anti-German narrow-minded Oxford to replace Berlin. German books in classics (unlike those in theology) were not regularly translated

¹² See W. M. Calder III, "The Correspondence of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf with Edward Fitch," *HSCP* 83 (1979) 369–96.

¹³ See M. H. Bacon, *This Life Speaks: The Legacy of Henry Joel Cadbury* (Philadelphia 1987) 31–49 and W. J. Cotter, "A Letter from Henry J. Cadbury to Adolf von Harnack," *HTHR* 78 (1985) 219–22. For the attack on Oldfather see Buckler (above, note 3) 348: "one of the ugliest episodes in the history of the University of Illinois," and K. M. Grisso, *David Kinley, 1861–1944: The Career of the Fifth President of the University of Illinois* (Diss. Illinois 1980) 325–50.

into English as they are into Italian. More and more German scholars became known to American students as Celsus had become known to Christians, through their American detractors. Wilamowitz' fate at the hands of the Scott-Shorey-Cherniss axis is only the most famous example. In archaeology the wave of anti-Germanism turned the discipline from *Kunstgeschichte* to what may be euphemistically called cultural anthropology, rooftiles, dowel clamps, mouldings, drainage systems. Americans adored William Bell Dinsmoor, the American Dörpfeld, and never read Ernst Buschor. Sterling Dow called Rhys Carpenter the only American art historian (that is during the anti-German period). Obviously there were exceptions. Oldfather did not die until 1945. The rise of scientific epigraphy and papyrology, the fields in which most historians of classical scholarship have seen the most permanent contributions of American scholars, are unthinkable without fundamental German preparation. On the other hand Theodor Mommsen often said "Dumm wie ein Epigraphiker." His son-in-law Wilamowitz "Dumm wie Hiller" (his son-in-law, the epigraphist Hiller von Gaertringen). Epigraphy was a valuable but lower discipline, something between archaeology and *Wortphilologie* that prepared the way for others.

One should recall that for classics in America this period was one of loss and discouragement. The Latin requirement for the B.A. in American colleges was almost uniformly dropped. This caused immediately a drop in Latin teaching in the schools. Greek had always been marginal. Latin survived in Catholic schools and the better private schools. The world-wide depression had affected hiring in the universities. With drops in enrollment classical positions were especially vulnerable. American classicists themselves seemed unable to better the situation. In short the profession needed help and change.¹⁴

Help and change came in an unexpected and external form. I in 1966 and Volker Losemann in 1978 in his book *Nationalsozialismus und Antike* have sought to document the influence on American classics of the so-called *Säuberungswelle*, that is legalized firing on racist and political grounds of scholars and teachers. Fleming and Bailyn's comprehensive work on the Intellectual Migration revealingly has no chapter on classics. They must have thought the field too marginal to include. Some twenty immigrants, often gaining posts at prestigious American universities in a depression when few posts were available for the natives, wrought considerable change. These immigrants were either Jews, husbands of Jews, or Kurt von Fritz. That they existed at all proves a difference between classics in Germany and

¹⁴ Typical for the time is: A. F. West (ed.), *Value of the Classics* (Princeton 1917), a collection of testimonia by influential Americans. One is struck today by the paucity of Jews and women among those giving testimonies. Out of 298 testimonials two derive from women (Lucy Martin Donnelly and Virginia C. Gildersleeve) and two certainly from Jews (James Loeb and Mortimer Schiff, his brother-in-law). Classics, as in England and unlike Prussia, remained a bastion of the male WASP Establishment.

classics in the United States. There was in Germany a tradition of Jewish classical scholars. In Prussia antisemitism was legalized and therefore less lethal. To be an *Ordinarius* a Jew had to be baptized. This produced the so-called *Taufjuden*. Most famous are the brothers Jacob and Michael Bernays. Jacob remained orthodox and a librarian until his death; Michael was baptized and won the Munich *Ordinariat*. *Selbsthaß* often characterized these *Taufjuden*. Friedrich Leo belonged to the *Kränzchen* of Paul de Lagarde and opposed the orthodox student Heinemann, who had to turn to the blond and blue-eyed Prussian Wilamowitz-Moellendorff for help.¹⁵ The antisemitism of Beloch, Jacoby and Norden is attested. But there were also Eduard Hiller and Karl Lehrs.¹⁶ Among Wilamowitz' great Jewish students were Eduard Fraenkel, Paul Friedländer, Felix Jacoby and Paul Maas. I do not know that Gildersleeve, Oldfather or Shorey had a Jewish doctoral student. We shall see how much more effective American antisemitism was.

Without the Nazi racist laws this great win for American classics would not have been possible. Before 1935 no German classical scholar had emigrated to the United States with one exception. Because of a quarrel with Noack that impeded his hope for advancement, the archaeologist, then a professor at Berlin, Valentin Müller (1889–1945), in 1931 accepted an associate professorship at Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania, where he taught until his death.¹⁷ There had been earlier guest professorships. Eduard Meyer at Harvard in 1909–10 was the most famous. Wilamowitz was invited to Chicago, but declined with a laugh. There had been visiting lecturers, Wilhelm Dörpfeld lectured in the United States in order to pay for central heating in his Ithaca home. The fact remains that if not compelled these scholars would never have emigrated.

The influence of this band of immigrants may best be discerned under five headings.

I. The Revival of the German Tradition in American Classical Studies

This meant first an emphasis on Greek rather than Latin studies. Gildersleeve, Oldfather and Shorey, as well as the lesser men, Goodwin, Seymour and Smyth, had all been Hellenists. Of the immigrants in

¹⁵ C. Hoffmann, "Antiker Völkerhass und moderner Rassenhass: Heinemann an Wilamowitz," *Quaderni di storia* 25 (1987) 145–57.

¹⁶ J. Glucker, "Juden in der deutschen klassischen Philologie," *Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte*, Beiheft 10 (Tel-Aviv 1986) 95–111. There are a number of errors and omissions.

¹⁷ For Valentin Müller see T. R. S. Broughton, *Archäologenbildnisse: Porträts und Kurzbiographien von Klassischen Archäologen deutscher Sprache*, ed. R. Lullies and W. Schiering (Mainz 1988) 244–45, where no reason for his exile is given. Professor Broughton informs me *per coll.* that Müller would never reveal the reason for his emigration and that at his death the name of no relation was known. For the quarrel with Noack see F. Matz, *Archäologische Erinnerungen aus sechs Jahrzehnten (1910–70)* (Bochum 1975) 29–30. In his *Gnomon* obituary Matz had given no reason.

philology only Lenz was a Latinist. He ended in far off Texas, exerted little influence and had few if any doctoral students. The influential men were Hellenists, Jaeger, von Fritz, Friedländer, Raubitschek, Solmsen and Turyn. Until this day there is a scarcity of Latinists in the United States. Of the Latinists we do produce, the most are notoriously in poetry, not prose. This certainly reflects the influence of Wilamowitz on Leo and Norden, whom he caused to prefer Latin poetry as he did Greek poetry.

The immigrants in their publications and lectures and seminars cited German secondary literature. American doctoral programs in classics had preserved a German requirement, usually a three-hour translation examination before the doctorate could be awarded. But a requirement is not the best way to encourage interest. The immigrants made us want to read German because the books and articles were made to sound so intelligent and stimulating. I came to Wilamowitz entirely because of Werner Jaeger, not because of any of my American professors at Harvard, who cited German—when they did cite German—with a sigh. Look at the notes in Jaeger's *Paideia* and in Friedländer's *Plato* to take only two famous and widely-read books by the immigrants that were translated into English.

Sir Kenneth Dover has remarked that what was most memorable for him about Eduard Fraenkel was the great seriousness with which Fraenkel took the calling of scholar. This was precisely my experience with Werner Jaeger at Harvard (1952–56). He remarked to me when I was 19 years old: "The trouble with American classical scholars is that they are only classicists from 9:00 am until 5:00 pm five days a week. One must always be a scholar, every moment of one's life." Our American teachers were dilettantes. Like Gildersleeve and his contemporaries, we learned seriousness from the Germans.¹⁸ The importance of this legacy cannot be overemphasized. It is the quintessence of the difference between the English and the German traditions. Scholarship, that is both research and teaching, was something central and of extraordinary importance. It was not, as it was to Jowett, useless or, as to Housman, higher crossword.

In college and university education at the better institutions the German method, lectures and seminars, had long since replaced English tutorials. On the other hand personal continuity had been broken. None of my teachers had studied in Germany. Several had in Greece and in England. None of their teachers had taken the German doctorate, although their teachers' teachers had (Smyth and Goodwin). Jaeger's graduate seminars certainly formed the pedagogical model for seminars later taught throughout the USA by his students. Normally he took an important text of difficulty and offered it as subject of the annual graduate seminar. I shared in the

¹⁸ A revealing document for the extraordinary impact of German professors on a young American student is James Morgan Hart, *German Universities: A Narrative of Personal Experience* (New York 1874) (Göttingen, Berlin and Leipzig in the 1850s). He is struck especially by the seriousness of the professorial calling.

seminars on Aeschylus' *Supplices*, Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea* and Pseudo-Longinus' *De sublimitate*. He used in these seminars what he called "the Berlin method." That was the intensive study of texts difficult for reasons of palaeography, language or content. The emphasis was always on thorough understanding rather than speed. In a semester-long seminar on Aeschylus' *Supplices* we read only through the first 233 verses. What we learned was the enormous difficulty of the task. Jaeger, in the Wilamowitzian tradition, occasionally offered a seminar or lectures on a subject rather than on an author as the Americans and English did. The seminar was the mixed constitution. The approach was philological, the careful study of chosen texts from Tyrtæus to the American Constitution. The lectures concerned "the transition from Hellenism to Christianity," again based on texts from the Septuagint Apocrypha to Clemens Alexandrinus. Both of these were histories of ideas but taught by the historical philological method. What Jaeger meant by a seminar is best illustrated by his answer to my question, "What do you think of Fraenkel's *Agamemnon*?" He answered: "It is not a book. It is a seminar."

Two corollaries must be added here. I emphasize Jaeger because Jaeger was so inspiring a teacher. In the hands of lesser men the Berlin method became a bore, pedantry for its own sake and a scrupulous avoidance of ideas. Herbert Bloch was a *Witzfigur* even among undergraduates. I took Juvenal with him and whenever a town or hill was mentioned by the poet, he would pass an elderly postcard around the room, assuming wrongly that this would make the text alive. His graduate seminar on Greek historiography consisted in the monotonous recital of old lecture notes. I sometimes corrected him because I had read more recent secondary literature. This angered him and he invited me to dinner one evening at the Harvard Faculty Club to ask me why I hated him. I recalled this years later when Douglas Young remarked, "the best students are the students that disagree."

Paradoxically Jaeger had very few doctoral students. The few that he had were regularly women or Jesuits. Of course there were occasional exceptions. What distinguished women and Jesuits was that they did not need jobs. Most women married and Jesuits had already secured their future. Young men at Harvard who needed positions flocked to Sterling Dow. It was still very much the old boy system. Dow regularly attended the annual philological and archaeological conventions and was active in the Classical Association of New England as well as founder of the Classical Teachers of New England. He introduced his boys to prominent people and firmly believed that it was the duty of the dissertation director to place his student in his first job. Jaeger always remained a *Fremdling* in his new *Heimat* and simply could not compete. One should recall that even in Berlin he never had the influence with Becker that Wilamowitz had earlier had with Althoff.

II. The Introduction of *Kunstgeschichte* in Place of *Dreckarchäologie*

James Loeb, who could not get an academic post in America because he was a Jew, when he died in 1931 left to the American School of Classical Studies in Athens the money with which they bought the Agora. The Agora dig became the American dig par excellence. Generations of students have been taught there and later at Corinth and elsewhere. The emphasis was on dirt archaeology, details of stratigraphy, potsherds, roof tiles, drainage systems and architectural remains. There had been a *Trivialisierung* of the subject. Epigraphy with wars over three- or four-bar sigmas flourished while no one spoke about sculpture or even vase painting. Museologists made catalogues but they had no students. That is until the Germans arrived. Margarete Bieber at Columbia, Otto J. Brendel at Indiana and then Columbia, G. M. A. Hanfmann at Harvard, Valentin Müller at Bryn Mawr and, after the war, Peter von Blanckenhagen at Chicago and then the Institute for Fine Arts in New York. Dietrich von Bothmer, because he was always a museologist, concerned, under the influence of the Englishman Sir John Beazley, with details of vase painting never had comparable influence. American art historians like Evelyn Byrd Harrison, the student of Bieber, and Jerome Pollitt, the great student of Brendel, were unthinkable before 1935.

III. Popularization of the Legacy of Greece and Rome

Before 1915 there had been no need to popularize. Latin and occasionally Greek requirements, in schools and at the leading universities, provided captive hordes of students and teaching positions for all who wanted them. By 1935 this was no longer the case. The immigrants were hampered by lack of English from becoming fluent lecturers overnight. On the other hand they had been taught by great lecturers and were accustomed to lecturing to large classes. Jaeger was as in so much else the exception. His Third Humanism sought to revive the ideas of Greek antiquity so that Weimar Germany could learn directly from them. It ended in failure for a number of reasons. But oddly it took on a second life in the United States; for Jaeger gained two influential apostles. His Harvard colleague J. H. Finley presented Greek texts to hundreds of first-year students as documents from which they could learn something that was of lasting importance in their lives. Gilbert Highet reached a wider audience than Harvard freshmen. He translated three volumes of *Paideia* and by popular publications and weekly radio talks he presented the legacy of Greece and Rome to the American middle class. He came as near to doing for America what Jaeger had done for Germany.¹⁹ Like Jaeger in the end he failed. American

¹⁹ For Highet's achievement see my necrology at *Gnomon* 50 (1978) 430–32 and T. A. Suits, "Gilbert Highet," in Briggs and Calder (above, note 3) 183–91. For Jaeger, see now

Banausentum was not going to be civilized by classical humanism. At the end of his life Jaeger wrote:²⁰

Ohne die dauernde Geltung der antiken Idee des Menschen in der menschlichen Kultur schwebt die klassische Altertumswissenschaft in der Luft. Wer dies nicht sieht, der sollte nach Amerika kommen und sich vom Gang der Entwicklung der klassischen Studien dort belehren lassen.

IV. The Opening up of Classical Posts to American Jews

Eduard Meyer shrewdly observed the hypocrisy of American egalitarianism during the WASP ascendancy:²¹

Wenn ein Jude erwähnt wird, wird einem zugeflüstert: ein gescheiter und gewandter Mann, but an awful Hebrew, you know; in die Sommerfrischen in New Hampshire und den Nachbargebieten wird kein Jude als Unsiedler zugelassen, und wenn er noch so viel dafür zahlen will, und es ist mir begegnet, daß man sich bei mir entschuldigt hat, daß man zu einem intimeren Zusammensein auch einen Juden aufgefördert habe, das habe sich leider aus bestimmten Gründen nicht vermeiden lassen. So gibt es denn Fälle, wo judische Gelehrte, weil ihnen in Amerika jede Aussicht zum Vorwärtskommen versperrt war, eine Stellung in Deutschland angenommen haben; denn hier denkt und handelt man, trotz alles Geredes, in diesen Dingen viel liberaler als drüben.

Antisemitism in American was illegal. Freedom of Religion was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. But the American Gentlemen's Agreement was far more effective in excluding Jews from the academy than Prussian antisemitic legislation had ever been.²² Disciplines also differed.

W. M. Calder III (ed.), *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*, ICS Suppl. 3 (Atlanta 1992).

²⁰ W. Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* I (Rome 1960) xxvi.

²¹ E. Meyer, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Geschichte, Kultur, Verfassung und Politik* (Frankfurt a. M. 1920) 173. For Meyer in America see above, note 2.

²² That is, American antisemitism was British rather than German; see B. Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945*² (Oxford and New York 1988). There had long been a *numerus clausus* of about 6% for admission of Jewish students to the good universities. This has now been treated honestly for the first time; see D. A. Oren, *Joining the Club: A History of Jews at Yale* (New Haven and London 1985). A similar problem has arisen recently with disclosure of a secret *numerus clausus* for Asian students. A further irritant for Jewish students, even when they were thoroughly secularized, was the persistence of required chapel services in some cases as late as 1960. By then non-Jewish students at Princeton signed up for the Jewish service which was on Friday as that would release them from returning to the university on Sunday morning. The requirement, that is, ended a self-parody and was dropped. Such a *numerus clausus* for Jewish students began in Germany only with the Nazis and before 1933 was furiously resisted; for contemporary newspaper accounts see D. L. Niewyk, *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism 1918-1933* (Baton Rouge 1971)

Anthropology from the start was liberal, Jewish (Boas) and open to women. Classics was conservative. Women were confined to girls' colleges. Margarete Bieber was never more than associate professor at Columbia and upon retiring was denied the title of emeritus. With one exception on the West Coast (Monroe Deutsch) no American Jew received a tenured post in classics in America before a European Jew had.²³ European Jews broke this prejudice for a simple reason. If a Jew were present at the meeting, no American would dare bring up the Jewish objection. Let us look at two American scholars whom Meyer presumably had in mind and two others who stayed.

1. James Loeb was the greatest benefactor American classics ever had. He endowed the Loeb Classical Library. He endowed the Charles Eliot Norton Lectureship for the American Institute of Archaeology. He endowed the Norton Fellowship for the American School. He left the American School the money with which to purchase the Athenian Agora. He could not achieve an American career in classics because he was a Jew. His teacher Norton advised him to go to France. In fact he chose exile near Munich. He received honorary degrees from Cambridge, Oxford and Munich but never one from Harvard. The income from the Loeb Library is funneled today directly into the Harvard Classics Department and contributes to making it one of the richest in the world.²⁴

2. Alfred Gudeman, editor of Tacitus, *Dialogus de oratoribus* and Aristotle, *Poetica* and author of a brief history of classical scholarship, was denied tenure at Pennsylvania and sought refuge in Germany, where he secured a post at the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. He lived and worked there until old age. He died in Theresienstadt.²⁵

3. Moses Hadas, one of the most influential classicists of his generation in the U.S., was kept instructor for 15 years at Columbia at a salary so low that he was forced to write books that sold. He only gained tenure after the European Jews had broken the barrier. He became very much a Leo-Norden type, embarrassed by orthodoxy and integrated into Anglo-Saxon society but with the "religion of Hellenism" and never Christianity.²⁶

159 ff. S. Klingenstein, *Jews in the American Academy 1900-1940* (New Haven 1991) is superficial and uninformed.

²³ For Monroe Deutsch (1879-1955) see J. Fontenrose, *Classics at Berkeley: The First Century, 1869-1970* (Berkeley 1982) 37. Fontenrose typically conceals the fact that he was Jewish. He received his associate professorship in 1919 but three years later went into administration. This could not have happened on the East Coast until almost 50 years later.

²⁴ See my "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf to James Loeb: Two Unpublished Letters," *ICS* 2 (1977) 315-32, where the details of Loeb's life are gathered.

²⁵ See D. W. Hurley, "Alfred Gudeman, Atlanta, Georgia, 1862-Theresienstadt, 1942," *TAPA* 120 (1990) 355-81.

²⁶ See my "Hadas, Moses," *Dictionary of American Biography: Supplement 8* (1966-

4. Harry Caplan of Cornell, editor of the *Loeb Auctor ad Herennium*, was an early example of an American Jew in classics. The case is of interest because a letter has survived dated "Ithaca, March 27, 1919" to Caplan, aged 23, signed by four non-Jewish colleagues in which they assure him of their friendship and that they are not anti-semites and advise that he go into school-teaching because, as a Jew in America, he has no future at the university level.²⁷

5. The case of Paul Shorey, who is on the other side of the fence, is revealing. Benedict Einarson, his successor in the Chicago chair, informed me in 1958 that Shorey "always gave Jewish students more difficult qualifying examinations." This was common American practice with blacks in other subjects until 25 years ago.

V

There is another effect that the immigrants had, one that has not yet been noted. The immigrants (I do not mean those who came to the U.S. as boys, e.g., T. G. Rosenmeyer and Martin Ostwald) remained Germans living in the United States, with German wives in German homes. They never became pseudo-Americans. A few, Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, like Rudolph Pfeiffer and Felix Jacoby in England, returned to Germany permanently after the war. Some, like Hermann Fränkel and A. E. Raubitschek, enjoyed guest professorships and others, like G. M. A. Hanfmann and Friedrich Solmsen, accepted honorary degrees bestowed by repentant West German universities. Margarete Bieber became honorary senator of the University of Giessen. I do not know any, other than Lehmann, that remained embittered. Margarete Bieber told me that she sent CARE packages in 1945-47 to German colleagues, some of whom had denounced her or refused to communicate with her in the Nazi period. W. H. Auden in 1940 taught at the New School for Social Research in New York, where there were a number of European exiles. He remarked perceptively:²⁸ "Quite a good place but O so German of 1925—and they seem to have learned nothing since." That holds true of the classical scholars. They were between two worlds, no longer Germans, but never Americans, isolated more from their colleagues and children than from their students.

70), ed. J. A. Garraty and M. C. Cames (New York and London 1988) 235-37 and *CO* 69 (1991/92) 8-9.

²⁷ See the publication of the document at *Cornell Alumni News* 84 (July 1981) 7 and B. vom Brocke, *Wilamowitz nach 50 Jahren* (above, note 3) 680 n. 43, who republishes the letter with valuable comment and bibliography.

²⁸ H. Carpenter, *W. H. Auden. A Biography* (Boston 1981) 295.

For us, the students, they were exotic and, therefore, more interesting than just another American teacher. There was also a less creditable reason why the refugees attracted students. They marked easily. Jaeger was famous during doctoral orals for asking long questions and then answering them himself. It never occurred to him that the American student would know the answer. This attitude of good-natured contempt was more dangerous when applied to colleagues. I asked him once why he had supported, against Sterling Dow, Cedric H. Whitman for tenure at Harvard. He replied, "What does it matter? They are all the same." Kapp at Columbia never learned English but he did learn that if he gave every student an A no student would complain about his teacher's lack of English. The refugees made some thirty years of students familiar with German professors. This in turn prepared the way for the wave of German immigration ca. 1970-90.

VI. The Second Emigration: 1970 to the Present

Students became professors. For me to have a German colleague was not so strange as it had been for my American teachers. This familiarity has been aided by the rise of Humboldt Stipendia and the frequency of German visitors whether as guest professors, guest lecturers, or research fellows of various sorts. But the refugee scholars had prepared the way. Within the field of classics a second wave of German immigrants occurred beginning about 1970. There were two reasons for this.

First the so-called *Studentenunruhen* and University Reform in Western Germany claimed its victims, usually men who had painted themselves into corners and could no longer survive in the intense political atmosphere of the time. Winfried Bühler and Walther Ludwig briefly held posts in the United States but never took American citizenship. They returned to their country when matters settled down, albeit not to the universities which they had left. G. N. Knauer, a leader of the opposition to reform at the Freie Universität in West Berlin, fled to the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, where he published nothing, taught reluctantly and took early retirement.

Secondly, the seventies and eighties saw a decline in classical philology in the Federal Republic, both in schools and universities. Such a decline does not occur abruptly and young academics were caught unawares by the change. This meant that highly educated young men of ability could not obtain posts in their own country. Among the emigrants of this last period are Karl Galinsky (Texas), Albert Henrichs (Harvard), Ludwig Koenen (Michigan), Eckard Schütrumpf (Colorado) and the German Swiss Kurt Raaflaub (Brown). These men uniformly have been successful in America in marked contrast to the English immigrants. The reason is not only the old one. The American university system with its lectures and seminars is fundamentally German rather than English. There is another more sinister reason.

The last twenty years have seen the rise in American universities of an administrative class. These administrators emerging on the analogy of Big Business see the universities as factories with themselves as management and the professors as labor. American professors are no longer allowed to elect their presidents, vice presidents and deans. They often do not set their own salaries. Only with the approval of an administrator are they allowed a new appointment and regularly an administrator not a colleague writes the letter of appointment. The salaries of administrators are regularly two to five times that of a professor of equal age. European colleagues often ask me why academics "in the land of the free and the home of the brave" are such cowards. The reason is that they have grown accustomed since their student days to consider themselves the inferiors of their administrators, who are usually failed scholars (who expectedly detest scholars) or ruthless businessmen. Our system is far closer to the former East German system where the party rules the faculty. The West German immigrants come from a different tradition, where the title professor is the highest the university can bestow. They speak up to deans in a way that Americans no longer dare. It is an open secret in America that the way to save a threatened department is to hire a German chairman.

A final change in American classics deserves notice. It was not caused directly by the refugee scholars but as their American exile was caused by National Socialism so was this change. I mean the introduction of lecture courses on classics in English translation. The fact that American classics has not become an *Orchideenfach* is due entirely to these courses. In 1945-46 with disarmament hundreds of thousands of young men returned to the United States. Under the G.I. Bill of Rights they were entitled to a college education. Their fathers had never been to the university. They had not attended elite schools. They were without Greek or Latin. Several farsighted American classicists, men like Moses Hadas, Gilbert Highet and J. H. Finley, often against the wishes of their senior colleagues, who called them betrayers of their subject, introduced courses like Greek tragedy in English translation or the Classical Tradition. More recently we find Women in Antiquity or the Sexual life of the Ancients. Such courses had never been taught before in the United States and they were unknown in England. But Wilamowitz had lectured to 600 in the Aula of the Berlin University on Greek literature in translation and so had Jaeger. Again we successfully imitated the Germans.

Sometimes good things happen for bad reasons. Neither King George III nor Adolf Hitler did what he did with the intent of benefitting American classics but in fact these two men caused American classics to become a professional, productive German discipline rather than to remain shallow English upperclass dilettantism. This fact reveals another unexpected fact. So other-worldly and in the American sense "academic" (that is useless and unnecessary) a discipline as American classics is entirely dependent upon a *Weltpolitik* which most of its practitioners prefer to denigrate and ignore.

Appendix

The following is an alphabetical list of eighteen leading refugee scholars of the thirties in the field of classical studies with their dates and the American institutions where they taught. References are given to the authoritative biographical material. Those who arrived in the United States young enough to be educated there (e.g., Martin Ostwald and T. G. Rosenmeyer) are not included. Heinrich Gomperz and his pupil Philip Merlan were philosophers rather than philologists and, therefore, are excluded. For the appalling exploitation of the helpless Heinrich Gomperz by the University of Southern California see Wallace Nethery, *Dr. Flewelling and the Hoose Library: Life and Letters of a Man and an Institution* (Los Angeles 1976) 76 ff.

1. Elias J. Bickerman (1897–1981): M. Smith, *Gnomon* 54 (1982) 223–24 and in E. J. Bickerman, "Religions and Politics in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods," ed. E. Gabba and M. Smith, *Biblioteca di Athenaeum* 5 (Como 1985) ix–xii with a full bibliography (xiii–xxxvii) by F. Parente (Columbia University).

2. Margarete Bieber (1879–1978): E. B. Harrison, *AJA* 82 (1978) 573–75; L. Bonfante, *Gnomon* 51 (1979) 621–24 and "Margarete Bieber (1879–1978): An Archaeologist in Two Worlds," in *Women as Interpreters of the Visual Arts*, ed. C. R. Sherman and A. M. Holcomb (Westport and London 1981) 238–74; W. M. Calder III, *DAB* Suppl. 10 (forthcoming) (Columbia University).

3. Herbert Bloch (b. Berlin 1911) (Harvard).

4. Otto J. Brendel (1901–1973): W. M. Calder III, "Otto Brendel 1901–73," *Archäologenbildnisse* (above, note 17) 283–84 (Washington University, St. Louis; Indiana University; Columbia University).

5. Ludwig Edelstein (1902–1965): H. Cherniss, *Year Book of the American Philosophical Society* (1965) 130–38; H. Diller, *Gnomon* 38 (1966) 429–32; F. Kudlien, *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 21 (1966) 173–78 (Johns Hopkins University).

6. Hermann Fränkel (1888–1977): K. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 50 (1978) 618–21; B. Snell, "Philologie von Heute und Morgen: Die Arbeiten Hermann Fränkels," *Gesammelte Schriften* (Göttingen 1966) 211–12 (Stanford University).

7. Paul Friedländer (1882–1968): W. Bühler, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 619–23; W. M. Calder III, "The Credo of a New Generation: Paul Friedländer to Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff," *Antike und Abendland* 26 (1980) 90–102 (University of California at Los Angeles).

8. Kurt von Fritz (1900–1985): H. Flashar, "Forschung als Spiegel des Lebens," *FAZ* 26 July 1985; W. Ludwig and G. Jäger, *In memoriam Kurt von Fritz 1900–1985. Gedenkrede von Walther Ludwig mit einem von*

Gerhard Jäger zusammengestellten Schriftenverzeichnis (Munich 1986); E. Vogt, "Kurt von Fritz 25. 8. 1900–16. 7. 1985," *Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 1987 (Munich 1988) 247–53; C. Wegeler, "Kurt v. Fritz verweigert den Gehorsamseid auf Hitler," *Die Selbstbeschränkung der Wissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie seit dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, untersucht am Beispiel des Instituts für Altertumskunde der Universität Göttingen* (1921–62) (Diss. Vienna 1985) 128–34 (Columbia University).

9. George M. A. Hanfmann (1911–1986): A. H. Borbein, *Archäologenbildnisse* (above, note 17) 313–14 (Harvard University).

10. Werner W. Jaeger (1888–1961): W. M. Calder III, "The Correspondence of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff with Werner Jaeger," *HSCP* 82 (1978) 303–47; "Werner Jaeger and Richard Harder: An Erklärung," *Quaderni di storia* 17 (1983) 99–121; "Werner Jaeger," *Berlinische Lebensbilder Geisteswissenschaftler*, ed. M. Erbe, *Einzelveröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin* 60 (Berlin 1989) 343–63; "Werner Jaeger," in Briggs and Calder (above, note 3) 211–26; *Werner Jaeger the Man and his Work*, ed. W. M. Calder III, *ICS Supplement* 3 (forthcoming) (University of Chicago; Harvard University).

11. Ernst Kapp (1887–1978): E. Mensching, *LuGiB* 33 (1989) 35–36 (Columbia University).

12. Karl Lehman (1894–1960): W. Fuchs and E. Burck, *Archäologenbildnisse* (above, note 17) 262–63 (Institute of Fine Arts of New York University).

13. Friedrich Walter Lenz, b. Levy (1896–1969): B. Kytzler, *Gnomon* 43 (1971) 526–27 (Connecticut Women's College; Southwestern University; University of Texas at Austin).

14. Otto Neugebauer (b. 1899) (Brown University; Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton).

15. Anthony Erich Raubitschek (b. Vienna 1912) (Yale; Princeton; Stanford).

16. Friedrich Solmsen (1904–1989): E. Mensching, "Zur Berliner Philologie in der späteren Weimarer Zeit—über Friedrich Solmsens Berliner Jahre (1922–33)," *Latein und Griechisch in Berlin* 33 (1989) 26–76; H. North, *Gnomon* 61 (1989) 751–59. For useful background see F. Solmsen, "Classical Scholarship in Berlin Between the Wars," *GRBS* 30 (1989) 117–40. (Olivet College; Cornell University; University of Wisconsin; University of North Carolina)

17. Alexander Turyn (1900–1981): M. Marcovich, *Gnomon* 54 (1982) 97–98 (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).

18. Felix M. Wassermann (1896–1976): V. Pöschl, "Felix Wassermann," *Bismarck-Gymnasium Karlsruhe Jahresbericht* (1975/76) 74–76, where date of birth is given as 1886 (Beloit College; Southwestern at

Memphis; Illinois College; Kansas-Wesleyan University; Marquette University).²⁹

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

²⁹ Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the University of Cologne and the City University of New York.

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Contents

1. On the *Iliad*, XVI, 259–65
2. Bedeutung der Motive des Volksglaubens für die Textinterpretation
3. A New Poem of Archilochus: *P. Colon.* inv. 7511
4. Archilochus Fr. 122 West (ap. Stob. 4. 46. 10)
5. Sappho Fr. 31: Anxiety Attack or Love Declaration?
6. Anacreon, 358 *PMG* (ap. Athen. XIII. 599C)
7. Was Xenophanes in Paros (Greece), Pharos (Dalmatia), or Pharos (Egypt)?
8. Xenophanes on Drinking-Parties and Olympic Games
9. On the *Agamemnon*, 1052
10. Zu Aeschyl. *Eumen.* 105
11. The First Foot Dactyl in Aeschylus
12. *Agamemnonea*
13. Zu Pind. Frg. 133 Schr. (= 137 Turyn)
14. Bacchylides' *Ode 7* Again
15. Euripides' Attack on the Athletes (Fr. 282 N.² ap. Athen. 413 C–F)
16. *Rhesus*—A Poor Poet's Play
17. Euripides *I.T.* 110–115
18. Euripides *I.T.* 369–71
19. Zu Terent. *Heauton Timorum.* 649–652
20. Aristophanes, *Aves* 1271–1273
21. The Gold Leaf from Hipponion
22. Philodamus' Delphic Hymn to Dionysus
23. Zum Zeushymnus des Kleanthes

24. Callimachus' Epigram XIII Again
25. A Callimachean Crux
26. Callimachus Fr. 725 Pfeiffer
27. Zu Arat. *Phaenom.* 56–57
28. Phoenix of Colophon Fr. 5 Diehl
29. Phanocles ap. Stob. 4. 20. 47
30. Machonica I–III
31. Zu A.G. VII 79 (Beckby 1957)
32. Over Troubled Waters: *Megara* 62–71
33. Philodemus 23 and Catullus 13
34. Menandri Sententiae
35. Nochmals Cordoba, wiederum Arrian
36. The Epigram on Apollonius of Tyana
37. Marcus Aurelius 4. 23 and Orphic Hymn 10
38. The Orphic Hymn to Erinyes (69)
39. Orphic Fragment 226 Kern
40. Oraculum Chaldaicum 159 des Places
41. A New *Graffito* from Ephesus
42. Three New Epigrams from Ephesus
43. Nomen–Omen: *I.G.* XIV. 2068
44. *Anthologia Palatina* 5. 225 (Macedonius)
45. The *Itinerary* of Constantine Manasses
46. Quatrains on Byzantine Seals

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Contents

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ROBERT ACKERMAN, University of the Arts, Philadelphia
2. Aunt Glegg Among the Dons or Taking Jane Harrison at Her Word
THOMAS W. AFRICA, State University of New York at Binghamton
3. Jane Harrison's Failed Candidacies for the Yates Professorship
(1888, 1896): What Did Her Colleagues Think of Her?
WILLIAM M. CALDER III, University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign
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MORTIMER CHAMBERS, University of California, Los Angeles
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ROBERT L. FOWLER, University of Waterloo
6. La Genèse du Système? The Origins of Durkheim's
Sociology of Religion
ROBERT ALUN JONES, University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign
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Background to the "Cambridge Ritualists"
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SANDRA J. PEACOCK, Emory University
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Ancient Greek Religion
RENATE SCHLESIER, Freie-Universität, Berlin
11. A. B. Cook, *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* (1914/1925/1940):
Nachdenkliches über Plan und Aussage des Werkes
HANS SCHWABL, Universität Wien

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MORTON SMITH, Columbia University
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Unpublished Essay on "Magick"
JOHN VAIO, University of Illinois at Chicago
14. An Unpublished Essay on Magick by George Grote
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
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WILLIAM M. CALDER III, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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MORTIMER CHAMBERS, University of California at Los Angeles
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Metaphysica* (1957)
ROBERT RENEHAN, University of California at Santa Barbara
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Correspondence 1929-1933
E. A. SCHMIDT, Universität Tübingen
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Contents

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Of Nature and Eros: Deianeira in Sophocles' <i>Trachiniae</i> MARYLINE PARCA, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign | 175 |
| 2. Asserting Eternal Providence: Theodicy in Sophocles' <i>Oedipus the King</i> R. DREW GRIFFITH, Queen's University, Kingston | 193 |
| 3. Rethinking the History of the Literary Symposium JOEL C. RELIHAN and the Members of Greek Seminar 420, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign | 213 |
| 4. Catullus 68A: <i>Veronae Turpe, Catulle, Esse</i> TREVOR FEAR, University of Southern California | 245 |
| 5. Love, Lovesickness, and Melancholia PETER TOOHEY, University of New England, Armidale | 265 |
| 6. Notes on Statius' <i>Thebaid</i> Books 5 and 6 J. B. HALL, University of London | 287 |
| 7. Statius <i>Silvae</i> 4. 9: <i>Libertas Decembris?</i> CYNTHIA DAMON, Harvard University | 301 |
| 8. "Thus Nature Ordains": Juvenal's Fourteenth Satire ALAN M. CORN, Pickerington, OH | 309 |
| 9. Notes on Justin Martyr's <i>Apologies</i> MIROSLAV MARCOVICH, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign | 323 |
| 10. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff on Wilhelm Dilthey: His Letters to Georg Misch (1914-1928) WILLIAM M. CALDER III and SVEN RUGULLIS, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign | 337 |
| 11. The Political Use of Antiquity in the Literature of the German Democratic Republic BERND SEIDENSTICKER, Freie Universität Berlin and the University of Michigan | 347 |

Of Nature and Eros: Deianeira in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*

MARYLINE PARCA

Humanity has always measured its individual and finite experiences against nature's endless cycle of birth, maturity and death. The descriptive analogies between human physical appearance and the natural life cycle which pervade epic and lyric poetry can also be documented in Greek tragedy, where the playwrights exploited a diction and an imagery already embedded in the spectators' cultural consciousness and adapted them to various dramatic purposes. Some of the ways in which erotic experience is portrayed by the tragedians through the manipulation of archetypal nature images can be observed in Sophocles' *Women of Trachis*. Conventional *topoi* of love poetry pervade the play and several passages show how those nature metaphors associated with erotic experience play a decisive rôle in the psychological characterization of the female protagonist.

Echoing Deianeira's opening monologue about her restless and unhappy existence (1-48),¹ the chorus reflect upon the linkage between cosmic order and human life. As the movement of the cosmos is one of eternal return, so is human life in constant flux (129-36):²

¹ Fear, unrest and unhappiness are characteristic of Deianeira's life, from her youth onwards: T. B. L. Webster, *Greek Poetry and Life: Essays Presented to G. Murray*² (New York 1967) 164-65; J. R. March, *The Creative Poet: Studies on the Treatment of Myths in Greek Poetry*, *BICS* Suppl. 49 (London 1987) 66-67; B. Heiden, *Tragic Rhetoric: An Interpretation of Sophocles' Trachiniae* (New York 1989) 21-30. The prologue constitutes the thematic key to the motifs developed in the course of the play: A. Martina, "Il prologo delle *Trachinie*," *Dioniso* 51 (1980) 48-79.

² The simile in *Trach.* 130-31 recalls Homer's description of the Bear in *Iliad* 18. 487-88: R. W. B. Burton, *The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies* (Oxford 1980) 45, 48; O. Longo, *Commento linguistico alle Trachinie di Sofocle* (Padova 1968) 74. A similar sentiment is expressed elsewhere in Sophocles: *Ajax* 669-76 and *TrGF* IV fr. 871 Radt. On the connection between cosmic cycle and human mutability: J. Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (London 1962) 174-77. On time in tragedy: J. de Romilly, *Le temps dans la tragédie grecque* (Paris 1971).

But grief and joy come circling to all, like the turning paths of the Bear among the stars. The shimmering night does not stay for men, nor does calamity, nor wealth, but swiftly they are gone, and to another man it comes to know joy and its loss.³

"Sophocles' universe is an interconnected whole in which nature, man and the gods indissolubly belong together. The divine order comprises the movements of the cosmos, the actions of the gods, and the fates of mortals . . . Man is intercalated among the powers of nature, as one of their metamorphoses."⁴ Love, therefore, is neither an absolute concept nor an abstraction in the *Trachiniae*, but, as a manifestation of the cosmic order and a by-product of time, it undergoes change, death and renewal. Deianeira perceives and articulates an interdependence between the natural cycles, the sequences of time and the different aspects of her emotional life,⁵ the constant opposition between past and present stressing the contrast between youth and maturity, love and amatory disillusion.

Although Deianeira's fearful existence predates her marriage to Heracles, her passage from a presumably serene period to one of relentless worries is bound to her reaching nubile age when, still living in her father's house, she was wooed for the first time (6-9). As Richard Seaford admirably illustrated, the wedding constitutes one of the most fundamental transitions in the life of an individual and represents, especially for the bride, a transition marked by ambiguity. Marriage comprises negative and positive aspects: The girl's passing to a new life and a new family signifies isolation and separation from her friends and relatives, while, at the same time, tradition demands that she and her groom be praised and likened to gods during the wedding ceremony.⁶

³ The translation is that of M. Jameson (*The Complete Greek Tragedies. Sophocles II*, ed. by D. Grene and R. Lattimore [Chicago 1957]). On the cyclical nature of human affairs, see M. Davies (ed.), *Sophocles. Trachiniae* (Oxford 1991) on lines 129 ff.

⁴ Th. C. W. Oudemans and A. P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity: Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles' Antigone* (Leiden 1987) 201.

⁵ Knowledge and time are intrinsically associated: P. E. Easterling (ed.), *Sophocles. Trachiniae* (Cambridge 1982) 3-4. Time is simultaneously a revealer, a teacher and a transformer: TrGF IV fr. 301 and 918 Radt, with A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge 1917) ad loc. and W. B. Stanford, *Sophocles. Ajax* (London 1963) on 646-48. For an analysis of the element of time in the play, see de Romilly (above, note 2) 81-83 and C. Segal, "Sophocles' *Trachiniae*: Myth, Poetry, and Heroic Values," *YCS* 25 (1977) 99-158, esp. 106-08.

⁶ "The Tragic Wedding," *JHS* 107 (1987) 106-30; J. Redfield, "Notes on the Greek Wedding," *Arethusa* 15 (1982) 188-91 emphasizes the similarities between the wedding and the funeral, both rites of passage involving a change of residence. Also A. van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage* (Chicago 1960) 3: "Transitions from group to group and from one social situation to the next are looked on as implicit in the very fact of existence, so that a man's life comes to be made up of a succession of stages with similar ends and beginnings: birth, social puberty, marriage, fatherhood, advancement to a higher class, occupational specialization, and death"; cf. 123-24.

Deianeira reveals her own awareness of the ambiguity of the transition effected by marriage when she contrasts her worrisome life as a wife and mother (148–50) with the peaceful seclusion of youth which she once enjoyed (144–47):

τὸ γὰρ νεάζον ἐν τοιοῖσδε βόσκεται
 χώροις αὐτοῦ, καὶ νιν οὐ θάλλπος θεοῦ,
 οὐδ' ὄμβρος, οὐδὲ πνευμάτων οὐδὲν κλονεῖ,
 ἀλλ' ἡδοναῖς ἀμοχθὸν ἐξαίρει βίον.⁷

Deianeira implicitly compares unmarried young women to plants:⁸ They grow up in a sheltered environment of their own—the paternal household—until they are mature; upon reaching maturity they are taken away (λάβῃ 149) and made to enter an alien household.⁹ The natural setting of lines 144–47 conveys the image of a *locus amoenus*,¹⁰ a place

⁷ R. D. Dawe, *Studies in the Text of Sophocles III* (Leiden 1978) 80–81 finds these lines “utterly alien to their context,” and deletes the passage from the text of the play in his edition of Sophocles (Leipzig 1979). The athetesis has been rejected by W. Bühler, *Zenobii Aethi Proverbia IV* (Göttingen 1982) 214–15; R. Seaford, “Wedding Ritual and Textual Criticism in Sophocles’ *Women of Trachis*,” *Hermes* 114 (1986) 50–54; T. C. W. Stinton, “Heracles’ Homecoming and Related Topics,” *PLLS* 5 (1985) [1986] 412–16; H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson, *Sophoclea: Studies on the Text of Sophocles* (Oxford 1990) 154–55; Davies (above, note 3) 90.

⁸ Easterling (above, note 5) on 144–47 suggests that *Iliad* 18. 56–57 (Achilles compared to a young plant carefully tended) and *Odyssey* 6. 162–63 (Nausicaa likened to a palm shoot) may lie behind the Sophoclean image. On comparisons with the vegetal world: E. Irwin, “The Crocus and the Rose: A Study of the Interrelationship Between the Natural and the Divine World in Early Greek Poetry,” *Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honour of L. Woodbury*, ed. D. E. Gerber (Chico, CA 1984) esp. 148–49 and 151–52. For a further, implicit, comparison with young animals: Easterling *ibidem*. In line 530, the bride is a calf (cf. A. S. McDevitt, *Hermes* 110 [1982] 245–47). Cf. also Eur. *IA* 1083–88, where the chorus compare the sacrifice of Iphigenia to that of a pure calf (cf. H. P. Foley, “Marriage and Sacrifice in Euripides’ *Iphigenia at Aulis*,” *Arethusa* 15 [1982] 162–69) and Eur. *Hecuba* 205–06 and 526, where the heifer metaphor is used of Polyxena. For comparisons with animals or plants in wedding songs, see Seaford (previous note) 50–53, (above, note 6) 111–12, and *JHS* 108 (1988) 119 (on Bacchylides’ eleventh ode). On the correlation between marriage and death: J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1910) 546–61; M. Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974); L. M. Danforth, *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece* (Princeton 1982).

⁹ On possible Homeric echoes in the puzzling χώροις αὐτοῦ: F. Ferrari, *RIFC* 116 (1988) 167–68.

¹⁰ This phrase, now conventionally taken as the literary term referring to a specific kind of landscape description, seems to have been first introduced by E. R. Curtius in his *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern 1948) 189–200. Treatments of the *locus amoenus* have been recently surveyed by H. Thesleff, “Man and *locus amoenus* in Early Greek Poetry,” *Gnomosyne: Menschliches Denken und Handeln in der frühgriechischen Literatur: Festschrift W. Marg* (Munich 1981) 31 n. 2; M. Davies, “Symbolism and Imagery in the Poetry of Ibycus,” *Hermes* 114 (1986) 400 n. 7 provides additional bibliography. Antecedents to the *Trachiniai* passage include the description of the Elysian fields in *Odyssey* 4. 566 (absence of snow, storms, rain), that of the two

traditionally well-shaded, well-watered and free from windy blasts. This bucolic setting is frequently used in archaic poetry, both epic and iambolyric, as conventional accompaniment to erotic situations, whether explicit or not. The presence of such symbolic imagery in the poetry of Archilochus, Sappho and Ibycus being widely acknowledged,¹¹ the instances recognized in iambic and lyric poetry have in turn guided the detection of precedents in Homeric poetry. For example, in *Odyssey* 5. 55–74 the scenery suggests a love-nest to which Odysseus refuses to yield,¹² and the *locus amoenus* depicted at the end of the same book also seems to prefigure a potential amatory situation. The secluded area where Odysseus rests upon his arrival in Phaeacia foreshadows the romantic tone of the meeting between the hero and Nausicaa (5. 475–80):

βῆ ῥ' ἔμην εἰς ὕλην· τὴν δὲ χεδὼν ὕδατος εὗρεν
 ἐν περιφαινομένῳ· δοιοῦς δ' ἄρ' ὑπῆλυθε θάμνονες,
 ἐξ ὁμόθεν πεφυῶτας· ὁ μὲν φυλῆς, ὁ δ' ἔλαιης.
 τοὺς μὲν ἄρ' οὐτ' ἀνέμων διάη μένος ὑγρὸν ἀέντων,
 οὐτε ποτ' ἥελιος φαέθων ἀκτῖνιν ἔβαλλεν,
 οὐτ' ὄμβρος περάσκει διαμπερές.

Trachiniae 144–47 and *Odyssey* 5. 475–80 both emphasize the absence of sun, rain and wind. The passages present the individual dwelling in such an environment as being apart from the achieved eroticism associated with exuberant vegetation and water sources, but at the same time about to experience it, either because of age (the maidens of Trachis and, before them, Deianeira) or due to attending circumstances (Odysseus). A place protected from direct sun, pouring rain and gusty winds, however, is not necessarily a gloomy, airless and parched wasteland; rather, the sheltered environment suggested in both passages conjures up the image of a spot untouched by the potentially destructive effect of unmitigated exposure to the elements.¹³

The concomitant reference to a secluded place, absence of scorching sun, rain and wind storms calls to mind a place where virginity could come to an end. A sense of latent fertility pervades the passage.¹⁴ First, θάλπος θεοῦ both contains a literal reference to the sun and conveys a metaphorical

bushes in *Od.* 5. 478–80 (absence of wind, sun, rain), and that of Olympus in *Od.* 6. 43–44 (absence of winds, rain, snow): Easterling (above, note 5) on 144–47.

¹¹ Cf. J. M. Bremer, "The Meadow of Love and Two Passages in Euripides' *Hippolytus*," *Mnemosyne* 28 (1975) 268–79; J. Henderson, "The Cologne Epode and the Conventions of Early Greek Erotic Poetry," *Arethusa* 9 (1976) 163–64; E. S. Stigers, "Retreat from the Male: Catullus 62 and Sappho's Erotic Flowers," *Ramus* 6 (1977) 83–102; Davies (previous note) 399–402.

¹² So Bremer (previous note) 270.

¹³ A. H. Sommerstein (*per litteras*) suggests that *Trach.* 144–47 rather describes the interior of a house, the expected dwelling of a παρθένος, as in Hes. *Op.* 519–23.

¹⁴ See A. Motte, *Prairies et jardins de la Grèce antique* (Brussels 1973) 10, 14, 126, 206, 214, 222 (fertilizing breezes), 217–22 (water), and 10, 70–75 (sun).

allusion to the emotional "heat of desire."¹⁵ As the warmth of the sun helps the plant to grow and ripen, so does the passion of love transform the maiden into a potential lover, ripe for marriage and sexual life.¹⁶ Second, the presumably moderate and benevolent moisture which visits the garden of youth recalls the fertilizing power of rain on earth¹⁷ and, ultimately, the archetypal union of sky and earth.¹⁸ Third, the absence of turbulent winds does not make the presence of gentle breezes impossible, and in a passage tinged with the images of idealized virginal existence common in hymeneal poetry, πνεύματα (146) contains a likely allusion to the positive and benevolent action ascribed to breezes in similar and related contexts.¹⁹

The climatological metaphor expressed in lines 144–47 through θάλλος, κλονεῖν and πνεύματα²⁰ also introduces the notion of change and

¹⁵ Later, Deianeira learns that Heracles is "warmed by desire" for Iole (ἐκτεθέρμανται πόθῳ 368). The imagery of θάλλος / θάλλειν can denote passion (e.g., Aesch. PV 649–50; Soph. El. 888): J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles: Commentaries II: The Trachiniae* (Leiden 1959) on 145; Segal (above, note 5) 110 and n. 37. Τήκω is similarly evocative of love's power: κόρτ' ἐντακείη τῷ φιλεῖν (*Trach.* 463). On the erotic connotations of heat and the sexual images of melting and liquefaction, see R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*² (Cambridge 1954) 202–04; R. D. Brown, *Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on de R. N. IV 1030–1287* (Leiden 1987) 228–29 and 244–45. Heat can also suggest disease and destruction, as in Heracles' words of agony at the end of the play (ἔθαλψε μ' ἄτης σπασμός, 1082; also 1193–99 [literal meaning]). For a comic usage, see Ar. Lys. 1078–79 and 1084–85; J. Taillardat, *Les images d'Aristophane* (Paris 1965) s. vv., and J. Henderson (ed.), *Aristophanes. Lysistrata* (Oxford 1987) ad loc.

¹⁶ D. Wender, "The Will of the Beast: Sexual Imagery in the *Trachiniae*," *Ramus* 3 (1974) 7; Heiden (above, note 1) 43.

¹⁷ Thus in Catullus' wedding song: *Ut flos in saeptis secretus nascitur hortis, / quem ... educat imber* (62. 39–41). Cf. J. Rudhardt, *Le thème de l'eau primordiale dans la mythologie grecque* (Bern 1971) *passim*; Motte (above, note 14) 214–25.

¹⁸ Moisture is a traditional component of the union of sky and earth: e.g., Hom. Il. 14. 351 (τσιλπαὶ ... ἔερται), Aesch. *Danaids*, TrGF III fr. 44. 3 Radt (ὄμβρος), Eur. *Chrysippus* fr. 839. 3 N² (ὕγροβόλονι σπαγόναι νοτιάς), Lucretius 2. 992–93 (*liquentis / umoris guttas*), and Verg. *Geor.* 2. 325 (*pater omnipotens fecundis imbris*). J. Herington, "The Marriage of Earth and Sky in Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1388–1392," in *Greek Tragedy and its Legacy* (Calgary 1986) 27–33 lists nine classical passages in which this immemorially old mythical mating is described.

¹⁹ Cf. Sappho fr. 2. 10–11 L–P: αἱ δ' ἄηται / μέλλιχα πνέουσιν [and 47 L–P: ἔρως δ' ἐτίναξέ μοι φρένας, ὥς ἄνεμος κατ' ὄρος ...; Ibycus PMG 286. 9–11 Page; Apoll. Rhod. 3. 970; Catullus 62. 41: [*flos*] *quem mulcent aurae*. Breezes are not uncommonly associated with sexual desire: Verg. *Geor.* 3. 274–75: *exceptantque levis auras, et saepe sine ullis / coniugiis uento grauidae* (*mirabile dictu*), with R. Thomas' note ad loc. on the impregnating wind (*Virgil. Georgics II: Books III–IV* [Cambridge 1988]); Hor. *Carm.* 1. 25. 9–14 (where strong winds and the passion of love vainly assail the withered mistress). See also Onians (above, note 15) 53–56, 119–20. An additional illustration of the use of πνεύματα in an erotic context may occur in P. Köln V 58, lines 36–40 (= supplement to Archil. fr. 188 West). The most recent edition of the papyrus can be found in J. M. Bremer, A. M. van Erp Taalman Kip and S. R. Slings, *Some Recently Found Greek Poems: Text and Commentary*, *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 99 (Leiden 1987) 62–69 ("second Cologne epode").

²⁰ Kamerbeek (above, note 15) 59.

disease. A "universal force of desire, confusion and destruction," love means imbalance and sickness.²¹ Indeed, the Hippocratic concept of disease is rooted in the belief in a close correlation between the μεταβολαί of the meteorological world and those affecting human bodies and souls.²² Encompassing all aspects of the power of desire and destruction, love subjugates gods,²³ men and animals and elicits from them hopeless reactions of resistance or obedience.²⁴ Love is an external force human beings must constantly control, resist or obey, an obsessive desire driving them to the edge of madness.²⁵ At this point in the play, however, the demonic violence of Deianeira's jealousy has not been unleashed and her love for Heracles is best defined as the loyal and steadfast devotion of a wife to her husband.²⁶

The meadow of maidenhood toward which Deianeira looks back thus ambiguously combines the security of virginal innocence with the promise of sexual readiness and marriage.²⁷ For Deianeira, however, the transition to

²¹ Oudemans-Lardinois (above, note 4) 141 (interpretation of the third stasimon of *Antigone* in 140–44). *Nócos* pervades the *Trachiniae* in its medical acceptation (784, 852, 981, 1013, 1084, 1115, 1120), in its conventional meaning as a metaphor for the "disease" of love (445, 491, 544), or both (1230). Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie*² (Göttingen 1954) I 273 and II 114–15; W. S. Barrett, *Euripides. Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) on 476–77; P. Biggs, "The Disease Theme in Sophocles' *Ajax*, *Philoctetes*, and *Trachiniae*," *CP* 61 (1966) 223–35; A. A. Long, *Language and Thought in Sophocles* (London 1968) 133–35; K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 208, 211; Segal (above, note 5) 113–15 and *HSCP* 70 (1965) 138 n. 19 (image in *Eur. Hipp.*); R. Scodel, *Sophocles* (Boston 1984) 39.

²² For the concomitant effects of heat, wind and water on human diseases, see, e.g., Hippocr. *Aër.* 26, 23, 27, 22 (ed. H. Diller) and F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945) 176–78, 183–86.

²³ Cf. *Eur. Hipp.* 451 ff., *Tro.* 948; Plato, *Symp.* 196d.

²⁴ Both neglect of and submission to love are destructive: The Danaids and Hippolytus are punished for neglecting erotic love and Deianeira's destruction is owed to her commitment to love. Cf. Seaford, *JHS* 107 (1987) 112–19; A. P. Burnett, "Hunt and Hearth in *Hippolytus*," in *Greek Tragedy and its Legacy* (Calgary 1986) 167–71.

²⁵ E.g., *Trach.* 441–42: "Whoever offers resistance to Eros like the first fighter with his hands is insane," and Plato, *Resp.* 329c: Πῶς, ἔφη, ὃ Σοφοκλεῖς, ἔχει πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια; ἔτι οἷός τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὅς, Εὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὃ ἀνθρωπεύς ἀμειναιτάτα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυτῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγόν. Cf. Dover (above, note 21) 125–26 and 208–12.

²⁶ Depictions of Heracles with wife and children are assembled in J. Boardman, *LIMC* IV (1988) s.v. "Herakles" 834 (catalogue nos. 1674–83).

²⁷ As in Catullus 62. 39–41, a poem indebted to the wedding poetry of Sappho:

Ut flos in saeptis secretus nascitur hortis,
ignotus pecori, nullo conuulsus aratro,
quem mulcent aurae, firmat sol, educat imber.

R. Merkelbach, *Philologus* 101 (1957) 28 n. 2 and Davies (above, note 10) 401 follow Garrod's emendation *educat unbra* on the grounds that rain is traditionally absent in a *locus amoenus*. In light of the previous discussion of the topos, however, I follow recent editors in keeping the reading of the manuscripts: R. A. B. Mynors, *Catulli carmina* (OCT 1958; repr. 1976); C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus* (Oxford 1961); W. Eisenhut (Teubner 1983); and G. Lee, *The Poems of Catullus* (Oxford 1990).

married life has brought suffering, and she, therefore, confines her memories of the past to a world of chastity. Later, when she learns that Heracles is back and that she is soon to see him, she invokes Zeus with words that, again, suggest the protected—yet ambivalent—inner world of virginity (200): ὦ Ζεῦ, τὸν Οἴτης ἄτομον ὅς λειμῶν' ἔχεις.²⁸ The "intactness" of the uncut meadow of Oeta suggests virginity and, at the same time, creates a context where virginity could find its end. The meadow is par excellence the place where lovers meet, a place whose sanctity, isolation and luxuriance produce the setting and/or occasion for love: e.g., Sappho fr. 2. 9 L-P (λείμων), Ibycus PMG 286. 4 Page (κῆπος ἀκήρατος) and Eur. *Hipp.* 73–74 (ἐξ ἀκηράτου / λειμῶνος), the latter referring to the inviolate meadow of Artemis which Phaedra, in her erotic hallucination, transforms into a love meadow (208–11).²⁹ The optimism of Deianeira's call upon the lush meadow of Oeta, however, is ironically vitiated by the outcome of her future actions: The robe which she sends to Heracles on Oeta and intends to be the symbolic instrument of a second union with her spouse will not foster renewed love and life but, rather, breed fiery torment and death.³⁰

Trachiniae 547–49 further illustrates Sophocles' treatment of traditional nature imagery. Now aware of Heracles' affair with Iole, Deianeira finds herself alienated from the world of love,³¹ not because she is not yet ready for it (144–47) but because she is too old for it:

ὁρῶ γὰρ ἤβην τὴν μὲν ἔρπουσαν πρόσω,
τὴν δὲ φθίνουσαν· ὧν ἀφαρπάζειν φιλεῖ
ὁφθαλμὸς ἄνθος, τῶν δ' ὑπεκτρέπει πόδα.³²

²⁸ While stressing the utter alienation of lines 144–46 from their context, Dawe (above, note 7) 81 ponders: "Were the lines perhaps once part of a description of the ἄτομος λειμῶν of v. 200?"

²⁹ Motte (above, note 14) 121–46 and "Le pré sacré de Pan et des nymphes dans le *Phèdre* de Platon," *AC* 32 (1963) 466–69; Segal (above, note 21) 124–25; Bremer (above, note 11) 268–79; Stigers (above, note 11) 92–95.

³⁰ For the gradual evolution of the Oeta in the play, from peaceful to destructive, see Segal (above, note 5) 149–51 and *Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles* (Cambridge, MA 1981) 84–85: "Zeus's meadow, though uncut, is the very antithesis of her sheltered meadow of virginity. Zeus and Oeta will bring her no joy . . . The meadow fantasy thus reflects that imbalance between hope and reality, innocence and maturity . . . Hence the meadow too, comes to reflect its opposites: shelter from heat turns into the full force of the heat of lust; protection from time in Olympian serenity becomes the total subjection to human transitoriness which Deianeira knows and fears."

³¹ Deianeira seemingly never had a balanced love experience: Her earliest memories of her readiness for love are tied to fear (5–17) and threat of rape (557–65). C. S. Kraus, "Λόγος μὲν ἔστ' ἀρχαῖος: Stories and Story-Telling in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*," *TAPA* 121 (1991) 87 notes that "the stasimon both brings Deianeira's marriage to a close and assimilates her to Iole (and vice-versa), both victims of bestial love."

³² ὧν δ' (548) and τῶν δ' (549) Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (with Zippmann), while Dawe posits a lacuna in the middle of 549.

The human process is compared to the natural world,³³ and so is vulnerable to the laws of nature—subjection to time and the transformations that time ordains and operates being the most tangible and damaging such law. Linked to the past, nature is positive and blooming (144–47); tied to the present, it signifies age and heralds desolation (547–49), for the analogy between the human process and the natural world breaks down with the finite nature of human experience. Nature's ever-recurring cycle of birth, maturity and death describes a circular pattern which provides the mutability of human lives and affairs with partial explanation and inadequate comfort.³⁴ The flow of the individual human life is obstructed by mortality; singly, humankind has no immediate share in the benefits of a predictable and endless repetition of natural phenomena. Human self-perpetuation is collective only; no isolated human life can be repeated. The flower of youth does not bloom twice.

Deianeira speaks of herself with the words of a tired lover. Her words are those of the speaker in the "Cologne epode" of Archilochus (16–19):

Νεοβούλῃ[ν μὲν ὦν]
[ἄ]λλος ἀνὴρ ἐχέτω· αἰαῖ πέπειρα δις [τόσῃ]³⁵
[ἄν]θος δ' ἀπερρύθηκε παρθενήϊον
[κ]αὶ χάρις ἦ πρὶν ἐπῆν·

Deianeira's youth is fading (ἥβην . . . φθίνουσιν = πέπειρα, ἀπερρύθηκε) and no longer exerts any attraction (ὑπεκτρέπει = Νεοβούλῃ[ν . . . ἄ]λλος ἐχέτω);³⁶ her rival, on the contrary, is still growing towards her full bloom (ἔρπουσιν πρόσω) and is most pleasing to behold (φιλεῖ echoes χάρις).³⁷ Both authors employ similar imagery to contrast younger and older women.³⁸

³³ For a perceptive definition of the ancient Greek feeling of kinship with the natural world: Irwin (above, note 8) 147–50.

³⁴ Cf. van Gennep (above, note 6) 3: "Man's life resembles nature, from which neither the individual nor the society stands independent. The universe itself is governed by a periodicity which has repercussions on human life, with stages and transitions, movements forward, and periods of relative inactivity." For an analysis of the concept of time in *Trachiniae*, see de Romilly (above, note 2) 81–83; Segal (above, note 5) 106–08.

³⁵ A. Henrichs, "Riper than a Pear: Parian Invective in Theokritos," *ZPE* 39 (1980) 10–13 supports West's conjecture (*ZPE* 26 [1977] 48) on the relevance of the entry δις τόσῃ in Hesychius δ 1978 Latte here.

³⁶ For other treatments of the same idea, see, e.g., Theocr. 7. 120–21 (καὶ δὴ μὰν ἄπιοιο πεπαίτερος, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες / 'αἰαῖ,' φαντί, 'Φιλῖνε, τό τοι καλὸν ἄνθος ἀπορρεῖ') and *AP* 12. 39. 1–3.

³⁷ The bloom of youth is a conventional image in lyric poetry: cf. Stigers (above, note 11) 100 n. 15; Bremer et al. (above, note 19) 41–42, to which *Mimn. fr.* 1. 4 and 2. 3 West can be added (Kamerbeek [above, note 15], Longo [above, note 2]). Also common is the image of the flower of love: e.g., Pind. *Pyth.* 9. 37, 109–11; Aesch. *Ag.* 743; Eur. *Cycl.* 499; Heiden (above, note 1) 84.

³⁸ Deianeira's possible analogy with Neoboule rests upon her somewhat ambiguous attitude toward sexuality, an ambiguity suggested by the tension between her undeniable

The use of nature imagery, however, is more pervasive in Archilochus' poem than in Sophocles' tragedy. While the Cologne fragment presents the surrogate maiden as a καλή τέρπεινα παρθένος (4) whose floral softness symbolizes innocence and vulnerability,³⁹ Sophocles introduces Iole by focusing on the ethical and social implications of the girl's demeanor.⁴⁰ Deianeira's candid portrayal of Iole stresses both the maiden's virginal appearance and her noble birth.⁴¹ Iole withstands the situation in a manner which betrays her γενναιότης and, hence, her σωφροσύνη (313).⁴² See 308–09:

ἄνανδρος, ἢ τεκνοῦσα;⁴³ πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φύειν
πάντων ἄπειρος τῶνδε, γενναία δέ τις.

Later on, however, once aware of Iole's actual relationship with Heracles, Deianeira's feeling is greatly transformed (379):

experience and her retrospective longing for virginity. A hint at the ambivalence of her sexuality possibly occurs in the Nessos episode (*Trach.* 555–74) where Deianeira, still a girl (παῖς 557) but already Heracles' wife (εὖνις 563), is almost raped by the centaur. P. Berol. 16140 (= Bacchyl. *dubia* fr. 64 Maehler = Pind. fr. 341 Bowra), a fragment of song in the style of Pindar and Bacchylides surely recounting Deianeira's encounter with Nessos, suggests the same ambiguity: νῆϊδα ῥοδόπ[αχυν (10) and φίλον πόσιν ἐκ[ετευ (18), γυναῖκός φον[(20). A. P. Burnett, *The Art of Bacchylides* (Cambridge, MA 1985) 196 n. 27 cautions that the fragment may be the work of yet another poet, perhaps Simonides. C. Calame, *Les chœurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque* I (Rome 1977) 63 observes that although κόραι, παρθέναι, νεάνιδες, νύμφαι usually designate maidens and γυναῖκες married women, the semantic content of those terms could vary according to the context. Similarly, E. M. Craik, "Two Notes on Sophocles' *Trachiniai*, 257 and 750–62," *LCM* 9 (1984) 24–25 points out the ambivalent and changing status of Iole, simultaneously girl and woman.

³⁹ Cp. Aesch. *Suppl.* 998–99. For the implications of the nature symbolism in the presentation of Neoboule and of the maiden, see Henderson (above, note 11) 164–65; Stigers (above, note 11) 86–87 and 90–91.

⁴⁰ The concern for the social aspect of the relationship is already present in Archilochus (δοκέω δέ μιν / εἶδος ἄμωμον ἔχειν 4–5), where it is closely bound to the nature of invective poetry. E. Degani and G. Burzacchini, *Lirici greci* (Florence 1977) 10 understand ἄμωμος as *quae irrideri et uituperari nequit*, an interpretation confirmed by the fear of χάρμα emphasized later on in the epode (21–23). Cf. Hes. *Op.* 700–01; Semon. 7. 111–13 West.

⁴¹ On φύσις in Sophocles: Heinimann (above, note 22) 95.

⁴² Σωφροσύνη can imply chastity as well as soundness of mind (Eur. *Hipp.* 731 and 1100 contrast the two; cf. Segal [above, note 21] 139). On *sophrosyne* as the virtue of women in antiquity: H. North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca 1966) 131 n. 26 and *ICS* 2 (1977) 35–48.

⁴³ τεκνοῦσα (Brunck): τεκνοῦσα L^s rec. S: τεκοῦσα rec. LA. Brunck's emendation, which is based on an unattested contraction of τεκνόεις, -εσσα, -εν, is accepted by the most recent editors: Longo (above, note 2) 131 brings Callim. fr. 431 παιδοῦσσα in support of Brunck's suggestion; Easterling (above, note 5) ad loc. adds Eur. *Hipp.* 733 πετροῦσσαν to the list of parallels; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (above, note 7) ad loc.

ἡ κάρτα λαμπρά καὶ κατ' ὄμμα καὶ φύσιν.⁴⁴

The captive is outstanding (λαμπρά) both because of her birth and of her good looks.⁴⁵ Although her appearance is not described in terms of nature symbolism, the diction is clearly tinged with the imagery of archaic epic and lyric poetry. In the *Iliad*, λαμπρός refers to the gleam of weapons (e.g., 13. 265, 16. 216) and the glare of the sun (e.g., 1. 605, 8. 485); it is also used in a simile where Achilles is likened to a star (22. 26–31) and in the description of Diomedes' starlike glittering arms (5. 5–6). The adjective thus conveys the idea of outstanding military might, a power supported by the gods and, at the same time, elevating the heroes to the rank of divine beings.

When Sappho borrows the star imagery and other images from Homer, refashions them and utilizes them in epithalamial poems, bride and groom become the unheroic warriors of the battle of love.⁴⁶ Historically and intellectually embedded in the transitional period between myth and the emergence of philosophy,⁴⁷ the poetry of Sappho, quite naturally, echoes the primitive understanding of the individual's life through the reenactment of myth at crucial moments of her (or his) existence.⁴⁸ The wedding day is one such instance: Custom demands that the couple be compared to gods.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Following the messenger's revelation that Eros was the guiding force in Heracles' sack of Oechalia (354–55) Deianeira at last "sees" Iole's seductive beauty: D. Seale, *Vision and Stagecraft in Sophocles* (Chicago 1982) 196–98; R. L. Kane, "The Structure of Sophocles' *Trachiniae*," *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 210; S. Durup, *Recherches sur "éros" dans la tragédie grecque* (the forthcoming monograph focuses on the physiological relationship between sight and erotic desire).

⁴⁵ Cf. W. Schadewaldt, "Experimentelle Philologie," *WS* 79 (1966) 77. Compare Eur. *El.* 36: λαμπροὶ γὰρ ἐκ γένος γε, χρημάτων δὲ διὰ πένητες; Aeschin. *Fals. leg.* 51. 7–52. 1: ἐδόκει Κτησιφῶντι τὴν ὄψιν λαμπρὸς εἶναι. The adjective often also refers to the handsome vigor of youth (e.g., Eur. fr. 282. 10 N²; Thuc. 6. 54. 2) and regularly implies social prominence and political clout (e.g., Soph. *El.* 685; Hdt. 6. 125. 1). On the multivalency of the word λαμπρός: F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Hildesheim 1958) s.v.; Seaford (above, note 6) 124 n. 182 (with further references).

⁴⁶ Particularly fr. 31 L–P, as convincingly argued by L. Rissman, *Love as War: Homeric Allusion in the Poetry of Sappho*, *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 157 (Königstein 1983) 66–104.

⁴⁷ H. S. Schibli, *Pherekydes of Syros* (Oxford 1990) 67–68 aptly captures the modes and terms in which the transition is expressed and negotiated in the work of Pherekydes (floruit 544/1 BC, the first—according to Theopompus [ap. D.L. 1. 116]—to write about nature and gods): "In sum, in the marriage of Zas and Chthonie the divine world touches upon the human world. The institutions and customs of men are traced back to the gods. In Pherekydes' book, marriages are literally made in heaven as each marriage re-enacts the first divine marriage. In mythical thought, human acts are real because they repeat the deeds of the gods."

⁴⁸ Cf. R. Merkelbach, "Sappho und ihr Kreis," *Philologus* 101 (1957) 1–29; Calame (above, note 38) 367–69 and 400–03.

⁴⁹ The human institution of marriage is grounded in the world of the gods. The marriages of primeval deities such as Ouranos and Ge, Zas and Chthonie are archetypal for all subsequent unions among gods and men, and the concept of an original divine mating is

The light imagery which stands prominently in her love poems and wedding songs (fr. 16, 18, 58, 26, 96, 6–9 L–P) naturally constitutes a universal and central theme in allusions to and depictions of wedding ceremonies in contemporary and subsequent literature.⁵⁰ Given such conventional mental representations and literary precedents, therefore, it is likely that when Sophocles uses λαμπρά⁵¹ he implies marriage.⁵² He grants Iole a godlike nature and presents her as the prospective victorious warrior in the coming war for Heracles' love,⁵³ while he prepares Deianeira's withdrawal from it.⁵⁴

associated with Zeus and Hera in particular: Burnett (above, note 24) 176 n. 62; J. Rudhardt, *Le rôle d'Eros et d'Aphrodite dans les cosmogonies grecques* (Paris 1986) esp. 25–28 and 39–40; Seaford (above, note 6) 117 n. 17; Schibli (above, note 47) 61–69 with nn. 27–28. The sexual urge in nature and cosmos is a common theme in later wedding ceremony: Men. Rh. 401 and 408. 13–19 (nature creates marriage and unites heaven and earth), Himer. Orat. 9. 8 (god and nature play key roles in instituting marriage), and Procl. in Tim. 3. 176. 19–30 Diehl (ὁ δὲ [i.e. the union of earth and sky] καὶ οἱ θεομοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰδότες προσέτατον οὐρανῷ καὶ γῇ προτελεῖν τοὺς γάμους). Cf. Seaford (above, note 6) 117 n. 117.

⁵⁰ Alcman PMG 1. 40–43 Page; Aristoph. Pax 859: τί δῆτ' ἐπειδὴν νυμφίον μ' ὄρατε λαμπρόν ὄντα; and Av. 1709–10 (mock-hymeneal passage in which Pisthetairos is said to outshine stars and sun rays); Eur. IA 74 (Paris is said to have come to Sparta χρυσῷ τε λαμπρό, both an allusion to his oriental princely glitter and an ironical reference to his being groom-to-be: ἐρῶν ἐρῶσαν [75] ... λαβών [76], following the tendency to describe adulterous union in terms of marriage ritual [Seaford (above, note 6) 123 n. 174]); Theocr. 16. 26–28; Ap. Rh. 1. 774–81 (Jason compared to the Evening Star, the star of marriage and fertility) and 3. 956–59 (Jason/Sirius steals Medea's heart and mind) with R. L. Hunter, *Apollonius of Rhodes. Argonautica, Book III* (Cambridge 1989) ad loc.; Catullus 61. 21–22, 192–93. Light imagery is commonly applied to the gleaming beauty of the gods as well as to the power and energy which emanate from them (e.g., Apollo is Φοῖβος in Hom. Il. 1. 43, Soph. OT 71, Eur. Ion 140 and Τειτάν in Orphic H. 34. 3). Marriage itself is associated with brilliance in Philoxenus Cytherius PMG 828 Page: Γάμει θεῶν λαμπρότατε. W. E. Gladstone, *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age III* (Oxford 1853) 482 argues that the celebrated goldenness of the gods "always belongs to light rather than color." While brightness might radiate from the whole body (Hom. H. Demeter 188–89 with N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* [Oxford 1974] ad loc.), radiance about the head is the traditional manifestation of divine power (Onians [above, note 15] 165–66). The radiate head naturally plays a key rôle in Hellenistic iconography and political propaganda: M. Parca, *Ptocheia or Odysseus in Disguise at Troy* (P. Köln VI 245), ASP 31 (Atlanta 1990) 41–44.

⁵¹ One might also recognize a topical dimension to λαμπρά since it echoes the parodos of the play (94–140) where Heracles and Deianeira are characterized through the opposing concepts of light and darkness (cf. T. F. Hoey, "Sun Symbolism in the Parodos of the Trachiniae," *Arethusa* 5 [1972] 133–54). Thus, by a tragic irony, Deianeira applies Heracles' active qualities to the maiden and makes her stand by him in an harmonious relationship from which she is alienated. Segal (above, note 5) 116 relates the adjective to the fire imagery latent in the first part of the play.

⁵² In 205–07 the chorus sing of a marriage about to be celebrated; in 379 Deianeira praises Iole for her beauty (a traditional element in wedding ceremony); and subsequently Iole is referred to as the bride of Heracles (536, 546, 843, 857, 894; cf. Eur. Hipp. 544–45); Seaford (above, note 6) 128–29 and (above, note 7) 50–54.

⁵³ In Sappho fr. 16. 18 L–P Anactoria's beloved face is ἀμάρνυμα λάμπρον (G. Lanata, *QUCC* 2 [1966] 76–77), and Segal (above, note 5) 116 notes that in *Trachiniae*

Iole's characterization combines heroic grandeur with lyric sensitivity and bears witness to Sophocles' adaptation of epic and lyric precedents to his literary genre and dramatic goal. Lines 539–40 reveal a similar blend of allusion and assimilation:

καὶ νῦν δὺ' οὖσαι μίμνομεν μιᾶς ὑπὸ
χλαίνης ὑπαγκάλισμα.

Μία χλαῖνα is the symbol for a pair of lovers⁵⁵ and its vivid contrast with δὺ' οὖσαι suggestively sums up the situation: "So now the two of us lie under the one sheet waiting for his embrace."⁵⁶ The seduction narrated in the Cologne epode provides a larger literary frame for the image (29–30):

μαλθακῇ δέ μιν
[χλαί]νῃ καλύψας, αὐχέν' ἀγκάλη<ι>ς' ἔχων.

The parallel becomes instructive when one recalls that Archilochus' poem is itself modelled on the *Dios Apatè* of *Iliad* 14, as it presents the reenactment by human beings of the sacred nuptials of Zeus and Hera.⁵⁷ Unless the community of diction and thought shared by the three episodes (χλαίνης *Trach.* 540, [χλαί]νῃ *P. Köln V* 58. 30, νεφέλην ἔσσαντο *Iliad* 14. 350; ὑπαγκάλισμα *Trach.* 540, ἀγκάλη<ι>ς' *P. Köln V* 58. 30,

"the word (λαμπρά) has erotic connotations too, suggesting the luminosity of the love object, and hence forms part of the constellation of themes linking the fire-imagery of lust to the destructive fires of the action itself." *Thuc.* 6. 54. 1–2 (τὸ γὰρ 'Αριστογείτονος καὶ 'Αρμοδίου τόλμημα δι' ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη . . . γενομένου δὲ 'Αρμοδίου ὥρα ἡλικίας λαμπροῦ 'Αριστογείτων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀκτῶν, μέγας πολίτης, ἐραστὴς ὧν εἶχεν αὐτόν) provides a possible indication that the adjective λαμπρός bears erotic overtones.

⁵⁴ Webster (above, note 1) 169 pointedly notes that Iole and Deianeira are not engaged in a conflict but rather embody two poles of the same reality, and P. E. Easterling, "Character in Sophocles," *G&R* 24 (1977) 122 observes that both women are linked as victims of love.

⁵⁵ Kamerbeek (above, note 15) 127; Long (above, note 21) 119; Longo (above, note 2) 198–99; Degani–Burzacchini (above, note 40) 20; B. Gentili, *QUCC* 21 (1976) 17–18; G. Arrigoni, "Amore sotto il manto e iniziazione nuziale," *QUCC* 44 (1983) 12–18; Davies (above, note 3) 152; G. Koch-Harnack, *Erotische Symbole: Lotos-blüte und gemeinsamer Mantel auf antiken Vasen* (Berlin 1989) 136–38. Cf. *Eur. Peliades* fr. 603. 4 N²: ὅταν δ' ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς χλαῖναν εὐγενοῦς πέσης; *Theocr.* 16. 19: Ζανὸς τοι θυγάτηρ ὑπὸ τὰν μίαν ἔκετο χλαῖναν; *Ovid Am.* 1. 4. 47–48: *saepe mihi dominaeque meae properata uoluptas / ueste sub iniecta dulce peregit opus*; *Prop.* 1. 4. 14.

⁵⁶ Arrigoni (previous note) 17 observes that the cloak could also serve as cover for the κλίνη of the symposium or for the bridal couch, and interprets Deianeira's last actions ("casting sheets [φάρη] and spreading them upon the bed of Heracles," 915–16) before her suicide as the symbolic reenactment of her union with Heracles. "Indubbiamente il comportamento della Deianeira sofoclea, dopo la morte di Eracle . . . dimostra che l'identità sessuale della sposa greca nasce e finisce nel talamo, sul letto nuziale, dove gli τρωτὰ . . . φάρη di Eracle, come precedentemente la *chlaina* indivisibile con le altre, raccolgono un altro viaggio verso l'abbandono" (51).

⁵⁷ On human marriages as replicas of that of Zeus and Hera: Bremer (above, note 11) 272–73; Redfield (above, note 6) esp. 188; Burnett (above, note 24) 178 n. 72.

ἀγκάς *Iliad* 14. 346) is merely coincidental, the similarity suggests that Sophocles may allude to the Homeric model and to the adaptation of that model by Archilochus. If so, *Trachiniae* 539–40 ironically perverts both the Homeric archetype and its lyric adaptation. Modelling the account of his experience on the tale of Zeus enshrouding himself and Hera in a golden cloud, Archilochus makes the speaker cover the girl with his cloak, thereby adapting the epic and mythical exemplum to the particular circumstances of his existence and recasting the god's gesture in familiar terms and human dimensions.⁵⁸ In Sophocles, however, the dramatic action invalidates the exemplary relevance of the mythical deed to lovemaking and marital harmony among mortals. The primeval divine union with which Archilochus assimilated his own erotic experience and through which he gave a literary expression to the universal aspects of human amatory encounters is now adapted to a *mariage à trois* in which two women are waiting for the man's attentions under a single cloak.⁵⁹ Spread over both his wife and his new lover the cloak of Heracles thus turns into a monstrous parody of the cover which traditionally effected the lovers' seclusion and constituted the emblem of their indivisible intimacy.⁶⁰

These passages illustrate Sophocles' adaptation of conventional images, epic and lyric, to the psychological characterization of the female protagonist. All depict Deianeira as a passive character either too young or too old to share in the potential erotic environment which surrounds her.⁶¹ Two other episodes, however, contradict this perception by portraying

⁵⁸ Intrinsically, of course, the mythical tales themselves reflect social and human realities. Zeus' cloud refers to the cloak with which the lover covered his girl in the actual lovemaking encounters which took place in the open. On the rôle of the nuptial cloak of the husband in the sexual initiation and matrimonial transition of the bride: Arrigoni (above, note 55) 48–56, and B. M. Fridh-Haneson, *Le manteau symbolique. Etude sur les couples en terre cuite assis sous un même manteau* (Stockholm 1983) 75–77 (with a note on Pherecydes fr. 7 B 2 Diels, in which Zas makes a robe which he presents to Chthonie as he declares her his wife, on which now see Schibli [above, note 47] 50–69).

⁵⁹ Koch-Harnack (above, note 55) 163–65.

⁶⁰ The shared blanket also recurs in the context of homosexual love: e.g., Lysias 14. 25; Plato *Symp.* 219b–c; *AP* 5. 169. 3–4. Cf. K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, updated and with a new postscript (Cambridge, MA 1989) 98 (with reference to a sixth-century BC Attic black-figure pyxis now in Bologna, Museo Civico inv. coll. Palagi 1434 = CVA Italy 7, plate [III He] 44.3) and 158; Koch-Harnack (above, note 55) 138–48.

⁶¹ These select passages, however, do not detract from the fact that once she has resolved to act, Deianeira does so out of passionate love, under the guidance of powerful and destructive erotic urges: H. Parry, "Aphrodite and the Furies in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*," in *Greek Tragedy and its Legacy* (Calgary 1986) 109 n. 30 (with bibliography). Also, the Aetolian mythological tradition underlines Deianeira's Amazonian nature, physical strength and harsh character: Bacchyl. 5. 165–68; Apollod. 1. 8. 1; *Σ* Ap. Rh. 1. 1212; Nonnos 35. 89–91. The pre-Sophoclean character was bold-hearted and perhaps even deliberately malicious: Th. Zielinski, "Exkurse zu den Trachinierinnen," *Philologus* 55 (1896) 583–85; I. Errandonea, "Deianeira vere Ἀνι-άνειρα," *Mnemosyne* 55 (1927) 147–48; F. Stoessl, *Der Tod des Herakles* (Zurich 1945) 29–31; March (above, note 1) 51–57.

Deianeira as a young woman instinctively—though only partially—aware of the emotional and physical demands placed upon her by the foreseeable transition from virginity to womanhood.⁶²

Deianeira's memories of her fear of suitors and of Acheloos' courtship suggest the setting which generally accompanies evocations of divine marriages (9, 13–14):

μνηστὴρ γὰρ ἦν μοι ποταμός, Ἀχελῷον λέγω,
ἐκ δὲ δαρκίου γενειάδος
κρουνοὶ διερραίνοντο κρηναίου ποτοῦ.

Acheloos' physical appearance combines the two elements inherent in most divine unions: water and vegetation.⁶³ The words ποταμός, κρουνοὶ and κρηναίου ποτοῦ constitute an obvious reference to the first component of a setting fit for the human reenactment of the divine ἱερὸς γάμος,⁶⁴ and an allusion to vegetation emerges from δαρκίου when the adjective is granted an extended, metaphorical meaning. Such is suggested by an entry in Hesychius: δάρκιον· μεγάλως σκιάζον διὰ τὸ σύνδενδρον καὶ δακύ (δ 286 Latte).⁶⁵ The clump of Acheloos' beard thus hints at dense bushes and shade, and elicits the image of a setting often associated with lovemaking. Acheloos was a well-known amorist in antiquity,⁶⁶ and the associative nexus which Sophocles creates between the monster's beard, water and vegetal growth probably reflects the belief in the association of the jaw—and hence of the beard—with procreation.⁶⁷

⁶² On the way stories are used by Deianeira and other characters in the play to organize their experience, see Kraus (above, note 31) 79–88 ("marriage stories") and 88–95 ("poison stories").

⁶³ See Motte (above, note 14) 208–09.

⁶⁴ "Rivers were regarded as generative powers and rivers of seed": Onians (above, note 15) 230, who refers to the custom in various parts of the Greek world for bridegroom and bride to bathe in river water. Also Martina (above, note 1) 64 n. 47: "È stata sottolineata la presenza dell'elemento acqua e il significato che essa assume nell'ambito sessuale, anche nelle forme in cui l'Acheloo si manifesta."

⁶⁵ Ordinarily, the adjective δάρκιος qualifies ὕλη and ὄρος (Longo [above, note 2] 29). G. Schiassi, *Sofocle. Le Trachinie* (Florence 1953) ad loc. observes, "δάρκιος dà l'idea della boscaglia ombreggiante le rive del fiume," and Segal (above, note 5) 105 remarks, "the fine lines which describe the water pouring down the forest-like tangle of his beard . . . make clear at once that we have to do with a figure who is not yet fully differentiated from the forces of nature." On the "fairy-tale uncouthness" of this and the Nessos episodes: K. Reinhardt, *Sophocles*, transl. by H. and D. Harvey (New York 1979) 37; Martina (above, note 1) 64 and 72–73.

⁶⁶ Cf. Heiden (above, note 1) 24–27; W. M. Clarke, "Achelous in Anthologia Palatina 12. 51 (Callimachus)," *CP* 76 (1981) 297–300 (esp. 299) and, generally, H. P. Isler, *Acheloos* (Bern 1970). For representations of Acheloos in art: H. P. Isler, *LJMC* I (1981) s.v. "Acheloos" 12–36 (catalogue nos. 213–67 survey the depictions of the fight between Heracles and the river god).

⁶⁷ Onians (above, note 15) 232–33.

Deianeira's second threatening erotic encounter with a hybrid creature occurred soon after her marriage to Heracles. She was being ferried across the Evenos river by Nessos when, in mid-stream,⁶⁸ the wanton centaur attempted to rape her (557–65).⁶⁹

ὁ παῖς ἔτ' οὐσα τοῦ δαρυτέρνου παρὰ
 Νέσσου φθίνοντος ἐκ φονῶν ἀνειλόμην,
 ὃς τὸν βαθύρρουν ποταμὸν Εὐήνον βροτοῦς
 μισθοῦ 'πόρευε χερσίν, οὔτε πομπίμοις
 κώπαις ἐρέσσων οὔτε λαίφεσιν νεώς. 560
 ὃς κάμέ, τὸν πατρῶον ἡνίκα στόλον
 ξὺν Ἡρακλεῖ τὸ πρῶτον εὖνις ἐσπόμην,
 φέρων ἐπ' ὅμοις, ἡνίκ' ἦν μέσφ' ὀρόφ,
 ψαύει ματαίαις χερσίν. 565

Combined with the particular setting of the episode, in or near a river (βαθύρρουν ποταμὸν 559),⁷⁰ the promise of shady vegetation (δαρυτέρνου 557) conveyed in the description of the physical aspect of the centaur is erotically suggestive.⁷¹ The natural liquid environment and the metaphorical shade and lush growth of Nessos' chest intimate a setting suitable for a lovemaking scene.⁷² Centaurs in effect were renowned for their arrogant licentiousness⁷³ and the verb ψαύει in line 565 bespeaks the nature of

⁶⁸ Some ancient critics faulted this scenario for its inherent absurdity: "Others charge that Sophocles has introduced the shooting of the arrow too soon, while they were still crossing the river, for in those circumstances, they claim, Deianeira too would have perished, since the dying Centaur would have dropped her in the river" (Dio of Prusa 60. 1, transl. H. L. Crosby [Loeb]). On Sophocles' innovation: March (above, note 1) 65.

⁶⁹ The various literary treatments of the Nessos tale (Archil. fr. 286, 288 West; Hes. *Cat.* fr. 25. 18–33 M–W; Bacchyl. 16; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 7. 6; Diod. 4. 36. 3) are surveyed and discussed in Ch. Dugas, "La mort du centaure Nessos," *REA* 45 (1943) 18–24; Easterling (above, note 5) 15–19; Burnett (above, note 38) 196; March (above, note 1) 52–58, 62–65; Heiden (above, note 1) 86.

⁷⁰ On the centaurs' association with wilderness and torrents: G. Dumézil, *Le problème des Centaures*, *Annales du Musée Guimet* 4 (Paris 1929) 170–71. B. Dietrich (*Hermes* 90 [1962] 135) notes that the horse, through its association with fountains and rivers, has affinities with deities of vegetation and nature.

⁷¹ Centaurs are traditionally hairy (e.g., Hom. *Il.* 2. 743; Hom. *H.* *Hermes* 224), and Longo (above, note 2) 204 cites Hes. *Op.* 514 as the first occurrence of δαρυτέρνου in reference to animals τῶν καὶ λάχνη δέρμα κατάρκιον. On the popular belief that growth of hair is associated with sexual vigor: Onians (above, note 15) 232–33.

⁷² D. Gerber, "An Epithet in Bacchylides' Dithyramb 16," *LCM* 14 (1989) 102–03 stresses the erotic overtones of the epithet ῥοδόεις applied to Nessos' river in Bacchyl. 16. 34 as well as the dramatically significant symbolism of the adjective: "The roses on the banks of the Lycornas are an appropriate setting for Nessos' attempted rape." On the question of whether Bacchylides is indebted to Sophocles, see Easterling (above, note 5) 16; Burnett (above, note 38) 196 n. 27; March (above, note 1) 62–63 (with bibliography); Davies (above, note 3) xxxii. On the date of *Trachiniae*: Kraus (above, note 31) 75.

⁷³ Cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 2. 41–48; Soph. *Trach.* 1096 (ὑβριστήν, ἄνομον, ὑπέροχον βίαν); Eur. *HF* 181 (τετρακελὲς θ' ὑβριμα). Dumézil (above, note 70) 176–77; J.

Nessos' intentions.⁷⁴ The attack on Deianeira however fails as the centaur succumbs under Heracles' arrow-shot, and the beast employs his last gasps to devise the death of his murderer. It is with the love-charm which the lustful creature concocts from a mixture of his blood and of the Hydra's poison⁷⁵ that Deianeira will irrevocably "cure" her husband's relentless lust.⁷⁶

Acheloos and Nessos belong to an elemental world of unrestrained sexual drive and physical violence and partake of an era in which the distinction between human and bestial realms is blurred. The multiformous river and the horse-man are forces of nature closely connected with meadows or, more precisely, creators of meadows.⁷⁷ In *Trachiniae*, they intrude in the human sphere at the moment when the female protagonist experiences the critical transition from maidenhood to marriage. The tension between the threat of their instinctive lust and the emotional and physical vulnerability of her coming of age is logically conveyed through metaphors drawn from the natural world. The following tabulation—fashioned after that which concludes J. M. Bremer's discussion of Sappho fr. 2 L-P and Ibycus PMG 286 as inescapable predecessors for the imagery of Euripides *Hippolytus* 73–78 ([above, note 11] 271)—seems to corroborate this interpretation:

Henderson, *The Maculate Muse*² (New York 1991) 133; P. du Bois, "On Horse/men, Amazons, and Endogamy," *Arethusa* 12 (1979) 37–38.

⁷⁴ The verb παύω carries erotic connotations: e.g., P. Köln V 58. 32: μακτ[ῶν τε χερσὶν ἥπιός ἐφηψάμην; Pind. *Ol.* 6. 35; Eur. *Archelaos* fr. 2 A line 4 (ed. M. A. Harder [Leiden 1985] 191–92); Σ Eur. *Hipp.* 14 (ὡς ἐν διηγῆσει λέγει ἢ ὡς πρὸς κνημονὴν αὐτῆς ἐκείνου τοῦτο ποιοῦντος). See Davies (above, note 3) on line 565 for additional parallels, and Jebb on *Antigone* 172 (on the verb's association with the notion of polluting profanation).

⁷⁵ Thus also in Ovid *Met.* 9. 129–33. Perhaps echoing a primitive version of the myth, the late sources (Diodorus 4. 36. 5 and Apollod. 2. 7. 6) list the centaur's sperm among the ingredients of the philter, a detail which Sophocles may have omitted as inappropriate for the dignity of tragedy (Dugas [above, note 69] 22–24). On the beguiling quality of Nessos' persuasive words on Deianeira: e.g., A. Roselli, "Livelli del conoscere nelle *Trachinie* di Sofocle," *Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 7 (1982) 29 and Stinton (above, note 7) 424–26; Heiden (above, note 1) 87–90.

⁷⁶ On sexual love, both Deianeira's and Heracles', as the actual mover of the play see, e.g., P. du Bois (above, note 73) 41; P. Holt, "Disease, Desire, and Deianeira: A Note on the Symbolism of the *Trachiniae*," *Helios* 8 (1981) 63–73; Seale (above, note 44) 196–98; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "Sophocles and Women," in *Sophocle*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique 29 (Vandoeuvres 1983) 239–40; Scodel (above, note 21) 38–39.

⁷⁷ Segal (above, note 5) 106 similarly links the two: "Nessus is 'shaggy-chested,' *dasusternos* (557), and his river is 'deep-flowing,' *bathurros* (559), a detail which relates to the wild realm and the shaggy beard of Achelous in the opening scene (13–14)."

| | <i>Trach.</i> 5-14 | <i>Trach.</i> 557-65 |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| springtime (of life) | πατρός μὲν ἐν δόμοισιν Οἰνέως / ναίους' ἔτ' (6-7) | παῖς ἔτ' οὐρα (557) |
| meadows-bushes | δακίου (13) | δακυτέρνου (557) |
| flowers | _____ | _____ |
| involute spot | _____ | _____ |
| irrigation | κρουνοὶ διερραίνοντο κρηναίου ποτοῦ (14) | μέσῳ πόρῳ (564) |
| rivers | ποταμός (9) | ποταμὸν Εὐήνων (559) |
| erotic urge | (μνηστήρ 9) | (Cypris 497-530 and 860-61) |

Differences between the *Trachiniae* and the other passages exist. The three texts examined by J. M. Bremer emphasize the presence of flowers and the fact that the spot is untrodden, and they depict the *locus amoenus* as a natural love nest in whose seclusion erotic love can potentially be pursued. In Sophocles' play, by contrast, there are no flowers and the natural setting favorable to an erotic adventure is partly created by the males' bodies, through highly elaborate metaphors.

Trachiniae 13-14 and 557-65, because they bear the imprint of the conventions of the nature symbolism diction, help complete and shade Deianeira's character. While the analogies she draws between herself and the natural world at different moments of her life first implant the idea that she is not an active erotic being (144-47 and 547-49), the Acheloos and Nessos episodes modify this impression and show that, within the limits of her personality, Deianeira acknowledges an awareness of her erotic potential: Bound to the past, her active sensuality belongs to the past as well.⁷⁸ Her psychological characterization reflects the tensions in the play, the clashes between youth and age, love and deception, birth and death, light and obscurity.

Is it valid to assume that the conventional images of love poetry motivate the metaphorical associations outlined in the *Trachiniae*? Can they be taken to be familiar to the public of tragedy to a degree that Sophocles might manipulate them freely as if they were common conventions? Only a global study of the ways tragic poets adapt archetypal, natural metaphors to the dramatic treatment of erotic and other major liminal experiences can provide an answer. In the meantime, we are left with possible links. From

⁷⁸ "The encounters with Achelous and Nessus . . . remind us that the power of female sexuality . . . still lives in Deianeira" (Segal [above, note 30] 79).

the Homeric hymns to Nonnus, the meadow metaphor is the standard accompaniment of accounts of divine and mortal unions.⁷⁹ A feature of the poetry of Archilochus, Sappho, Anacreon (*PMG* 346 fr. 1. 7–9 and 417. 5 Page), Pindar (*Pyth.* 9. 37, 109–10), Bacchylides (*Dithyr.* 16. 34) and Euripides (*Cycl.* 499; *Hipp.* 73–78, 208–11), such imagery also pervades Hellenistic poetry. This permanence suggests that instead of being “skipped” by the tragedians, the conventional *topoi* of love poetry lived on in their works, but encoded in words and applied in ways that satisfied the demands of an altered subjectivity, of a different literary genre, of changing cultural views, and of new philosophical questions. J. M. Bremer’s suggestion that Phaedra’s “sensual words about the meadow [*Hipp.* 208–11] will have been understood easily by an audience which was accustomed to poetry in which erotic activities took place on lush meadows” ([above, note 11] 278) are particularly apt and invite further investigation.

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⁷⁹ Motte (above, note 14) 208–12.

Asserting Eternal Providence: Theodicy in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*

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On the last occasion when I had the good fortune to read E. R. Dodds' famous essay, "On Misunderstanding the *Oedipus Rex*",¹ I felt certain misgivings at some of his conclusions. Dodds, it will be remembered, is denouncing a view that he discovered in some undergraduate essays on the question, "In what sense, if in any, does the *Oedipus Rex* attempt to justify the ways of God to man?" The offending view² holds that "we get what we deserve,"³ that is, that Oedipus in some measure merits his suffering. Dodds' position in answer to this has an ethical aspect (Oedipus has an "essential moral innocence"⁴), a religious one (Sophocles' "gods are [not] in any human sense just"⁵) and a literary-critical one ("there is no reason at all why we should require a dramatist—even a Greek dramatist—to be for ever running about delivering banal 'messages'"⁶). Many have anticipated Dodds

¹ E. R. Dodds, "On Misunderstanding the *Oedipus Rex*," *G&R* 13 (1966) 37–49 = *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford 1973) 64–77, cited henceforth as Dodds. The article has been cited frequently and anthologised at least twice, in M. J. O'Brien (ed.), *Twentieth Century Interpretations of Oedipus Rex* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1968) 17–29 and H. Bloom (ed.), *Modern Critical Interpretations: Sophocles' Oedipus Rex* (New York 1988) 35–47.

A version of this paper was read at Concordia University in Montreal on March 4, 1991. I am grateful for much helpful criticism and advice to the audience on that occasion as well as to Christopher G. Brown, Gloria D'Ambrosio-Griffith, Emmet Robbins, Ruth Scodel and the editors of *ICS*, whose kind assistance in no way implies that they assent to the view expressed here.

² Dodds identifies and refutes two further views (that the *OT* is a tragedy of fate and that Sophocles, as a pure artist, does not concern himself with morality or religion at all), which, since they are mutually exclusive of the view I support, I join him in rejecting.

³ Dodds 37 = 64.

⁴ Dodds 42 = 69.

⁵ Dodds 47 = 75.

⁶ Dodds 45 = 73. Dodds holds a similar view of Aesch. *Eum.*; he wrote in "Morals and Politics in the *Oresteia*," in *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (above, note 1) 47–48: "Nearly everyone agrees . . . that there is a political point here; but after a century of controversy there is still no agreement on what the point is. I believe myself that this is

in his position⁷ and others have followed him,⁸ with very few dissenting.⁹ This position is consonant with the emotional reaction of anyone watching or reading the play. Our sympathies are with Oedipus: We feel terror and pity at his plight and this makes us want him to be innocent and his persecutor, Apollo, to be unaccountably vicious. This emotional reaction is important, because Greek tragedy is an emotional medium.¹⁰

Tragedy is also, however, an intellectual art-form and the intellectual clarification of the concepts of terror and pity is arguably as much a part of tragic catharsis as is any psychological purgation through terror and pity.¹¹ As well as feeling for Oedipus, we must analyze his situation. Texts contemporary with Sophocles suggest that, while feeling about the play much as we do, many members of its original audience would have questioned Dodds' analysis. Oedipus has no essence beyond what we can infer from the deeds that he performs and, of these, Sophocles' contemporaries will have found some morally innocent and others not. Apollo's actions, meanwhile, will have seemed to them to be just in an all-too-human sense. The present article is devoted to the analysis of the roles of Oedipus and Apollo in the play along lines suggested by fifth-century thought.

I

Beyond doubt, Oedipus suffers greatly in Sophocles' play. He has been living in a state of incest and he blinds himself in order to be unable to see the children conceived in pollution (lines 1273-74, 1369-90). He is undoubtedly not responsible for his incest and the pain that he experiences is innocent suffering. The presence of this innocent suffering explains our sympathy for his actions, but should not cloud our analysis of them.

If there is any additional suffering that Oedipus has merited, it must be because he has done something. He is not likely punished for a character-

exactly what the poet would have wished: he was writing a political play, yes; but a propagandist play, no."

⁷ Of these, Dodds mentions (38 = 65) especially U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Excursus zum Oedipus des Sophokles," *Hermes* 34 (1899) 55-80 = *Kleine Schriften* VI 209-33. He also (42 = 69) sees similarities between his view and those of Whitman, Waldo, Letters, Ehrenberg, Knox and Kirkwood.

⁸ R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: An Interpretation* (Cambridge 1980) 203, and R. D. Dawe, *Sophocles. Oedipus Rex* (Cambridge 1982) 4-5.

⁹ The view that Oedipus is guilty is expressed by P. H. Vellacott, "The Guilt of Oedipus," *G&R* 11 (1964) 137-48, and A. Cameron, *The Identity of Oedipus the King* (New York 1968) 133.

¹⁰ See W. B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions* (London 1983), who cites bibliography at 174-76, to which add M. M. Kokolakis, "Greek Drama: the Stirring of Pity," in J. H. Betts et al. (edd.), *Studies in Honour of T. B. L. Webster* I (Bristol 1986) 170-78, and M. Heath, *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (London 1987) 5-36.

¹¹ L. Golden, "The Clarification Theory of *Katharsis*," *Hermes* 104 (1976) 437-52.

flaw,¹² because not all tragic heroes suffer a *hamartia*, which is in any case more likely an ignorance of fact than a moral flaw,¹³ and because actions and not character-traits cause things to happen in Greek tragedy.¹⁴

Oedipus does only one thing on stage: He "pursue[s] the truth at whatever personal cost," and "accept[s] and endure[s] it when found."¹⁵ This is shown by the moment (1170) when he pauses in his course of action, having realized its implications, and chooses to follow Delphi's command and implicate himself by pursuing the truth. This moment recalls that in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers* (899–903) where Orestes pauses briefly and then immediately chooses to follow Delphi's command and kill his mother. But this very self-prosecution points backward in condemnation to an earlier act, namely Oedipus' murder of his father Laius.

The murder of Laius might justify part of Oedipus' suffering, since it is a deed and not a character-flaw and since it not only precedes but also paves the way for his suffering.¹⁶ Laius' death makes Jocasta a widow, and so enables Oedipus to marry her¹⁷ and reside in Thebes; the residence of the regicide in Thebes, in turn, causes the plague (106–07) that sets in motion the plot. Still, small causes can provoke disproportionately large effects and our question remains.

The crime of parricide has two components: homicide and father-abuse. The play enforces this distinction: The quests for Laius' killer and for Oedipus' father remain separate for most of it, not merging until the recognition-scene (1182–85). Let us examine the crime under these two headings, beginning by considering the murder of Laius in the context of fifth-century Athenian law. This is relevant, given Greek tragedy's tendency to anachronism,¹⁸ the audience's familiarity with the Athenian judicial

¹² Dodds 38–39 = 66.

¹³ On this question, see especially J. M. Bremer, *Hamartia* (Amsterdam 1969), T. C. W. Stinton, "Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy," *CQ* 25 (1975) 221–54 = *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1990) 143–85, and S. Halliwell, *Aristotle's Poetics* (London 1986) 202–37.

¹⁴ On the general preference for plot over character, see S. Goldhill, "Character and Action, Representation and Reading: Greek Tragedy and its Critics," in C. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1990) 100–27, who cites bibliography at 111 n. 32. On character in Sophocles, see P. E. Easterling, "Character in Sophocles," *G&R* 24 (1977) 121–29.

¹⁵ Dodds 48 = 76.

¹⁶ Dodds 39 = 66.

¹⁷ There are no grounds on which to assess Oedipus' guilt or innocence in the case of his incest, for incest was not formally illegal at Athens; see A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens I: The Family and Property* (Oxford 1968) 22 n. 3, and M. Broadbent, *Studies in Greek Genealogy* (Leiden 1968) 155. This is of little moment, since incest is obviously a violation of motherhood, which the Greeks held in high esteem (see A. H. Sommerstein, *Aeschylus. Eumenides* [Cambridge 1989] ad 657–66) and apparently constituted a pollution (R. Parker, *Miasma* [Oxford 1983] 97–98).

¹⁸ B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley 1964) 58–59, P. E. Easterling, "Anachronism in Greek Tragedy," *JHS* 105 (1985) 1–10.

apparatus and the probability that the play draws heavily for its structure on the process of judicial inquiry.¹⁹

Classical Athenian jurisprudence recognizes three kinds of killing²⁰ and different scholars have classified Laius' murder under all three. The first is the unintentional killing of an innocent victim (what we would call "manslaughter"). The hero of *Oedipus at Colonus* claims unintentionality to defend himself from the charge of parricide (273, 547–48, 988–99). Yet if Oedipus did not know that Laius was his father, he knew that he was a human being and that his act was homicide, in contrast to Deianira who could (but, interestingly, does not) plead unintentional killing, having administered a poison believing it to be a love-potion.

The second kind is justified homicide (which has no equivalent in American jurisprudence), which is the intentional killing of a criminal caught in the act. The best-known example is the killing of an adulterer apprehended *in flagrante delicto*,²¹ but another is the killing of a highwayman caught red-handed.²² Oedipus does not claim to have thought that Laius was a robber.²³ Indeed, according to the admittedly none-too-factual report of Laius' surviving slave, Laius and company suspected Oedipus of intending to rob them (122), as he does in Euripides' version.²⁴

The third kind is intentional homicide (ordinary murder). Self-defense²⁵ was a mitigating circumstance in a case of intentional homicide, rather than grounds for lawful homicide.²⁶ Demosthenes (21. 71–75) tells how a certain Euaeon, who killed a man in retaliation for a single blow, was convicted by one vote. This case shows that, despite the considerable sympathy that the jury obviously felt for the killer, "the mere fact that the victim struck the first blow was not sufficient to acquit the killer."²⁷ One must show that the victim intended to kill the murderer. Yet Oedipus does not argue self-defense,²⁸ claiming, as he would have to do, that Laius was

¹⁹ R. Garner, *Law and Society in Classical Athens* (London 1987) 103–04, and R. G. Lewis, "The Procedural Basis of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*," *GRBS* 30 (1989) 41–66; cf. G. Greiffenhagen, "Der Prozess des Ödipus," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 147–76.

²⁰ See D. M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 113–18.

²¹ I.e. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ, e.g. Lys. 1.

²² Ἐν ὁδῷ καθελόν, Dem. 23. 53; cf. Aeschin. 1. 91.

²³ M. Gagarin, "Self-Defense in Athenian Homicide Law," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 111–20, at 118 n. 32, pace Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 = 209.

²⁴ Eur. *Phoen.* 44–45. Even in Euripides' version the robbery is incidental to the murder and is not the motive for it.

²⁵ Ἀμυνόμενος ἄρχοντα χειρῶν ἀδίκων, Lys. 4. 11, Dem. 23. 50, 47. 7, Isoc. 20. 1, Pl. *Leg.* 869d, Arist. *Rhet.* 2. 24. 9 (= 1402a), Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 4. 9.

²⁶ Gagarin (above, note 23) *passim*.

²⁷ Gagarin (above, note 23) 117.

²⁸ As is claimed by Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 = 209, J. T. Sheppard, *The Oedipus Tyrannus of Sophocles* (Cambridge 1920) xxix, and C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 165.

about to kill him,²⁹ stating in fact that on this occasion³⁰ Laius wanted only to drive him from the road (805). Moreover, according to Plato (*Leg.* 869b)—who may or may not be reflecting Attic law—parent-murder is the only crime in which self-defense is not an extenuating circumstance.

One might suppose that Oedipus' act was a third-degree murder, since he acted without malice aforethought (807),³¹ and that he was guilty of something less than premeditated homicide, but this claim would ignore fifth-century Attic law, which reserves no special category for homicide that is intentional but unpremeditated. "[T]he Athenians used [the terms] 'unpremeditated' and 'unintentional' interchangeably . . . [T]he practical effect of this was to narrow unintentional homicides to our category of accidental killings. This meant that all other killings were classified as intentional and were subject to the severest penalties. Sudden killings thus received no more lenient treatment than any other intentional killings unless some justification such as self-defence could be shown"³² (which in Oedipus' case, as we have seen, it could not).

Again, one might argue that, whatever the judgement of a hypothetical fifth-century court, the heroic society in which Oedipus is imagined as having lived would have "acquitted" him. Not so. In Homer and Hesiod a murderer faces one of three penalties. He may either be killed by the victim's family,³³ or go into exile,³⁴ or offer monetary compensation.³⁵ Only two of the murders mentioned in epic are not followed by such an atonement: One is the murder of Laius; the other is Heracles' murder of Iphitus.³⁶ When Sophocles recounts the latter (*Trach.* 38, 270–79) he supplies the penalty, exile, that is missing in Homer's account. Given Sophocles' supplement to this story, Oedipus stands alone among epic murderers³⁷ in escaping human retribution. We do not know why this is so

²⁹ Not even in the *OC* does he make this claim explicitly, although he says παθὼν μὲν ἀντιέδρων (271), which implies reciprocity. Mekler's emendation (accepted by Jebb) at 547, καὶ γὰρ ἄν, οὓς ἐφόνευσ' ἔμ' ἀπώλεσαν, has Laius intent on murder, but the MSS read καὶ γὰρ ἄλλους ἐφόνευσα κάπωλεσα, which is capable of a wide variety of reconstructions, of which Mekler's is by no means the most obvious.

³⁰ For Laius had, of course, wanted to kill him when he exposed him years before, a point to which we shall return.

³¹ Δι' ὀργῆς. This is but the last occurrence of ὀργή and related words in the play, the others being at 335, 337, 339, 344, 345, 364, 405 and 524.

³² W. T. Loomis, "The Nature of Premeditation in Athenian Homicide Law," *JHS* 92 (1972) 86–95, at 93.

³³ *Od.* 1. 35–43, 3. 309–10, 11. 422–30.

³⁴ *Il.* 2. 661–70, 13. 694–97, 15. 431–39, 16. 572–76, 23. 85–90, 24. 480–83, *Od.* 13. 259–75, 14. 380–81, 15. 271–82, [Hes.] *Aspis* 9–19, 80–85, Hes. fr. 257 Merkelbach–West.

³⁵ Ποινῇ: *Il.* 9. 633, 18. 497–508.

³⁶ Laius: *Od.* 11. 271–80; Iphitus: *Od.* 21. 24–30.

³⁷ There are other murderers known to Greek myth as we find it in Apollodorus who make no compensation or purification for murder and these are listed by Parker (above, note 17) 375, sections 2 and 3.

in the epics, but Sophocles supplies an explanation: The Thebans were too distracted by the Sphinx to investigate the murder and try the killer (130–31). Although postponed by the Sphinx, punishment was as fitting for Laius' killer as for any other. This is why the oracle orders the murderer's exile (98) and why Oedipus pronounces this sentence upon him (236–43).

The audience's appreciation of Oedipus' act was conditioned by the precepts of ancient Greek popular morality.³⁸ For example, Laius' murder occurred at a crossroads (716, 730, 733, 800–01), an important fact since it is a constant in the myth, while the precise location is variable.³⁹ The crossroads is a place where a decision must be made, as in the story of the choice of Heracles.⁴⁰ As in that story, the alternatives confronting Oedipus were as much moral as directional: By turning one way, he would kill four strangers; either by retreating (an option available to Oedipus, but not to Heracles) or by deviating temporarily from his chosen path, he would spare them.

Three considerations make clear the judgement that morality passes upon these alternatives. Firstly, since Laius was trying to push Oedipus from the road (804–05), which was narrow (1399), and since there was another path available, one party should step aside. According to Homer (*Il.* 9. 69, 160–61), one should yield to the kinglier, that is, to him who commands more men,⁴¹ and to the elder. The old might defer to the young of higher rank, but with both age and rank⁴² on his side one would expect deference and try to exact it if not forthcoming. Laius (a king) is actually kinglier than Oedipus (a king's son) and obviously so, travelling in a mule-car (753, 803)⁴³ with a retinue, while Oedipus goes alone on foot.⁴⁴ In the

³⁸ I shall henceforth use the term "morality" as a shorthand for "ancient Greek popular morality."

³⁹ Cf. Aesch. fr. 387a Radt. On this fragment, see G. O. Hutchinson, *Aeschylus. Septem Contra Thebas* (Oxford 1985) xix–xx. The crossroads (of unspecified location) are mentioned again in Sen. *Oed.* 278, 772.

⁴⁰ Pind. *Pyth.* 11. 38, Theogn. 911–12, Prodicus apud Xen. *Mem.* 2. 1. 21–34 (= 84 B 2 Diels–Kranz), Hdt. 1. 11. 2, Pl. *Leg.* 799c. Beyond its empirical demonstrability, recent readers of the play are reminded of this fact by the commentary of Dawe (above, note 8) 3, a scholar scarcely given to rash interpretative conjecture. See, too, S. Halliwell, "Where Three Roads Meet: A Neglected Detail in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*," *JHS* 106 (1986) 187–90, at 189.

⁴¹ Agamemnon, of whom the word βασιλεύτερος is used in comparison with Achilles, commands one hundred ships to Achilles' fifty (*Il.* 2. 576, 685). See R. Drews, *Basileus* (New Haven 1983), A. G. Geddes, "Who's Who in 'Homeric' Society?," *CQ* 34 (1984) 17–36, esp. 28–36, and T. Rihill, "Kings and Commoners in Homeric Society," *LCM* 11 (1986) 89–91.

⁴² E.g. *Od.* 2. 14, Tyrt. fr. 12. 37 West, Theogn. 935–36.

⁴³ In addition to its usefulness for cartage, an ἀπήνη is the appropriate vehicle for conveyance on a ceremonial occasion; see H. L. Lorimer, "The Country Cart of Ancient Greece," *JHS* 23 (1903) 132–51, esp. 136–37. Nor is it merely the tool of rustics: A ἄμαξα drawn by mules was not beneath Priam's dignity (*Il.* 24. 266–74) and the ἀπήνη

parallel incident in the *Iliad* (1. 188–92), when Achilles is provoked by Agamemnon, who is both kinglier and elder, he contemplates homicide, revealing that the course actually chosen by Oedipus is not unnatural, but then wisely abstains from violence. Laius was also clearly older than Oedipus, for his hair was “a sable silver’d” (742) and Oedipus calls him “elder” (805, 807), not necessarily an old man, but a senior figure⁴⁵ deserving of respect. Oedipus should not have quarrelled with Laius, not because he might be his father,⁴⁶ but because morality demanded respect for elders.⁴⁷

Secondly, Laius was a stranger (813), whom it is wrong to kill,⁴⁸ for “all strangers are in the keeping of Zeus” (*Od.* 6. 207–08 = 14. 57–58) in his capacity as Zeus of Strangers.⁴⁹ Indeed, some may even be Zeus incognito.⁵⁰ These beliefs are grounded in social reality: The stranger lacks brotherhood, law and hearth (*Il.* 9. 63) and is very vulnerable. To limit this vulnerability and prevent a breakdown of society, the Greeks ritualized the behaviour proper toward strangers. When a stranger presents himself at one’s house, he must be entertained no matter how inconvenient (cf. Eur. *Alc.* 476 ff.). Even in battle one should not attack a man of unknown identity lest he be a god.⁵¹ The proper behaviour of strangers meeting as wayfarers is shown in the *Iliad*, where Priam, the old man, travelling away from home with his herald encounters the unrecognized young man, his surrogate son, who is Hermes in disguise, and whom he suspects of being a brigand.⁵² In contrast to Oedipus, Hermes is a paragon of courtesy.⁵³ To

was used as a vehicle for competition in the Olympic games (cf. Pind. *Ol.* 5, 6). Contrast the Near Eastern attitude to the mule as shown by Zechariah 9. 9 and Matthew 21. 5.

⁴⁴ The king has naturally undertaken a mission to Delphi himself, rather than delegating it; cf. Pind. *Ol.* 6. 37–38. No motive for the mission is given or necessary in the play.

⁴⁵ Dawe (above, note 8) ad 805.

⁴⁶ As Vellacott (above, note 9) 140 argues.

⁴⁷ E.g. Ar. *Nub.* 993, Pl. *Resp.* 412c, 465a, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 2. 10.

⁴⁸ See J. Gould, “*Hiketeia*,” *JHS* 93 (1973) 74–103, at 90–94.

⁴⁹ *Il.* 13. 624–25, *Od.* 9. 270–71, 14. 283–84. W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, trans. J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA 1985) 130.

⁵⁰ *Od.* 17. 483–87, *Ov. Met.* 1. 212–13, 8. 611–724; cf. Acts 14. 12. A. S. Hollis, *Ovid. Metamorphoses Book VIII* (Oxford 1970) 108–09 and *Callimachus. Hecale* (Oxford 1990) 341–54.

⁵¹ *Il.* 6. 119–236. This is a special case, since Glaucus and Diomedes are connected by earlier ties of family; but then so too were Oedipus and Laius, if they had only bothered to stop and find this out.

⁵² Old man: γέρων *Il.* 24. 358, 361, 368, like the πρέσβυς Laius, *OT* 805, 807; travelling away from home: *Il.* 24. 481; herald: *Il.* 24. 282, 352, again like Laius, *OT* 753; young man: κοῦρος *Il.* 24. 347; son: *Il.* 24. 362, 371 with C. W. MacLeod’s note (*Homer. Iliad XXIV* [Cambridge 1982] ad 362, “Hermes becomes something like Hector to Priam, both as his defender and as his good ‘son’”); cf. Oedipus’ unrecognized filiation; brigand: *Il.* 24. 355–57, like Oedipus, *OT* 122.

⁵³ The particular relevance of this story to my argument was pointed out to me by Emmet Robbins.

murder strangers is extreme barbarity, fit for Laestrygonians or Cyclopes, each of whom is a law to himself and cares nothing for others (*Od.* 9. 112–15), but unthinkable to a civilized Greek. Of potentially ironic application to Oedipus is Hesiod's observation (*Op.* 327–32) that whoever harms a stranger is as bad as a father-abuser.

Thirdly, Laius was accompanied by a herald (753), recognizable as such (802), presumably through his caduceus.⁵⁴ The herald accompanied him because he was an "envoy sent to consult the oracle"⁵⁵ (114) on official religious and state business. Oedipus at first "[forebore] to strike the sacred herald"⁵⁶—whom he does eventually kill—because heralds are inviolable.⁵⁷ To violate their rights was "sacrilegious";⁵⁸ to kill them was to break the customs of all men.⁵⁹ Herodotus (7. 133–37) tells how the Spartans killed Dareius' heralds and were incited by the hero Talthybius, in life the herald of Agamemnon, to send men to Xerxes to die to expiate the crime. Xerxes refused to act illegally like the Spartans; yet, although he spared them, their sons later died, Herodotus editorializes, in requital for Talthybius' wrath. Once, whenever Athenian youths assembled they wore mourning for the herald Copeus whom the Athenians had killed (Philostr. *VS* 2. 1. 5 = 2. 59 Kayser). An Athenian herald murdered by the Megarians was buried with full honours at the Dipylon gate while his murder caused enmity between the two states.⁶⁰

Three arguments, all inadequate, might be raised in Oedipus' favour. The first is that he did not choose to kill Laius because, unlike Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigeneia (Aesch. *Ag.* 206–17), his deliberation is not reported. Lacking on his lips is "the characteristic cry of the tragic hero,"⁶¹ "What should I do?"⁶² Yet this is a feature of his character, not of his situation. The only one to hesitate in our play is Creon (91–92, 1443);

⁵⁴ So R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles. Oedipus Tyrannus*² (Cambridge 1887) ad 804–12.

⁵⁵ See C. P. Bill, "Notes on the Greek *θεωρός* and *θεωρία*," *TAPA* 32 (1901) 196–204.

⁵⁶ Jebb (above, note 54) ad 804–12.

⁵⁷ See L. M. Wéry, "Le meurtre des hérauts de Darius en 491 et l'inviolabilité du héraut," *AC* 35 (1966) 468–86. The relevance of this evidence to the case of Oedipus has been noted by A. D. Fitton Brown in a review of W.-H. Friedrich, *Vorbild und Neugestaltung*, *CR* 19 (1969) 307–09, at 308.

⁵⁸ Ἀσεβές, Dem. 12. 4.

⁵⁹ Hdt. 7. 136. 2. A Euripidean chorus cries μή πρὸς θεῶν κήρυκα τολμήσης θενεῖν, *Heracl.* 271.

⁶⁰ Plut. *Per.* 30. 3, Dem. 12. 4. Oedipus, who killed a man engaged in a *theoria*, will easily insult a seer (386–89; cf. his insulting of the Pythia, 964–65), since that is a relatively common form of disrespect for the gods' servants (cf. *Il.* 1. 106, 12. 231–50, *Soph. Ant.* 1033–38).

⁶¹ A. F. Garvie, *Aeschylus. Choephoroi* (Oxford 1986) ad 899.

⁶² τί δράσω; Aesch. *Cho.* 899, *Soph. Phil.* 908, *Eur. Alc.* 380; cf. Aesch. *Suppl.* 379–80, *Ag.* 206–07, *Soph. Aj.* 457, Hdt. 1. 11. 3–4, *Eur. Med.* 502, *Ar. Vesp.* 319a (paratragic). See further R. L. Fowler, "The Rhetoric of Desperation," *HSCP* 91 (1987) 5–38.

Oedipus is full of Sophoclean self-assurance, impatient at others' slowness (74, 287, 1162) and always quick to jump to a suspicion (124–25, 139–40, 380–89). More quick-witted than Agamemnon, he will not laboriously deliberate before choosing the wrong course; it is his particular glory to rush “with characteristic decisiveness”⁶³ into actions whose outcome is ruinous.

Secondly, Oedipus was provoked. Laius was rude to him and seems by nature to share his temperament as well as his looks (743), as we would expect of kings, who laid great store by heredity.⁶⁴ Morality, far from counselling one to turn the other cheek, commands vengeance: Helping friends and harming enemies is the oft-cited recipe for justice.⁶⁵ Still, the vengeance exacted by Oedipus exceeds the wrong done. Oedipus says, “[Laius] paid no equal penalty” (810),⁶⁶ a phrase reminiscent of the herald in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* (532–33), who says that the Trojans “do not boast that they wrought more than they suffered.” This reminiscence is ominous in view of the consequences that Agamemnon’s excessive vengeance had for him. Of course, in all self-defense killings the victim gets more than he gave,⁶⁷ but this is only because he is less successful; in terms of intent the acts are equal, with one killing in order to avoid being killed. Yet by Oedipus’ own admission Laius only sought to remove him from the road (804–05). On this point again morality suggests that the vengeance should fit the offense, being equal to instead of greater than the crime,⁶⁸ a principle enunciated by Antigone (Soph. *Ant.* 927–28). If equality of retribution was not an absolute standard of morality, the Greeks were at least sensitive to the problems inherent in excessive retaliation (cf. Soph. fr. 589 Radt). This is clear in the present passage where the escalating violence spirals rapidly out of control: Laius and his servant drive Oedipus away, perhaps using only words (804–05); Oedipus responds with a blow, evidently of his fist (806–07); Laius is then the first to use a weapon, coming down upon Oedipus’ head with an ox-goad (807–09); Oedipus finally kills them all with a deadlier weapon, his staff (811–13).

Why, then, mention the provocation at all? (It is not in earlier or later accounts.⁶⁹) The reason is that neither here nor anywhere else did Sophocles

⁶³ Bowra (above, note 28) 190.

⁶⁴ Cf. Neoptolemus in Soph. *Phil.*, who shares the nature of the father he has never known.

⁶⁵ E.g. *Ant.* 641–44. M. W. Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* (Cambridge 1989) 26–59.

⁶⁶ Οὐ μὴν ἴσθιν γ’ ἔτεισεν. Thus Bowra (above, note 28) 164 is wrong to say, “Laius was the aggressor and got what he deserved”; by Oedipus’ own admission he got *more* than he deserved.

⁶⁷ Gagarin (above, note 23) 118 n. 32.

⁶⁸ ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα, Hdt. 1. 2. 1.

⁶⁹ Earlier accounts: *Od.* 11. 273, *Pind. Ol.* 2. 38–39; later accounts: cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 37–44, in which Oedipus is provoked, but not by Laius.

portray an irredeemably evil man. Faced with a dilemma, he chooses a crime that he would never have gone out of his way to commit.

Thirdly, it will be argued that no one censures Oedipus for murder as murder (as distinct from regicide and parricide). On a strict application of the principle that what is not mentioned in the play does not exist (schol. *Il.* 5. 385d), such censure must be impossible. The answer to this lies in the play's structure. The rapid movement of the play between two distinct questions, the public one of who killed Laius (106–07) and the private worry of Oedipus over his parents' identity (437, 779–93, 1017), allows no time for the identity of Oedipus' victims to be raised in its own right. If a third question arises at all it is the red herring of whether one can foreknow the future (720–22, 945–49, 981–82). Oedipus reveals to Jocasta and the audience his past, apparently for the first time,⁷⁰ only when the play is half over (813), and in the context of the distracting search for Laius' killer.

If Oedipus chose to kill the old man and his act was no mere accident or reflex, what was his motive? None is explicit in the text, which gives an account remarkable for its succinctness (813); we must infer one from Oedipus' character.⁷¹ Oedipus, exemplary in so many respects, is led to his crime because he has the Sophoclean hero's impulsive incapacity to yield,⁷² as when he ignores the pleas of his wife and herdsman to stop his investigation (1060–61, 1165).⁷³ Read this trait as hubris⁷⁴ or heroism; it keeps him from yielding to the old man and thence leads him to murder. "Character is destiny."⁷⁵

If Oedipus is unquestionably guilty of murder, we must turn to the question of whether he is guilty of the other component of parricide, harming his father. Oedipus does harm his father and this was a grave offense,⁷⁶ but he never would have done so knowingly, having taken elaborate, if futile, steps to avoid it. Therefore, he could⁷⁷ defend himself by saying that he did not know that Laius was his father. One can act in ignorance and still bear some blame according to Pittacus of Mytilene. He enacted a law that one be fined double for an offense committed while

⁷⁰ This seems to be the implication of 771–73 and of the phrase καὶ σοί, γύναι, τάλιηθές ἐξερῶ (800).

⁷¹ Dodds 38–41 = 66–68 ridicules the scrutiny of character, but I would argue that much of this scrutiny has been rather insufficiently focused than misdirected.

⁷² See Knox (above, note 18) 15–16.

⁷³ He does yield once in the play, with great reluctance, at 669–72, when he spares Creon in response to the combined pleas of Jocasta and the chorus.

⁷⁴ Some scholars such as Winnington-Ingram (above, note 8) have tried to have an Oedipus at once arrogant (183) and innocent (203).

⁷⁵ Heraclitus 22 B 119 Diels-Kranz, quoted by Winnington-Ingram (above, note 8) 177.

⁷⁶ Hes. *Op.* 331–32, Theogn. 821–22, Aesch. *Eum.* 269–71, Ar. *Ran.* 147–50.

⁷⁷ As he does in Soph. *OC* 273, 547–48, 988–99.

drunk.⁷⁸ This law was not designed to discourage drunkenness,⁷⁹ or he would have outlawed wine, but rather, as Aristotle approvingly explains, because one is culpable of a crime committed in ignorance, if this ignorance arises through negligence.⁸⁰ Oedipus' abuse of his father is an extraordinary example of such a crime.

One would not have thought Oedipus negligent in harming his father. Indeed, his abandoning of his comfortable life in Corinth to embark upon the wandering that brought him to Thebes seems the opposite of negligence. Nevertheless, Oedipus was negligent in remaining ignorant of his father's identity, having been led into this negligence again by his impulsive character. He made the trek to Delphi to learn who his parents were and upon hearing that he was destined to defile them, he immediately abandoned the object of his journey, for the oracle manifestly did not resolve it (788–89), raising instead the separate (789) issue of parricide and incest, and set off to flee Corinth. Far from distracting him from his parents' identity as it did,⁸¹ the oracle's response made it imperative that he pursue just this quest. As a distant second best, he might have contemplated a life of non-violence and celibacy⁸² rather than murdering the first people whom he met and marrying in the first city to which he came. The failure to consult the oracle further is an essential ingredient in his downfall and shifts the blame onto his own shoulders, as is shown by Sophocles' friend (cf. Soph. fr. 5 West *IEG*) Herodotus.⁸³ Herodotus tells how Croesus, having received the oracle that if he attacked Persia, he would destroy a mighty empire, caused his own misfortune by attacking without first determining which empire was meant (Hdt. 1. 91. 4). Delphi addressed a similar rebuke in like circumstances to the children of Heracles (290 Parke–Wormell = L63 Fontenrose). While repeated consultation of an oracle might seem an improbable pestering of the god, myth records many examples of just this phenomenon.⁸⁴ Like that of Croesus and the Heraclids, Oedipus' ignorance results from his negligence in failing either to understand Apollo's warning or to inquire further about a question that the oracle had just shown to be crucial. In this regard, Creon is an important foil, showing constant reliance upon Delphi (603, 1442–43).

⁷⁸ Diog. Laert. 1. 76, Ar. *Pol.* 2. 9. 9 (= 1274b), *Rhet.* 2. 25. 7 (= 1402b).

⁷⁹ Pace Diog. Laert.

⁸⁰ Δι' ἀμέλειαν, Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 3. 5. 8–9 (= 1113b–14a).

⁸¹ He acts as though he knew that Polybus and Merope were undoubtedly his parents; cf. 826–27.

⁸² Which can only with extreme latitude be characterized as “compil[ing] a handlist of all the things he must not do” (Dodds 40 = 68, quoting Waldo); it would be a short list.

⁸³ Sophocles and Herodotus shared views on many topics: e.g. *Ant.* 908–12 = Hdt. 3. 119. 6; *El.* 417–23 = Hdt. 1. 108. 1; *OC* 337–41 = Hdt. 2. 35. 2; *OT* 1528–30 = Hdt. 1. 32. 5; *El.* 62–64 = Hdt. 4. 95; *OC* 1224–27 = Hdt. 7. 46. 3–4.

⁸⁴ 4–5, 43–44, 94–95, 161, 216–21 Parke–Wormell = Q58A–B, Q28–29, Q146–47, Q191A–B, Q7–9 Fontenrose.

There are signs that Oedipus has not been told the truth: the scars on his feet that have always troubled him (1033) and the story of the drunk (780), which may have been widely circulated,⁸⁵ and which Polybus and Merope do not deny outright (783–84). Oedipus, skilled at reading signs, has to his credit noted these and feels the uncertainty of his parentage as an impairment of his intellect (786); it motivates his hundred-kilometre walk on mountain roads from Corinth to Delphi and repeatedly rears its head during his quest for the regicide (437, 779–93, 1017). He elevates his ignorance into his governing principle, acknowledging that he is “the Know-Nothing Oedipus” (397).

This man, who knows of his ignorance, acts not once but repeatedly as though he were privy even to hidden facts, treating the many phantasms of his imagination (124–25, 139–40, 380–89) as though they were manifest revelations (534–35). Likewise at the crossroads he acted—knowingly and yet as though unknowingly—in ignorance, recklessly failing to yield when it was moral and convenient to do so.

In light of these observations, we see that Oedipus is guilty of parricide as well as being an innocent victim of incest. But there is still one point to make in his favour, namely that his fate was unconditionally pre-ordained.⁸⁶ “Sophocles,” writes Dodds, “has provided a conclusive answer to those who suggest that Oedipus could, and therefore should, have avoided his fate. The oracle was *unconditional* . . . And what an oracle predicts is bound to happen.”⁸⁷

While a conditional prediction allows for the play of free will, an unconditional prediction might be supposed to imply predestination. Even on this assumption the prediction does not exonerate Oedipus, for predestination does not, paradoxically, constitute a compulsion. Dodds knows this. His own book, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, made familiar the concept of overdetermination whereby according to early Greek thought an event may be “doubly determined, on the natural and on the supernatural plane.”⁸⁸ We cannot deny this overdetermined status to Oedipus’ act: He killed Laius by free choice, thereby abdicating any claim to essential moral innocence. Oedipus’ act is also determined on the supernatural plane by fate, and the Pythia says so (713),⁸⁹ but fate is an impersonal force, not an

⁸⁵ Depending upon the interpretation of the phrase ὑφείρπε γὰρ πολὺ (786).

⁸⁶ 148, 149 Parke–Wormell = L17, L18 Fontenrose. Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 = 209, Dodds 41 = 69.

⁸⁷ Dodds 41 = 69 (Dodds’ italics).

⁸⁸ *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 31. In the present context he cites, after B. M. W. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven 1957) 39, the case of Peter, who fulfilled Jesus’ prediction that he would deny him (Matthew 26. 34, 74–75) but “did so by an act of free choice” (Dodds 43 = 71). H. D. F. Kitto, *Sophocles: Dramatist and Philosopher* (London 1958) 60 is right in saying, “there was nothing compulsory about the affair at the cross-roads.”

⁸⁹ Cf. [Laius’] μῆριμος υἱός, Pind. *Ol.* 2. 38.

Olympian deity or even a lackey of the gods like the Furies, and it is as binding upon gods as upon mortals (cf. *Il.* 16. 433–61).

Oedipus' unsuccessful attempt to elude his fate has been attributed to hubris,⁹⁰ but he would have invited greater condemnation either by rushing toward Corinth in homicidal and libidinous determination to fulfil the prophecy or by quietly going about his business like some Stoic *avant la lettre*. Moreover, Socrates is not hubristic in trying to disprove Delphi's claim that he is the wisest of men,⁹¹ a less than total faith in the ineluctability of the Pythia's predictions being neither unusual at Athens nor in itself evidence of impiety.

Even apart from overdetermination, Oedipus' fate does not absolve him of blame, since he could have fulfilled it in total innocence. Laius could have "died at the hand of his son" (713) and Oedipus become the "murderer" (793) of his father had he killed him accidentally, for example while hunting or playing javelin or discus (cf. e.g. *Hdt.* 1. 43, *Apollod. Bibl.* 1. 3. 3). One who kills by accident is readily called a "murderer" by a society that denies this name and the consequent legal proceedings neither to animals nor even to inanimate objects (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 57. 4).

Furthermore, an unconditional prediction is not evidence for predestination if time for the agent making the prediction is not an abstract, inexorable forward flow. Consider this example: Suppose I videotape a group of playing children and, before playing back the tape, I state that during the play-session Mary will steal Tom's teddy-bear. My prediction is unconditional and will be brought to pass, and yet I did not compel Mary to act in this way; I may even wish that she had not done so (it has spoiled my movie). I am, in fact, incapable of imposing my will on the children or of removing theirs from them, but I can accurately predict how they will act, because I, unlike them, do not experience time as a chronometric, impersonal medium. If Apollo has a relationship to time like that in this example, he could accurately predict events without ordaining them and he could have such a relationship to time only if Time itself is a free agent, moving forward or backward, quickly or slowly, for the benefit of those whom he would help. According to the Greek conception, such was in fact the nature of Time.⁹² In our play, Time is personified as "the All-seer" (1213).⁹³ The situation in the play is more complex than in the videotape

⁹⁰ J. B. Halsted, "Oedipus, in *Oedipus the King*, Commits Many Serious Errors," *CB* 55 (1979) 73–77, at 77.

⁹¹ *Pl. Ap.* 21a–b (420 Parke–Wormell = H3 Fontenrose).

⁹² J. de Romilly, *Time in Greek Tragedy* (Ithaca 1968) 50 writes, "Even if things are supposed to exist through all eternity and to have been decided regardless of time, it is with time and in time that they come to be. He *uncovers* them." See also P. Vivante, "On Time in Pindar," *Arethusa* 5 (1972) 107–31, who cites bibliography at 130–31, to which add A. M. Kormicka, "La notion du temps chez Pindare," *Eos* 64 (1976) 5–15.

⁹³ This is a title of Zeus (*Aesch. Eum.* 1045, *Soph. OC* 1085) and of Helios (*Aesch. PV* 91; cf. *Il.* 3. 277).

example, because Apollo does not predict the event to a disinterested third party but to the protagonist himself, and Oedipus reacts of his own free will to the god's prediction. Yet such is the nature of fate that any action that Oedipus might have taken in response to any prediction that Apollo might have made would have ended in the same result, albeit brought about by a different chain of intermediary events.

To sum up: By murdering the belligerent stranger, his superior and elder along with his retinue, including the sacred herald, while they were engaged upon official religious and state business, Oedipus violated the prerogatives of Zeus of Strangers, the respect due to superiors and elders, and the principle of fitting retaliation; he is therefore guilty of murder. He knew that he was acting in ignorance and yet behaved as though he did not know this; he is therefore guilty of father-abuse. He was fated to commit his crime, but it cannot be shown that he was compelled to do so, and certainly not in the way in which he did.

II

What, then, of Apollo, who manifests himself in the story of Oedipus (1329)? If Oedipus had been, as the prevailing view holds, essentially morally innocent, then Apollo would have been unjust in allowing him to suffer as he does. Now that we have found Oedipus in fact responsible in some measure for some of the suffering that he incurs, the possibility arises that Apollo's actions may be just. There is no a priori reason to think that they are so; the gods of Greek myth lie, commit adultery, are gluttons. "Men find some things unjust, other things just; but in the eyes of God all things are beautiful and good and just."⁹⁴ Nevertheless, if the actions of Sophocles' Apollo conform to an accepted definition of justice, we should admit that he at least is in that sense a just god.

We have seen that he did not compel Oedipus to kill his father and sleep with his mother, but neither did he try to prevent him from doing so, for example by giving him a straightforward answer to his question concerning his parents. The reason that he did not do so is linked, perhaps, to the fundamental difference of power between god and man. Gods cannot reveal themselves undisguised to men without destroying them;⁹⁵ when they appear incognito they are often recognized only at the end of the encounter and only by the extremity of their body, their feet (*Il.* 13. 71-72, *Verg. Aen.* 1. 405, etc.). This disguise-principle is intensified in connection with verbal communication. Gods have their own language and their own special

⁹⁴ Heraclitus 22 B 102 Diels-Kranz, quoted by Dodds 47 = 76.

⁹⁵ Zeus and Semele: Pind. *Ol.* 2. 25-26, *Eur. Bacch.* 6-12; Yahweh and Moses: *Exodus* 33. 18-23.

intonation.⁹⁶ The inevitable process of translation needed to enable them to communicate with men is complex: At Delphi when "the enquirer entered, the Pythia was already under the influence of Apollo, and was in some abnormal state of trance or ecstasy . . . [Her] answer would vary in its degree of coherence and intelligibility. When it had been given, the prophet would reduce it to some form, and dictate it to the enquirer."⁹⁷ The answer given by this convoluted process was perforce oblique: "The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks nor hides, but gives a sign" (Heraclitus 22 B 93 Diels-Kranz). It is scarcely surprising if the answer was not as straightforward as we would like.

Even so, Apollo does not lie to Oedipus. The cause of Oedipus' extraordinary ignorance of the events attendant upon his birth lies with Polybus and Merope. The drunk at the banquet accused Oedipus of being a supposititious child (780), but this is itself either a lie or an error, for Polybus was privy to the secret (1021). Even at the drunk's false charge the royal couple expresses anger, thereby effectively misleading Oedipus (783–84).⁹⁸ Later, a quick detection of the regicide is prevented by the lone survivor's mendacious description of "many robbers" (122–23).⁹⁹ In both cases humans, not gods, have lied.

Whether we find any justice in Apollo's actions will depend upon our definition of the term. Simonides' definition, cited by Polemarchus in Plato's *Republic*, is "giving back to each person what is owing."¹⁰⁰ So conceived, justice is wholly reactive. It requires one not to initiate any action, but only to respond in kind to the actions of others. It does not require one to help any person (by warning of impending disaster or by any other means) unless one has been helped first by him. True to the Greeks' anthropomorphic conception of the gods, this rule applies to human-god relationships just as to relationships between humans. In the *Iliad*, Apollo helps Chryses because he has roofed many temples for him (*Il.* 1. 39). In

⁹⁶ For their own language, see Hes. *Theog.* 831, for their own intonation, see LSJ s.v. ὄσσα and ὁμῆ. See also C. Watkins, "Language of Gods and Language of Men: Remarks on Some Indo-European Metalinguistic Traditions," in J. Puhvel (ed.), *Myth and Law among the Indo-Europeans* (Berkeley 1970) 1–17, who cites bibliography at 1 nn. 1 and 2, to which add J. Clay, "The Planktai and Moly: Divine Naming and Knowing in Homer," *Hermes* 100 (1972) 127–31, J. Clay, "Demas and Aude: The Nature of Divine Transformation in Homer," *Hermes* 102 (1974) 129–36, and J. Calderón Felices, "Lengua de los dioses—lengua de los hombres," *Faventia* 4.1 (1982) 5–33.

⁹⁷ H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle I: The History* (Oxford 1956) 33.

⁹⁸ Nothing would have prevented Polybus and Merope from openly adopting a child, but, as a foundling (1026), Oedipus cannot be adopted, if Athenian laws are imagined as holding good in Corinth; hence they are forced to lie. See Harrison (above, note 17) 71.

⁹⁹ S. Goodhart, "Ἀγοστὰς Ἐφάσκει: Oedipus and Laius' Many Murderers," *Diacritics* 8 (1978) 55–71, esp. 56 n. 2.

¹⁰⁰ Τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστω ἀποδιδόναι, Pl. *Resp.* 331e = Simonides 642 PMG.

the *Oresteia*, the gods punish Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra in response to their breaking of laws.

According to this conception of justice, Apollo is under no obligation to help Oedipus by warning him of the impending catastrophe, for Oedipus has performed no prior service for him. Yet, once Oedipus has offended the gods by his sacrilegious behaviour at the crossroads, Apollo is obliged to intervene and ensure that the fitting penalty of exile is enforced. He does this through the plague and the oracle to Creon (97); we can also see him at work in the fortuitous arrival of the Corinthian messenger (924) who, again by a striking pseudo-coincidence, is the very man who rescued the infant Oedipus in the first place (1022). Compassionate and comforting Apollo is not, but he is just in this all-too-human sense.

At this point, a further objection might be raised. Given that, from Oedipus' perspective, the murder of Laius is a crime justly punished by his subsequent suffering, is not the same act, when viewed from the perspective of Laius, merely an absurd suffering and, as such, evidence for the wanton cruelty of the gods that negates any other hint of divine justice in the play? When viewed from the perspective of Jocasta, does not the incestuous marriage, discovery of which provoked her suicide, also refute any claims of divine justice? I can meet this objection in two ways: First, Laius was not a wholly innocent bystander at the time of his murder, having actually provoked Oedipus to strike. Second, the suffering of Laius and Jocasta may be construed as punishment for an earlier crime of their own: that in which he "yoked" the feet of the infant Oedipus (718) and she gave the child to a herdsman to kill (1173-74).¹⁰¹

Opinion is divided over whether newborns were commonly exposed in fifth-century Athens.¹⁰² Even if they were, it would be rare to treat a healthy, legitimate, first-born son like Oedipus in this way.¹⁰³ Exposure did

¹⁰¹ H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*² (Berkeley 1983) 121 likewise believes that Laius must deserve his suffering, yet his own solution (that the suffering is provoked by Laius' rape of Chrysippus) violates Aristarchus' rule, "what is not mentioned in the play does not exist," and so is less economical than the view proposed here.

¹⁰² A. Cameron, "The Exposure of Children and Greek Ethics," *CR* 46 (1932) 105-14 and W. V. Harris, "The Theoretical Possibility of Extensive Infanticide in the Graeco-Roman World," *CQ* 32 (1982) 114-16 hold that exposure was common; M. Golden, "Demography and the Exposure of Girls at Athens," *Phoenix* 35 (1981) 316-31 holds that the exposure of girls was common; L. R. van Hook, "The Exposure of Infants at Athens," *TAPA* 51 (1920) 134-45, H. Bolkestein, "The Exposure of Children at Athens and the ἐγχυτρίστριαι," *CP* 17 (1922) 222-39, D. Engels, "The Problem of Female Infanticide in the Greco-Roman World," *CP* 75 (1980) 112-20, and C. Patterson, "'Not Worth the Rearing': The Causes of Infant Exposure in Ancient Greece," *TAPA* 115 (1985) 103-23, are far more sceptical about the frequency of exposure of children of either sex.

¹⁰³ Health: Patterson (previous note) 113-14; legitimacy: *ibid.* 115-16; primogeniture: Cameron (previous note) 106 (cf. Pl. *Theat.* 161c); maleness: Golden (previous note) *passim*. Tyro in one of Sophocles' plays of that name exposed her twins because they were illegitimate. It would of course be rare in real life, if not unparalleled in

not constitute homicide, firstly because the newborn was not a legal person until its adoption into the family during the naming festival, which took place on about the tenth day of life¹⁰⁴ and an unwanted child would be exposed before this time, Oedipus, for example, at three days (717–18), and secondly because the parent did not actually kill the child. Yet, while not criminal, the act was open to moral censure: Oedipus blames his parents for hurting him knowingly, while he committed his crimes in ignorance (Soph. *OC* 273, 547–48, 988–99); the servant saved him out of pity (1178) and Jocasta, thinking of the exposure, calls him “wretched” (855).¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Oedipus’ was no ordinary exposure. Ordinary exposure is not necessarily lethal, thrusting the newborn from the family only, not necessarily from life. All children exposed in myth¹⁰⁶ and, presumably, many in real life were saved and reared as foundlings,¹⁰⁷ for the parents, callous enough to abandon their child, scruple actually to shed its blood. By contrast, Laius and Jocasta, intending actually to kill their son, left him on a trackless mountain (719) where the hope of rescue was slight and took the unprecedented step of maiming him, which both weakened him and made it unlikely that he would be rescued even if found. We note the symmetrical justice in the adult Oedipus’ causing the deaths in fact of the parents who tried to kill him as an infant.

III

Recognition that Oedipus’ guilt and Apollo’s justice are greater than is usually allowed for affects how we understand what—if any—is Sophocles’ message. Sophocles’ gods, like those of Aeschylus, are just in an obvious human sense. It is no longer true, on the basis of this play at least, to speak of “the incomprehensible ways of the divine will” or to hold that “one must not bring in false concepts of human morality involving good and evil.”¹⁰⁸ These are precisely the concepts necessary to understand Apollo’s role in Oedipus’ suffering. It is even less true to say that “what causes his ruin is his own strength and courage, his loyalty to Thebes, and his loyalty

legend (cf. Paris: Apollod. *Bibl.* 3. 12. 5), that a child should be prophesied to kill his father (Soph. *OT* 712–13).

¹⁰⁴ N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 231–34 and Patterson (above, note 102) 105–06.

¹⁰⁵ Golden (above, note 102) 331; cf. Pl. *Theat.* 161a.

¹⁰⁶ On exposure as a motif in myth, see G. Murray, “Ritual Elements in the New Comedy,” *CQ* 37 (1943) 46–54 and D. B. Redford, “The Literary Motif of the Exposed Child,” *Numen* 14 (1967) 209–28.

¹⁰⁷ ὀρεπτοί, Patterson (above, note 102) 121–22.

¹⁰⁸ “Die unerforschlichen Wege des göttlichen Willens”; “man darf nicht durch gut und böse falsche Begriffe menschlicher Sitlichkeit hineinragen,” Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 56 = 210.

to the truth."¹⁰⁹ This is only "[t]he immediate cause"¹¹⁰ of his ruin and the Greeks are far more sensitive than we to ultimate causes, abounding as their myths do in nativities, inventors, aetiologies and even an original sin or two.¹¹¹ This is especially true in a legal context: For example, in Plato's *Apology* (18a-b) Socrates identifies and refutes his "former accusers." Oedipus is himself an aficionado of ultimate causes, beginning with confident relish (132) the seemingly hopeless investigation into the regicide and extrapolating from Teiresias' claim that he, Oedipus, has committed parricide and incest not only an alleged proximate cause (Teiresias has been bribed to say this) but also a putative distant cause (Creon bribed him because he wants the kingship [380-89]). We must never forget the ultimate cause of Oedipus' ruin—the murder at the crossroads come back after all these years (613, 1213) to haunt him.

The profound differences between Aeschylus and Sophocles are not theological and it is difficult to agree with those who find in the god who tells Orestes, "you *must* kill your mother"¹¹² a kinder, gentler Apollo than the god who tells Oedipus, "you *will* kill your father." What is new—and far from comforting—in Sophocles is his assessment, gloomy even by Greek standards, of the limits of human knowledge. The ignorance of Sophoclean characters runs through a broad spectrum: Oedipus mistakes his parents for strangers, homecoming for exile and hereditary kingship for unconstitutional rule; Creon in *Antigone* twice mistakes the priorities of the living for those of the dead;¹¹³ Deianira mistakes a poison for a love-potion; and Ajax mistakes a sheep for Agamemnon. In Sophocles humans deceive one another¹¹⁴ and people act with a self-confidence unwarranted by their feeble grasp of reality. Only once does a god deceive: Athena in *Ajax* (51-52), and her deception, motivated by retribution (762-77), prevents a crime from being committed. It is in his anthropology rather than his theology that the uncompromising quality of Sophocles' world consists.

The function of art, according to Dodds, quoting Dr. Johnson, is "the enlargement of our sensibility."¹¹⁵ This phrase is perhaps too broad to

¹⁰⁹ Dodds 43 = 71.

¹¹⁰ Dodds 43 = 71.

¹¹¹ Nativities: Pind. *Ol.* 1. 26-27, 6. 39-47, 7. 35-38, *Nem.* 1. 35-47; inventors: Pind. *Ol.* 1. 40-45, 7. 42, 13. 17-22, *Pyth.* 2. 32, 4. 217, 12. 6-8 and see A. Kleingünther, "Πρώτος Ευρετής," *Philologus* Suppl. 26 (1933) and K. Thraede, "Das Lob des Erfinders: Bemerkungen zur Analyse der Heuremata-Kataloge," *Rh. Mus.* 105 (1962) 158-86; παρακοπή πρωτοπήμων (Aesch. *Ag.* 223). See B. A. van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past* (Leiden 1953) 122.

¹¹² Aesch. *Cho.* 269-96, 900-02, 953-56, 1029-30, *Eum.* 798-99.

¹¹³ Firstly at *Ant.* 773-80, 1068-71; secondly at 1192-1205.

¹¹⁴ *Aj.* 646-92, *Trach.* 249-90, 569-77, *El.* 680-763, *Phil.* 343-90.

¹¹⁵ Dodds 45, 49 = 74, 77. This curious doctrine of enlarged sensibility was no mere temporary aberration of Dodds' thought, for he had enunciated it years before in *Euripides. Bacchae* (Oxford 1944) xliii = 2nd ed. (1960) xlvii. Dodds does not specify the source of this quotation, but David Sansone has most plausibly suggested to me that it is an

capture the specific virtue of tragic drama. The virtue of tragedy lies elsewhere, in a region suggested by the examination question set by Dodds for his undergraduates, namely, in adding understanding to our spontaneous emotional response, in order to assert eternal providence, and justify the ways of God to men.

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inaccurate quotation from memory of Johnson's *Life of Waller* §139: "From poetry the reader justly expects, and from good poetry always obtains, the enlargement of his comprehension and elevation of his fancy."

Rethinking the History of the Literary Symposium

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and the Members of Greek Seminar 420

In the Spring of 1992 it was my pleasure and privilege to direct at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign a Greek seminar called "Plato and Later Symposiac Literature." Four Greek texts were read in common: Plato's *Symposium*, Xenophon's *Symposium*, Plutarch's *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* and Lucian's *Symposium or The Lapiths*; each member of the seminar was then responsible for the production of a study of a different text within the genre. These latter texts were assigned as follows: Joseph Leichter to Petronius' *Cena Trimalchionis*, Stephen Trzaskoma to Plutarch's *Table Talk*, Eleanor Hardin to Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists*, A.L. Dollmetsh Worley to Methodius' *Banquet of the Ten Virgins*, John Houlihan to the Emperor Julian's *Symposium or Saturnalia* (popularly *Caesars*) and Jennifer MacDonald to Macrobius' *Saturnalia*; I concerned myself with the *Cena Cypriani* and related late classical texts. Timothy Johnson, who has just finished a dissertation on Horace's symposiac poetry, was unable to attend the seminar, but agreed to help us in our revisions with his knowledge of sympotic lyric and Homer. We present here the conclusions that we have reached about the definition of the genre, Plato's place within its history, and the relation of later texts to earlier models; it is, as it were, a potential introduction to a volume, *Collected Ancient Symposia*, that has not yet found its B. P. Reardon. My students have allowed me the general supervision and construction of this essay, along with the free use of the pronoun "I" and reference to my forthcoming book, *Ancient Menippean Satire*; I lean on their expertise not only for the specific authors which were their particular concern but also for their general literary acumen.

NOTE: We will use as a convenient shorthand the adjective "sympotic" to refer to the actual cultural institution which is the symposion, and "symposiac" to refer to the literary genre which is the symposium.¹

¹ This corresponds roughly to the use of the terms employed in O. Murray (ed.), *Symptica* (Oxford 1990) v, as borrowed from Plutarch, *Table Talk* 629d: *Symptica* is the preferred term for talk about the symposion, and *symposiaca* for talk suitable for a symposion.

Some Initial Considerations

That Plato's *Symposium* is to us *the* symposium obscures the fact that it is a very eccentric symposium, whether it is viewed in contrast to those literary symposia that follow it and take it as a model, or in contrast to those contemporary sympotic realities which form the historical background against which we may evaluate the text as a document of social history. Once this is stated, it is perhaps not so surprising; those other few Platonic dialogues which take their names not after characters within them offer strikingly anomalous examples of the things they affect to discuss: Surely the *Apology* is a strange apology, and the *Republic* a strange republic.² Plutarch, who in his *Table Talk* shows his theoretical understanding of the genre (his practice in the *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* is quite different), must constantly make excuses for Plato's divergence in his *Symposium* from sympotic and symposiac norms.³ But what is at issue here is more than whether there are to be flute-girls, symposiarchs and rules for seating: Rather, what most accounts for the difference between the *Symposium* and a symposium is the presence of Socrates. For Socrates is practically by definition an unsympotic character. If the norm for a symposium is egalitarianism, then Plato's hybriatic Socrates is out of place;⁴ if a symposium is a social microcosm, then Socrates can no more be constrained by its boundaries than he can be by those of Athens. And it is surely the case that the topic of the *Symposium* is not Love, but the nature of Socrates himself. A Socratic literary symposium is, if not exactly a contradiction in terms, at least a kind of oxymoron; and those who follow in Plato's footsteps must come to terms with a model whose central character violates the norms of the symposium.

What Alcibiades does to the end of Agathon's symposium later authors do to Plato's *Symposium* as a whole: They remove the straitjacket that was imposed in the name of philosophy, and allow dissentient voices to be heard. As this kind of multiplicity becomes the symposiac ideal, the person of Socrates undergoes some remarkable changes. The problem for the author is how to have a philosophical view endorsed without dragging the

² *Sophist* and *Statesman*, as continuations of *Theaetetus*, are dialogues that seek to define their key terms as character types (*Philosopher* was not written); *Laws* (and its *Addendum*) may be allowed to be unironic.

³ This matter will be discussed more fully below.

⁴ In a sense, this complete egalitarianism is social anarchy, or panarchy; the sympotic society is controlled by everyone and no one. It is now questioned whether equality was a sympotic reality in the Roman world of the patron-client relationship; and there are now suspicions that even in Greek sympotic gatherings some people were allowed a privileged position. J. D'Arms, "The Roman Convivium and the Idea of Equality," in Murray (above, note 1) 308-20, argues that Roman sympotic reality may be much illumined by jettisoning the idea of equality, but also allows that literary symposia may operate along egalitarian lines. The genre, then, obeys literary conventions at some remove from social reality: There are rules of equality, and the violations of these rules are important.

owner of that opinion into the levelling fray. The hero of a symposium is neither narrator nor host: Shall the hero be one in the discussion and bruised by it, or one outside of the discussion and superior to it? Xenophon's Socrates is much more sympotic: He participates in the rough and tumble, makes jokes and is embarrassed, and is much more interested in bodies than in souls.⁵ The question ultimately raised there is whether the ugly Socrates is truly *kalos*; the entertainers who vote say no, but Lycon, his future accuser, says yes, he is *kalos kagathos*. Other authors, not actually putting Socrates on stage, can be more polite in their treatment of the one with superior wisdom. In Plutarch's *Banquet*, he is heard only as a voice off, in the person of the holy man Arion. But as the texts become more motley, he becomes the jester figure (already implicit in Alcibiades' description of him), or the disruptive uninvited guest: The bald and ugly buffoon Satyrion in Lucian (*Symp.* 18) resembles Alcibiades' Socrates in name as well as appearance; further, Lucian's uninvited Cynic is a mildly Socratic version of the veridical Cynics of Athenaeus. In Julian's *Caesars*, Socrates lurks behind the Silenus who insults the emperors; in Martianus' *Marriage*, his drunken antics disrupt the boring speeches at the wedding feast. One may say that Plato's Alcibiades is the other half of Socrates' own self, and that the uninvited disrupter is himself a Socratic figure; Socrates may himself be present in a number of different guises in a single work; as we shall see, these various traditions reassemble themselves in the person of Evangelus in Macrobius' *Saturnalia*, who inspires the conversations by his objections.

Rosen's analysis of the dynamics of the *Symposium* reveals a Socrates on trial for and convicted of hybris; in other words, the *Symposium* points outside of itself, to the death of Socrates, to gain its point and to show the true value of the arguments contained within it.⁶ But what Rosen sees as singular about this one symposium is in fact central to the nature of the whole symposiac genre. What is crucial to a literary symposium is the anticipated death of its main character.⁷ Xenophon's *Symposium* ends with Lycon, one of Socrates' future accusers, calling him a good mensch; Athenaeus sets his *Deipnosophists* just prior to the death of the acidulous Ulpian;⁸ Macrobius' *Saturnalia* antedates Praetextatus' death by only a few

⁵ A nice point made by M. Jeanneret, *A Feast of Words: Banquets and Table Talk in the Renaissance*, transl. J. Whitely and E. Hughes (Chicago 1991) 142.

⁶ S. Rosen, *Plato's Symposium*² (New Haven and London 1987) 21–22: "Both Agathon and Alcibiades present what one may call the private, or more serious version of the public charges against Socrates recorded in the *Apology*: Socrates is accused and condemned of hybris."

⁷ It may be best to say that in the symposium an ancient aspect of the symposion is brought to prominence; namely, that the convivial gathering is both a funeral ritual and a relief from the world of death; consider the surprised reaction of Patroclus when he discovers Nestor and Machaon swapping stories while drinking a healing potion in an impromptu symposion of wounded soldiers at *Iliad* 11. 618–803.

⁸ Athenaeus depicts his least likeable character, Ulpian, thus (385a): "nit-picky Ulpian, who reclined by himself, eating little and scrutinizing the speakers." The aloof attitude, in itself

years. Petronius' Trimalchio, Lucian's Lapiths, Methodius' martyr-to-be Thecla and even Julian himself, about to march to his death in Persia with great foreboding, may be allowed to participate in this tradition; we shall also suggest that the extraordinary Last Supper in John's extraordinary Gospel belongs here as well.

The unsympotic Socrates and the death-centeredness of the symposium are central to the proposed definition of the genre whose history we sketch below. There are three further, related points. First, the symposiac genre must violate sympotic norms in order to function as literature. As a cultural institution, the symposium seeks to create an atmosphere in which individual differences may be aired without fear of embarrassment or reprisal, in which no one person may be allowed an authoritative point of view or an absolute truth, and where all may vie for honor but not at another's expense.⁹ But, as a literary genre, the symposium will generate its plot from tension, conflict and the violation of rules, and will show some key participants trying to gain the upper hand in impolite ways.¹⁰ In this agon, death is never far away, for sympotic order is implicitly imposed on potential disorder, and violence and orgy are the all-too-real inverse of the convivial ideal.¹¹

Second, what better source of conflict than the rules of the ritual? As the *Table Talk* shows, the proper conduct of discussion at a symposium is in fact one of the most important topics of conversation at a symposium, and in all fictional symposia the impulse to reveal these rules which shape the action is very strong.¹² It is crucial that Socrates does not play by the rules

anti-sympotic behavior, identifies Ulpian unpleasantly as the Socratic hero of the *Deipnosophists*.

⁹ O. Murray, "The Greek Symposium in History," in E. Gabba (ed.), *Tria Corda: Scritti in Onore di Arnaldo Momigliano* (Como 1983) 260.

¹⁰ Xenophon is remarkable in making all of his guests enter equally into discussion, even the Syracusan impresario; so too Lucian, whose goal is to criticize all. Plutarch's Seven are only a subset of the guests at Periander's symposium; typically, some characters remain quiet and unsympotic. These include our narrators, who can themselves be abused for their aloofness; Petronius' Encolpius is a good example, but so is Athenaeus' narrator.

¹¹ Hippocleides' dancing at the betrothal feast (Hdt. 6. 128-29) is the most famous example of the fact that symposia preserved by historians are notable precisely for the violation of the sympotic rules of decorum.

¹² R. B. Branham, *Unruly Eloquence* (Cambridge, MA 1989) 110, puts it succinctly: The symposium is "a tradition in which social and literary practices intersect." Plutarch, in *Table Talk* (1. 1), has his characters conclude that, as far as philosophical conversation goes, the tone should not be contentious, the speakers should not go on interminably, nor should the conversation get insipid. The symposium should not become a rhetorical school, a gambling house, or a theater (1. 4). It should be noted that Plutarch raises all sorts of questions about conduct that are not strictly relevant to the question of proper conversation; for example, should wine be strained, and why is it that old men get drunk faster than young men? The laws of conversation are most important for the symposiac genre, for the symposium is more interested in recording ideas as they struggle against the restraints of politeness. Most instructive in this regard is one of Varro's *Menippeans*, the *Nescis quid uesper serus uehat*, which has a comic set of convivial laws, all of which are probably broken in the confusion at the end of the meal which the title portends. These include (cited from Astbury's 1985

of Plato's *Symposium*: Refusing to deliver an encomium, he tries to get Agathon into his elenctic clutches, and then tells his Diotima story; when drinking becomes the rule, he does not get drunk. It is a question of rhythm: Characters are to harmonize.¹³ Third, as a cultural institution, the symposium is aristocratic; sympotic social groups despised commoners, and it is not only such spectacular acts as the mutilation of the herms that make the violent and hybriatic nature of such groups the object of special legislative concern.¹⁴ But Plato deftly reverses this. It is Socrates who is hybriatic, and the Alcibiades who convicts him of this is not just another aristocrat but, as a man of wine and passion, functions as a representative of Athens at large.¹⁵ The popular and democratic voice that overrides the aristocratic and philosophical discussion will live on in many comic ways—the symposium is not sympathetic to philosophers and their abstractions, but will tend to have common sense laugh at squabbling pedants. To be sure, this is a trivialization of the drama of the Platonic *Symposium*, but the elements of the comic symposium are all in place in Plato.

Plato attempts to restrain a symposium, and consequently keeps under pressure a number of centrifugal forces: the catalogue of wise opinions; the presentation of philosophers; the equality of guests; the levelling mechanisms which make discourse possible. It is the explosion of this sealed system that first gives the *Symposium* its drama, and later gives the symposium genre its shape. Parodies will emphasize orgy and violence;¹⁶ imitations will stress heterogeneity rather than homogeneity; excerpters will concentrate on catalogues of wisdom, or of riddles; expanders will place increasingly large catalogues within increasingly fantastic frames; the

Teubner text; italics identify the editorial comments of Aulus Gellius, the source for these fragments): (336) *nec loquaces autem, inquit, conuiuias nec mutos legere oportet, quia eloquentia in foro et apud subsellia, silentium uero non in conuiuio, set in cubiculo esse debet.* (337) *sermones igitur id temporis habendos censet non super rebus anxii aut tortuosos, sed iucundos atque inuitabiles et cum quadam inlecebra et uoluptate utiles, ex quibus ingenium nostrum uenustius fiat et amoenius.* (339) *dominum autem, inquit, in conuiuio esse oportet non tam lautum quam sine sordibus, et* (340) *in conuiuio legi non omnia debent sed ea potissimum, quae simul sint βιωφελῆ et delectent, potius ut id quoque uideatur non defuisse quam superfluisse.* I discuss these fragments at some length in my forthcoming book, *Ancient Menippean Satire*.

¹³ The guests who drink too much and are quarrelsome, those who mindlessly chatter on and on and those who, pretending to some higher moral status, do not truly share in the sympotic activity, are all arrhythmic, unharmonious personalities. On the idea of arrhythmic personalities in symposia, see Ath. 445d, where Pontianus calls Ulpian an arrhythmic drinker, and Lucian *Symp.* 34, in which the narrator describes arrhythmic philosophers who cannot live in harmony with their own learning.

¹⁴ Murray (above, note 9) 268–69.

¹⁵ The madness of wine is seen as an inevitable popular component of symposia in *Laws* 1–2 and in need of tight control; see below, 219–20 and n. 22. As Plutarch says (*Table Talk* 1. 2), the symposium is a democratic institution. So too does Lycon function at the end of Xenophon's *Symposium*, Athens giving Socrates the back-handed compliment that he is beautiful and good, the perfect gentleman (*Symp.* 9. 1).

¹⁶ See Jeanneret (above, note 5) 151, on Lucian's *Lapiths*.

irreconcilability of the many contrasting forces which the social symposium tries to harmonize will make the genre a frequent ally of Menippean satire; its fragmentation into things like riddle books, lists, etc. marks its end.

These aspects of Plato's *Symposium* allow us to draw a line from it through the symposia of late antiquity; placing Plato within the tradition which he inspires has proven a useful way to read his text. Accordingly, what we wish to do in this paper is three-fold: first, to explain from a literary viewpoint the peculiarities of Plato's dialogue *Symposium*, and describe the general processes by which they are transmuted into the symposiac genre; second, to give an accounting of the symposiac genre by defining the characteristics of the general phases of its history and development; and, third, to offer brief accounts of specific late texts, pointing out the ways in which they belong to a complete understanding of the nature of Plato's own provocative work, ending substantially with Macrobius' *Saturnalia*, but allowing some space for consideration of the genre's sparse medieval progeny. In this essay we do not take up the question of the nature of those symposia known to us only in fragments, nor do we address sympotic poetry, the *deipnon*, the sympotic letter, or symposiac *problemata* as literary forms; but the interest recently shown in the phenomenon of the classical Greek symposium, abundantly attested by Slater's *Dining in a Classical Context* and Murray's *Sympotica*, allows us to attempt a brief *Symposiaca* and make a particular sense of a nearly 800-year Greco-Roman prose tradition that was not obvious to earlier literary historians, primarily Ullrich and Martin; a sense which those who restrict their literary interest in the genre to Plato would do well to consider.¹⁷ We are inspired by, but take exception to, the fascinating assessment offered by Jeanneret in his study of Renaissance symposia. Plutarch, Athenaeus and Macrobius are not "mausoleums."¹⁸ Traditions of the Renaissance do allow for fruitful readings and rereadings of the classical texts; we hope here to construct a stronger bridge to lead from ancient to more modern literature.

From Dialogue to Symposiac Genre

By its simplest definition, a literary symposium is a dialogue that takes place at some time in the course of that ancient ritual of dining, drinking and conversation known as the symposion. In other words, it is by form a dialogue; and if we assert that the symposium is a separate genre of literature, we need to define how this setting so influences the dialogue in its structure, and so affects its range of characters and topics, that dialogue is

¹⁷ J. Martin, *Symposion: Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form* (Paderborn 1931), largely superseding F. Ullrich, *Entstehung und Entwicklung der Literaturgattung des Symposion*, 2 parts (Würzburg 1908 and 1909).

¹⁸ Jeanneret (above, note 5) Ch. 6, "Classical Banquets," pp. 140-71; mausoleums, pp. 160-61.

no longer an adequate label for it. We must therefore begin with Plato and face the fact that if his *Symposium* had inspired no followers it would probably be classified as another of his middle dialogues, presenting well-known characters, themes and literary devices in a form which, while exceptional in his corpus, would prove no obstacle to its inclusion among the dialogues.¹⁹

Plato's *Symposium* primarily aligns itself with the middle Socrates who speaks of transcendent forms, a separable soul and the philosophical contemplation of ultimate reality in terms of sexual union—philosophy as erotics.²⁰ We note the similar literary devices: The *Symposium* is a dialogue reported long after the fact, as is the *Theaetetus*; the *Phaedrus* has a bad speech of Lysias' recalled and discussed, reminding us of the bad speeches in the *Symposium*, particularly Eryximachus'; the Socrates who is in love in some problematic way with Alcibiades recalls the early dialogue *Gorgias*; and while Socrates' story of Poros and Penia reflects a love of myth-making abundantly attested in the middle period (Er in *Republic* 10, the chariot of the soul in the *Phaedrus*), Aristophanes' tale of the origins of the human race seems a comic anticipation of the account in the late *Timaeus*. It is significant that the *Symposium* is retrospective and prospective, for in it we see in action a number of different personae of Socrates and different views of the nature of the symposion itself. When he questions Agathon (199c3–201c9), we see an elenctic Socrates who wants to be as he was in the early dialogues;²¹ but this questioning is impolite (the cardinal rule of conduct in a symposion or sympotic discussion is politeness) and violates the rules of this particular symposion (at *Symp.* 177a1–78a1 the guests agree to deliver encomia only, a genre which Socrates affects not to master), and so Socrates is compelled to proceed more along the lines of the middle Socrates, relating his mystical instruction at the hands of Diotima. The call for sober discussion without entertainment is reminiscent of Socrates' prescriptions for a properly educational symposion in the early *Protagoras* (347c–48a), in which we find both Agathon and Socrates; but the interruption of the proceedings by the drunken Alcibiades would anticipate the regulations of *Laws* 1–2, where

¹⁹ For example, Martin (above, note 17) 295–96 makes the reasonable observation that there are symposiac traditions prior to Plato, and only the later exaltation of Plato made him the founder of a new genre. Martin also notes that the symposion setting for this particular dialogue portrays the social life of Athens with a vividness and detail not paralleled in the other dialogues.

²⁰ See Chapter 2, "Socrates *contra* Socrates in Plato," in G. Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca, NY 1991) 45–80.

²¹ The Socrates of the early dialogues, who takes all his interlocutors as equals and argues only to show that he and they are equally unaware of the truth, is by nature truly sympotic; the middle Socrates is not. The dialogic methods of the early Socrates are implicitly held up to ridicule in Plato in this brief interview with Agathon; they are explicitly mocked in Xenophon (*Symp.* 4. 56–59), when all the guests agree to reply Πάνο μὲν οὖν to all of Socrates' questions.

wine and madness are deemed necessary, but in need of firm control.²² As a final point, there are here, as always in Plato, enough layers of reporting and enough biased filters intervening between the focal point of the dialogue and its actual relation to satisfy Plato's general wary unwillingness to let any one presentation of a point of view pass for an absolute truth; Socratic wisdom must always be grasped darkly.²³

What then makes the *Symposium* unique? This dialogue is driven by a tension between sympotic reality and Socratic desire. In dismissing the flute-girl and refusing to drink deeply, the guests attempt to deny that they are at a symposium, and try to transcend the occasion and their physical surroundings. Plato conspires with them in this by omitting details of the dining. All this is done in the name of Philosophy, of course; as Rosen points out, all of the speakers, even the unworthy ones, may be allowed to have some partial glimpse of the truth, so that Socrates' speech stands as the summation and perfection of all that has gone before. The clear implication is that this symposium is superior to a real symposium because words and speeches stand in for food and drink. This proud attitude will have a long history; it will become commonplace for guests to arrive at a literary symposium with words and riddles and debate as their share (their *symbolon*) for the convivial potluck.²⁴ As symposiac texts become increasingly encyclopedic, the images of learning as eating, of compilation as satire, of books as digests, come increasingly to the fore.²⁵ It will be the

²² See M. Tecuşan, "Logos Symptikos: Patterns of the Irrational in Philosophical Drinking: Plato Outside the *Symposium*," in Murray (above, note 1) 238–60, esp. 257–60.

²³ The sequence of narration in Plato (Apollodorus tells to an unnamed friend the dialogue as he heard it from the guest Aristodemus, a version considered to be more accurate than that related to Glaucon by Phoenix, and checked in some details against Socrates himself) is laboriously followed by Methodius (Gregorion tells Eubulion, who had earlier heard an unsatisfactory version from an unnamed informant, about the banquet given by Arete as she heard it from the guest Theopatra).

²⁴ See Aulus Gellius 7. 13. 2–3 on the sympotic *quaestiunculae* (a trivializing diminutive for which he also gives the Greek equivalent, ἐνθυμημάτια) that guests would bring to banquets at the home of the philosopher Taurus, in Athens: *cum domum suam nos uocaret, ne omnino, ut dicitur, immunes et asymboli ueniremus, coniectabamus ad cenulam non cuppedias ciborum, sed argutias quaestionum. unusquisque igitur nostrum commentus paratusque ibat, quod quaereret, erat initium loquendi edundi finis*. Examples of these levelling riddles are given: Should we say that one who is dying dies while still alive or when dead? Do you stand up while seated or when already standing? The point is made that such questions stimulate the wit and the conversation; but it is not really polite for one guest to try to prove the superiority of his opinion.

²⁵ This is abundantly illustrated in Jeanneret, *A Feast of Words* (above, note 5); but it is worth noting that those who explicitly claim the superiority of words over food may be mocked. In Plutarch's *Banquet* (160c), when Solon delivers a rude and lengthy diatribe against the pleasures of food, in which the bowels are compared to Hell (the "pit" of the stomach), his unsympotic fervor is not commented on by our narrator or anyone else (160c), and we get the impression that his words were received with a shocked silence. Silence as an undercutting response to an improper speech in the symposium deserves further study. See also below, note 40.

primary joke in Athenaeus, where the Cynic guests must always wonder whether the food before them will ever be eaten, or only talked about. But the point to make is that Plato's *Symposium* desires to be unsympotic. Pellizer describes sympotic reality as a controlled exercise of the passions, a private agon (unlike the public one in which Agathon secured his victory) in which the public image can be put at risk in a sort of ritualized exhibitionism.²⁶ In Plato's *Symposium*, this agon is clearly present, both in the rivalry that animates the different encomia and in the tensions that surface between speakers; but control disappears, just as the other aspects of sympotic reality make their first appearance, at the end with the arrival of Alcibiades. Now we have a symposiarch who imports a flute-girl (though she does not play), orders deep drinking and sets about embarrassing Socrates and calling into question the value of his speech on Love.

Alcibiades makes his famous claim that there is a reality to Socrates that is hidden from view, and he implies that Socrates intentionally keeps it hidden. This is Socrates' erotic nature, and the references to the Sileni with the gods inside and to the mad-piping Marsyas do not only tell us of Socrates' enigmatic nature, but of his attempt to conceal himself, to be unsympotic. And when Alcibiades offers himself for ridicule, telling of his own impropriety in attempting to seduce the older man Socrates and how his advances were rejected, we see not only an embarrassed Socrates but also a Socrates convicted of *not* proceeding, as he had been instructed to by Diotima, from the physical body to transcendental love.²⁷ It may be too much to say that Alcibiades' revelations and talk of hybris give the lie to Socrates' abstractions, but Socrates' attempt to live in the abstract, both in philosophy and in the symposium, is disdainful of the world around him.

What distinguishes Plato's *Symposium* from his other dialogues is the way in which the social order of Athens, which differs so dramatically from the dialogic world of Socrates, intrudes at the end to force a re-evaluation of the character of Socrates. This is obviously not like the *Apology* with its verdicts, or the *Phaedo* with the jailer and his poison; in these, death comes to a Socrates whose opinions are fully endorsed, while in the *Symposium* death waits for a Socrates whose opinions are questioned. Socrates sits here beneath no plane tree, and is not in his usual element, before two or three eager listeners. Bathed and with shoes on, he is out of character; the lengthy delay before he enters suggests his unwillingness; the concluding long and paradoxical discussion of the nature of the writing of tragedy and comedy, which puts our narrator to sleep, makes the reader wonder just what has transpired here: Is the disjunction between Socrates and his

²⁶ E. Pellizer, "Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment," in Murray (above, note 1) 182-83.

²⁷ Rosen (above, note 6) 276-77, summarizing a long analysis of the Diotima passage: "It is by no means self-evident that Socrates himself begins unambiguously at the level of the body."

audience a comic or a serious thing?²⁸ The learning of the speakers has been set in a frame that calls for the re-evaluation of both the learning and the speakers, and society appears impatient with the wisdom of the wise.

This, then, is our genre in its first stage of development, the symposiac "mode" of the dialogue to use Alastair Fowler's terms.²⁹ The transition from Plato's *Symposium* to the symposiac genre is accomplished by a number of means. Creative imitation draws out selectively certain aspects of the work; recourse to actual sympotic convention augments Plato's material; and appeals to other literary traditions afford an intertextual richness that goes some way toward making up for the particular philosophical profundity which is Plato's genius, never seriously rivalled within the tradition. In the eyes of later authors, the characters of Plato's *Symposium* are too homophonous, the speeches themselves are objectionable as too long and too serious, and there is a need of variety (*poikilia*).³⁰ Variety is imported into the symposium partly by attention to the details of actual sympotic practice: the rituals of eating and drinking; entertainment, jesters and buffoons; variety of topics discussed; riddles and puzzles. But the theoretical justification for the modification of the master's practice is, of all people, Homer. The important discussion of this is the beginning of Book 5 of Athenaeus, in which the jurist Masurius comments on the ways in which Xenophon and Plato variously approximate the Homeric ideal. Epicurus suffers most in the analysis for never having made the attempt, but Homeric symposia are superior to philosophical symposia, to the partial exception of Xenophon's *Symposium*, by virtue of *poikilia*. This is in fact a remarkable literary sleight-of-hand. Despite the laborious reference to Homer at its beginning, Plato does not draw on Homeric feasting scenes to create his own *Symposium*.³¹ In effect, Plato is

²⁸ Too much attention is paid, I think, to the discussion of drama at the conclusion of the *Symposium*, where the best writer of tragedy is said also to be the best writer of comedy; and too much to the supposed five-act structure of the symposium, although D. Sider, "Plato's Symposium as Dionysiac Festival," *QUCC* 33 (1980) 41–56, has an interesting statement of the thesis. We are more impressed by the implicit equation of the guests and the chorus of drama: Socrates, as it were, steps out from the chorus to pronounce the truth, and like most of those in tragedy who say what is true, he is to pay with his life.

²⁹ A. Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge, MA 1982) Ch. 10, "Transformations of Genre," pp. 170–90.

³⁰ The importance of this term for Athenaeus is discussed by A. Lukinovich, "The Play of Reflections between Literary Form and the Sympotic Theme in the *Deipnosophistae* of Athenaeus," in Murray (above, note 1) 267–68. We are not dealing merely with a stylistic matter here: As a banquet is compounded of various courses, and would be unpalatable without variety, so too does the literary symposium require what the symposium does.

³¹ Socrates' ponderous complaint to Aristodemus (174b3–d3) of how Homer made the lesser Menelaus go unasked to the sacrifice and feast of Agamemnon in *Iliad* 2 has a surprising afterlife. Masurius wrestles with this in Athenaeus, and proposes a textual emendation as well (Ath. 5. 177c–78e). In Petronius' *Cena*, an Agamemnon goes to attend a symposium at which a Menelaus is present; Evangelus in Macrobius bids his host fear lest he take three Menelauses into his home (*Sat.* 1. 7. 10): *superuenire fabulis non euocatos haud equidem turpe*

acknowledged to be the founder of the genre, but appeal to the earlier and more authoritative Homer justifies the modification of the Platonic model. It is also curious that the long tradition of pre-Platonic, archaic sympotic literature, expressed in epigram and drinking song and tales of the sympotic gathering of the seven archaic wise men, is generally suppressed.³² Of course Plutarch's *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* is the exception; it could never have existed without this tradition. Plutarch's narrator claims to be writing in the archaic age, making this work an interesting example of historical fiction as well as a symposium. But though the work tries to leap over Plato, as it were, to the archaic traditions, we shall show that the actual structure of the *Banquet* is Platonic, and that the prior traditions do not exist to create rival forms of the literary symposium but only superficial modifications of the Platonic model.

Even Homeric *poikilia* is not sufficient to override the Platonic pattern of the symposium. Plato's death-centeredness is maintained, whether one speaks of the mortal heroes of the *Iliad* and the discussions found in the Embassy to Achilles, or of the feasting of the suitors on Ithaca.³³ The *Odyssey* is in fact more important to the later sympotic tradition, just as the *Odyssey* is more important generally in the history of later prose genres (romance, Menippean satire, the picaresque). It is fascinated with violations of the rules for proper feasting (the gluttony of the suitors, Polyphemus' cannibalism, the eating of the Cattle of the Sun) and in Telemachus' initiation into the right use of ritual conviviality (learning from Nestor, Menelaus and, ultimately, his own father). More importantly, however, Homeric realities become the counterpoint to philosophical debates. Thus, Lucian's *Symposium or Lapiths*, which is centered on a wedding feast, ends in bloodshed as philosophers fight like Penelope's suitors; the heavenly symposium which figures in Julian's *Symposium*, like the wedding feast on Olympus that Philology reaches at the end of her journey in Martianus Capella's *Marriage of Philology and Mercury*, are pointedly unworthy sources of wisdom by virtue of the associations of their Homeric fantasies.

existimatur: uerum sponte inruere in conuiuium aliis praeparatum nec Homero sine nota uel in fratre memoratum est, et uide ne nimium arroganter tres tibi uelis Menelaos contigisse, cum illi tanto regi unus euenerit.

³² See B. Snell's fascinating collection, *Leben und Meinungen der Sieben Weisen*⁴ (Munich 1971); Martin (above, note 17) 291-92 does not deal with the significant difference between real model (pre-Platonic sympotic reality and sympotic production) and claimed model (Homer).

³³ The significance of sympotic feasting in the *Iliad* is taken up by Murray (above, note 9) 259-62; Masurius in Athenaeus (above, note 31) also speaks explicitly of the Embassy. W. J. Slater, "Sympotic Ethics in the *Odyssey*," in Murray (above, note 1) 213-20, speaks of Odysseus among the Phaeacians, but does not note how unsympotic such a story would be by contemporary sympotic standards. That symposia may be implicitly death-centered can be argued from Homer (above, note 7), but Plato fronts this concern in ways that cannot be extrapolated from Homer, except in the general way that epic and tragedy together assert that heroes must die.

Lucian's comic treatment of Homer's heaven helps to pave the way for this. Later symposia enjoy the relief from Plato's high sentence, allowing wrangling philosophers to be mocked for their arrogance, and exalting Odyssean piety and practical wisdom.

It is good to remember that philosophical debate is itself a violation of sympotic norms: Philosophers in their discourse are outside the pale of civilized human beings. This is a joke frequently encountered in Varro's *Menippeans* and throughout the Menippean tradition as well, in which the *philosophus gloriosus* is the recurring butt of humor.³⁴ This theme, and the key term *poikilia*, are both stressed at the very beginning of Lucian's *Symposium or Lapiths*: Ποικίλην, ὦ Λυκίνε, διατριβήν φασι γεγενῆσθαι ὑμῖν χθὲς ἐν Ἀρισταινέτου παρὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τινας λόγους φιλοσόφους εἰρῆσθαι καὶ ἔριν οὐ σμικρὰν συστήναι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς . . . , "They say, Lycinus, that you had a truly sympotic gathering over dinner at Aristaeetus' house the other day, that philosophical words were spoken, and that no small contention arose because of them . . ." See how clearly Platonic *eros* has been replaced by *eris*; the "philosophical words" are themselves examples of objectionable behavior.³⁵ The discussion even takes place during dinner, and not after—no order is maintained. Wrangling eggheads have supplanted the philosophers. It is not important to Lucian that Plato's doctor Eryximachus stands out as one who cannot pass muster as a philosopher; he typifies the foolish wise man, and this theme is pounced on here with a vengeance.

The Three Phases of the Symposiac Genre

These considerations allow us to see the transition from Plato to later authors in a clearer light. To continue to use Fowler's terms, once we establish a genre out of the symposiac mode of Platonic dialogue, we can discern the three typical phases of the genre's life span. To the primary stage (primitive/simple/naive) we assign Xenophon's *Symposium*, which is concerned not to use Socrates to make philosophical points but to remember Socrates as a personality. Xenophon's Socrates displays a "complex irony" which is in welcome contrast to his moral didacticism in the *Memorabilia*.³⁶ He is present at a symposium that is concerned with bodies much more than minds: the dancers who entertain them, the beauty of Callias and Critobulus,

³⁴ N. Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton 1957) 229–31.

³⁵ The term reappears as the adjective ποικίλα at section 34, where too we learn of the absence of rhythm in the conduct of the philosophers; see above, note 13. Branham (above, note 12) 104–23 has a nice discussion of Lucian's use of Platonic material in the *Lapiths*. See also Jeanneret (above, note 5) 150–52 for a brief treatment that makes the interesting point that the *disiecta membra* of the discussion, letters, fragments of poets, etc. suggest a text about to fly apart.

³⁶ For complex irony, see Vlastos (above, note 20) 30–32.

the ugliness of Socrates.³⁷ Philosophical issues are accordingly played out on the physical level, and it is left to Lycon to proclaim the paradox that Socrates is beautiful and good. In the person of Lycon, Socrates' death is before us here as it was in Plato, but Socrates' eccentricities and foibles are more sympathetically presented by Xenophon. Here we see Socrates the pander, the man who loses the beauty contest, the philosopher who is chided for not being able to educate his wife Xanthippe. His praise of the beauty and virtue of the young man Autolycus, Lycon's son, is sufficient to win the admiration of the boy's father; but his words and example are quickly countermanded by the Syracusan impresario, who stages a "live-sex-act" version of the myth of Dionysus and Ariadne that sends the married men galloping off to their wives, makes the unmarried men wish they were married, and leaves Socrates rather out of the picture, tagging along after the proud father and son. The central debate on the value of the characteristic on which each speaker prides himself is a series of praises of paradox, of money and of poverty.³⁸ Here Socrates preens himself on his abilities as pander. What we have is genuine dialogism, a multiplicity of surprising opinions, all sanctioned by the convivial table; Socrates does and does not belong.³⁹ Xenophon follows, but with an originality that should not be overlooked; he introduces a polyphonous strain of symposiac literature that pursues Plato's ends by a very different means. Xenophon competes very creditably on Plato's terms, achieving a pointed portrait of an exceptional wise man on the level playing field of the symposion.

Plutarch's *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* also belongs to this primary stage; in it, Periander (often called one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece but pointedly not so labelled here) presides over a banquet which will reveal the superiority of his wisdom and piety to that of the Seven; instrumental in this exaltation of Periander is his protection of Arion, whose rescue from the pirates establishes him as an anti-Socrates, a wise man not delivered up to death at the hands of the mob. The story is worth some detail.

It becomes clear that Periander's brother Gorgus stands in the place of the uninvited guest.⁴⁰ He has a tale to tell, the tale of Arion and the dolphin (160e–62b); it has the climactic function of the Diotima story in Plato. Gorgus had seen to it that soldiers be stationed at various landfalls to be on

³⁷ Jeanneret (above, note 5) 142.

³⁸ This will prove inspirational to Julian in his imperial debate, as each emperor proclaims his guiding principles and justifies himself before the gods. Socrates is present at the proceedings only as Silenus, who mocks all their pretensions.

³⁹ Jeanneret (above, note 5) 144 speaks of Xenophon's open-ended text as "a foretaste of the Menippean satire."

⁴⁰ Gorgus' arrival (160d) stops the conversation. The name alludes clearly to the Gorgon; cf. Socrates in Plato (*Symp.* 198c), who says that the figures of Gorgias in Agathon's speech, like a Gorgon, almost turned him to stone and prevented his speech. Xenophon's *Symposium* begins with all the guests unable to speak because of the beauty of the boy Autolycus. Silence and a new beginning are used to set off important passages in a symposium.

the look-out for the pirates who had abducted Arion; and we discover that the soldiers have been successful and have just arrived at Corinth with the pirates. Periander at first does not believe it, but finally has the pirates put in prison without revealing to them Arion's escape. So far, we have the story in Herodotus 1. 23–24, but the conclusion is missing. We never hear of what happens to the pirates; but we do know what will happen because we know Herodotus. A story whose conclusion is known is already begun; and the one who was to be unjustly murdered will receive justice and vindication.

But this Arion is more than Herodotus' Arion. It is made more clear that he is θεοφιλής; his song is not only a hymn but a swan-song; he is a friend of Periander's. In these details our story is just like that which begins the *Corinthian Oration* (*Or.* 37) of Plutarch's contemporary Dio Chrysostom; Dio also makes the point that Solon was at Periander's court at the time of the Arion affair, being exiled from Athens and Peisistratus. Peisistratus is not mentioned in Plutarch's *Symposium*. But we have here further adumbrations of the untold story: Periander is a wise man in comparison to the tyrants, and we know that he will act in defense of the holy man Arion. In this light, the Seven Wise Men, who frequently have been seen as less than religious,⁴¹ to whom our religious narrator is something of a naive foil, and whose behavior has been less than exemplary (consider Solon's tasteless speech on the bowels as Hell, 159b–60c, which immediately precedes the arrival of Gorgus and the tale of Arion), are to come around to a religious point of view, and their concluding stories strike the religious theme, telling other dolphin stories and tales of divine interventions. Other types of wisdom are contrasted with theirs. Periander is the practical wise man; Arion is the holy man; the seven are much more in the realm of *philosophi gloriosi*. We have, in other words, a frame which makes for a re-evaluation of the nature of the seven.

We are fortunate to have two parodies of this primary phase of the literary symposium in the death-centered *Cena Trimalchionis* and in Lucian's bloody *Lapiths*. We leave the *Cena* for later, but the *Lapiths* may be dealt with briefly here. Lucian is a moralist, and the philosophers who gather for the wedding feast are shown up as hypocrites as they steal food, vie for honors, and try to seduce the groom.⁴² The Odyssean battle which

⁴¹ Near the beginning, word is brought of a monstrous birth, of a foal with a human head (149c–e). The narrator Diocles (functioning as Plutarch's porte-parole) says it calls for purification and atonement, but Thales disagrees, and says only that the young men who keep the horses should find other work or get themselves wives. The narrator is proved right, of course; this parallels the story of the one-horned ram at *Pericles* 6, where Plutarch says that Anaxagoras' clever explanation from natural science does not eliminate the possibility of a concurrent theological explanation; the one addresses cause, the other purpose.

⁴² There is no attempt at moderation. The narrator Lycinus, though present, tries to keep himself to himself. He observes the boorish behavior of his companions, but never steps in himself to do anything about it.

terminates the work only points the moral that wisdom is not worth acquiring if your life is going to be out of synch with it. All of the impolitenesses exhibited are part of a thoroughgoing parody of the Platonic symposium, to the significant exception of having no one person singled out for approval of any sort; while this is consonant with Lucian's general anti-philosophical stance, it is also a very sympotic attitude: All are certainly equal at this symposium, Epicureans and Stoics, Aristotelians and Platonists alike. It is the opposite of a symposion: There is only orgy and violence, and a failure to impose order on the different voices contained within it.⁴³

To Fowler's secondary phase (artificial/sophisticated/sentimental) we assign that great gallimaufry which is the *Deipnosophists* of Athenaeus; a symposium composed of the stuffings of many another symposium, and organized, like a menu, course by course from appetizer to dessert. It is food as philology, and not really at a great conceptual remove from Trimalchio's banquet, where each astonishing dish must be explained, where every event is a riddle, where nothing seems to be what it really is. The ritual must be explained by mock scholars: As Trimalchio says (39. 4), *oportet etiam inter cenandum philologiam nosse*. It is preceded by Plutarch's *Table Talk*, also an assemblage of materials from various symposia, on a variety of issues round and about the general theme of how to conduct a symposion. This is the structural equivalent of a collection of nothing but programmatic verse satires. Though it lacks a plot it anticipates that later agglutinative tendency which affects all late prose genres—the process by which systematic learning becomes the content of an imaginative work.⁴⁴ We see this in Menippean satires as they increasingly follow the lead of Varro's scholastic *Menippeans*, thus creating the fantastic and ironic encyclopedia of Martianus Capella; we see it also in romance, not only in the almost euphuistic use of digressions on natural history in Achilles Tatius, but also in the *Clementine Recognitions*, in which the romance form is largely a vehicle for sermons. We note again that imitation is creative: We are in the realm of the intellectual game of the philological satura, half-way between Xenophon's polyphony and later fantasy.

For Fowler's third and final phase, characterized by literary nostalgia and the elevation of various generic elements to a quasi-allegorical status, we have Methodius' *Banquet of the Ten Virgins*, which sets out deliberately to emulate and rival Plato's *Symposium*. Not only is the elaborate chain of sources for the relation of these carefully arranged speeches preserved, but so is the theme of transcendent love, the use of the female voice for

⁴³ Further on *Lapiths*, above, note 35.

⁴⁴ G. Matino, "Strutture Retoriche e Colloquiali nelle 'Quaestiones Convivales'," in G. D'Ippolito and I. Gallo (edd.), *Strutture Formali dei "Moralia" di Plutarco* (Naples 1991) 295–313, points out that while there is no obvious scheme of composition in the *Table Talk* (to the exception of Book 9, which is limited to a single symposion) the rhetorical tension between Attic and koine speech throughout the work indicates a unity of intent, and that the discussions are not just an aggregation of random observations (esp. 296).

instruction on the nature of love and the appetite for the good, and the impending martyrdom of the main speaker, Thecla, which leads us to look beyond the speeches for ultimate wisdom. Many other things conspire toward this: The symposium's setting is a walled garden beneath a chaste-tree; the symposiarch of this sober discourse, Arete, hopes to lead the guests on to the milleniarist's fields of immortality; a concluding dialogue between the teller of the tale and his auditor underlines the point that those who listen must do more than listen to achieve their salvation. The pagan counterpoint to this is Macrobius' *Saturnalia*, a stately presentation of Vergilian wisdom expounded over three days in three different houses, in response to the blasphemous objections of Evangelus to Vergil's literary authority. One wishes that the various lacunae hide some passages in which Macrobius would have asserted the value of these bookish pursuits relative to the larger world, but this is probably a vain hope; it is a book that seeks to exalt another book, not to denigrate its own efforts in doing so. It is important that the introduction speaks of the following work as a digest of learning for his son.⁴⁵ It is a return to Platonic homophony and a rejection of the reinterpretations to which the Platonic model had been subjected; it is also possible that Roman rituals of dining influenced this literary decision. Macrobius is at any rate little interested in that *satura* which is a heady mixture of all the possibilities of the dinner table, or in humor at the expense of those who know.

We have not yet made room for Julian in this scheme, nor for the *Cena Cypriani*. To do so, we need to point out a crucial aspect of the history of the symposium genre, and this is the extent to which it intersects the history of Menippean satire. Northrop Frye takes Athenaeus and Macrobius as authors of Menippean satires, for he makes much of the encyclopedic hunger of the Menippean genre, and its desire to contain the world within a book.⁴⁶ But I think that it is easy to keep these in the fold of the symposium: There is no fantasy, no narrator on a fantastic quest, little sense of the narrator's self-parody. Menippean satire has the fantastic device of the journey to the other world in search of absolute truth, the mordant theme that truth is not to be found at the ends of the earth, and the self-parodic laugh at the authors and narrators who attempted the impossible only to come up with their hands empty. As I argue in *Ancient Menippean Satire*, its inspiration is Plato's Myth of Er; in the hands of Varro and Petronius it becomes a parody of verse satire and its preachers. The symposium is not

⁴⁵ Macrobius, *Sat.* praef. 3: *nec indigesta tamquam in aceruum conguessimus digna memoratu: sed uariarum rerum disparilitas, auctoribus diuersa, confusa temporibus, ita in quoddam digesta corpus est, ut quae indistincte atque promiscue ad subsidium memoriae adnotaueramus, in ordinem instar membrorum cohaerentia conuenirent.* The conventions of such educational statements are treated in F. J. LeMoine, "Parental Gifts: Father-Son Dedications and Dialogues in Roman Didactic Literature," *JCS* 16 (1991) 337-66.

⁴⁶ Frye (above, note 34) 310-11, where the writings of Macrobius and Athenaeus are said to be "a species, or rather sub-species, of the [Menippean] form."

in essence fantastic and does not laugh at its narrator; it speaks of the value of knowledge in the real world and not beyond it; but, like Menippean satire, it does make fun of philosophers and all who affect a specialist's knowledge of everyday phenomena.

Because of the sympotic reality of *problemata*, there is a tradition of recording, without the sympotic setting, the opinions of the wise on various problems ("What is wisest, most just, most useful?"). Plutarch shows how sets of questions and answers attributed to the Seven Wise Men could be given a symposium treatment, and how these views could be denigrated in comparison to a higher truth; in his *Table Talk* he also shows how problems can be stripped of their setting. It is the question of how the setting affects the learning that is at issue. A work like the *Placita Philosophorum* can be read as if it were excerpts from a banquet of the learned; a hagiographic work like *Secundus the Silent Philosopher* shows such digested learning fully endorsed. The sympotic setting implies that all opinions are equally valid, but the symposiac tradition asserts that some one person has a superior truth. In Plato, this person is Socrates, and the price exacted for superior wisdom is very loudly hinted at. In other words, there may be many opinions, in the name of *poikilia*; but there is also one opinion, and symposiac literature finds itself much exercised about who gets to hold it, because there is little literary interest in having many opinions endorsed as equally valid, but quite a bit of interest in having all opinions (or all but one) overthrown. Consequently, both symposium and Menippean satire enjoy the use of frames that question the validity of the learning contained within them.

To make his thematic overlap between Menippean satire and symposium all the more confusing, Menippean satire, out of its general desire to parody other forms of literature, may include a symposium within itself without actually becoming a symposium. This is obviously the case with the *Cena Trimalchionis*; this Menippean satire contains within itself a parodied symposium; the narrator and main characters of the whole are largely quiet here, observing and then passing on. Varro is a complex case. His 150 *Menippean Satires* are not compelled by the overarching title to be generically identical, but there are certainly many parodied symposia contained within them. Unfortunately, we cannot tell if their point is to parody the Platonic form (as in Petronius or Lucian) or whether the symposium is itself emblematic of a place in which the seeker of truth will not find it, which is the habit later in the history of the Menippean genre. The *Nescis quid uesper serus uehat*, which contains a series of polite sympotic rules certainly dramatically violated as the title implies, may have worked to parody the symposiarch/author/narrator who pronounced them and so be Menippean;⁴⁷ but Lucian's *Lapiths* shows that the symposium can just be parodied without any further generic complications. When we read

⁴⁷ See above, note 12.

Martianus Capella, we see that the fantastic journey of Books 1 and 2 takes Philology to a wedding feast, the setting for the last seven books; this is a symposium contained within a Menippean satire, and the discourses of the Liberal Arts are presented as sympotic exercises that do not possess the Truth discovered earlier in the text, when Philology glimpsed the Unknown Father. This delays the marriage, and participates in the usual symposiac fun at the expense of intellectuals. Julian is the unusual case: His Menippean satire, his journey to heaven, is almost coterminous with the symposium contained within it, in which the equality of the emperors who vie for divine honors is shown to be largely an equality of error. In other words, in adapting Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* Julian had to find a way to have many aspirants to Olympus present themselves at once and be found wanting: The symposium is used for this reason, and because a symposium levels its guests. Julian stands outside, and it is his own impending death that gives added meaning to the distance that he keeps from his comic predecessors.

To this extent, we can assign Julian to the second phase of the history of the symposium genre. The *Cena Cypriani*, on the other hand, is of the final phase, for it attempts to relate a banquet almost entirely through the medium of riddles; specifically, cryptically expressed Biblical trivia. Isaac brings firewood and the reader must remember why it is appropriate for him to do so. This *Cena* has no conversations, and lasts for two days; but the discovery of the theft of one of the host's cups ultimately results in the death of one of the guests, both reminding us of Lucian's *Lapiths* and violently asserting the significance of death to the constitution of the genre and justifying its insertion here. Rather like the late *Aenigmata Symp[h]osii*, the *Cena* takes one aspect of the symposium and expands on it alone; it does this with gusto, and with a nod toward other generic requirements, but once the genre loses its ability to synthesize its constituent elements it is effectively dead.

A New View of the Late Symposia

Much of what informed the previous discussion was distilled from our reading of later texts: our understanding of their conventions and themes, our view of their interrelations and history. What we do here is present profitable ways to read these texts, to draw them into the ambit of Plato and show how they can illumine each other. We do not desire to be exhaustive, but to point a direction.

Cena Trimalchionis

Petronius is read as a document of first-century social history, whose literary affiliations are almost entirely to the Roman satiric tradition. For the *Cena*, the pertinent satiric theme is of course the dinners of the

nouveaux riches; Horace's *Cena Nasidieni* (*Sat.* 2. 8) is the obvious parallel. But Petronius is clearly more than tastelessness, debacle and escape; Trimalchio strains the satiric straitjacket by being ultimately a likable character, at least more likable than the hypocrites who eat his food and laugh behind his back. I have discussed elsewhere the *Satyricon* as a whole as an example of Menippean satire; but this literary setting has particular pertinence for the understanding of the *Cena*. Our narrators are wandering scholars, full of book opinions and uncomprehending of what they see; in the *Cena* they walk into another book, a parody of Plato's *Symposium*. The death of the hero could not be more clearly anticipated, from the painting of his apotheosis seen by the guests as they enter to the mock funeral which terminates the evening's festivities. As a fictional character, Trimalchio has no life to the reader outside of the text; we do not know how his life will continue after the dinner, as we do know in the case of Socrates, and so we have to be told. Trimalchio's inability to serve food without a lecture directly anticipates the *Deipnosophists*; the emergence of the superiority of our gauche hero from the cacophony of undirected voices is in the tradition of Xenophon.

What is most fascinating is that Trimalchio is not just a nouveau riche but another Socrates. The grotesque physical appearance is one connection; the inappropriate dancing for which Fortunata taxes him (*Sat.* 52. 9–53. 1) reminds us of the laughter aroused by Xenophon's Socrates, who claims that he wants to learn how to dance, perhaps to improve his figure (*Symp.* 2. 16–20).⁴⁸ Just as Alcibiades tells us of the inner and the outer Socrates, so do we hear (endlessly) of the old and the new Trimalchio, and how he tries to hide his servile nature behind a show of wealth and mock-senatorial trappings. But he is paradoxically wise, in contrast to the narrator, who will go on to other adventures; Trimalchio is toying with these people. A large part of this game-playing consists of his appallingly enigmatic choice of foods, a clear anticipation of the gustatory/philological humor of Athenaeus, and an extension of the general sympotic love of riddles.⁴⁹ The *Cena* must not be separated from the history of Plato's *Symposium*.

Table Talk

Plutarch's project here is ostensibly to relate verbatim actual conversations to his friend Sossius Senecio but, with nine books and a total of ninety-five disputations, many having been put on paper after an interval of several

⁴⁸ Xen. *Symp.* 2. 17–19; see too the contortions of Philip the jester at 2. 22. Consider also the buffoon Satyrion in Lucian (*Symp.* 18) who also resembles Socrates; he is ugly and bald, and dances in a contorted fashion.

⁴⁹ C. P. Jones, "Dinner Theater," in W. J. Slater (ed.), *Dining in a Classical Context* (Ann Arbor 1991) 185–98, discusses dinner theater and its transformation into theater-dinner, as he calls it, in terms of the Roman patron's obligations of providing for his guests; this social explanation does not eliminate its literary resonances, particularly its relation to Athenaeus.

years (if they ever actually took place), and almost all of them filled with erudition of the most impressive sort, we are obviously dealing with a highly literary undertaking, rather like an edited collection of letters. The list of alleged exemplars which Plutarch gives in his introduction is headed by Plato; he is followed by Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus and several more of the "greatest philosophers" who wrote symposia.⁵⁰ The *Table Talks* are particularly valuable because of their self-referential nature; what we have is a series of talks which are themselves mini-symposia, some of which are about what should happen at symposia. Plutarch blurs the line between artificially constructed symposia and actual drinking parties not only by referring to the symposia of Xenophon and Plato as if they actually happened, but by literarily rendering actual entertainments.

This anticipates the elaborate construction of the *Deipnosophists*, being more ethical and concerned with rules than philological and concerned with courses. But it also gives us the opportunity to check Plutarch's view of the nature of Plato's *Symposium*: We have already seen his partial attempt to distance himself from Plato's practice while keeping to the theme of the wise man's impending death. It becomes clear that each discussion is so arranged that the last speech has a place of honor and commands assent; we can tell what the rules are supposed to be, and these symposia are homophonic according to the practice of Plato, and do not indulge in the dialogic complications of ambiguity. We can deduce that Plato's *Symposium* follows sympotic rules for seating according to friendliness rather than honor (1. 2); it is exempted from the rule that there ought to be music and flute-girls (7. 7) because of the extraordinary nature of the guests; it generates the rule that people may come if invited by other guests and not the host (7. 6). But the symposiarch must not be drunk (1. 4); and Plutarch is hard put to explain Alcibiades' behavior in what must still be the model symposion/symposium. Plutarch tries sleight-of-hand: We learn that insults must be designed to increase friendship (2. 1); Alcibiades and Aristophanes are equated as good-natured, comic speakers who liven things up a bit (7. 7). In every reference to rules, where we see Alcibiades as a disruptive sympotic element, Plutarch would only see good-natured banter, inspired by his rivalry with Agathon for Socrates' love.

Yet Plutarch, regardless of his idealization of Alcibiades, fundamentally understood what was happening in the *Symposium*.⁵¹ Consider the following (1. 1 in Goodwin's translation):

⁵⁰ S.-T. Teodorsson, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks*, vols. I and II (Göteborg 1989) on this passage states that "Plut. adduces the large number of famous authors of convivial works in his first prooemium in order to warrant his project." It is more likely that the list is intended, not to justify, but to locate Plutarch's ambitions within the tradition.

⁵¹ I think this is borne out nicely in the *Banquet*, where Thales is perfectly correct in his appraisal of seating arrangements and Alexidemos' rudeness, but still appears a pompous fool while doing so. Cf. esp. 149f, where Thales says in a voice "louder than usual": "Where is the place at table to which the man objected?"

You see that even Plato in his *Symposium*, where he disputes of the chief end, the chief good, and is altogether on subjects theological, doth not lay down strong and close demonstrations; he doth not prepare himself for the contest (as he is wont) like a wrestler, that he may take the faster hold of his adversary and be sure of giving him the trip; but he draws men on by more soft and pliable attacks, by pleasant fictions and pat examples.

Instead of forcing a single opinion on the reader, Plato employs several "soft and pliable attacks," the most important of which is Alcibiades. Alcibiades undercuts Socrates and the *Symposium* as a whole. He does so, not because Plato wants the reader to think that Socrates is wrong or that the *Symposium* is trash-literature but, paradoxically, to increase Socrates' authority without appearing to do so, by singling him out as the object of this intrusion. Plato's *Symposium* is not an ideal symposium, despite Plutarch's special pleading; yet Plutarch seems to be aware of the mechanics by which Plato tries to impress Socrates on his readers.

The Deipnosophists

Athenaeus is at some distance from his material, and this preserves the narrative frame's illusion of sympotic objectivity. But here the symposium is seen in a different way, not as one person's reported narrative or even a firsthand account. Athenaeus' narrator exerts an enormous amount of control over the organization of his work. Unlike most sympotic works (Plutarch's *Table Talk* seems to be an exception), his is not recounted in chronological sequence.⁵² Its narrative frame, the situation which sets up the narrative, seems to be—because of the lamentable state of the first two and a half books—a conversation at a dinner between Athenaeus and his young friend Timocrates, who asks to know all about the dinners held at the house of a wealthy Roman, Larensis (which is a situation comparable to that in the narrative frame of Lucian's *Lapiths*). What Athenaeus has done in order to tell his friend about these banquets is to take the conversations the 23 wise guests had at these banquets (whenever they were held), edit them, and reshape them so that the subject matter of the discussions of the wise men corresponds to the courses of a banquet—from hors d'oeuvres to sympotic wreaths and hard drinking. Practically everything they eat is discussed. Sympotic literature itself becomes a topic, as do the characters of various philosophers, prostitutes and other historical figures (not to mention sympotic activities: music, singing, riddles and the like). This creates an odd and often ridiculous aping effect: A character talks about citron, in literature or history, and the characters eat citron as if they have never tasted it before (85c); they wash their hands, and discuss washing hands (408b).

⁵² For example, it is mentioned at 361e that it is the Parilia (April 21st), but later on (372d–e) the banqueters think they are eating cucumbers in January.

The equation of food and learning, which aligns the later symposium genre with Menippean satire, here reaches fantastic heights as the narrator himself becomes a cook, preparing, ordering and serving various ingredients. This parallel becomes clear when the actual cook from the banquets appears in the text. On each of three separate occasions, the cook presents an inventive dish which has transformed the natural and casual into the artificial and structured: a pig roasted on one side and steamed on the other (375d ff.), the dish made of roses (403d ff.) and the *myma*, a dish of mashed up ingredients (685e ff.). On each occasion, the cook must enlighten the puzzled diners, who are ravenous for information. The similarity between the skills of narrator and cook can also be observed when the cook first appears with the amazing shoat and his *sophia* (376c) as well as his *techne* (381f) is admired. Moreover, the cook, like the narrator, seems to have much control over the guests. Like the narrator, he is allowed to joke with them and mock them gently. He knows the riddle of the dishes he has invented; he alone knows how they were created, and only he can provide the answers. Athenaeus' narrator has been cast in the role of the chef of his work, since he has taken bits of Greek literary art, sympotic conversation and repartee and transformed them into one banquet.⁵³ This is quite a departure from the narrative technique of other symposia.

The Banquet of the Ten Virgins

Methodius writes in the last half of the third century. We have already assigned him to the third phase of the genre's history; the later Julian seems more comfortable in the second; we give the authors chronologically here, but it is important to see just how much in flux the genre is in late antiquity. There is no ordered march toward its demise. Methodius is the only Christian author to attempt a symposium along classical lines; we shall return in the conclusion to why this is so. But what is most remarkable is how thoroughly the job of emulation of Plato has been accomplished. Not only are the distancing effects of the narrative frame expressly modeled on the *Symposium*, but so are its themes of spiritual love and transcendence. Thecla's virginity, like Socrates' homosexuality, is a means of access to the realms of higher truth; but unlike Plato, who uses Alcibiades' entrance to force a re-evaluation of the wisdom of Socrates and so draw him down to earth, Methodius concludes with a brief Platonic dialogue between the narrator of the work and his/her audience (we must be uncertain, because

⁵³ At 6. 222a and 223d-e Athenaeus compares himself in terms of his invention (the *Banquet*) with comic poets, while the cook (or cooks), when they appear, bring as their *symbolai* the quotes from comic poets dealing with cooks. The cook also prides himself on the novelty of his work, quoting *Nubes* 961. So, too, when at the end of a book (10. 459b-c) Athenaeus makes a transition to the topic of drinking-cups, which will be the subject of Pausanias' discourse on the following morning, he justifies this transition on the basis of "novelty," by quoting Metagenes' comedy *Philothule*.

Eubulion, the listener, is supposed to be a woman, but the occasional masculine adjective forces us to see her as Methodius' own voice) which forces the narrator of the symposium to admit that we who listen cannot hope to achieve transcendence by speech and by ear, but by hard work and struggle, the spiritual agon.

Methodius is not as homophonic as he seems. The *Banquet* accomodates exercises in many genres: sermons, exegesis, a Socratic dialogue, a hymn. The symposion setting allows ten speakers to espouse ten good opinions: Even Theophila's Praise of Marriage (the second speech) can be incorporated into a system in which virginity is the supreme good. Yet there is an agon: What was depicted as a contest among speakers in Plato for the most fitting praise of love has been here transferred to the agon of spiritual perfection; the language of the theater has been completely replaced by Pauline language of struggle and race and contest, victory and crown.⁵⁴ As the rich meal concludes at the end of the prelude, the hostess Arete proposes a contest of speeches in praise of virginity and promises a crown of wisdom to the winner. At the end it is Arete who crowns all the contestants,⁵⁵ but gives a larger crown to the martyr-to-be Thecla, the Socrates-figure who outshone all the rest.

Methodius proceeds largely by inverting Plato point by point. It is a banquet of women; it holds female virginity as a universal model; its author, the auditor of the dialogue, presents himself as a woman, and takes the gender of Plato's Diotima seriously.⁵⁶ Socrates' mediating Eros is here replaced by a mediating Christ. Man is halfway between mortality and

⁵⁴ In her exegesis (8. 12) of the passage in the Apocalypse in which the woman clothed with the sun fights the dragon, she uses and extends Pauline battle language in encouraging her virgins:

Do not then lose heart at the deceits and the slanders of the Beast, but equip yourselves sturdily for battle, arming yourselves with the helmet of salvation, your breastplate and your greaves. For if you attack with great advantage and with stout heart you will cause him untold consternation; and when he sees you arrayed in battle against him by Him who is his superior, he will certainly not stand his ground. Straightway will the hydra-headed, many-faced Beast retreat and let you carry off the prize for the seven contests. (Musurillo's translation, *ACW* 27, p. 130)

In the interlude at the end of Thecla's speech, Eubulion characterizes her thus: "And so outstanding did she frequently show herself as she engaged in those first great contests [ἄθλοις] of the martyrs, possessing a zeal equal to her generosity, and a physical strength equal to the maturity of her counsels." We are here at a great remove from the agon in solving riddles in Plutarch's *Banquet* or the beauty contest in Xenophon (*Symp.* 5. 7).

⁵⁵ Julian has equal crowns awarded to all contestants, even though Marcus is better than all the rest, and Constantine much worse.

⁵⁶ D. M. Halperin, "Why is Diotima a Woman? Platonic *Erôs* and the Figuration of Gender," in D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (edd.), *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (Princeton 1990) 257-308, argues that Diotima's teaching is a male construct of what the feminine should be; Methodius (through the female voice of Eubulion) presents a male view of what female virginity should be, but claims it as universal.

immortality; Christ is Adam's clay recast and Christ/Adam participates in death and resurrection.⁵⁷ The theanthropic Christ, by his two-fold nature in one Person, leads all from earth to heaven. As Archvirgin he leads the choir of virgins. In the mediating time of the Millennium, of which this banquet is a foretaste, virginity will be the only natural state. The reality of the world to which we may aspire and which we may actually reach excels the world described by Diotima to Socrates. What is well ordered in Methodius is not merely a sign of dull dislike of disorder but part of a conscious attempt to out-Plato Plato and present a superior world-view; there is no latecomer, uninvited guest, change of plan, or interruption. But we note the nearness of the work to allegory and fantasy; the walled garden, the chastetree, the fields of the millennium. We may deplore a lack of social reality in a genre so intimately tied to social reality, but it is emphatic in trying to describe an unearthly world beyond, much as Socrates labors to do.

The Caesars

The problem of generic definition of this work has already been raised. I have discussed it elsewhere as a Menippean satire; yet symposium may still be the better envelope for it. It may be claimed that Xenophon and Plato use Socrates' unusual behavior at a symposium, and the consequences of that behavior, as a metaphor for the way he was perceived and treated by society at large: His inner beauty was misunderstood or ignored, and his superficial eccentricity and apparent arrogance were ridiculed and condemned. The point to make here is that the philhellenic philosopher and emperor Julian could not help but see himself in this Socrates, for he too was mocked for his manner and appearance (he indulges in a bit of self-parody on this score in the *Misopogon*), while his efforts to promote his Neoplatonist philosophy met with little success: "Without luck and unblest he struggled against the current for a lost cause, a cause which he himself could not avoid recognizing as lost."⁵⁸ Moreover, Julian was probably writing his *Symposium* in December of 362,⁵⁹ when his ill-fated Persian expedition was only a few months away; thoughts of possible martyrdom to the cause for which he was fighting could not have been far from his mind, and they undoubtedly influenced what he wrote. Indeed, Julian could hardly have written a symposium without considering the meaning that this circumstance would give to his choice of genre.

To some extent, then, Julian's own character can be considered the topic of his *Caesars*, just as Socrates' can be considered the topic of Plato's *Symposium*. Socrates provides one view of his habits and character in his

⁵⁷ See Thalia's speech (3. 1-8).

⁵⁸ T. Mommsen, *Römische Kaisergeschichte*, as quoted by W. M. Calder III in "Mommsen's *History of the Empire*," *CW* 76 (1983) 295-96.

⁵⁹ According to G. W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (Cambridge, MA 1978) 101.

own speech, but a rather different impression is given in the speech of Alcibiades; the penultimate speaker among the competitors in Julian's *Caesars*, Marcus Aurelius, is similarly embarrassed by Constantine, who refutes the merit of Marcus' virtuous lifestyle by winning the same reward in spite of his own wicked ways. Now if Marcus occupies the same position in Julian's *Caesars* as Socrates does in Plato's *Symposium*, then one might assume that Marcus and his philosophy of life are its true topic. But as Marcus' philosophy of life is presented essentially as being the same as that which was publicly professed by Julian, it can be argued that the true topic is Julian himself. A final point to consider is that Julian stands outside this heavenly symposium and watches but does not enter: In this he is not like a guest/narrator who eats but does not speak; rather, he is like the Socrates who, in Plato's *Symposium*, stands outside Agathon's door and does not come in.

But the identification of Julian, through Marcus, with Socrates, and of Constantine's function with that of Alcibiades, is complicated by the fact that the divine equivalents of Socrates and Alcibiades, namely Silenus and Dionysus, also play prominent roles in the *Caesars*.⁶⁰ Dionysus and Constantine are clearly divine and mortal sides of the same coin, for it is Dionysus who requests that Constantine be allowed to participate in the competition as a representative of all pleasure-seekers (317d), the god himself presumably included. Silenus, moreover, merely echoes the outer Socrates, through his appearance, his flirtatiousness with Alcibiades/Dionysus, and his tendency to be a gadfly, while the inner Socrates, Socrates the philosopher, is represented by Marcus Aurelius. Marcus' own external characteristics, such as the abstemiousness that Silenus mocks (333c-d), are reminiscent not so much of Socrates⁶¹ as of the emaciated Julian, and in a sense it is Julian himself who is being mocked.⁶²

Julian also pokes fun at his own supposed sense of superiority by drawing parallels between his *alter ego*, Marcus, and Xenophon's Hermogenes: Hermogenes considers himself a friend of the gods, and he wins their friendship by subscribing to a moral code of which Socrates says (*Symp.* 4. 49), εἰ ἅρα τοιοῦτος ὢν φίλους αὐτοὺς ἔχεις, καὶ οἱ θεοί, ὡς ἔοικε, καλοκἀγαθία ἡδονται. Marcus too has lived his life in accordance with what he believed were the wishes and precedents of the gods (333c), assuming, for the most part, that they took pleasure in the good and the beautiful as Hermogenes said. Hermogenes' speech had become rather

⁶⁰ For Alcibiades as Dionysus, cf. the description of him as ἐστεφανωμένον . . . κιττοῦ τέ τινη στεφάνῳ δασεῖ καὶ ἴων, καὶ ταινίας ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνυ πολλὰς (Pl. *Symp.* 212d-e).

⁶¹ Cf. Xen. *Symp.* 2. 19: ἢ τόδε γελᾶτε, εἰ μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων μετριωτέραν βούλομαι ποιῆσαι αὐτήν;

⁶² The Platonic Socrates is often fragmented in later symposia—in Lucian's *Lapiths*, for example, the jester resembles the outer Socrates/Silenus in both appearance (18) and name (19); the closest thing in Lucian to the inner Socrates is probably the Platonic philosopher Ion.

serious in tone (Οὔτος μὲν δὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἐσπουδαιολογήθη), and to preserve the balance of the serious and the comical that is so important in symposia it is followed by the speech of the jester Philip; this too is echoed in Julian's *Caesars*, where the serious speech of the ascetic Marcus is followed by the laughable effort of the sybarite Constantine.

Julian's *Caesars* displays a remarkable acquaintance with the earlier Greek works, and his encyclopedic catalogue of dead emperors in divine assembly participates in the sort of energy that Athenaeus and Macrobius have. I have argued for his close acquaintance with Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* in *Ancient Menippean Satire*; it should be added that Julian knows the symposiac traditions as well as the Menippean ones, and is at home in the late classical traditions that use old genres as fantastic containers for ever greater amounts of learning. But his is a creative use, respecting those traditions that rejoice in cacophony and do not expect philosophy to escape unscathed from the banquet, and his symposium, like that of Methodius, deserves to be much better known.

The Saturnalia

This title Macrobius shares with Julian's subtitle; the Saturnalia are a feast of social inversion, in which the lowly are exalted, just as Julian's mortal emperors get to be gods for a day. Even Methodius sees that a symposion is an appropriate setting for celebrating inversion; but the same cannot be said for Macrobius. His characters are more like students home for vacation; there is nothing subversive going on; all is politeness and order; the goal is the writing of an educational work, from father to son. It is a homophonic, nostalgic return to Plato by a Platonist who does not see the irony of Plato; the frame has little to do to modify the learning contained within it. We are far from the world of Plutarch's *Banquet*, or Athenaeus', for that matter. But there is one incongruous element in all of this, and all that the symposium genre offers by way of disorder, multiplicity and impropriety is wrapped up in it: the person of Evangelus.

Evangelus, who dares to ask, "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" to a group of philologues (*Sat.* 7. 16. 1), is really one of the most intriguing rogues in classical literature. He is not just a character who needs to be educated about the glories of Vergil, as the author's son is; and he is more than the braggart scholar who haunts the pages of Aulus Gellius, from whom Macrobius gets much of his material. Braggarts let Gellius and his scholastic clan reveal the depths of their knowledge, but Gellius rebukes his braggarts in the same way that Evangelus rebukes Praetextatus and his friends.⁶³ Praetextatus, the one who, in the main, must put down these

⁶³ For Gellius' braggarts and Evangelus, see T. R. Glover, *Life and Letters in the Fourth Century* (Cambridge 1901) 175. This sort of anonymous character serves as a foil to be put down by the likes of Fronto and Favorinus, to avoid their facing off against one another.

remarks, is always the very picture of gentility and modesty (as is, say, Apollinaris in Gellius 13. 20. 3). Evangelus is never forced to say "uncle,"⁶⁴ nor does he ever leave in a huff.⁶⁵ Obviously, this symposium needs him.

Evangelus is in fact three different characters rolled into one: As the uninvited guest, he represents the unpredictable element, the element of surprise; this follows in the footsteps of Aristodemus and Alcibiades in Plato, of Philip in Xenophon, of Gorgus in Plutarch, of Alcidas and the letter of Hetoimocles in Lucian. But he is also a buffoon, the one who raises a laugh, or at least laughs at what goes on. In Book 2, the guests agree to tell the jests of the great men of old; Evangelus is needed to goad the reserved Servius and Disarius on to speak (2. 2. 12-14). While not a comic on the order of Plato's Aristophanes, or even Xenophon's troubled humorist Philip, Evangelus is close to Lucian's Satyrion, or Julian's Silenus, who can mock all in turn without rousing too much ill will.⁶⁶ A third function is that of the contentious Cynic. Consider Xenophon's Antisthenes, who asks Socrates about his unmanageable wife (*Symp.* 2. 10). Impoliteness does not necessarily generate friction; characters often rise above the insults directed at them. Unpredictability, humor and strife are all to be seen as ineradicable elements of the literary symposium. Evangelus is in fact doing what should be done at a symposium. After all, Plutarch says that asking whether the chicken or the egg came first is a perfectly good sympotic poser (*Table Talk* 635d), and Evangelus is satisfied with the answer he gets; what is remarkable is that our respondent, the doctor Disarius, is so caught up in his own erudition that he gives answers on both sides of the question (7. 16. 2-14).

Evangelus is Macrobius' spirit of symposium. His objections motivate the Vergilian discussion, but it is clear that the guests could talk even without his prompting. He is rude, but does not seem to suffer for it; he makes his characters think. The suspicion here is that in Evangelus we have reunited some of the various aspects of Socrates which were fragmented in Plato's *Symposium*, and variously reflected after it.

Christian Symposia and the End of the Classical Genre

Many of the forms of late classical prose literature are Platonic: Lucian's dialogues are obvious as comic developments of the master's special genre, but there are other, less obvious, reflections of Platonic practice as well. Menippean satire is inspired by Platonic myth-making, particularly the myth

⁶⁴ Aulus Gellius 6. 1.

⁶⁵ Aulus Gellius 6. 17.

⁶⁶ However, when Satyrion reaches Alcidas the Cynic, the latter becomes very angry and challenges him to a fight (*Luc. Symp.* 18-19). The blushing reaction of Alexander and Constantine to Silenus' criticisms in Julian (328c-31b) is closer to the reactions that Satyrion generates.

of Er. Not only is the device of the fantastic story important; the Platonic insistence that words cannot convey ultimate reality is very close to the heart of this subversive genre. Utopian literature has its origins in the *Timaeus*, where too we find that not everyone believes that such stories can reveal the truth. Prose fiction and romance can be said to draw inspiration from Plato's deliberate fictions and then to reject Plato's cautious desire to gain the reader's conscious acceptance of fictional devices and the reader's willed complicity in the fabulous.⁶⁷ The romance lulls the reader into taking the false as true, but we may suspect that there is enough Second Sophistic humor in the romance that we are to laugh at the incongruity of the lovers' adventures and the language which they use and which encloses them.

What becomes clear is that Plato bequeaths to literature not only a number of forms and genres but also a certain intellectual attitude concerning the function of literature. It is at an ironic distance from what is real; it is playful; it begs the question of whether fiction is true. To say this is not merely to assert the modern critical viewpoint that the meaning of literature lies in its inability to mean anything; rather, it is the acknowledgment of a Platonic point of view that transcendent reality is only approximated by words and stories, and that wise readers must appreciate the gulf between stories and the truth. Plato stands at the head of a number of traditions, all of which assert that wisdom is found outside of the propositions of the wise.

And so we would understand the symposium. Throughout its history, the Platonic symposium is taken as a medium for depicting a social microcosm and a crucial anomalous element. In Plato, this is Socrates, the unsympotic man, whose opinions, and whose chosen form for the expression of those opinions, set him apart from his fellows, and in fact mark him for death. The fate of the main speaker is more important than his opinions; the learning exposed to public view may be grand or contemptible, but it is the inability of those who have these opinions to make their points forcibly that is to the fore. We may have to allow that Macrobius is off to one side, unable as he is to make fun of Praetextatus' guests, even though he seems to allow Socrates to come to life to some extent in the rude Evangelus. The literary symposium implies a conflict, but the resolution typically lies outside the symposium which it describes.

If we want to describe the end of classical symposia, we face a couple of facts. There are no Byzantine symposia, and only the *Cena Cypriani* (in its first edition of 400 and the expanded rewriting of it around 800) stands between late antiquity and Dante's *Convivio*. The heavenly banquet allows no classical symposia, though we can imagine how the Crucifixion could

⁶⁷ See C. Gill, "Plato's Atlantis Story and the Birth of Fiction," *Philosophy and Literature* 3 (1979) 64-78. I discuss Gill's views at greater length in the concluding chapter of *Ancient Menippean Satire*.

serve to frame a discussion of different views of the nature of history, God and salvation; dialogue exists, but there is little interest in writing a dialogue in such a form as to suggest that the differing points of view must be subjected to a higher principle of interpretation; in this light we must view the boldness of Methodius as a thing we should have liked to see more often in Christian texts.

It is worth asking why Christian symposia are so rare. Here we must look to the Gospel of John, whose importance in the history of the classical genre needs to be asserted. John's Gospel, unlike the synoptic gospels, has Jesus handed over for trial and execution on the Passover. Consequently, this Last Supper (Chapters 13–17) is not a Passover meal, and Jesus does not institute the Eucharist (though he does speak of the Bread of Life at 6. 26–59 in ways that remind us of the symposiac insistence that real food is not physical food but words; or, here, the Word). Related to these is the fact that John's Last Supper comes much closer to the form of a classical symposium than does any of the other, much shorter, Last Suppers. The beloved disciple reclines languorously close to Jesus; questions are asked that betray the ignorance of the speakers; and perhaps more clearly here than anywhere else the impending sacrificial death of the main speaker gives an edge to his discourse, for he continually speaks of things that his listeners do not understand. Note too that John never has Jesus foretelling his passion and death outside of the Last Supper, though he does foretell his betrayal. We think here of Socrates and Lycon in Xenophon.

We could say that John understands that the symposium has its place in religious discourse through the example of Job: Jastrow's old theory, that the form of Job is the classical symposium, is out of favor these days, though I think it more persuasive than the more popular view that the book is a five-act drama.⁶⁸ Note how the frame of the story of Job, which makes it quite clear that Job's sufferings are due exclusively to a wager made between God and Satan, makes all of the talk of sinfulness and justification irrelevant; there is a constant undercutting in Job, a constant presentation of the limitations of both conventional wisdom and conventional piety; and even God's epiphanal speech, which shuts off any further discussion, rather pointedly refuses to tell Job of the truth of things. There is no undercutting of Jesus in John, of course; but the wisdom of the speaker is over the heads of the listeners, and death and resurrection will give a meaning that speech cannot: These are all in the ballpark of the classical symposium. We are not terribly far removed from the world of the social microcosm, the

⁶⁸ M. Jastrow, *The Book of Job: Its Origin, Growth and Interpretation* (Philadelphia 1920) 30–38. One could similarly point to the debate among the three courtiers in the intertestamental Esdras (3–4) on "What is strongest?" to demonstrate the vitality of elements of the classical symposium in Judaeo-Christian literature. Similarly, in the *Letter to Aristaeas* 187–294, the 72 translators of the Septuagint are described as philosophers in the court of Ptolemy, each being asked a question at a banquet lasting seven days and each having his answer approved by the king (see Murray [above, note 9] 271).

enigmatic Socrates, the levelling riddle and the impending doom. It may be that the symposium does not flourish in Christian literature out of deference to this evangelical symposium; certainly Jesus' "open commensuality" could have inspired the creation of gatherings of people from all walks of life whose equality before God and each other is stressed. Also missing are symposia set at the heavenly banquet, or parodies of symposia in the abundant literature of the visions of Hell. It is probably no accident that gnostic writings have no time for symposiac forms, stressing rather direct revelations of truth from master to student. At any rate, Methodius remains our lone example of a thoroughgoing Christian symposium.

The *Cena Cypriani* represents a sort of dead end in the history of the Christianized symposium.⁶⁹ It belongs to a jumble of late classical symposiac works, of which Vespa's *Iudicium coci et pistoris* and the *Riddles* of Symphosius (or Symposius) are best known. It is a remarkable attempt at Biblical parody, a symposium told entirely through enigmatic Biblical references that have the status of riddles. King Iohel invites all the famous Biblical personalities to a wedding feast at Cana: The Christian reader thinks immediately of the miracle of the wine, but the reader steeped in the symposiac tradition will expect drinking and inappropriate behavior, and will not be disappointed. It is fantastic, as late symposia often are; because all these different personalities exist at the same time and in the same place, one could say that this is in effect a heavenly banquet; but it ends in death, and nearly conjures up more of the atmosphere of the *Dialogues of the Dead*.

We hear of sympotic practice, but usually in a fleeting reference. All bathe in the Jordan before seating; there are latecomers who must find their own seats (Job complains that he has to sit alone on a dung heap, 893); food is brought, but rather than sharing, each takes an appropriate food (Jonah takes gourds, 875); they put on festive clothing; drinking habits and drunkenness are described (887). At one point, all change clothes and play dress-up (Jesus as a teacher, Pharaoh as a persecutor, Nimrod as a hunter,

⁶⁹ Text edited with an introduction by K. Strecker, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Poetarum Latinorum Medii Aevi* IV.2-3 (Berlin 1923) 857-900. As the text is mostly verse with the occasional prose insert, the line numbering of the text is somewhat misleading and I cite by the page number of Strecker's edition. As each page consists mostly of apparatus, with small pieces of the two versions of the text printed above each other, the page number is sufficient. For discussion, see P. Lehmann, *Die Parodie im Mittelalter* (Munich 1922) 25-30; Jeanneret (above, note 5) 204-05.

The work is related to a work of Zeno of Verona (1. 24, *post traditum baptisma*) in which those who have fasted and been baptized are invited to a heavenly, not an earthly banquet, for which the Father provides the bread and wine, Christ pours the oil, Isaac carries the firewood, John the Baptist brings locusts and honey, Peter provides the fish, and Noah (the *arcarius*) provides from his store whatever any guest may feel the need of. I offer only about half of Zeno's examples. The *Cena* could be uncharitably thought of as this sort of playfulness carried to lunatic proportions; it seems to lie along the line that leads to the playful trivia questions of the *Joca Monachorum*.

889). They return a second day, bearing gifts, but at this point a theft of some cups is discovered (reminiscent of the theft by which Joseph playfully frames his younger brother Benjamin in Genesis) and various suspects are tortured in an attempt to find the criminal (Jesus is crucified at this point, 893), and we are in the world of the *Lapiths*, as all the guests suspect each other. The thief turns out to be Achan, son of Carmi, known from Joshua as the man who stole from Jericho after it had been destroyed and declared a holocaust. After his execution in Joshua (7. 16–26) the Lord's favor is restored; Iohel hands him over to the guests for execution in the *Cena Cypriani* to provide another happy ending. Judas and Jesus work side by side to kill him (896, though John the Deacon rewrites this part).⁷⁰ They are all ordered to bury him, and the text ends with a laugh (897):

Vendidit agrum Emmor, emit Abraham,
monumentum fecit Nachor et aedificauit Cain,
aromata imposuit Martha, clusit Noe,
superscripsit Pilatus, pretium accepit Iudas.
Quo facto
gaudens clamat Zacharias, confunditur Helisabeth,
stupet Maria, ridebat de facto Sarra.

It is stunning that a death actually, instead of only potentially, terminates a symposium. This is a symposium which obeys no proprieties. Iohel, as *rex mensae*, commands certain things; each brings appropriate food; but there is no discussion, no topics, no undercutting; the symposium is itself a set of riddles, but the guests are not set to solve riddles; all are levelled by the accusation of Iohel, though not all are tortured; the guilty party is expelled from the group as the symposium becomes a sort of fantastic detective story. While the form shows the genre at its end, its themes are exactly those of its more polyphonic predecessors. There is no respect of persons, all are subjected to ridicule, and the one who does not belong must die.

It is regrettable that this did not inspire further symposia. We leap ahead to Dante, who is important to the later history of the genre in two ways. First, as the author of *La Vita Nuova*, he knows of Menippean satire in its ancient form. The love story with its dream vision and constant academic reference to the poetry of the author's youth is at some remove from the medieval *Aucassin et Nicolette*. Second, his *Convivio* also reflects more of the late classical fascination with the encyclopedic potential of the symposiac genre: It is a philosophical work designed as a series of discussions and explications of fourteen of the author's own *canzoni*. Dante knows well the academic functions of the varieties of late classical prose and prosimetrum; but for all this his works must be set apart from either

⁷⁰ The original reads: . . . *lapide percussit Dauid, uirga Aaron / flagello Iesus, medium aperuit Iudas* . . . John the Deacon, who also omits Sarah's final laugh, rewrites this last line as *Iudas intima diffidens in ficus supposuit*. So creeps propriety into an upside-down text.

Plato or Athenaeus. But one later medieval text seems to recall an earlier, more Socratic form of the symposium. In *Piers Ploughman* there is an inset symposium, Passus 13 in the B-text, Passus 15 in the C-text, in which the dreamer encourages the assembly to admit Patience, who stands outside and begs bread. This hermit becomes the presiding genius of the banquet; there is also a friar, who cannot digest satisfactorily the diet of the scriptures, and the dreamer will reject the book-learning and theology of this fat man for a more experiential approach to Faith and the Active Life. We could say that here too we see the halves of a divided Socrates, both the reluctant soothsayer and the buffoon. Langland seems to understand something of the nature of the classical symposium, and this is worth further study; his commentators do not seem to discuss by what medium he acquires it.⁷¹

But the problem, it seems to us, is Macrobius. He has the homophonous guests of a Platonic symposium, but all at the standard of an absolute truth; the value of Vergil seems not to be countermanded by context; the later death of Praetextatus does not seem to affect the presentation of the learning; the character of Evangelus, though he can be seen profitably as the confluence of a number of symposiac conventions, shows how tolerant his host and the other guests are. When Plato's rhetoric of ambiguity and doubt are completely written out of the genre, we may have to admit that only the shell remains, and we no longer have the spirit which animated our genre. We do not say that Macrobius is simple-minded or unsophisticated, only that his symposium seems not to insist on the subordination of scholars' views to some higher reality. Or could the cult of the sun so lovingly expressed in the first book be like Plutarch's religious framework, and could Servian commentary still be the stuff of eggheads? Could Macrobius' son learn from the predigested learning here that there are religious truths and spritual views that transcend the bookworm's truth? It is hard here to keep wishful thinking from filling Macrobius' lacunae.

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⁷¹ I owe this reference to Langland to my colleague Charles Wright.

Catullus 68A: *Veronae Turpe, Catulle, Esse*

TREVOR FEAR

Catullus 68A remains a volatile forum for critical discussion. Two rival camps of interpretation can currently be identified, the one centring its theories around a Mallius who is considered to be seriously distressed and emotionally committed; the other around a Mallius assumed to be playful and humorous. The work of scholars such as Woodman and Ferguson¹ seems to have been moving us towards a "humorous" orthodoxy, but the most recent critical study of the poem² has taken a stance that is unequivocally "serious." Naturally the conclusions of these rival groups have resulted in quite disparate interpretations of the poem. The aim of this paper is a re-examination of the evidence through a close reading of the poem and in particular through a re-assessment of the problematic lines 27–30. We must now turn to the poem's opening (1–10):

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------|----|
| Quod mihi fortuna casuque oppressus acerbo | |
| conscriptum hoc lacrimis mittis epistolum | |
| naufragum ut eiectum spumantibus aequoris undis | |
| sublevem et a mortis limine restituam, | |
| quem neque sancta Venus molli requiescere somno | 5 |
| desertum in lecto caelibe perpetitur, | |
| nec veterum dulci scriptorum carmine Musae | |
| oblectant, cum mens anxia pervigilat: | |
| id gratum est mihi, me quoniam tibi dicis amicum, | |
| muneraque et Musarum hinc petis et Veneris. | 10 |

Taken at face value the language naturally indicates a disaster of some magnitude: "fortuna casuque oppressus acerbo," "conscriptum hoc lacrimis mittis epistolum," "sublevem et a mortis limine restituam." But if Mallius is genuinely upset and there is a reference to some real loss, the reader is forced to pass a rather unfavourable judgement on the nature of Catullus' response. For, as we shall see, Catullus not only declines to provide the *munera* but also expresses his refusal by reapplying to himself

¹ A. J. Woodman, "A Reading of Catullus 68A," *PCPS* 209 (1983) 100–06, J. Ferguson, *Catullus* (Lawrence, KS 1985) 225–35.

² J. G. F. Powell, "Two Notes on Catullus," *CQ* 40 (1990) 199–206.

the substance and imagery of Mallius' complaints. In this way he seeks to demonstrate the more radical nature of his own suffering. It would be unforgivable to treat in this way a friend who had suffered a genuine loss. Even if we can modify our opinion by accepting Wiseman's suggestion that Mallius was "not one of the poet's intimate friends,"³ the effect is still one of egocentric and heartless brutality, a brutality in marked contrast to Catullus' expression of grief at his brother's death.

Given the improbability of this scenario, a closer reading of the opening lines is required. The lines are in fact carefully constructed to move the reader from a response of sympathy to one of humorous complicity. Lines 1-3 resound with an air of tragic melancholy. Within the terms of this portentous language (and consequent to the association of shipwreck with death), Catullus is requested to perform an appropriate act of compassion: "sublevem et a mortis limine restituam" (4). The specific nature of Mallius' discomfort remains unstated, but the reader is clearly drawn into the anticipation of an explanation suited to the gravity of the language.

In lines 5-8 the reader is introduced to Mallius' specific grievances. Although the register of language remains at a suitably lofty level ("sancta Venus," "veterum dulci scriptorum carmine Musae"), nevertheless the reader senses some distance between the effect of these lines and lines 1-4. Finding no pleasure ("nec . . . oblectant") in the writings of the *veteres scriptores* seems to be out of step with a request to be rescued "a mortis limine" (4), and "fortuna casuque oppressus acerbo" (1) is a rather overstated way of describing the condition of "desertum in lecto caelibe" (6). Mallius is in fact presented as using the conventional and exaggerated imagery of the abandoned lover but in a frivolous rather than seriously intentioned manner.⁴

³ T. P. Wiseman, *Cinna the Poet* (Leicester 1974) 102.

⁴ The imagery of shipwreck and death is frequently associated with the abandoned lover:

... ? heu quotiens fidem
mutatosque deos flebit et *aspera*
nigris aequora ventis
emirabitur insolens,

qui nunc te fruitur credulus aurea,
qui semper vacuum, semper amabilem
sperat, *nescius aurae*
fallacis. miseri quibus

intemptata nites. me tabula sacer
votiva paries indicat *uvida*
suspendisse potenti
vestimenta maris deo. (Horace, C. 1. 5. 5-16)

Propertius uses the imagery of death with typical obsessiveness:

sic igitur *prima moriere aetate*, Properti?

Again, if Mallius had faced a serious amatory setback (such as the death of his wife or the end of a longstanding relationship) his complaint of finding no pleasure in poetry appears a trifle frivolous. Though poetry is certainly possible as a form of consolation,⁵ it surely is inadequate for an event as grave as the death of one's wife. Mallius' very use of "oblectant" ("delight in") clearly indicates that he foresees the *munus Musarum* as providing entertainment and not consolation. Similarly his request for a *munus Veneris*, in a context of serious misfortune, would appear to be somewhat disreputable.

The progression, then, from the intense and tragic imagery of the opening four lines to the more mundane nature of the complaints in lines 5–8 must indicate that the former are merely an exaggerated and humorous analogy of the latter.⁶ Such humour and exaggeration are surely indicated in the apparent simplicity of the remedy that Mallius requires, "muneraque et Musarum . . . et Veneris."⁷

The nature of the gifts themselves has caused endless argument. This problem cannot be sidestepped by appeal to the poem's epistolary form. "After all, presumably Mallius' request itself was clear enough and Catullus would not need to report it back to him."⁸ For this misses the point that

sed *morere*; *interitu* gaudeat illa tuo! (2. 8. 17–18)

Death as a consequence of erotic desertion is also detailed in *Eclogues* 2 and 10:

O crudelis, Alexis, nihil mea carmina curas?
nil nostri miserere? *mori* me denique coges. (*Ecl.* 2. 6–7)

Quae nemora aut qui vos saltus habuere, puellae
Naides, *indigno* cum Gallus *amore* peribat? (*Ecl.* 10. 9–10).

⁵ Cf. R. Ellis, *Commentary on Catullus* (Oxford 1889) 404.

⁶ It may also be noted that Catullus' initial response to Mallius, "id *gratum* est mihi" (9), is hardly a tactful or appropriate remark to describe the receipt of a letter solely concerned with the exposition of tragic circumstance.

⁷ F. Cairns, *Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome* (Cambridge 1979) 163, similarly interprets the effect of these lines: "If these lines [1 to 4] alone had survived and the question were asked what misfortune Catullus' addressee had suffered, the unhesitating answer would be that he had lost a loved one through death. This is implied by *fortuna* and *casuque* . . . *acerbo* (1) and by *a mortis limine* (4). But the next few lines dispel this illusion. Allius is said to be kept awake in an empty bed by Venus (5 f.); he gains no satisfaction from old poetry (7 f.) and he asks Catullus for new love-poetry (10). Through this anticlimax the reader realises that Allius has not lost a beloved to death but has been abandoned by a living mistress." We should perhaps feel a little reservation about Cairns' "unhesitating," for the imagery of death may simply be activated by the shipwreck metaphor of line 3. It will become clear that I cannot agree with Cairns on several other substantive points.

⁸ Powell (above, note 2) 206.

68A is *both* a letter *and* a poem. Its publication⁹ presupposes that it should be intelligible both to its general audience (the reading public) and to its specific audience (Mallius). This principle must be equally applicable to the nature of the *munera*, for they are an integral part of the poem/letter.

The correct identification of the *munera* has also been hindered by a continuing desire to read "muneraque et Musarum . . . et Veneris" as a hendiadys. Though the insuperable difficulties of this approach were pointed out long ago by Prescott,¹⁰ nevertheless the idea has not been finally buried. But the idea of hendiadys is simply untenable. It ignores the formal relationship between "neque . . . nec" (5–8) and the "et . . . et" of line 10; it plainly contradicts the "utriusque" of line 39 (which informs us quite specifically that Catullus, at least, believed he had been asked for two separate items¹¹) and obliterates the elaborate chiasmic structure of the poem.¹²

That scholars are reluctant to abandon the idea of hendiadys derives from a similar reluctance to accept the obvious meaning of the *munus Veneris*. It is consequently necessary to state quite unequivocally that the only possible meaning is an object of sexual gratification.¹³ It is irresponsible of the

⁹ There can be no conclusive evidence that Catullus envisaged 68A as a published poem rather than a private verse letter for Mallius. Nevertheless its comprehensibility as a "finished" work of art must raise doubts as to whether its effect was intended to be limited solely to Mallius. Moreover, the recognition of 68A (by some scholars) as part of the deliberate arrangement of Poems 65–68 (G. W. Most, "On The Arrangement of Catullus' *Carmina Maiora*," *Philol.* 125 [1981] 109–25, T. P. Wiseman, *Catullus and his World* [Cambridge 1985] 159–64, J. Ferguson, "The Arrangement of Catullus' Poems," *LCM* 11 [1986] 18–20) obviously presupposes an intention to publish the poem.

¹⁰ "The Unity of Catullus LXVIII," *TAPA* 71 (1940) 473–500, at 478–79.

¹¹ Nisbet's emendation ("Notes to the Text of Catullus," *PCPS* 204 [1978] 105), *quod tibi non hucusque petenti exempla paravi*, can surely only be acceptable if the idea of hendiadys is unquestionably correct.

¹² For more detailed analysis, cf. Prescott (above, note 10) 478–79.

¹³ A position accepted by Wiseman (above, note 3) 94 ("What Manlius wanted besides poetry . . . was a girl.") and Woodman (above, note 1) 101. T. E. Kinsey, "Some Problems in Catullus 68," *Latomus* 26 (1967) 35–53, at 41–42, introduces a variant to this position: ". . . it would seem that Manlius is trying to open, or perhaps reopen, a homosexual affair with Catullus." This interpretation is also accepted by J. Ferguson (above, note 1) 226: "His friend is making two requests: one for a poem, the other for the renewal of a homosexual affair with Catullus: there is no other explanation of *munera Veneris*. There is a chiasmus—empty bed : old poets :: Catullus's poetry : Catullus in the empty bed."

A homosexual interpretation cannot be lightly dismissed. However, though reference to the *munera Veneris* need not exclude a homosexual context (cf. Sappho fr. 1 etc.), there is no clear indication either that the reader should be led in this direction. "Tempore quo primum vestis mihi tradita pura est, iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret, multa satis lusi" (15–17) evidently refers to sexual activity in general; it need not exclude homosexual involvement, but it clearly does not stress it. Likewise Kinsey's reference to "amicum" (9) and "hospitis" (12) to support this meaning is unconvincing. In "id gratum est mihi, me quoniam tibi dicis amicum" (9) what "gratum est mihi" is that Mallius is treating Catullus

critic to shy away from this meaning through personal aesthetic and moral criteria. The evidence of both Greek and Latin literature demands this meaning and has been widely quoted.¹⁴ The specific meaning of the *munus Veneris* is an integral part of the poem and cannot be left undefined.¹⁵ For it both explains the content of lines 15–26, with their air of sexual renunciation, and points to the likelihood of an erotic reference in the critical lines 27–30.

as an “amicum” by placing confidence in him. “Hospitis officium” is also unlikely to have “an obscene sense.” It is much more likely to be a response to Mallius’ use of the shipwreck metaphor, as noted by Woodman (above, note 1) 101–02. It is also noted by Woodman (104 n. 12) that a homosexual reference loses point if the reader does not believe that the reference to *munera Musarum* is a request for poems written by Catullus: “There is some attractiveness in this thesis [that Mallius had requested Catullus as a homosexual partner] if the *munera* are taken to mean Catullus’ own poetry, for then the poet would be asked to be personally responsible for both requests. But if the request is not for Catullus’ own poetry, as I believe, the theory of homosexuality becomes in my opinion less plausible.”

¹⁴ [Hesiod] *Aspis* 46–47:

παννύχιος δ' ἄρ' ἔλεκτο σὺν αἰδοίῃ παρακοίτι
τερπόμενος δώροισι πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης.

[Homer] *Hymn. Cer.* 101–02:

γῆρὶ παλαιγενεὶ ἐναλίγκιος ἢ τε τόκοιο
εἵργεται δώρων τε φιλοστεφάνου Ἀφροδίτης.

Catullus 61. 224–28:

claudite ostia, virgines:
lusimus satis. at boni
coniuges, bene vivite et
munere assiduo valentem
exercete iuventam.

Catullus 68. 145: sed furtiva dedit mira munuscula nocte.

These references are quoted variously by Ellis (above, note 5) 404–05; Kroll, *Catull* (Berlin 1923) 221; Prescott (above, note 10) 499. A further passage referred to by both the proponents and opponents of hendiadys is Anacreon 96 D:

οὐ φιλέω δς κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέω οἰνοποτάζων
νείκεα καὶ πόλεμον δακρυόεντα λέγει,
ἀλλ' ὅστις Μουσέων τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης
συμμίσγων ἐρατῆς μνήσεται εὐφροσύνης.

C. J. Tuplin, “Catullus 68,” *CQ* 31 (1981) 113–39, cites this poem to support his point that line 10, in isolation, could plausibly mean, “you ask for gifts consisting in love poetry.” Kinsey (previous note) 41 n. 6 has, however, already dealt with this argument by rightly stressing συμμίσγων, which not only indicates that the two items are separate but is also itself representative of sexual activity.

¹⁵ “I assume that the *munera Musarum* meant poetry of some sort, and that the *munera Veneris* meant something different,” Powell (above, note 2) 205–06.

It should also be noted that the very nature of the *munus Veneris* must imply humour.¹⁶ At this point we might consider the possibility that “epistolium” (2) should have already alerted the reader to the introduction of such humour. The diminutive is frequently used in Catullus to suggest irony and a sense of mock-seriousness. This is certainly the case in Poems 3 and 50. In the third poem the forms “miselle,” “ocelli” and “turgiduli” all occur in the last three lines (3. 16–18):

o factum male! o *miselle* passer!
tua nunc opera meae puellae
flendo *turgiduli* rubent *ocelli*.

Here the diminutives serve both to emphasise the absurdity of Lesbia’s grief over such an issue and to put in perspective Catullus’ apparently “tragic” treatment of the incident. Similarly in Poem 50 the diminutive is used to emphasise the frivolity and humour behind the apparently serious façade of physical discomfort: “nec somnus tegetet quiete *ocellos*” (10), “at defessa labore membra postquam / semimortua *lectulo* iacebant” (14–15), “oramus, cave despuas, *ocelle*” (19). The loss of literary activity and intellectual stimulus is jokingly referred to in terms of love-sickness.

The use of the diminutive should alert the reader to the potential for irony and humour in “epistolium.” Parallels can be provided for “epistolium” as a term designating frivolity: This is the case in Apuleius, *Apologia* 6: “Primo igitur legerunt *e ludicris meis epistolium* de dentifricio versibus scriptum.” Two related examples, which also emphasise the erotic associations of “epistolium,” are found in Plutarch:

τὸν δ’ ἀναγνόντα Σερβιλίας τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἐπιστόλιον ἀκόλαστον
πρὸς τὸν Καίσαρα γεγραμμένον, ἐρώσης καὶ διεφθαρμένης ὑπ’
αὐτοῦ. (Plut. *Cato minor* 24. 3)

καὶ τοῦ Καίσαρος τὸ δελτάριον, ὡς εἶχε, τῷ Κάτωνι
προσδόντος, ἀναγνόντα Σερβιλίας τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀκόλαστον
ἐπιστόλιον. (Plut. *Brutus* 5. 4)

That it is the diminutive form which suggests frivolity in these two passages is made clear from reference to the same ἐπιστόλιον as τὸ δελτάριον, γραμματιδίου μικροῦ and τι μικρόν. When the diminutive is

¹⁶ This point is the basis for Woodman’s (above, note 1) 101 perception of humour in the poem: “Manlius cannot have suffered a serious crisis if he expected that a new girl would immediately solve his problems; and asking a friend to send a girl from one area of Italy to another is in itself a humorous notion and presumably not to be taken seriously.”

combined, as in our poem, with a grandiose phrase, "conscriptum hoc lacrimis,"¹⁷ it surely can only have a humorous effect.¹⁸

With the humour and frivolity of Mallius' self-description and his request for a *munus Veneris* (a woman) established, it is time to consider the nature of Catullus' response in lines 15–26. These lines have two basic objectives: first to reveal to Mallius the precise nature of Catullus' "incommoda" (11) and second to demonstrate how Catullus' current position makes him unable to comply with a request for a *munus Veneris*.

Line 15 immediately places us in an erotic context, as the "vestis . . . pura" is defined by erotic rather than political meaning; the assumption of the *toga virilis* symbolically marking the inception of sexual interest. (Line 16, "iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret," clearly indicates that this particular stage in Catullus' life is intended to show the beginning of pleasurable rather than "serious" pursuits.) This context already establishes the probability of "multa satis lusi" as a specific reference to "love-affairs," and this inference is further confirmed by the appearance of Venus in lines 17–18, "non est dea nescia nostri/ quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem."

Though it is tempting to see a possible literary reference in "lusi,"¹⁹ there are nevertheless good reasons for the exclusion of such a reference. An examination of the use of *ludere* in Catullus reveals that the only place where this verb implies poetic composition is in Poem 50. But, as we have already seen, this poem humorously equates literary and erotic experience. As Wiseman notes, "the imagery is deliberately *erotic*,"²⁰ and therefore the use of *ludere* in this poem cannot be cited as support for a general meaning of the verb, "to compose poetry." Even though it may be argued that "non est dea nescia nostri/ quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem" (17–18) need not emphasise the lover at the expense of the poet,²¹ there is nevertheless a clinching argument in the careful structuring of lines 31–33:

ignoscas igitur si, quae mihi luctus ademit,
haec tibi non tribuo munera, cum nequeo.
nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me, . . .

¹⁷ A phrase which, as Ellis (above, note 5) 403 rightly stresses, means "not tear-stained but written in tears instead of ink."

¹⁸ Thus Powell's assertion (above, note 2) 204 that non-serious interpretations of Mallius' letter must be excluded as being "too frivolous" to be consistent with the tone of "conscriptum hoc lacrimis" is quite invalid.

¹⁹ Cf. C. W. Macleod, "A Use of Myth in Ancient Poetry," *CQ* 24 (1974) 82–93, at 84 n. 5.

²⁰ Wiseman (above, note 3) 92 n. 27.

²¹ So Prescott (above, note 10) 480: "Even the immediately following allusion to the goddess of bitter-sweet love with whom Catullus is not unacquainted may seem to our opponents [supporters of hendiadys] ambiguous and applicable to a composer of love-poetry as easily as to a lover."

The effect of these lines is to polarise the content of lines 15–30 (27–30 being attached to 15–26 by the consequential force of “quare” in line 27) from that of 33–36. “Igitur” (31) looks backwards to the content of 15–26; line 32, “haec tibi non tribuo munera, cum nequeo,” summarizes the total effect of the whole of 15–36; and “nam” (35) looks forward to the content of 33–35, Catullus’ reason for refusing to provide the *munus Musarum*. The precision of this structure makes the idea of any literary reference in “lusi” misplaced.

Although Catullus’ emphasis on the sexual aspect of his life may appear to be leading him towards compliance with Mallius’ request, this impression is simultaneously countered by the poet’s specific reference to past situations that are no longer applicable. Catullus certainly would have been the right person to approach in this matter, but he is no longer. The sense is clear and concisely expressed; so “tempore quo primum” (15) signifies the beginning of a past preoccupation, “satis lusi” (17) establishes that this past is finished with, and “sed” (19) points forward to a new reality. Catullus quickly introduces the reason for this new situation: “sed totum hoc studium luctu fraterna mihi mors / abstulit” (19–20). The death of his brother has removed his capacity to enjoy relations with the opposite sex, “totum hoc studium” referring back to “tempore quo primum . . . multa satis lusi” (15–17).

The introduction of “death” as the basis for Catullus’ position is significant. For it is by the use of this imagery that he will demonstrate to Mallius the disparity of their respective situations.²² Mallius has expressed the nature of his own insignificant erotic desertion in the terms of death imagery (dependant on “naufragum” in line 3); hence his request to be rescued “a mortis limine” (4) and his enforced stay in a “lecto caelibe” (6, where “caelibe” is potentially not only “bachelor” but also “widowed”). For Catullus, however, the imagery of death is not a form of frivolous exaggeration but an expression of harsh reality. Restatement and intensification of this imagery would be ruinously inappropriate if Mallius’ complaint had been seriously expressed. But, faced with a Mallius who communicates in this humorous and exaggerated manner, this same technique becomes a necessary and effective means of both explaining his own situation and pointing out the incongruity of Mallius’ request.

²² Contra Tuplin (above, note 14) 115, who argues that, “The loss of the brother is thus deliberately made to seem of the same sort as the loss that Mallius has sustained,” and, “In short, Catullus is showing Mallius that his own position was exactly like Mallius’—only very much worse.” But this argument seems to be based on a striking contradiction, for Catullus’ situation cannot be “exactly like” and “very much worse” than Mallius’.

To this end Catullus emphasises the intensity and reality of his loss by repeated apostrophe, "*o misero frater adempte mihi, / tu mea tu moriens fregisti commoda, frater*" (20–21), and by a stress on the completeness of his loss and the causal link between his brother's death and the misery of his present situation (21–26):

tu mea tu moriens *fregisti commoda*,²³ frater,
 tecum *una tota* est nostra sepulta domus,
omnia tecum *una* perierunt *gaudia* nostra
 quae tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.
 cuius ego interitu *tota* de mente fugavi
 haec studia atque omnes delicias animi. 25

Although the reader may sense a movement away from the specifically erotic reference of "*totum hoc studium*" (19) to a wider area of influence, "*omnia . . . gaudia*" (23) and "*haec studia atque omnes delicias animi*," this should not be seen as a confirmation of deliberate ambiguity in "*multa satis lusi*." Such expansion is simply necessary to indicate the generality of misery that has descended on Catullus. "*Haec studia*" and "*omnes delicias animi*" are expressive of pleasure in general. Obviously Catullus cannot realistically limit the effect of his brother's death simply to the removal of his love-life. It has to have a more generally depressive effect but at the same time he is forced to emphasise one particular aspect, as the one that specifically prevents him from providing a *munus Veneris*. The possibility of the expansiveness of "*haec studia*" and "*omnes delicias animi*" having a literary, rather than an emotional, basis is further precluded by the structure of 31–33 (see above).

So certain basic parameters have been established: Mallius' description of his own state is deliberately exaggerated (and his request for *munera* is inevitably implicated in this frivolity); Mallius has misjudged, or is, rather, unaware of Catullus' true situation (i.e. he knows that Catullus is in Verona but he does not know why) and consequently seeks the impossible, "a

²³ "*Fregisti commoda*" forms an obvious rhetorical link back to line 11, "*sed tibi ne mea sint ignota incommoda, Malli*." This link does rather more than merely establish the dependance of Catullus' "*incommoda*" upon his brother's death. It may, in fact, be possible, given the likely proximity of lines 1–10 to the actual words of Mallius' letter, that Mallius had himself used the phrase "*mea incommoda*" to describe the consequences of his situation and to explain his specific requests from Catullus ("*muneraque et Musarum . . . et Veneris*"). Catullus then initiates his refusal of Mallius' requests by informing him that he has in fact "*incommoda*" of his own. The effectiveness of "*sed tibi ne mea sint ignota incommoda, Malli*" would naturally be considerably enhanced by the reapplication of Mallius' own words. Moreover the essential difference between Mallius' and Catullus' "*incommoda*" is more poignantly expressed by the existence of an apparent point of similarity. For the "*incommoda*" of both men force them into a celibate state, but their reasons for this enforced celibacy are quite disparate.

misero dona beata" (14); the basis of the poem is Catullus' attempt to demonstrate the reality of his own distress and the extent of Mallius' misconception; and finally lines 15–26 state his inability to provide a *munus Veneris* and establish the reason for his refusal, the death of his brother.

These considerations have to be borne in mind as the reader approaches the much-debated lines 27–30:

quare, quod scribis "Veronae turpe, Catulle,
esse," quod hic quisquis de meliore nota
frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili.
id, Malli, non est turpe, magis miserum est.²⁴

"Quare," as shown above, indicates a close thematic link with the content of lines 15–26. In the light of the consequential force of "quare" it is justifiable to make two assumptions: first that 27–30 deal with the same subject matter as 15–26, the *munus Veneris*; second that they are further designed to display and emphasise the disparity of Catullus' and Mallius' respective positions (which has been the central point of the preceding section).

Before analysing the effect of 27–30 it is necessary to establish the correctness of the punctuated version of these lines shown above. The problem of whether "hic" (28) refers to Catullus' or Mallius' current location is of fundamental importance, for it not only defines the extent of Mallius' direct speech but also has a radical effect on the reader's entire perception of the poem. (The meaning of 27–30 must alter drastically²⁵ according to whether "hic" is a reference to Catullus in Verona or to Mallius in Rome.)

A detailed reading of the poem will reveal an elegant tripartite use of "hic," as a means of reference to Catullus in Verona, and an explicit contrast between the use of "hic" in this sense and the use of "illic" in line 35. The first reference is in line 10, "muneraque et Musarum *hinc* petis et Veneris," where "hinc" is an explicit reference to Catullus in Verona, from where Mallius seeks his *munera*. Similarly in line 36, "*huc* una ex multis capsula me sequitur," "huc" refers to Verona, the place to which Catullus has gone. "Hic" (28) would naturally stand within this pattern as a reference to Verona, the place where Catullus currently is. Each of these positional references is also accompanied by a different temporal aspect: "Hinc" (10) is defined by the future, the place Mallius envisions his gifts will come from; "hic" is

²⁴ The punctuation indicates what I believe is the correct reading.

²⁵ It is surely inadvisable therefore to leave the resolution of the meaning of "hic" to simply a matter of personal preference: "There are linguistic arguments, but not decisive ones, on both sides . . . Accordingly, which text we adopt depends primarily on whether we think it is at Verona, or at the place where Mallius is writing from, that all the best people are warming their cold limbs in a deserted bed," Powell (above, note 2) 203.

rooted in the present, referring to Catullus' current emotional condition; and "huc" (36) is detailed by past action,²⁶ Catullus' initial move to Verona. "Hic" then is the pivotal point of this structure, defining both Catullus' spatial and emotional position.

This use of "hic" stands in explicit contrast to the meaning of "illa . . . illa . . . illic" in lines 34–35,

hoc fit, quod Romae vivimus: *illa domus,*
illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas,

where "illa . . . illa . . . illic" are all defined by the locative "Romae," the place where Catullus is not. The reader is then left to conclude that the extent of Mallius' direct speech must be limited to "Veronae turpe, Catulle, esse," for if "hic" has to be a reference to Verona it cannot be part of Mallius' direct speech, since Mallius, wherever he may be, is clearly not himself in Verona. Direct speech ends after "esse" (28), and "quod" (28) then introduces Mallius' speech as reported by Catullus, "quod hic . . . cubili" (28–29). The portions of direct and reported speech combine to indicate *what* precisely Mallius believes to be shameful, Catullus' very presence in Verona ("Veronae turpe, Catulle, esse"), and *why* he thinks it is shameful ("quod hic quisquis de meliore nota / frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili"). "Id" (30) then initiates Catullus' judgement of Mallius' reproach.

The basis of Catullus' statement, "id, Malli, non est turpe, magis miserum est" (30), is plain enough: The reason his stay at Verona is not "turpe" but "miserum" is the death of his brother. This still leaves us with the problem, however, why Mallius should believe Catullus' stay in Verona to be "turpe." Catullus, of course has already stated Mallius' reason in lines 28–29 (quoted above), but this has only served to further diversify critical opinion.²⁷

²⁶ Although Mallius made his request in the past and "petis" (10) is a present tense, nevertheless the question of whether or not Catullus will provide the *munera* is clearly rooted in the future. Likewise in line 36 the verb which accompanies "huc" is a present tense, "sequitur," but must indicate a past action since Catullus is already in Verona: "Verona turpe, Catulle, esse."

²⁷ Ellis (above, note 5) 406–07 suggests two basic possibilities: (i) "It is disgraceful for Catullus to be at Verona, because here (i.e. at Rome, or perhaps Baiae) everyone of any fashion has been warming the limbs that lie cold on a forsaken bed,' i.e. has consoled Lesbia for Catullus' absence by becoming in turns her paramour." (ii) "It is disgraceful to Catullus to be at Verona, because in Verona every man of fashion is condemned to freeze on a solitary bed,' i.e. is unable to follow the pursuits of a man of pleasure." Powell (above, note 2) 205 proposes a speculative rift between Lesbia and Catullus: "It is a shame for you to rush off to Verona (just because you have been deserted by Lesbia). Don't you realise that, here, everybody who is anybody (including, of course myself) has been deserted by his lady friend, and is at this very moment trying to warm his frozen limbs in a deserted bed." Kinsey (above, note 13) 41 opts for a homosexual explanation: "Or does 'hic' refer

It is helpful to approach this problem within the context of the poem's structure. The poem is built around various expositions of disparity. Mallius himself has assumed a disparity, but this is one of a "miser" Mallius and a "beatus" Catullus. This impression has to be removed, even reversed, by Catullus. He has to show himself as the one who is "miser" in a real rather than superficial way. This has already been achieved in part by the revelation of his brother's death. Catullus, however, can most effectively expose Mallius' frivolous humour as incongruous by forcing Mallius' words back upon him.

As lines 27–30 are linked (by "quare") to the content of 15–26, with their focus on the *munus Veneris*, "turpe" must also be explicable within this context. Mallius in Rome²⁸ states that he is abandoned and sleeping on his own ("desertum in lecto caelibae," 6). The identification of the *munus Veneris* as a woman and his request for the same from Catullus must emphasise two things: first that he believes Catullus is in a position to comply with this request (i.e. he believes Catullus has no shortage of women to sleep with in Verona) and second that it is the general condition of being "desertus" that is problematic and *not* the loss of one specific partner. The application of "turpe" in this sense must imply that Mallius regards it as "shameful" that he is forced to sleep on his own when Catullus is not. Indeed, Mallius' request for a *munus Veneris* (a woman) not only assumes that Catullus is not sleeping on his own but (within the general tone of Mallius' exaggerated humour) hints at a belief that Catullus has in fact his own personal harem in Verona.

to Rome and is Manlius suggesting that Catullus should return to Rome and help him to attain the *munera Veneris*?" Wiseman (above, note 3) 100 prefers to see "turpe" (as defined by Mallius) as a reference to Catullus' inability to indulge himself in Verona: "Therefore (*quare*), his stay in a town where the élite did not sleep around with the same freedom as in Rome (or so at least he makes out for the sake of his argument), was not a disgraceful abdication of his normal way of life, as Manlius had implied, but proof of his genuine misery." Woodman (above, note 1) 101 on the other hand takes it that Mallius' "turpe" signifies that he believes Catullus is having more luck with his love-life in Verona than Mallius is in Rome: "The sense of these notoriously difficult lines seems to me to be: 'As for your writing "How shocking it is, Catullus, <for you> to be in Verona," the fact that here all the best people can still warm their limbs even when their beds have been deserted is, Manlius, not shocking but sad.' In other words, I take it that Manlius had employed a humorous and ironical way of saying that there was a surplus of girls in Verona."

²⁸ In fact there is no specific evidence that Mallius is in Rome. But Catullus' emphasis on the disparity between his present situation at Verona (where he is mourning his brother's death) and his former life at Rome, "quod Romae vivimus" (where "vivimus" symbolises life's pleasures and contrasts with the oppressiveness and inactivity of Verona), suggests that Catullus may well be reversing an image that Mallius has projected, an image of himself miserable in Rome and Catullus having a good time in Verona.

When "turpe" is applied in this sense it gains a suitable sense of mock moral indignation. Mallius berates Catullus for doing precisely what he himself wants to do. This argument presupposes that the effect of "deserto" (29) is quite different from that of "desertum" in line 6. The structure of the poem makes this a valid assumption: "Desertum" (6) is Mallius' reference to his own situation whereas "deserto" is his reported reference to Catullus' situation. Given that Mallius has assumed a disparity between their respective positions, the effect of the word in each instance must be different. So far from this "clear rhetorical link" being used to emphasise the parallel nature of their suffering²⁹ it rather demonstrates the extent of Mallius' misconception.

None of this argument will stand, however, if there is no possibility of an active sexual meaning in lines 28–29:

... quod hic quisquis de meliore nota
frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili.

This possibility is vigorously denied by Powell: "If you are warming cold limbs in a deserted bed, it means that you are sleeping alone." But, as shown above, the basic theme of contrast throughout the poem (Mallius' misconception of Catullus' position and Catullus' attempt to reverse this impression) must alert the reader to the probability of a different point of reference in "deserto" (29) from "desertum" in line 6.

The hypothesis that "tepefactat" is an allusion to sexual activity³⁰ may be supported by reference to Ovid, *Heroides* 1. 7, where Penelope complains that, if Ulysses had not departed, "non ego deserto iacuissem frigida lecto." Two things are made clear here, first that she is "frigida" precisely because Ulysses is not with her and second that she envisions her limbs being returned to a more temperate state by his return.

It may, however, be argued that a state of being "tepidus" represents a degree of heat that is warm rather than hot.³¹ But "tepidus" indicates an intermediary stage between the extremes of "frigidus" and "calidus." So

²⁹ Cf. Powell (above, note 2) 205.

³⁰ A possibility that Powell (above, note 2) 205, in accordance with a serious interpretation, will not allow: "Mallius is not warming his limbs with the assistance of a second party, but by wrapping the blankets around them; it is surprising that scholars should be unwilling to accept this as a legitimate way of warming the limbs." The reader may, however, note that although the warming properties of blankets cannot be denied, nevertheless, their desirability as a heating agent is surely rather circumscribed within an erotic context. Moreover, it is inherently unlikely that Mallius is complaining about the superior quality of Veronese blankets.

³¹ So Ellis (above, note 5) 407, on the benefits of a "celibate" reading of lines 28–29: "This has the advantage of giving *tepefacere* its proper meaning of slightly, as opposed to thoroughly, warming."

although it can be used to indicate a decline in erotic feeling ("Fac timeat de te, tepidamque recalface mentem"³²), it may also display an intermediate stage in the ascent, a progressive state, moving from "frigidus" towards "calidus." "Frigidus" is naturally applied to two "erotic" conditions, virginity and widowhood:

nec tenerum Lycidam mirabere, quo calet iuventus
nunc omnis et mox *virgines tepebunt*.³³

"Tepebunt" is not, I believe, contrasted with "calet" to demonstrate the relative intensity of male and female sexuality. Rather, it indicates the inception of female sexual awareness that will be consequent upon Lycidas' arrival at manhood. In this sense "tepebunt" is contrasted with the already developed homosexual interest, "calet," that accompanies Lycidas' pubescent state.³⁴ A movement away from a state of being "frigidus" is also a natural consequence of remarriage:

ipsam iam cedere sensi
inque vicem tepuisse viro.³⁵

Widowhood is a form (albeit enforced) of erotic desertion and consequently returns the sufferer to a state of being "frigidus." The reactivation of a love-life, the movement away from "frigidus," is here implicit in the infinitive "tepuisse."

Less permanent forms of desertion, such as separation or simple lack of sexual activity, will also result in "frigida membra":

frigidus in viduo destituere toro.³⁶
frigida deserto nocte iacebis anus.³⁷

³² Ovid, *Ars* 2. 445, quoted by Kroll (above, note 14) 223 and restated by Wiseman (above, note 3) 100.

³³ Horace, *C.* 1. 4. 19-20.

³⁴ This gives point to Nisbet and Hubbard's remark (*A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book 1* [Oxford 1970] 72), "*tepebunt*: less strong than *calet*" and to their explanation: "He illustrates the lapse of years by remarking that Lycidas will soon be loved by women instead of men." Stinton's objection to this point ("Horatian Echoes," *Phoenix* 31 [1977] 162), "But if this is the only point, why did Horace write *tepebunt* not *calebunt*?" does not take account of the "temporal" aspect of the poem or the progressive status of "tepebunt." The verb thus represents something that presently ("mox") will begin to happen and is depicted in its initial stages so as to contrast with the fully-developed (but precarious) nature of present events.

³⁵ Statius, *Silv.* 1. 2. 139-40, quoted by Nisbet and Hubbard (previous note) 72.

³⁶ Ovid, *Am.* 3. 5. 42.

³⁷ Ovid, *Ars* 3. 70; this and the previous example are both quoted by Powell (above, note 2) 205.

"Tepebunt," then, in connection with "frigida . . . membra," in a specifically erotic context, must be an indication of sexual activity. In particular it indicates sexual activity for someone who, for whatever reason, has been recently inactive in this department. The point that Mallius must be making is that, if he were in Catullus' position (i.e. in Verona), he would have no problem in finding suitable female company; his limbs need not remain "frigida deserto . . . cubili."

The use of the frequentative verb need not, as Wiseman says, "suggest that the warming was not very successful, and that 'everyone of quality' was in bed alone" ([above, note 3] 100). Rather, the frequentative verb indicates that "everyone of quality"³⁸ could successfully warm their limbs, even when deserted, anytime that they pleased. *Tepefactare* with its idea of repeated action thus links explicitly to the idea of "copia" (39–40)³⁹ and its association of fruitful abundance. Mallius has suggested that there is an abundance ("copia") of suitable girls in Verona. This must be what Mallius is alleging is "turpe": that Catullus should be surrounded by sexual opportunity when he himself is forced to sleep "in lecto caelibe" (6).

But is this reconstruction tenable? Why should Mallius assume that women were more readily available in Verona?⁴⁰ Can we possibly credit the idea that Mallius is asking Catullus to send him a girl from Verona? To be drawn into the question of Veronese morality (whether one believes "tepefactat" has a sexual point of reference or not) is to miss the point at issue.⁴¹ Verona simply represents where Catullus is and Mallius is not. Catullus' exact location is relatively unimportant (at least to Mallius): Mallius merely wants to point out that he believes Catullus is having a

³⁸ The approbatory nature of "quisquis de meliore nota" may in itself lead the reader to expect some positive rather than negative action taking place in "frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili."

³⁹ The reference to "copia" (33, 40) makes Tuplin's idea (above, note 14) 115, that the *munus Veneris* is a request "for help in getting back the girl he loves," unlikely. (Powell is presumably alluding to Tuplin's argument when he writes, "Perhaps Mallius asked Catullus to intervene and try to persuade his errant mistress to return.") "Copia" in this sense would have to mean, "much influence," which goes ill with the sense of plurality and abundance that is inherent in "copia" in lines 33 and 40 ("nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me").

⁴⁰ It is perhaps possible to see this improbable assumption as yet another attempt to establish the wretchedness of his position. He may in effect be saying, "Here I am in Rome (all alone), where you might expect it would be easy for a deserted man to find another woman and there you are, Catullus, in Verona (that provincial backwater) and still having a good time."

⁴¹ The reference of Poem 67 to Veronese immorality (though surely not in an entirely serious or generally applicable sense) may be seen as leading the reader into the expectation of some form of sexual misconduct in lines 27–30 of 68A. However this draws us into the contentious questions of whether and by whom the Catullan collection was deliberately arranged.

good time when he himself is not. Mallius' point would presumably have been similarly phrased wherever Catullus may have been. That Mallius' censure is essentially humorous is stressed by the extravagance of his claim: the generality of "quisquis de meliore nota" and the exaggeration of the frequentative verb "tepefactat." Catullus and not Verona is the target of Mallius' humour.

Mallius' expression, then, in 27-30 is perfectly in keeping with the frivolity of the opening ten lines. His request for a *munus Veneris* is in itself deliberately humorous. He cannot seriously expect Catullus to send him a woman from Verona. But such an improbable request is certainly compatible with the polarity of their respective positions that Mallius has created: a wretchedly miserable, sex-starved Mallius in Rome and a wildly fortunate Catullus, sitting amidst his harem in Verona. This use of humour and the obvious frivolity of Mallius' tone combine to exclude the need to defend the concepts of *communio amicae* or the free movement of women for erotic purposes around the Roman world.⁴²

⁴² These ideas are not, however, necessarily untenable. *Communio amicae* cannot be rejected on the grounds of "emotional involvement," as Powell (above, note 2) 206 insists: "It is not squeamishness about the idea of such trafficking that leads one to reject the hypothesis, but the fact that it presupposes a cynical and commercial attitude which is totally at odds with the emotional involvement of both Catullus and Mallius as displayed in the poem." This assumes a similarity between the emotional states of Mallius and Catullus that the poem clearly does not display. Similarly, Powell's statement, "Roman convention appears to have been that such things could have been offered, but not asked for without breach of propriety," is unconvincing. For the account of Pompey and Flora in Plutarch (*Pomp.* 2. 3) clearly indicates that it is not Geminus who is acting in a peculiar fashion by asking for a share in Flora's favours but Pompey in refusing to have anything to do with her thereafter and Flora herself for being upset about this state of affairs. (Cf. Wiseman [above, note 3] 95, "the surprising fact which made the story worth telling was that one of the principals involved was not prepared to co-operate.") The activities of another lady, Cytheris, are also interesting in this context, and in particular her movement between M. Antonius and Volumnius: "She first appears in Antony's retinue in May 49 . . . greeted as Volumnia . . . When late in 46 Cicero saw Cytheris at the dinner-table of her patronus Volumnius . . . she may have gone back to her old lover: the ingratiating Volumnius appears later as a protégé of Antony (*RE IX A*, 878 f.), and presumably had lent him the lady in the first place" (R. D. Anderson, P. J. Parsons and R. G. M. Nisbet, "Elegiacs by Gallus from Qasr Ibrim," *JRS* 69 [1979] 125-55, at 152-53).

Neither can the notion of a courtesan travelling from a man at point A to a man at point B be simply dismissed. This idea may be present in *Eclogue* 10. 22-23, in connection with Gallus, Lycoris and another: "'Galle, quid insanis?' inquit, 'tua cura Lycoris / perque nives alium perque horrida castra secuta est.'" The sense of "secuta est" is unclear: "followed" or "accompanied." Possible clarification is available in lines 46-47: "Alpinas a, dura, nives et frigora Rheni / me sine sola vides." But again it is uncertain whether "sola" has a general (on her own) or a specific (without Gallus) point of reference. Of course none of this evidence is conclusive, but it does at least raise some interesting possibilities.

Lines 27–30 form a natural progression from the preceding section. In 15–26 Catullus deals with his brother's death in elaborate and expressive depth. So, when he quotes and reports Mallius' words back to him in 27–30, the ruinously inappropriate nature of his frivolous humour is readily apparent (both to Mallius and to us). Catullus need not do more than state the obvious: "id, Malli, non est turpe, magis miserum est." The point is achieved with devastating economy.

This effect of pregnant brevity is continued in lines 31–32:

*ignosces igitur si, quae mihi luctus ademit,
haec tibi non tribuo munera, cum nequeo.*

"Ignosces igitur" is a piece of studied politeness, for there can now be little doubt about the propriety of Catullus' refusal. This point is further emphasised by "quae mihi luctus ademit," forcibly reminding the reader (again the effect is the same for us as it is for Mallius) of the emotional intensity of 19–26: "sed totum hoc studium luctu fraterna mihi mors / abstulit. o misero frater *adempte* mihi" (19–20).

This conciseness of expression⁴³ appears to continue into Catullus' basic excuse for the non-provision of the *munus Musarum*: "nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me, / hoc fit, quod Romae vivimus:

⁴³ The emphatic repetition (34–35) of "*illa domus, illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas*" appears, however, to conflict with the matter-of-fact expression of the rest of lines 33–36. This may lead the reader to suspect that its reference is not merely confined to Catullus' shortage of books in Verona. Further examination will suggest that the intensity of its expression (especially "*illic mea carpitur aetas*") helps to emphasise the fuller implications of "Romae vivimus." The meaning of this phrase is expanded outside of its immediate context (lines 33–36, where it simply applies to Catullus being separated from his library in Rome), and becomes, instead, indicative of the habitual pleasures of Catullus' life at Rome. This inevitably contrasts with the depression and misery of his current situation in Verona. This change of emphasis once more suggests to Mallius the unsuitability of his simplistic dichotomy: good times for Catullus in Verona, hard times for Mallius in Rome. The effect of "*illa domus, illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas*" is however more wide-ranging. For it effectively compresses and summarises the whole content of the poem within the space of nine words. "Domus" is a reference to Catullus' house in Rome and more specifically in this context to his library in that house. His separation from that house and his library makes the provision of a *munus Musarum* impossible. "Illa mihi sedes" is a reactivation of the *hospes*-theme and provides an explanation as to why Catullus is unable to comply with either request. By not being in his normal *sedes* (the link between *sedes* and the role of *hospes* is demonstrated at 64. 176, "*consilia in nostris requiesset sedibus hospes!*") Catullus is effectively excused from being required to perform the "*hospitis officium*" (12) that would normally be due to a "naufragum" (3). "*Illic mea carpitur aetas*" links back to line 16, "*iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret*," and its context of erotic pleasure. However, the enjoyment of these pleasures, which are a habitual part of Catullus' life in Rome ("Romae vivimus") is precluded from Verona by circumstance (the death of his brother) and so there is no possibility of Catullus' providing a *munus Veneris* from Verona.

... / ... huc una ex multis⁴⁴ capsula me sequitur" (33–36). He lives at Rome, he hasn't brought many books⁴⁵ with him and so isn't in a position to send any to Mallius.

That the *munus Veneris* should be dealt with so fully in lines 15–30 and the *munus Musarum* so briefly (33–36) is not in itself surprising. For it is the *munus Veneris* which affords Catullus the best opportunity to demonstrate the true nature of his own position. Conversely the act of lending a book does not suppose or depend upon any particular emotional state.

The final four lines of the poem are once more affecting in their restraint:

quod cum ita sit, nolim statuas nos mente maligna
id facere aut animo non satis ingenuo,
quod tibi non utriusque petenti copia posta est:
ultra ego deferrem, copia siqua foret.

40

It is perfectly clear by now that Catullus' refusal can hardly be due to "mente maligna" or "animo non satis ingenuo." But, in spite of the unfortunate blunder that Mallius has made and circumstances that might dictate a rather brusque reply (or no reply at all), Catullus handles himself with remarkable composure. Mallius is informed, not rebuked.

The reference in the final line to the possibility of Catullus' complying with Mallius' requests, "ultra ego deferrem, copia siqua foret," should not be seen to invalidate the frivolous nature of the *munus Veneris* that has been suggested in this paper. Catullus is merely responding to Mallius within the terms of the latter's humour. It is Mallius who has suggested that a "copia" of books and a "copia" of women are concepts that are on the same level and are both something that can be transported with equal facility.

Catullus exploits Mallius' humour to the full. Mallius' request for a *munus Veneris*, with its attendant emotional emphasis (albeit frivolous in this instance), provides Catullus with the perfect opportunity to inform Mallius of his own situation: The harshness of Catullus' real misery is

⁴⁴ Again an obvious rhetorical link exists between "una ex multis capsula" (36) and "multa satis lusi" in line 17. Both link to the idea of Catullus' usual abundance of these items in contrast to his current shortage in the present circumstances. The affirmation of a lack of books is specifically stated in line 33, "nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me," and the shortage of both commodities is covered in the final two lines of the poem, "quod tibi non utriusque petenti copia posta est: / ultra ego deferrem, copia siqua foret." The link between a shortage of reading material and the lack of someone to sleep with is of course a product of Mallius' humour. Catullus is able, however, to respond to this equation because his own radical suffering has ironically produced exactly the same circumstances (a lack of books and enforced celibacy).

⁴⁵ For my belief that the *munus Musarum* must be a reference to books rather than poetry written by Catullus, compare these lines with Kinsey (above, note 13) 38–40 and Woodman (above, note 1) 100.

expressed all the more effectively against the backdrop of Mallius' humorously exaggerated problems.

The whole poem, then, is built around an effective contrast between Mallius' misfortunes, which are superficial and exaggerated for humorous effect, and the very real nature of Catullus' distress at the death of his brother. Catullus does not treat Mallius dismissively (for his blunder is unintentional), but he nevertheless makes his situation perfectly clear and emphasises the inappropriateness of Mallius' overstated imagery at this particular moment. This emphasis is achieved by the reapplication of Mallius' imagery to himself (the shipwreck metaphor, the closeness to death and enforced sexual inactivity), and by quoting Mallius' words back at him. This latter technique is especially effective after Catullus has created a context in lines 15–26 which forces Mallius into recognition of his error.

As a letter, 68A conforms to its generic parameters by conveying information that is unknown to the recipient (the death of Catullus' brother) and by being (or at least seeming to be) specifically tailored to the nature of the addressee (a friend who through unavoidable ignorance uses humour, which at other times would have been appreciated, in a wholly inappropriate situation). As a poem, 68A does not exclude the general reader from its meaning. All the information that is needed is there and is perfectly explicable.⁴⁶ Its success "as a poem" depends both on this accessibility to a wider audience and on its particular and personal expression reaching a more universal level. This is achieved not only by the reader's being able to identify with the emotional intensity of bereavement and the unpredictability of life, but also, as this poem's particular expression shows, by recognition of the inadequate and unreliable medium of human communication.⁴⁷

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⁴⁶ One of the most regrettable aspects of Powell's article (above, note 2) is the reintroduction of Lesbia (the King Charles' Head of Catullan interpretation) as a basis for interpretation. The fallacy of Lesbia's presence in this poem is perhaps one of the few major areas of agreement in the recent critical tradition. The idea is rejected explicitly or implicitly excluded by all of Kinsey, Wiseman, Tuplin and Woodman. For those who believe in the division of Catullus 68 into two quite separate poems the reintroduction of Lesbia into 68A can only be a regressive step in the analysis of the poem.

⁴⁷ I should like to thank Dr. J. L. Moles and Professor A. J. Woodman of the University of Durham for their invaluable assistance in the production of this article.

Love, Lovesickness, and Melancholia¹

PETER TOOHEY

Love, lovesickness, and melancholia, these three terms have not always enjoyed the banal symbiosis that they do in our era.² Love was not always associated with lovesickness.³ Yet on occasion it could be. Love's onset, especially if unconsummated, often brought lovesickness; and once this

¹ This paper was read to the 26th Congress of the Australian Universities Language and Literature Association in Perth, February 1991, and to the staff seminar of the School of Archaeology, Classics, and Ancient History at the University of Sydney, May 1991. My gratitude to both audiences. Professor Beryl Rawson helped with bibliography and provided me copies of her pieces from *Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome*, ed. Beryl Rawson (Canberra and Oxford 1991). Professor Herwig Maehler kindly posted me a copy of his article, "Syptome der Liebe im Roman und in der griechischen Anthologie," in *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel*, ed. Heinz Hofmann, 3 (1990) 1-12. Dr. Suzanne MacAlister assisted me with Aristotle and the novelists; Mr. Robert Baker with Propertius and the elegists. To Professor David Konstan I owe an especial debt; he has corrected and clarified my argument on many points.

² The following works are cited by author's name and date of publication: D. A. Beecher and M. Ciavolella (eds. and trans.), *Jacques Ferrand. A Treatise on Lovesickness* (Syracuse 1990) (= Beecher and Ciavolella 1990); S. W. Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times* (New Haven 1986) (= Jackson 1986); R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art* (London 1964) (= Klibansky 1964); J. Pigeaud, *Folie et cures de la folie chez les médecins de l'antiquité greco-romaine: "la manie"* (Paris 1987) (= Pigeaud 1987); P. Toohey, "Some Ancient Notions of Boredom," *ICS* 13 (1988) 151-64 (= Toohey 1988), and "Some Ancient Histories of Literary Melancholia," *ICS* 15 (1990) 143-61 (= Toohey 1990a), and "Acedia in Late Classical Antiquity," *ICS* 15 (1990) 339-52 (= Toohey 1990b); M. F. Wack, *Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: The "Viaticum" and its Commentaries* (Philadelphia 1990) (= Wack 1990).

³ On lovesickness generally Wack 1990 cites: H. H. Biersterfeldt and D. Gutas, "The Malady of Love," *JAOS* 104 (1984) 21-55; H. Chrohn, "Zur Geschichte der Liebe als 'Krankheit'," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 3 (1905) 66-86; M. Ciavolella, "La Tradizione dell' 'aegritudo amoris' nel 'Decameron'," *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana* 147 (1970) 496-517, and *La "malattia d'amore" dall' Antichità al Medioevo* (Rome 1976); A. Giedke, *Die Liebeskrankheit in der Geschichte der Medizin* (diss. med. Düsseldorf 1983); E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*³ (Leipzig 1914); H. Schadewaldt, "Der *Morbus amatorius* aus medizinhistorischer Sicht," in *Das Ritterbild in Mittelalter und Renaissance* (Düsseldorf 1985) 87-104; J. J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York 1990).

*pestis*⁴ was established its frustration could easily induce a viral recurrence.⁵ Nor was lovesickness necessarily associated with melancholia. Yet, at least in the eyes of some, an attack of lovesickness could not easily be distinguished from an attack of depressive melancholia. The focus of this paper will be on the tenuous relationship among these three conditions, but especially on lovesickness⁶ and melancholy.⁷

Why? It is a matter of origins and precedents. The combination of these emotions represents a powerful theme for Western literature, if not always Western experience. The theme was especially prominent in the literature of the Middle Ages.⁸ During that period the literary theme of lovesickness, assuming the proportions almost of a textual epidemic, received considerable medical attention.⁹ In this paper some of the more prominent ancient examples of lovesickness will be examined. The questions repeatedly to be asked are: Do these examples, first, have any basis in ancient medical thought and, second, do they have any resemblance to medieval and modern love-melancholy?

Three tentative conclusions will be offered. First, the depressed, fretting, passive, and physically ill lover (sometimes termed the love-melancholic), though present in ancient literature, is more a cliché of medieval and modern literary experience. The dominant reaction to frustrated love in ancient literature was manic and frequently violent. Second, lovesickness, in its literary depictions, mirrors the distinctions which the ancient medical writers posited for melancholia itself: There was a depressive type and there was a manic type. Third, the depressive variety of lovesickness becomes more frequent late in antiquity, perhaps during the first century after Christ. (Thus it is coeval with the "literary discovery" of depression.)¹⁰ The form my discussion will take is as follows. After a brief outline of the prevailing ancient medical interpretations of lovesickness (Section I), illustrations will be provided of the corresponding literary

⁴ Virgil's word; Dido is apostrophized at A. 1. 712 thus: *praecipue infelix, pesti devota futurae*. Compare Val. Fl. *Arg.* 7. 125. Here a feverish lap dog is being compared to lovesick Medea: *aegra nova iam peste canis rabieque futura*.

⁵ By, for example, rejection, enforced separation, jealousy, or being cuckolded.

⁶ There have been a number of terms used for this condition. Jackson (1986, 352) lists the following: love-melancholy (Robert Burton's term), lovesickness, love-madness, *amor hereos*, *amor heroicus*, heroic love ("hereos," "heroicus," and "heroical" are corruptions of the Greek word for love, ἔρως), the malady of hereos [*sic*], the lover's malady, erotomania.

⁷ I take lovesickness (or love-melancholy, as it came to be known) as the product of *unconsummated* or perhaps unseasonably frustrated love. Thus jealousy is not here at issue. Bitinna in Herondas 5, for example, exhibits neither an unconsummated nor an unseasonably frustrated love relationship. The same point could be made of the soulful amatory frustrations of Roman elegiac poetry (thus Propertius 1. 5, 1. 9, and 1. 19, or Tibullus 2. 4 and 2. 6). More on elegy below, notes 22 and 30.

⁸ See, most recently, Wack 1990, and Beecher and Ciavolella 1990.

⁹ See Jackson 1986, and Beecher and Ciavolella 1990.

¹⁰ Toohey 1990a.

portraits (Section II). Section III will look at examples of manic lovesickness which do not correspond to the medical views. In the fourth section I will attempt to show how both forms of lovesickness match prevailing ancient notions of melancholia.

I

Ancient medicine has very little to say of lovesickness. What is said (confined to Aretaeus, Galen, Oribasius, Caelius Aurelianus, and Paul of Aegina) interprets lovesickness as a depressive illness whose symptoms, but not etiology, match those of depressive melancholia.¹¹ Aretaeus of Cappadocia (c. A.D. 150), for whom melancholy was a depressive rather than a manic illness, describes one man who "appeared to the common people to be melancholic." In fact his trouble was merely a case of "serious dejection due to unrequited love."¹² His doctors, like the common people, must have assumed the illness was melancholy, for their treatments were unsuccessful. The truth of Aretaeus' diagnosis was demonstrated by the man's cure. This took place when he declared his love to his beloved.

Aretaeus' distinction may seem to us to be hair-splitting. He was, however, a humoralist and attributed melancholia to a superfluity of black bile (in Greek μέλαινα χολή). The sufferer in this instance was the victim, not of an excess of black bile but of a psychological disturbance.

Galen (c. A.D. 130–200) was also a humoralist. One finds, therefore, the same careful distinction. Galen describes lovers as sometimes "emaciated, pale, sleepless, and even feverish."¹³ In one instance he discusses his treatment of a woman who exhibited symptoms of sleeplessness at night and restlessness during the day, taciturnity, and, when Galen consulted her, a reaction as follows: "She turned her face away, threw her clothes over her body and hid herself away completely."¹⁴ Galen's diagnosis? "Either she was tormented by melancholy, or she was grieving over some cause she did not want to confess." Subsequently he discovered that love was the problem. He discovered that her pulse rate rose when mention of the stage dancer Pylades was made. Although easily confused with depressive melancholia, the real origin of the woman's condition—and love melancholy generally—is psychological rather than physical (brought on, that is, by an excess of black bile).¹⁵ Two other writers are of

¹¹ Brief recent surveys in Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, Jackson 1986, and Wack 1990.

¹² Jackson 1986, 353, who cites as his reference F. Adams (ed. and trans.), *The Extant Works of Aretaeus, The Cappadocian* (London 1856) 300.

¹³ Jackson 1986, 353, citing G. C. Kuhn (ed.), *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, 20 vols. (Leipzig 1821–33) XVIII 18. Wack 1990, 7–9 provides an excellent discussion.

¹⁴ The passage is quoted in Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 51.

¹⁵ It is also worth pointing out that Galen seems to have felt that "excessive vehemence in loving" was a condition related to lovesickness (Jackson 1986, 353, citing P. W. Harkins [trans.] and W. Riese [intro. and interpret.], *Galen. On the Passions and Errors of*

significance in this matter. Oribasius (A.D. 326–403) and Paul of Aegina (fl. c. A.D. 640), in their discussions of lovesickness, present what seems to be a shared view of lovesickness. Oribasius, the physician to Julian the Apostate, treated lovesickness as a distinct illness and attributed to it symptoms such as sadness, insomnia, hollow eyes, an inability to cry; and sufferers “appeared to be filled with voluptuousness, and their eyelids, the only part of the body not weakened, were continuously blinking.”¹⁶ For Paul of Aegina the lovesick were “desponding and sleepless.” He describes them in his discussion (*On Lovesick Persons*) in terms very similar to those of Oribasius.¹⁷

Caelius Aurelianus (5th cent. A.D.),¹⁸ who translated the Trajanic medical writer Soranus of Ephesus, believed that lovesickness manifests many of the symptoms of depressive melancholy: “unhappiness, mental anxiety, tossing in sleep, frequent blinking of the eyes, and disturbances of the pulse . . . ‘it manifests itself now in anger, now in merriment, now in sadness or futility, and now, as some relate, in an overpowering fear of things which are quite harmless.’” Wack, whom I am quoting,¹⁹ links the preceding reference to anger with Caelius’ statements elsewhere correlating melancholia with anger. (On this topic see Section IV of this paper.) Although not humoralist,²⁰ it may be possible that Caelius and Soranus were conscious of a tradition of manic lovesickness.

The description of lovesickness in all of these writers presents a condition that, while not technically melancholia, shows the outward signs of the illness in its depressive phase. Aretaeus and Galen are at pains to point this out. (Caelius’ comments on anger may offer the only modification.) Centuries later Avicenna (A.D. 980–1037) makes the very same point.²¹ The link, therefore, between lovesickness, depression, and melancholia is a vital one. Lovesickness, according to the major surviving medical view, was a condition typified by sadness, insomnia, despondency,

the Soul [Columbus, OH 1963] 48). The significance of this suggestion is something to which I will return.

¹⁶ Jackson 1986, 354, citing U. C. Bussemaker and C. Daremberg, *Oeuvres d'Oribase*, 6 vols. (Paris 1851–76) V 413–14. See too Wack 1990, 10.

¹⁷ Jackson 1986, 354, citing F. Adams (ed. and trans.), *The Seven Books of Paulus Aeginata*, 3 vols. (London 1844–47) I 390–91.

¹⁸ Caelius made a Latin translation (*De morbis acutis et chronicis*) of a lost text by Soranus of Ephesus, who worked in Alexandria during the Trajanic and Hadrianic periods. For a text see: I. E. Drabkin (ed. and trans.), *Caelius Aurelianus. On Acute Diseases and on Chronic Diseases* (Chicago 1950). Pigeaud 1987 has an extensive discussion of this author. See too Wack 1990, 11.

¹⁹ Wack 1990, 11–12.

²⁰ Drabkin (above, note 18) 561. Klibansky 1964, 48 quotes the text: “melancholica dicta, quod nigra fella aegrotantibus saepe per vomitum veniant . . . et non, ut plerique existimant, quod passionis causa vel generatio nigra sint fella; hoc enim est aestimantium magis quam videntium veritatem, vel potius falsum sicut in aliis ostendimus.”

²¹ Jackson 1986, 354–55.

dejection, physical debility, and blinking. Aretaeus and Galen do not seem to have thought of the condition as a specific illness (unlike melancholia), but rather as a vague psychological disturbance presumably best cured by therapeutic intercourse. Oribasius and Paul of Aegina conceived of lovesickness as an actual illness, but not one based upon an excess of the black bile.

II

Depictions of depressive lovesickness are not common in ancient literature.²² Perhaps the earliest unambiguous example is to be found in Theocritus' second idyll.²³ Here Simaetha has fallen in love with Delphis. The description of her initial infatuation is remarkable. Lovesickness is like a fever and it causes Simaetha to become frenzied (ἐμάνην 82). Yet, as the emotion lays hold of her, she becomes ill and takes to bed (82–86). After ten days her skin has become dull and sallow, her hair has begun to fall out, and she has been reduced to skin and bone (88–90).²⁴ The cure comes when the slave-girl Thestylis coaxes Delphis to Simaetha's home. Love-making provides the remedy. The outlines of the condition of depressive lovesickness are all present in this story: taking to bed, physical debility

²² The point needs to be stressed that the concern here is with lovesickness, not with love in general. Hence discussions or expostulations such as those of Plato in the *Symposium* or *Phaedrus*, of Sophocles, *Antigone*, 781 ff., of Plautus, *Trinummus* 223–75 and 668 ff. (where the stress is less on the subjective experience than it is on the deleterious effects of love on aristocratic young men and their families—though at 669 love is said to make men *morosi*) are not germane to my argument. The same point may be made concerning D. H. Garrison's useful discussion of love in the Hellenistic epigram: *Mild Frenzy: A Reading of the Hellenistic Love Epigram*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 41 (Wiesbaden 1978). Other passages, while offering witness to lovesickness, lack detail. Such a one is provided by Horace, *Odes* 3. 12, a description, according to Quinn, of a lovesick Neobule. Quinn terms this a "cliché" and compares Sappho 102 L–P. Into this category should be placed such productions as Propertius 1. 5 and Ovid, *Amores* 1. 6 (and note Barsby's comments ad loc.). See also notes 7 and 30.

²³ Polyphemus is also lovesick for Galatea in *Idyll* 11 (a model for Corydon in Virgil's *Eclogue* 2). Theocritus, however, does not detail the physiology of his condition. At lines 10–11 he is said to love "not with apples, or roses, or ringlets, but with downright frenzy (ὀρθαῖς μανίαις)." That sounds hardly depressive. Nor do lines 15–16, where he has "deep beneath his breast an angry wound which the shaft of the mighty Cyprian goddess had planted in his heart" (translation Gow). The only hint of a Simaetha-like passivity is suggested in lines 14–15, where he is described thus: He "alone on the wrack-strewn shore, would waste away with love as he sang of Galatea." "Wasting" (here the verbal form is κατετάκετο) is typical of the depressive lovesick. (In Ovid's depiction of the lovesick Cyclops his emotion seems to be a violent one, see *Met.* 13. 867–69.) There may be a hint of a Simaetha-like lovesickness in the case of Gryllus, the admirer of Threissa in Herondas 1. 49–60. Unfortunately the picture here too is very sketchy.

²⁴ W. V. Clausen, *Virgil's "Aeneid" and the Tradition of Hellenistic Poetry* (Berkeley 1987) 101, points out that the baldness is a symptom of a "morbidity excited condition" and compares Hesiod, *Catalogue* fr. 133. 4–5 M–W and Virgil, *Ecl.* 6. 51.

leading to emaciation and, potentially, death, and a dramatically altered complexion. The cure is sexual congress.

It is noteworthy that this Alexandrian tradition does not take firm root within the literary tradition (as it survives) until the first century of our era.²⁵ That tradition is inaugurated by Valerius Maximus (5. 7 ext. 1), who recounts the famous ancient example of Antiochus, the son of King Seleucus, who fell in love with his young stepmother Stratonice. Antiochus, either unwilling or unable to reveal his passion, fell ill, took to his bed, and began to waste away.²⁶ The physician Erasistratus, called to attend Antiochus, noticed how, when Stratonice entered the room, his pulse and breathing quickened, and how he flushed. Erasistratus realized that the cause of Antiochus' troubles was frustrated love. King Seleucus so loved his son that, on hearing Erasistratus' diagnosis, he passed on his wife Stratonice to Antiochus. That selfless action afforded the cure.

There are many variations of this story, within and without medical literature.²⁷ Plutarch's variant version is undoubtedly the most influential (*Demetrius* 37. 2-3). In Plutarch's account Antiochus takes to bed and begins deliberately to starve himself as a means of controlling his passion. But whatever Antiochus' motives, the symptoms he displayed were those of a depressive melancholic: physical debility, emaciation, a pallid complexion alternating with one flushed, laboured breathing, and a disturbed pulse rate. Love, lovesickness, and melancholy are inextricably intertwined.

Such lovesickness is not confined to the popular Antiochus and Stratonice story. A narrative clone may be found in the Vandal poem, the miniature epic, *Aegritudo Perdicae*.²⁸ This story concerns a young man, Perdica, who was studying in Athens. Just before leaving for home he

²⁵ The most famous example of lovesickness is Sappho's *phainetai moi* ode (31 Campbell), which seems to aim to describe thwarted sexual desire. (Catullus' adaptation, C. 51, ought to be compared.) The symptoms of the speaker's lovesickness are speechlessness (9), a burning sensation on the skin (9-10), loss of vision (11), ringing in the ears (11-12), cold sweat (13), trembling (13-14), pallor (14-15), and a near-death experience (15-16). Many of these symptoms will be seen in later descriptions (e.g. Theocritus 2. 106 ff.). Whether this experience was depressive or manic, however, cannot be known: The last stanza of the poem is incomplete; nor does Sappho tell us what followed this experience. Worth comparing are Ibycus 286 and 287 Campbell, where the onset of love seems especially violent (in 286. 10-11 the word *mania* is used, significantly associated with darkness, ἐρεμνός 10). In 287 Ibycus trembles at love's coming. The onset of love in Archilochus is equally prepossessing. Compare 112 and 118 Campbell.

²⁶ Plutarch, in his version, attributes the story to a Greek physician, Erasistratus, who lived in the first half of the first century B.C. I see no reason why we ought to believe Plutarch's attribution. The story has the ring of the literature of the Roman empire.

²⁷ Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 48-51 provide references to a number of these. See also Wack 1990, 17 ff.

²⁸ Text: F. Baehrens, *Poetae latini minores* V (Leipzig 1914) 112-25. For a discussion see D. F. Bright, *The Miniature Epic in Vandal Africa* (Norman, OK 1987) 222-44, and Wack 1990, 4-5.

neglected to sacrifice to Venus and Cupid. He was rewarded with a dream-image with which he fell in love. The image was of his mother. Lovesickness not only caused him to reject food, but also produced insomnia, fearfulness, and physical debility. His mother called a doctor, Hippocrates, who, by feeling for Perdica's pulse, discovered that it increased when his mother entered the room. Realizing the cause of the illness he resigned the case. Despite his mother's ministrations Perdica became more and more sick: He became pallid, emaciated, his nose, the tendons in his arms, and his ribs became protuberant. In the end he decided to hang himself. Once again lovesickness manifests itself in a depressive manner, and one that is easily confused with melancholia.²⁹

A lovesickness which may be confused with depressive melancholy figures in Ovid's story of Echo and Narcissus (*Metamorphoses* 3. 339–510).³⁰ The nymph Echo had fallen in love with the handsome young Narcissus. He fastidiously rejected her love. Echo's reaction to the rejection may be compared to that of Perdica. She became grief-stricken (395), anxious and insomniac (396), was unwilling or unable to eat (397),

²⁹ A possible contemporary parallel comes from the Vandal poet Reposianus, who, in his miniature epic, *The Intrigue of Mars with Venus* (text and translation: J. W. Duff and A. M. Duff [eds. and trans.], *Minor Latin Poets* [repr. London 1961] 524–39), depicts a lovesickness (here effected by jealousy) which is depressive, but also manic. The poem describes the famous affair of Venus with Mars and their punishment by Vulcan. It is the love of Vulcan for Venus which is frustrated. When he discovers his wife's infidelity his reaction is a bizarre mixture of depression (160: "and now half benumbed"—*iam quasi torpescens*) and mania (161–62: "he growls aloud, and groaning mournfully strikes his sides to their very depth and wrathfully heaves sigh on sigh unceasing"—Duff and Duff adapted; the Latin is: *ore fremit maestoque modo gemit ultima pulsans / ilia et indignans suspira pressa fatigat*). But anger quickly wins the day (160: *vix sufficit ira dolori*).

³⁰ Discussion in Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 53–54. It is sometimes suggested of Narcissus' pining away that "the *topos* is the familiar one of the lover who wastes away with passion." Knox (*Ovid's "Metamorphoses" and the Traditions of Augustan Poetry*, Cambridge Philological Society, Suppl. 11 [Cambridge 1986] 22), who makes this claim, cites in support Ovid, *Ars* 1. 735; cf. *Am.* 1. 6. 5, 2. 9. 14; Propertius 1. 5. 21–22; Theocritus 2. 88 ff. Knox's parallels raise an important problem: To what extent is lovesickness to be seen in Roman elegy? Narcissus, I believe, has a real parallel in Simaetha (Theocritus 2), but does he in Gallus (Propertius 1. 5)? In Gallus' case, we ought to point out, wasting does not indicate unconsummated or unseasonably frustrated love (so 1. 5. 13–21; see above, note 7). Nor, in its detail (we should include 1. 5. 13–21), is its description as specific and as ample as, say, that of Theocritus. There is also the problem of "sincerity." Elegy is such a deliberately unrealistic, literary (Gallus' situation is an ironic reversal of Phaedria's at Terence, *Eunuch* 46–49), and hence ironic genre, that it is very difficult to take Gallus seriously (thus I follow P. Veyne, *Roman Erotic Poetry: Love, Poetry, and the West*, trans. D. Pellauer [Chicago 1988], e.g. 31 ff. or 132 ff.). Compare Propertius 1. 1. 21–22 (*en agedum dominae mentem convertite nostrae / at facite illa meo palleat ore magis*). Baker (*Propertius* I [Armidale 1990]), for example, seems to take this as an example of the pallor brought on by wasting and lovesickness (thus another instance of Knox's *topos*), and cites Plautus and Aretaeus in support. But lines 33–34 of the same poem seem to identify such pallor as the result of too much love-making. It is that very sort of complication which makes elegy such an unreliable and ironic witness.

and, like Perdica, her bones became protuberant (though in a slightly different manner). Narcissus was punished (406) for his heartless behaviour. He caught sight of his own reflection in a pool and fell in love with it (407 ff.). Like Echo he became weak (469, 488–90), unable to eat (437), and gradually starved to death.³¹ He was transformed into the flower bearing his name.³²

Depressive lovesickness figures large in the following, rather different illustration. This one comes from the life of Marcus Aurelius (ruled A.D. 161–80) in the *Historia Augusta* (*Marcus Antoninus* 19. 12) and repeats an alarming story concerning the conception of the brutal emperor Commodus (ruled A.D. 177–92).³³ It runs as follows:³⁴

Some say, and it seems plausible, that Commodus Antoninus, his son and successor, was not begotten by him, but in adultery; and they embroider this assertion, moreover, with a story current among the people. On a certain occasion, it was said, Faustina, the daughter of Pius and wife of Marcus, saw some gladiators pass by, and was inflamed with love for one of them; and afterwards, when suffering from a long illness [*aegritudo*], she confessed the passion to her husband. And when Marcus reported this to the Chaldaeans, it was their advice that the gladiator should be killed and that Faustina should bathe in his blood and in this state lie with her husband. When this had been done the passion was indeed allayed, but their son Commodus was born a gladiator, and not really a *princeps*.

If it is not wholly clear in this version whence Faustina's illness derived, my preceding discussion ought make this plain. Like Antiochus or Perdica, Faustina was so love-struck by the gladiator that she fell ill and took to her bed. Frustrated love has produced a state of physical enfeeblement. We cannot be sure that this was depressive, but the mention of a "long illness" (*longa aegritudo*—the noun often means "lovesickness") points to this. The cure may seem remarkable. Yet a little thought will indicate that it offers a

³¹ The novelty of this description may be underscored by comparing it with another case of frustrated love in the *Metamorphoses*. Byblis fell in love with her brother (9. 454–665). Declaration of love to him was followed by rejection. Her reaction was not Antiochean pining, but violent and unrestrained madness—she became a Bacchante (9. 635 ff.). The exertion of her Bacchic travels eventually caused her to die. She metamorphosed into a fountain.

³² In Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* 3. 23, Daphnis tells Chloe a variant version of the legend. Here Echo repulsed Pan's advances. In an excess of frustrated love he caused the local shepherds and goatherds to go into a frenzy (*mania*) and rip her limb from limb. Earth buried these limbs in a variety of places where, henceforth, echoes became possible. Pan's reaction is one of manic lovesickness, which variety I will discuss in the next section. On the history of the Narcissus legend see L. Vinge, *The Narcissus Theme in Western European Literature up to the Early 19th Century* (Lund 1967).

³³ The tale is repeated by Aurelius Victor, *Caes.* 16. 2.

³⁴ Translation (but here slightly adapted) and Latin text: D. Magie (ed. and trans.), *The Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, 3 vols. (repr. London 1953).

variation on a standard method of curing lovesickness, sexual congress with the beloved. In this instance it is therapeutic intercourse by proxy. Faustina, coated with the blood of the unfortunate gladiator, undergoes with him a type of sexual union through the proxy of the ineffectual Marcus Aurelius.³⁵

Perhaps the most striking examples of lovesickness seeming to ape melancholy are to be found in the ancient novel.³⁶ Chariton (writing maybe in the middle of the first century A.D.), Xenophon of Ephesus (writing in the second century), and Heliodorus (third or fourth century) provide descriptions of frustrated young lovers which, in their similarities, seem to indicate that love melancholy had become a literary topos.³⁷

Let me take Chariton first. The hero and heroine of this novel, Chaereas and Callirhoe, spot one another at a public festival of Aphrodite and fall in love at once. The effect of love on Chaereas was dreadful: He was too weak to stand, and began to waste away; he looked set to die (1. 1). The effect on Callirhoe was worse, because, unlike Chaereas, she would not admit her condition to her parents: She lay on her bed, head covered, crying, and when marriage (not, she thought, to Chaereas) was proposed, she became speechless, sightless, and almost expired (1. 1). Chaereas and Callirhoe were saved from death in the nick of time. They married.

Xenophon's description of the love of Habrocomes and Anthia in his *Ephesian Tale* is more detailed. The youngsters fall in love at a festival of Artemis. Habrocomes in love (1. 5) was worn out, insomniac, weary-eyed, of altered complexion; he was moaning, weeping, and praying pitifully; eventually his body wasted away and his mind gave in. Things were no better for Anthia (1. 5), whose beauty was quickly fading. Had their parents not consulted the Delphic oracle and settled on marriage (1. 6) Habrocomes

³⁵ A comparably macabre example may be found in Quintus Smyrnaeus' *Posthomerica* when Achilles develops a necrophiliac lovesickness for Penthesileia. After he has killed the Amazon warrior (1. 654 ff.), he gazes on her corpse and is smitten (716–21, cf. 666–68) by love (719, cf. 671–74) and by grief ("deadly grief [*anial*] devoured his heart"—720). His reaction was not violent, but passive, at least until provoked by Thersites (722 ff.).

³⁶ Maehler (above, note 1) is very useful on this topic.

³⁷ Less striking instances may be found in Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, after Chloe has been abducted by the Methymnaeans (2. 20), when Daphnis, in the despair of frustrated love, casts himself onto the ground, languishing and waiting for death (ἐνταῦθα περιμένῳ κείμενος . . . θάνατον 2. 22). This is not quite melancholy, yet the passive desire for death resembles the despair of Antiochus or Perdica. Melancholy is more evident in Book 3. Here Daphnis and Chloe are kept from the pastures and their meetings by the harsh weather of winter. Their reaction: "They had long and sleepless nights, now they had sad and pensive days, and desired nothing so much as a quick return of the spring, to begin their regeneration and return from death" (3. 4, Edmonds' translation). Similar reactions take place in Book 4: Chloe, thinking Daphnis has forgotten her, weeps, complains, and thinks only of death (4. 27); Daphnis, after Chloe has subsequently been spirited away by Lampis, sinks into a similar state of despair (4. 28).

and Anthia, who lay ill and in critical condition, would certainly have died (1. 5).

Xenophon's portrait has an approximate parallel in an interesting passage to be found in his near contemporary Apuleius. In his *Metamorphoses* Lucius relates a tale which he had heard of a beautiful young stepmother who had fallen in love with her handsome stepson. Hippolytus-like he virtuously rejected her overtures. Frustrated love changed to hate, and the stepmother responded by fabricating a charge of fratricide which almost succeeded. But what matters here is the description provided by Apuleius of the young woman's feigned or real love-wracked condition (10. 2):

her countenance was pale, her eyes sorrowful, her knees weak, her rest disturbed, and she would sigh deeply because of the slowness of her torment; there was no comfort in her, but continual weeping and sobbing; you would have thought that she had some fever, except that she wept unreasonably . . .

This could as well be the description of the far more appetizing Habrocomes or Anthia.

Only one of the lovers in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* shows full-blown signs of depressive lovesickness. This is the fair-skinned Ethiopian Charicleia,³⁸ Charicleia had seen the young Thessalian Theagenes (3. 5) in the procession of atonement to Neoptolemus at Delphi. She was at once love-struck (3. 5). Calasiris, her subsequent guide, took her languishing in bed, her moist eyes, and her headache (3. 7) for the effects of the evil eye (3. 7-9) and promised to help cure it. But her condition continued to deteriorate (3. 19): "The bloom was fleeing her cheeks, and it was as if the fire in her glance was being extinguished by the water of her tears." Theagenes and Charicleia saw one another a second time when Theagenes ran in the Pythian games (4. 3-4). The effect was catastrophic. Charicleia became still worse and her whole household was reduced to tears (4. 5). Calasiris unsuccessfully attempted to cure her with incantations, incense, and laurel (4. 5). Charicleia was subsequently examined by a doctor (4. 7). Arcesinus the physician discovered at once that the root of the problem was love:

Can you not see her condition [*pathos*] is of the soul and the illness [*nosos*] is clearly love? Can you not see the dark rings under her eyes, how restless is her gaze, and how pale is her face—although she does not complain of internal pain? Can you not see that her concentration wanders, that she says the first thing that comes into her head, that she

³⁸ Theagenes suffers too, though not so badly. At the banquet for Neoptolemus (3. 10) he is distracted and gloomy and, later, he confesses to Calasiris that he is near to death. Calasiris describes his condition at the beginning of 3. 11 in terms redolent of medical depression—he is full of *χάσμη ἀδημονούση* (presumably "troubled depression" or perhaps "troubled ennui") and he is also suffering from a humoral imbalance (he is *ἀνώμαλος*).

is suffering from an unaccountable insomnia, and has suddenly lost her self-confidence? Charicles, you must search for the man to cure her, the only one, the man she loves.

Charicleia's *nosos* is finally cured by union with her beloved, Theagenes.

What especially interests in Heliodorus' description of the effects of lovesickness are the indications that Arcesinus the physician initially took her problem to be a superfluity of the black bile. He tells Charicles (4. 7) that he has discovered no excess of humours (οὐ γὰρ χυμῶν τις περιττεύει). The humour in question can only have been black bile, μέλαινα χολή. Further indication that Charicleia's lovesickness could be confused with depressive melancholy is suggested by Arcesinus' testing her pulse (4. 7). That seemed to give the game away.³⁹ Arcesinus' pulse test seems to mirror that applied by Galen and that which we have seen in the stories of Antiochus and Stratonice, and Perdica.⁴⁰

Depressive lovesickness, as I hope my brief survey has demonstrated, is not at all common in the literature of the classical world. One of the earliest unambiguous examples comes from Theocritus. The majority of ancient examples, however, are to be drawn from the first century of our era and later. Their appearance coincides approximately with the earliest medical discussions of the condition. While Theocritus may demonstrate that depressive lovesickness was a condition from which people must always have suffered, the remaining instances suggest that, as a sociological phenomenon to be taken seriously, depressive lovesickness is "discovered" in the early imperial era.

III

Although the doctors may have thought lovesickness a depressive condition, that is not the way it is depicted in the majority of ancient literary descriptions. Lovesickness, displayed in a violent or manic fashion, receives descriptions in almost all of the periods of ancient literature. It is a dominant amatory cliché. One of the best representations of the experience may be found in Apollonius Rhodius' depiction of the love of Medea for Jason. The symptomatology of Apollonius' portrait is explicit and consistent. The initial attack of love produces a violent physical reaction. Subsequent frustrations recapitulate, though in a more pronounced manner,

³⁹ Noted by R. M. Rattenbury, T. W. Lumb, and J. Maillon, *Héliodore. Les Ethiopiques (Théagène et Chariclée)*² II (Paris 1960) 12 n. 1.

⁴⁰ Another example of this type of lovesickness is alluded to by T. Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity* (Oxford 1983). It is the story of Paul and Thecla in the apocryphal acts (see E. Hennecke, *New Testament Apocrypha* II [London 1965] 353–64). Hägg points out (160) that "Thecla's first reaction when she hears Paul preaching in the neighboring house—she does not touch her food or drink, she worries her family by her distracted behaviour—is reminiscent of the purely physical manifestations of awakening love in, for instance, the *Ephesiaca*."

this emotional reaction. The descriptions, as we will see in the next section, match those used of melancholy but, of course, lack the precision of humoral diagnosis.

Medea's infection is precipitated by Hera.⁴¹ Wishing to help Jason succeed in gaining the fleece from King Aietes, she persuades Aphrodite to have Eros make Medea fall in love with Jason (*Argonautica* 3. 36–110). When Eros wounds Medea (3. 284–98) the subjection to love is sudden and complete:

He [Eros] shot at Medea. Speechlessness (ἀμφασίη) overcame her. And he sped back from the high-roofed hall laughing, and the shaft burnt in the girl, deep below her breast, like fire (φλογὶ εἵκελον). Continuously she cast bright glances at the son of Aeson. In the turmoil her clever wits left her breast. She had lost her memory. Her heart was flooded with this sweet agony (ἀνίη). As a working woman, who spins for a living, piles brushwood on a smouldering log to spread light through her home in the dark, while she works nearby, and, as the great blaze, kindled from a little brand, reduces the twigs to ashes, so, enfolded within her breast, did woeful love (οὐλος ἔρωος) stealthily smoulder. Her soft cheeks turned from white to red in the whirl of her mind (ἀκηδείησι νόοιο).

The description of Medea's reaction, though incomplete, gives a fair idea of the violence of her response. The imagery bears this out: Eros' shaft is "like fire," Medea's heart is full of "agony," the shaft causes, furthermore, forgetfulness, mental turmoil (ἀκηδείη), and pallor alternating with rose-coloured flushing.⁴²

Once Medea's condition has been established it is not allowed to run its course. Her love is frustrated in two ways. First, loyalty to and fear of her father Aietes initially restrain her from succumbing to the emotion. Second, Jason's own fecklessness threatens to prevent her love reaching its obvious conclusion. In response to both, Medea's reaction is violent. *Argonautica* 3. 444–71 shows how she is affected by loyalty and fear. She is wracked by contradictory emotions: She cannot remove Jason's image from her imagination (453–58); she fears for his safety (459–60), but mourns him as if he were already dead (460–61); she hopes he will escape unharmed (464–68) but, if he does perish, that he will know of her sympathy (468–70). These contradictions seem to be the result of the illicit nature of Medea's passion: Love impels her to hope for Jason's success, but this, she knows, will be at the expense of her father Aietes. Medea's "lovesickness" results in part from a conflict between αἰδώς and ἔμπερος (3. 653). The former dictates loyalty, the latter that she follow her longing for Jason. This ambivalence is especially evident in the dream-sequence at 3.

⁴¹ On love in Apollonius see G. Zanker, "The Love Theme in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica*," *WS* 13 (1979) 52–75.

⁴² This latter description may be compared to those of Antiochus.

616–32⁴³ and in her actions (645–68) after the first monologue (636–44). She hesitates to leave her room, but hangs on its exit. She casts herself writhing onto her bed. She weeps. Finally, Chalciope hurries to her (670 ff.). She manages to disguise her willingness to assist Jason as concern for Chalciope's sons, who are now in the company of the Argonauts (681 ff.). There follows the description of another bout of anguish. The symptoms of her condition are becoming more and more explicit (755–65):⁴⁴

Her heart throbbed quickly within her breast . . . a tear of pity ran from her eyes, and within her unceasingly agony wore her away as it burnt through her skin along her nerve endings right up to the muscles of the neck beneath the head, where pain is the most severe whenever tireless love (ἀκάματοι ἔρωτες) casts pain into one's mind (πραπίδες).

Despite this physical anguish Medea does not, like Antiochus or Faustina, take to bed. She makes her decision. Ἐρρέτω αἰδώς ("let shame perish" 3. 785), she states. She will betray her parents. Medea herself gives a name to the condition: It is ἄτη, violent delusion.

In *Argonautica* 4 there is no longer a conflict between αἰδώς and ἔμερος. Medea has abandoned Colchis.⁴⁵ Her passion is frustrated now by the fecklessness of Jason, who seems likely to give in to the threats of the pursuing Colchians. Near the beginning of this book Medea's lovesickness is described with real precision: Her eyes are filled with fire, her ears ring, she clutches at her throat, she pulls at her hair, groans, is suicidal (16–23). These physical woes seem partly the product of frustrated love, partly fear.⁴⁶ Later, when the Colchians manage to cut off the Argo's party (303–38), Jason, sensing that their situation is hopeless, strikes a deal (συνθεσίη) with the Colchians. They will keep the fleece, but leave Medea on a nearby island with its priests of Artemis. Judges can later arbitrate her future (339–49). Medea's reaction to this treachery is not to swoon, nor to take to bed, nor to begin a wasting illness, nor even to contemplate suicide, rather it is to threaten violence. She wrathfully argues that Jason is under oath to protect her (358–59, 388). If abandoned she threatens she will curse him.

⁴³ She dreams that Jason had taken on the contest, not to gain the fleece, but to win her. Medea even dreams that she fought Aietes' bulls in his stead (R. L. Hunter, *Apollonius of Rhodes. Argonautica, Book III* [Cambridge 1989] 164 notes the sexual symbolism of fighting the bulls). In the dream Medea must decide, her father dictates, whether to award the stranger the fleece. Aietes would not, for Jason had not fought. Against his wishes she awards Jason the fleece.

⁴⁴ The translation follows the line order of Hunter's commentary (previous note).

⁴⁵ At the beginning of the book (4–5) Medea flees from the palace to join Jason: The poet asks whether her action is the result of ἄτης πῆμα δυσίμερον ("ill-desired woe resulting from ἄτη") or a φόβον ἀεικέλιον ("unseemly panic").

⁴⁶ Fear is her motive according to A. R. Dyck, "On the Way from Colchis to Corinth: Medea in Book 4 of the *Argonautica*," *Hermes* 112 (1989) 455–70, and Zanker (above, note 41) 64.

Jason at once backtracks and hatches a plan to murder the leader of the Colchians, Medea's brother Apsyrtus (395–420). There follows a most extraordinary personal intrusion into the narrative (445–51):⁴⁷

Wretched Love, great woe and great object of hatred for humans, from you destructive strife, groaning, and wailing, and countless other pains pierce us. Rise against the sons of our enemies, god, in the way that you cast hateful madness (στυγερή ἄτη) into Medea's heart. For how then with awful death did she overcome Apsyrtus? My song's task next is to tell that.

Medea's lovesickness then reaches its apogee of violence. The bloody murder of Apsyrtus follows. In the thrall of passion Medea, it seems, will go to any length.

I have dwelt at such length on this version of the Medea story because it provides such a detailed (and moving) instance of the violent power of passion. Medea's lovesickness—and there can be no other word for it (she is still a virgin, and a young one at that)—leads her to remarkable acts of violence. In Apollonius' reading of the emotion of lovesickness, the onset of love and, later, its frustration can lead to violent physical and emotional disorders. It can lead, furthermore, to acts of violence, even murder. Not only does Apollonius graphically illustrate its effects but he also editorializes on its dangers.

Love in Apollonius' version of the story of Medea is a typical, if extreme instance of what seems to have been the prevailing ancient view of the dangers of lovesickness. Let me give a few other examples to illustrate and to bolster this contention. Dido suffers like Medea. Her love, like that of Medea, has been thrust upon her by divine scheming (*Aeneid* 1. 657 ff.).⁴⁸ Dido's infection is likened to a wound (*Aeneid* 4. 1–2, 67) and it burns like fire (2, 66). Like any love-melancholic Dido becomes insomniac (5) and anxiety-ridden (9 ff.). But, like Medea, she sees giving in to her passion as a form of betrayal (27; cf. 172)—and giving way to the passion results in exactly this (86–89, 193–94). Also like Medea she is betrayed, in her case by Aeneas. The "betrayal" comes after Jupiter sends Mercury to Aeneas (237–78): Aeneas must remember his mission and cease from Carthaginian affairs. But before Dido meets Aeneas she senses that treachery is afoot. Her reaction is not depressive, but manic. (Her reactions, though not strictly relevant to a discussion of frustrated, unconsummated love, are so much of a kind with those of Medea, that they deserve to be detailed.) Dido rages through the city like a bacchant (300–03) to meet Aeneas. (This was the action of Ovid's Byblis and Valerius

⁴⁷ Val. Fl. *Arg.* 6. 469 ff. (not quite the same point in his narrative) moralizes on the destructiveness of love. Here Valerius is describing the girdle Venus lends to Juno. With this she causes Medea to fall in love with Jason.

⁴⁸ Venus' intention powerfully uses the imagery of fire: *donisque furem / incendat reginam atque ossibus implicet ignem* 1. 659–60; note also 1. 712–22.

Flaccus' Medea.) Dido, her love frustrated and after an unsuccessful attempt at persuading Aeneas to delay sailing (416–49), again reacts violently: She sets about planning her own death (450–552). Notice that Virgil compares her to those embodiments of violent anger, Pentheus and the manic melancholic Orestes (469–73),⁴⁹ and, elsewhere, stresses her anger (531–32; note that it is linked with love [*resurgens / saevit amor*])—this is not just a matter of insulted pride or broken covenants.⁵⁰ Dido's soliloquy, delivered as she watches the Aeneadae sail away, shows no relaxation of anger (590–629): She summons the sun, the gods, and the Furies to avenge her, on Aeneas first, then on all of his descendants. Soon afterwards she suicides.

Of Virgil's other love-blighted, if not lovesick, protagonists such as Corydon (*Eclogue* 2),⁵¹ Cornelius Gallus (*Eclogue* 10), or Orpheus (*Georgics* 4),⁵² it is only Orpheus who gives signs of real depressive melancholy.⁵³ Yet even he meets a most violent end (*Georgics* 4. 523–27). Perhaps Virgil's amatory reservations are based on Epicureanism. Lucretius' famous descriptions and rejection of love and its effects (*De rerum natura* 4. 1037–1287) seem in line with Virgil's view of lovesickness as a dangerous, violent *pestis*.⁵⁴ For the Epicurean Lucretius love is "a disease of the soul that slowly pervades the entire body, just like madness, and that must be eradicated before it completely upsets the physiopsychological balance of the man."⁵⁵ Most important for the present discussion is Lucretius' opinion that the onset and effects of love do not produce a state of depressive enfeeblement, but madness. Lucretius is to the point: Love is a madness (*rabies* 1083) and a dangerous one at that (1079–83). His contemporary Cicero does not tell us of lovesickness, but he has his suspicions of love. In the *Tusculan Disputations* 4. 75 he notes of love that "of all disturbances of the soul there is assuredly none more violent . . . the disorder of the mind in love is in itself abominable." Horace's *Satire* 1. 2, another Epicurean diatribe against love (which might as well be

⁴⁹ The comparison is important. Orestes is singled out in the canonical discussion of manic melancholia, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problema* 30. See Toohey 1990a. In Val. Fl. *Arg.* 7. 144–52 Medea, initially inflamed by the love of Jason, is compared to Orestes *furens*.

⁵⁰ 4. 531–32: *rursusque resurgens / saevit amor magnoque irarum fluctuat aestu*.

⁵¹ Nor are the characters of *Eclogue* 8 passive, depressive figures.

⁵² Scylla, in the *Ciris*, is not Virgilian (see R. O. A. M. Lyne, *Ciris: A Poem Attributed to Virgil* [Cambridge 1978]). But she is very like Apollonius' Medea in her total surrender to love (ἔμπερος) and her swift betrayal of her father Nisus to her beloved, King Minos.

⁵³ The lineaments of the pattern may be found in Virgil's allusion to depressive, metamorphic love at *Aeneid* 10. 189–93 (the transformation of Cynus). The allusion is perhaps too brief for proper discussion.

⁵⁴ For a discussion see Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 52–53.

⁵⁵ Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 52.

designed as advice for Corydon in *Eclogue* 2), reproduces the same vision of love, if not lovesickness, as a type of dangerous mania.⁵⁶

There exist in ancient literature many other examples of manic lovesickness.⁵⁷ Here I will confine myself to a final pair of illustrations which test this conclusion. These concern the lovesickness of Phaedra as it is depicted by Euripides (*Hippolytus*) and by Seneca (*Phaedra*).⁵⁸

Euripides' heroine (sometimes compared to Dido) is certainly lovesick.⁵⁹ She has fallen unexpectedly in love with her stepson Hippolytus. The infatuation has been caused by Aphrodite, who, angered at Hippolytus' insulting behaviour (*Hippolytus* 12 ff.), intends to use Phaedra's love to bring him down. Phaedra's love is, of course, frustrated, for the object of her desire is the son of her still living husband Theseus. What are the symptoms of her lovesickness? Initial impressions suggest a condition which might easily be confused with depressive melancholia. Like Simaetha, Antiochus, and Perdica, Phaedra has become bedridden (131–34), debilitated (198–202), seems to be unable to take food (135–38), she is pallid (174–75), and inconsistent in her wants (176 ff.). If her symptoms continue she will die (138–40). But it emerges as the drama continues that these symptoms are feigned (391 ff., 400–01, 419 ff.). Phaedra, mindful of αἰδώς (385), of τιμή (329), of σωφροσύνη (399), and of τὰ ἐσθλά (331), has determined, like Plutarch's Antiochus, to preserve her honour and to disguise the ἔρωρ by starving herself to death. It seems, however, that the real symptom of lovesickness, if it is allowed to manifest itself, is mania.

⁵⁶ A few random examples: Sallustius *insanit* over freedwomen at l. 2. 48–49. Amatory frustration is alluded to in a colourful manner at l. 2. 71 (*mea cum conferbuit ira*) and at l. 2. 118 (*malis tentigine rumpi*).

⁵⁷ Ariadne, love-blighted and frustrated in Catullus 64, eventually works herself into a frenzy and, like Dido or Valerius' Medea, is *furens* (124 and 54) and is compared to a bacchant (61). Ariadne, of course, has presumably consummated her love and, therefore, does not quite fit within the parameters of this paper—see above, note 7. Scylla in the pseudo-Virgilian *Ciris* will go to any length to consummate her love for Minos. Medea in Ovid's *Heroides* 12 is frenzied rather than depressed. Much, much later the Roman emperor Caracalla fell in love with his stepmother Julia, who, "as if through carelessness, had uncovered the greater part of her body" (*HA, Caracalla* 10). He was encouraged by her complacency: "His disordered madness was given strength to carry out the crime and he contracted the marriage which . . . he alone should have prohibited." The description and language used of Caracalla's emotions might be compared to those used of a mad (*furiosus*) slave who is said to have attacked Hadrian (*Hadrian* 12).

⁵⁸ Ovid, *Heroides* 4 provides us with an ironic letter from Phaedra to Hippolytus. But here we have a portrait of a loose-living Roman *matrona* whose love or lust, though apparent, hardly exhibits the symptoms of real lovesickness. H. Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides* (Princeton 1974) 142–58 is helpful.

⁵⁹ Her condition is sometimes linked with *hysteria*; see M. R. Lefkowitz, "The Wandering Womb," in *Heroines and Hysterics* (London 1981) 12–25, at 19 ff. But whether ancient hysteria ought to be considered a manic or depressive disease (in the same way as lovesickness or melancholy) I am not sure. By the time of Galen, at any rate, some descriptions are of the depressive order; see I. Veith, *Hysteria: The History of a Disease* (Chicago 1965) 31 ff.

Thus at 188–238 Phaedra seems to be caught off guard by the nurse and reacts in a manic fashion (206, and note 241 ἐμάνην). She admits as much to the chorus at 243–48. And, after the nurse indicates Phaedra's love to Hippolytus (601 ff.), her reaction to the nurse—she does not meet Hippolytus—is angry and violent abuse (682 ff.). Her off-stage suicide follows soon after, and soon after that Theseus returns to discover the body and, with it, the note which mendaciously dooms Hippolytus to a most violent death. It is significant that the contents of the letter seem to declare themselves in a most vehement manner (877–80). From these indications, therefore, it appears that the real nature of Phaedra's lovesickness is manic. What are we then to make of the early, seemingly depressive symptoms? I suspect that here an audience saw Phaedra's illness not as the direct result of lovesickness but merely as indicating a means of attempting a suicide which would guard her honour against the onset of desire. The *modus moriendi* here is the common ancient tactic of *inedia*—starvation.⁶⁰

Seneca's Phaedra also exhibits a form of lovesickness which is best described as manic, rather than depressive. Seneca's depiction of Phaedra's condition, however, is not as carefully constructed as that of Euripides. Seneca is at times more rational: Phaedra's passion, for example, can be explained away as resulting from the neglect (*Phaedra* 91 ff.) of an adulterous husband (97–98); nor does Phaedra make much of an effort to hide her passion from the nurse: At times it seems that it is all that she can talk about (218–21, 225, 241). Yet Seneca does skimp logically. Phaedra's decision to look after her good name (her *fama*; Euripides' Phaedra was concerned with τιμή, but also αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη) seems rather an afterthought (250–54, 258–60).

What are the symptoms of Phaedra's lovesickness? In the early parts of the play it is a violent madness (a *furor*; see 184–85, 186–87, 268, and especially 339 ff.). Later, after she has determined to guard her *fama*, she begins to suffer a wasting illness (360–86), which seems in its symptoms to match those of Antiochus and Perdica. Yet it is unclear in Seneca's version whether these symptoms are feigned or whether they are simply the result of a prolonged starvation aimed at suicide. At any rate, the wasting illness does provide her with a chance to be alone with Hippolytus and to declare her love. That she may have been feigning the illness is confirmed by her reaction to Hippolytus' rejection. Once spurned she becomes angry (824–28) and guilefully dooms Hippolytus by claiming (868 ff.) that he had raped her. *Furor* overcomes her in the end as well. After Hippolytus' death

⁶⁰ A. J. L. van Hooff, *From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-Killing in Classical Antiquity* (London 1990) 45–46 argues: "*inedia* is the ancient method for attracting attention for grief, open or hidden. Phaedra could not reveal her unbecoming love for her stepson Hippolytus. 'I abstain from food' (*asiteo*); such will be 'the renouncing of life (*apostasis tou biou*)' . . . Frustration in love leading up to voluntary starvation is a theme in the ancient novel: on one occasion Chaireas is convinced that Kallirhoe is in love with Dionsysios. He decides to abstain from food . . ."

is reported she comes on stage mad (1156) and suicides. Thus, the Senecan portrait of Phaedra's lovesickness is persistently, if not unequivocally, manic.

Lovesickness, as I hope these admittedly random examples may have demonstrated, was capable of producing a manic rather than a depressive reaction. Space precludes a demonstration of the following point, yet my own reading of the literature of the classical periods indicates that this type of lovesickness, in most ancient contexts, is the dominant form.

IV

While ancient medical theory seems in practice to recognize only one form of lovesickness, I hope to have demonstrated that in the literary sources there were two distinct forms, the medically recognized depressive form, but also the more widespread manic form. I would like to focus now on the relationship of this manic lovesickness with ancient concepts of melancholia.

Ancient medical theory focused on two forms of melancholia. There was, of course, a depressive form, but the more prevalent type was violent and manic. The information on this matter has been examined elsewhere.⁶¹ Perhaps it will suffice here to point to the evidence of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problema* 30. 1.⁶² The author of the *Problemata* maintains that melancholia is the product of a superfluity of black bile. Black bile is a mixture of cold and hot. Melancholics, accordingly, fall into two broad groups, those in whom the black bile becomes very hot and those in whom the black bile becomes very cold. Where the black bile is hot, one would expect what we term the manic phase of this condition; where the black bile is cold, one would expect the depressed phase. Subsequent theorists, whether humoralists or not, associate the illness with one, the other, or both of the two poles, mania and depression. So Celsus, Soranus of Ephesus, and Caelius Aurelianus all associate the disease with depression. Aretaeus of Cappadocia and Galen, on the other hand, allow the bipolarity of the *Problemata*.

How does this information relate to ancient concepts of lovesickness? The two types of melancholia mentioned in the *Problemata* and depicted later in various medical contexts seem to match the two types of lovesickness I have been attempting to describe. Just as melancholia could be manic or depressive, so could lovesickness be manic or depressive. The congruence is remarkable and perhaps tells us something of the popular perceptions of melancholia and lovesickness. This curious congruence, however, may provide an explanation for two other features of ancient

⁶¹ Toohey 1990a (with bibliography) outlines the evidence epitomized here.

⁶² A reproduction of the Greek text with translation and comments may be found in Klibansky 1964, 18–29.

lovesickness, namely the paucity of descriptions of the depressive form of lovesickness and, second, the relatively late appearance within literary texts of this condition.

It has been argued elsewhere that the depiction of melancholia as a depressive illness rather than as a manic illness is not common in ancient literature and, furthermore, that what occurrences there are appear late in the tradition. They seem to begin seriously in both popular literatures at about the time of Seneca.⁶³ The same tendencies seem to be observable in the ancient descriptions of lovesickness. Medical discussions of lovesickness, as we have seen, are all relatively late and describe the condition as depressive and as not unlike melancholia—also treated as a depressive illness. Of the literary descriptions of lovesickness provided here, the examples of manic lovesickness are distributed throughout most periods. The descriptions of depressive lovesickness, however, begin in earnest with Valerius Maximus, who wrote under the Roman emperor Tiberius (ruled A.D. 14–39) and continue sporadically over subsequent centuries. Descriptions of melancholia as a depressive disease seem to begin seriously at approximately the same time as do descriptions of depressive lovesickness.⁶⁴ The parallel between melancholia and lovesickness, therefore, allows us to be more precise in categorizing and dating the phases of the ancient perceptions of lovesickness and perhaps love itself.

V

After Florentino Ariza saw her for the first time, his mother knew before he told her because he lost his voice and his appetite and spent the entire night tossing and turning in his bed. But when he began to wait for the answer to his first letter, his anguish was complicated by diarrhea and green vomit, he became disorientated and suffered from sudden fainting spells, and his mother was terrified because his condition did not resemble the turmoil of love so much as the devastation of cholera. Florentino Ariza's godfather, an old homeopathic practitioner who had been Tránsito Ariza's confidant ever since her days as a secret mistress, was also alarmed at first by the patient's condition, because he had a weak pulse, the hoarse breathing, and the pale perspiration of a dying man. But his examination revealed that he had no fever, no pain anywhere, and that his only concrete feeling was an urgent desire to die.

⁶³ Toohey 1990a. I stress popular, for the medical perception predates the literary expression. Celsus, for example, was conscious of the depressive nature of melancholia. Perhaps the perception of the real force of depression dates to the third century, during which period, Pigeaud 1987 has argued, there was a soul-body split in medical thought.

⁶⁴ Toohey 1988 also dates the earliest descriptions of boredom to this period.

This passage comes from Gabriel García Márquez's *Love in the Time of Cholera*.⁶⁵ I have reproduced it to illustrate a simple point. This description of a depressed, fretting, passive, physically ill lover—almost a cliché of modern literature⁶⁶—might as easily be of an ancient depressive melancholic as of a victim of cholera or lovesickness. The dominant ancient concept, as I hope to have shown, was a violent one. Thus, we see the origins or the “discovery” of Florentino Ariza’s hackneyed condition above all in the literature of the early empire. It has its best parallels in the Greek novel.

A second observation concerns the passivity of the *inamorati* of the first and second centuries of our era. Is this really passivity or is it in fact the result of a literature that interests itself in the young and inexperienced and in love-relationships that violate societal taboo? The depressed lovers of the Greek novel are usually young and inexperienced. One might easily blame their sense of powerlessness on their age and social station. Had they been older, more experienced, and more capable of attaining their own ends, then might their frustration have manifested itself as anger, rather than melancholy? Is the “discovery” of depressive lovesickness merely the product of a literature that takes more of an interest in the emotions of a more vulnerable class? There are, in the texts mentioned above, several instances that vitiate such a supposition. Chariton’s Dionysius, Callirhoe’s first suitor after her abduction by the pirates, offers one example. He is a man full grown. Recently widowed, wealthy, friend of kings, and the father of two children, he might have been expected to react to frustration in anger, rather than in the depressed manner he does (*Chaereas and Callirhoe* 2. 4). Similarly Theocritus’ Simaetha. She seems to be the victim of neither age nor inexperience. Anger, therefore, might be expected to be the reaction to her infatuation with Delphis. It was not. Medea, on the other hand, offers an example, especially in Valerius, of an angry reaction to frustrated love. Like Callirhoe or Anthia or Charicleia, she is young and inexperienced. The likelihood of her being able to marry the foreigner Jason is remote. Her response, therefore, might be expected to be one of depression. It was not. Youth and inexperience act as an inaccurate means of predicting the reaction to love’s onset and initial frustration. The same point might be made of a love that violates societal taboo. Here I am thinking of Marcus Aurelius’ wife Faustina, or Perdica, or Phaedra, or Ovid’s Byblis (especially *Metamorphoses* 9. 635–40). It could be argued that, were their affections expressed openly, they might run the risk of detection and punishment. Hence their depressive inversions. But let us compare Medea. The taboo against a relationship with Jason is every bit as strong as that, say, against

⁶⁵ Gabriel García Márquez, *Love in the Time of Cholera*; trans. Edith Grossman (New York 1988) 61–62.

⁶⁶ I have not yet seen M. Di Battista, *First Love: The Affections of Modern Fiction* (Chicago 1991).

Marcus Aurelius' wife (who could, after all, have had a clandestine affair). Love for Medea meant betrayal of her father and her family. She knew this from the beginning. Yet her reaction was not one of powerlessness, but, especially in Valerius' version, of strong anger. What is noteworthy in the stress on passivity in love is, I contend, not its being confined to the young or to taboo-breakers, but its efflorescence in the first and second centuries of our era.

A third observation deserves to be made. It is curious that love-melancholy begins to gain real currency at the same time, approximately, as descriptions of depressive melancholy become current. It is equally curious that it is the same period which begins to show descriptions of "boredom" in the modern sense of the term. These peculiar congruences may tell us something about the prehistory and even archaeology of affective states. They show also how closely allied were the emotions of anger, depression, boredom, and love. Perhaps of more interest is that they suggest that there took place in the first or second century of our era a shift in the perception of the symptoms of such affective states as love, lovesickness, and melancholia. This has, I suggest, some bearing on the notion of the "discovery" of depressive love-melancholy.

Finally, there is Paul Veyne. In a brilliant article in 1978 he argued that such an affective shift, at least as far as love is concerned, is evident in the early empire. He believes that, with the weakening of the extended, aristocratic Roman family system, romantic love rather than family compulsion became the means for securing marital obeisance from women.⁶⁷ It would be easy to interpret love-melancholy as another aspect of the new stress on romantic love (which seems above all a passive condition; as love itself became romantic, so did lovesickness become depressive). The active, frequently violent emotions of the lovesick are slowly, but never wholly, replaced by the passivity of Antiochus, or of Habrocomes, or of Florentino Ariza.⁶⁸

Veyne's explanation for the affective shift has been, and probably rightly, rejected.⁶⁹ Most, however, accept the existence of such a shift.

⁶⁷ P. Veyne, "La famille et l'amour sous le haut-empire romain," *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations* 33 (1978) 35-63 and again in his chapter in G. Duby, P. Ariès, and P. Veyne (eds.), *A History of Private Life I* (London 1987).

⁶⁸ The remarkable condition of *acedia*, at least in its fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-century manifestations, bears a very close resemblance to depression and lovesickness. It is curious that lovesickness receives one of its best descriptions in the *Aegritudo Perdicae* in Vandal North Africa at approximately the same time monks and lay folk were being ravaged by the *morbus* of *acedia*. There can be no easy explanation for this coincidence except perhaps to remark that the first and fifth centuries of our era were most dangerous and demoralized periods. Perhaps in such periods that sense of passivity which seems a congener of these conditions is especially prevalent and encourages these *pestes*? On this phenomenon see Toohey 1990b.

⁶⁹ Veyne has been corrected, notably by R. P. Saller and R. D. Shaw, "Tombstones and Roman Family Relations in the Principate: Civilians, Soldiers, and Slaves," *JRS* 74

What was its cause? Space precludes consideration of the issue here. But it does not preclude the observation that the interrelation of lovesickness with melancholia, depression, and boredom seems sufficiently strong to demand an explanation which provides a cause not just for the affective shift in the perception of frustrated love, but also for depression and boredom. Veyne's exhilarating thesis may tell us something about the "discovery" of romantic love and even of lovesickness, but it tells us nothing of the interrelated "discoveries" of its congeners, depression and boredom.⁷⁰

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(1984) 124-46, at 134-35; there is also S. Dixon, "The Sentimental Ideal of the Roman Family," in Rawson (above, note 1) 102 ff. There is now S. Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniugales from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian* (Oxford 1991).

⁷⁰ P. Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (London 1988) 16 n. 51 states that, although Saller and Shaw correct Veyne "on important points," his is "an exceptionally thought-provoking study."

Notes on Statius' *Thebaid* Books 5 and 6

J. B. HALL

This is the third in a projected series of six papers presenting conjectures in the text of Statius' *Thebaid*. The first two of these papers appeared in *ICS* 14 (1989) 227-41 and 17 (1992) 57-77; the rest will follow at intervals. As before, I take my lemmata from D. E. Hill's edition (Leiden 1983), and have regularly consulted the editions by Gevartius (1616 and 1618), Cruceus (1618), Veenhusen (1671), O. Müller (1870), Garrod (1906), Klotz (1908; revised by Klinnert, 1973) and Mozley (1928).

5. 13-16

illae clangore fugaci,
umbra fretis aruisque, uolant, sonat auis aether.
iam Borean imbresque pati, iam nare solutis
amnibus et nudo iuuat aestiuare sub Haemo.

The cranes are flying, and flying northwards from Egypt to their summer quarters in Thrace, their precise destination being Mt Haemus. "Soon it will be their delight . . . to spend the summer days on naked Haemus," says Mozley, but I must confess that I am at a loss to see how "naked" Haemus could be an attraction to the birds, or indeed what the relevance of its being "naked" might be here. Lactantius' comment at this point only increases my incomprehension: "sine honore siluarum. Haemus est autem mons Thraciae. et bene nudo. uestiuntur enim arboribus . . ."; to which mystifying, not to say contradictory, sequence of observations he adds a reference to Sall. *Iug.* 48. 3, where a tree-clad eminence is described. And surely, in our present context, *nudo* is exactly the opposite of what is required. As apt as any word here would be *uiridi*, emphasising the attraction to the migrating cranes of Haemus' tree-clad slopes.

5. 17-24

hic rursus simili procerum uallante corona
dux Talaionides, antiqua ut forte sub orno
stabat et admoti nixus Polynicis in hastam:
"at tamen, o quaecumque es" ait "cui gloria tanta,
uenimus innumerae fatum debere cohortes,

quem non ipse deum sator aspernetur honorem,
dic age, quando tuis alacres abstimus undis,
quae domus aut tellus, animam quibus hauseris astris. . ."

Saved from death by dehydration, the Argive army takes time off from its march to hear the story of Hypsipyle, their saviour. The request that she should tell her tale comes from Adrastus (*dux Talaionides*), here depicted as standing under an ash tree, leaning on Polynices' spear. Not his own spear? Why not his own spear? Is this normal military practice, for one man to lean on another's weapon? Is not his own strong enough? Surely to goodness, if anyone is at ease and leaning on a spear, it must be the man who owns it? If so, should we not expect:

stabat, et admotam Polynices nixus in hastam?

Adrastus, then, is standing under the ash, while Polynices rests on his spear hard by.

Lines 20 and 21 harbour two corruptions, I believe, of which the first, *at* for *tu*, was corrected by Markland, while the second, not yet corrected, lies concealed in the words *fatum debere*. That *fatum debere* might mean the same as *uitam debere*, as Lactantius opined, is about as credible—or incredible—as the equation of “to owe one’s fate” with “to owe one’s life”; and Barthius at all events had the common sense to suggest altering *fatum* to *uitam* here. But more is needed than that, for, as Mozley notes, “‘uenimus debere’ is doubtful Latin,” and, on any analysis, it is hardly true to say that the army’s purpose in coming was to owe its life to Hypsipyle. One variant reading, however, *fato* for *fatum*, though worse in isolation even than *fatum*, as Mozley’s solecistic conformation of text makes clear, does nevertheless point the way to a credible solution, and a very easy one, namely:

“tu tamen, o quaecumque es” ait “cui gloria tanta
uenimus innumerae fato debente cohortes, . . .”

Now all is in order: the coming of the army was owed by fate, and it brought great glory to Hypsipyle.

One final difficulty is presented by line 21, where the question *animam quibus hauseris astris* seems to invite Hypsipyle to state her geniture, the disposition of the celestial bodies at the time of her birth—as if it could make the slightest difference to her questioner whether she was born on 1 April or the day in which the sun first entered Leo or whatever day it actually was in the Lemnian calendar. But no: Adrastus did not want to know her birthday, but rather

animam quibus hauseris oris,

the second half of 21 being no more than a variation on the first.

5. 61-64

illa Paphon ueterem centumque altaria linquens,
nec uultu nec crine prior, soluisse iugalem
ceston et Idalias procul ablegasse uolucres
fertur.

This note is no more than a cry for help. The words *nec uultu nec crine prior* are rendered "with altered looks and tresses" by Mozley, and something like that must be the sense intended by Statius, but *prior* seems to me totally inadequate to represent that sense; nor am I in the slightest degree impressed by the gloss "id est non apparens in uultu neque in cultu qualis prius" which Hill cites from "Schol. Dres. a." For *prior* I can do no better at the moment than *eadem* or *ut erat* (and heaven alone knows how the corruption could have come about), but something better still must occur to someone.

5. 64-67

erant certe media quae noctis in umbra
diuam alios ignes maioraque tela gerentem
Tartareas inter thalamis uolitasse sorores
uulgarent, . . .

"... the goddess, armed with other torches and deadlier weapons, ..." is what Mozley has to offer us for line 65, but since when did *maiora* mean "deadlier"? The presence in this line of *alios* might perhaps suggest the idea of replacing *maioraque* with *atque altera*, but more economical, and not inferior, would be either *grauioraque* (cf. 585) or, perhaps more to the point, *peioraque* (cf. e contra 138 *melioraque*).

5. 70-72

protinus a Lemno teneri fugistis Amores:
mutus Hymen uersaeque faces et frigida iusti
cura tori.

Cura is less than adequate here: it was not that their "care" for their lawful spouses had grown cold, it had vanished altogether. So what was now *frigida*? Surely their *flamma*? The word *cura* is an intruder from 75.

5. 102-06

stricto mox ense silentia iussit
hortatrix scelerum et medio sic ausa profari:
"rem summam instinctu superum meritique doloris,
o uiduae (firmate animos et pellite sexum!)
Lemniades, sancire paro; . . ."

The aged Polyxo works on the emotions of the Lemnian women, urging them to murder. Such a "desperate deed" (*rem summam*, so translated by Mozley) is, she claims, prompted by the gods above and by the *meritus dolor* which they themselves feel. Now *dolor* is by no means a precise word, and here could mean either "pain" or "anger"; the fact that it could mean just "pain" is enough in itself to disqualify *meritus* as an appropriate adjective for Polyxo to use here. What she must appeal to is the *inmeritus dolor* of the women.

5. 120-22

quodsi propioribus actis
est opus, ecce animos doceat Rhodopeia coniunx,
ulta manu thalamos pariterque epulata marito.

The dreadful story of Procne is set before the Lemnian women as an example, but 122 as it stands in our manuscripts does not tell us anything about the nature of the feast she set before Tereus. I feel quite certain that *pariterque* conceals an original *partumque*, which would make all the difference in the world to Polyxo's counsel.

5. 152-55

tunc uiridi luco (lucus iuga celsa Mineruae
propter opacat humum niger ipse, sed insuper ingens
mons premit et gemina pereunt caligine soles),
hic sanxere fidem, tu Martia testis Enyo . . .

Hic in 155 is unsatisfactory, since *uiridi luco* has preceded. Perhaps *hanc*?

5. 278-79

accelerate fugam, tuque, o mea digna propago,
hac rege, uirgo, patrem, . . .

Surely *o me digna propago*?

5. 281-83

stat funesta Venus ferroque accincta furentes
adiuuat (unde manus, unde haec Mauortia diuae
pectora?).

"Whence hath the goddess this violence, this heart of Mars?" is how Mozley translates the end of this utterance, but where is "this violence" (surely the sentiment required here) to be found in the Latin of the manuscripts? Perhaps replace *manus* with *haec uis*?

5. 291-95

tunc demum litore rauco
 multa metu reputans et uix confisa Lyaeo
 diuidor, ipsa gradu nitente, sed anxia retro
 pectora; nec requies quin et surgentia caelo
 flamina et e cunctis prospectem collibus undas. 295

Hypsipyle is now going away from the shore, so how is *prospectem* to the point? Is not *respectem* what is needed (as conversely, let me suggest, *prospexit* for *respexit* at 5. 421)? Then there is the phrase *surgentia caelo flamina*, which can hardly serve as the object of any verb of seeing. It may be that *lumina* for *flamina* is all that is required here, but *ponto* for *caelo* might additionally be worth a moment's consideration.

5. 488-90

fremet impia plebes
 sontibus accensae stimulis facinusque reposcunt.
 quin etiam occultae uulgo increbrescere uoces:

Since the direct speech which follows in 491-92 is in turn followed by the words *talibus exanimis dictis*, it is evident that *occultae* gives exactly the opposite sense to that which is needed here. *Quin nec iam occultae* ... therefore.

5. 513-15

nunc ille dei circumdare templa
 orbe uago labens, miserae nunc robora siluae
 atterit et uastas tenuat complexibus ornos; ...

The semi-personification imported by *miserae* strikes me as out of place here. A more significant, and appropriate, epithet would be *sacrae*.

5. 570-71

uolat hasta tremens et hiantia monstri
 ora subit linguaeque secat fera uincla trisulcae, ...

Capaneus' fatal spear enters the gaping maw of the great serpent and "cleaves the rough fastenings of the triple tongue" (so Mozley), but "rough" is not a normal meaning of *ferus*, which indeed strikes me as fearfully weak at this juncture. *Tria* or *sua* would be better than *fera*, I fancy.

5. 577-78

hic magno tellurem pondere mersus
 implorantem animam dominis adsibilat aris.

Exsibilat for adsibilat?

5. 617–18

sic equidem luctus solabar et ubera paruo
iam materna dabam, . . .

“Eurydice, wife of Lycurgus, was the mother of the babe Opheltes, whom Hypsipyle had been nursing,” observes Mozley in a note on line 632, and his observation highlights the factual error of *iam materna*. Perhaps the easiest solution is *non materna*, but *ceu materna* might be worth a moment’s consideration.

5. 633–35

hocne ferens onus inlaetabile matris
transfundam gremio? quae—me prius ima sub umbras
mergat humus?

Such is Hill’s punctuation, following Brinkgreve, who first postulated an aposiopesis after *quae*. Needless to say, no previous editor had suggested so improbable a change of linguistic direction. Nevertheless, *quae* is a problem, though no previous editor had suggested as much. The problem would disappear, and rhetoric be better served, if we read

quin me prius ima sub umbras
mergat humus!

5. 667–69

quos inter Adrastus
mitius et sociae ueritus commercia uitae
Amphiaraus ait, “ne, quaeso! absistite ferro, . . .”

Lycurgus, seeing the corpse of his son, makes to strike Hypsipyle, but is intercepted by Tydeus and other leaders of the Argive host. They in turn are threatened by Lycurgus’ men, and a general conflict seems imminent. Adrastus and Amphiaraus accordingly interpose themselves in the interests of peace. In line 668 *mitior* would be appreciably better than *mitius*, and for *commercias*, which is senseless in this context, we could do much worse than write *conuicia*. It is pertinent that Mozley translates, “Amphiaraus, fearing the strife of kindred fillets”; pertinent also that Markland had jibbed, not at *commercias*, but at *ueritus*, for which he proposed *meritus*, perceiving indeed that there was a target here for the emendator, but missing it by one word.

5. 719–22

sed Lemnos ad aures

Three small corrections may improve the expression here: *latusque* for *dictusque*; *inruerunt* for *inruerant*; and *adripiunt* for *diripiunt*.

mox circum tristes seruata Palaemonis aras
nigra superstitione, quotiens animosa resumit.
Leucothea gemitus et amica ad litora festa
tempestate uenit.

6. 74-83

namque illi et pharetras breuioraque tela dicarat
festinus uoti pater insontesque sagittas; 75
iam tunc et nota stabuli de gente probatos
in nomen pascebat equos cinctusque sonantes
armaque maiores expectatura lacertos.
[spes auidi quas, non in nomen credula, uestes
urguebat studio cultusque insignia regni 80
purpureos sceptrumque minus, cuncta ignibus atris
damnat atrox suaque ipse parens gestamina ferri,
si damnis rabidum queat exaturare dolorem.]

The passage is notoriously difficult, and I am not sure that what I have to say about it satisfies even my own qualms; but since diagnosis may aid to a cure, I will say it all the same. Lines 79 to 83 are omitted by the Puteaneus and other manuscripts; and because P omits them, they were bound sooner or later to fall under suspicion. Accordingly, they were condemned by Müller, and are bracketed as spurious by Hill. Wrongly, in my view, since their expression is (barring corruption) entirely Statian, and one can see how they might have come to be omitted if one contemplates the jump from *ex-atura* in 78 to *exatura-* in 83. As far as 78 there is, so far as I can see, no problem; but 79, here printed by Hill in Gronovius' version, is a mess; and it is in that line, and that line alone, I suspect, that the key to the whole of this passage will be found. Quite how Gronovius arrived at *auidi*, for which the manuscripts universally offer *auid(a)e*, I do not know; nor do I know

how his version is to be construed or interpreted. The words *credula uestes urguebat studio* must, however, refer to the contribution of Archemorus' mother Eurydice, made to complement that of his father, and a specific reference to Eurydice, at present lacking in 79, would help greatly to clarify what is going on in 79–81. One might add, moreover, that *studio* would benefit from an adjective, while *in nomen* in 79 looks suspiciously like a scribal iteration from 77. All of which brings me to the proposal I wish to advance for the restoration of line 79, and that is:

Eurydice quas non materno credula uestes
urubat studio . . .

Should this proposal fail to satisfy discerning critics, my hope is that it may urge one of them on to the definitive solution.

6. 109–10

non grassante Noto citius nocturna peregit
flamma nemus.

At Amphiaras' bidding the army fells vast swathes of forest to make a funeral pyre for Archemorus; and they do the job in double quick time, as quickly indeed as a forest fire sweeps through a grove, fanned by the south wind. Very well, but why should the flame be a "nocturnal" one? Why not rather, or as easily, a "diurnal" one? I suspect that *nocitura* lurks here.

6. 175–76

occumbam pariter, dum uulnere iusto
exaturata oculos unum impellamur in ignem.

What wondrous syntax! *Occumbam . . . exaturata . . . impellamur*—the sequence of first person singular verb, nominative singular participle, and first person plural verb, all supposedly referring to one and the same person, constitutes an egregious solecism. Write:

exaturata oculos unumque impellar in ignem.

6. 217–19

ter curuos egere sinus, inlisaque telis
tela sonant, quater horrendum pepulere fragorem
arma, quater mollem famularum brachia planctum.

The Greek kings ride around the funeral pyre, clashing their arms as they go, and the handmaids respond by beating their breasts. The very strange arithmetic (*ter . . . quater . . . quater*) appears not to have bothered anyone except Mozley, who comments: "It is not clear why, if they clashed arms thrice, the noise was heard four times." Quite so; and surely the number

ought to be the same on all three occasions. In 217 *ter* is guaranteed by metre, so let us make necessary changes in 218 and 219, as follows:

tela sonant, terque horrendum pepulere fragorem
arma, ter et mollem famularum bracchia planctum.

Once *terque* had become *quater* (via *que-ter*), it was inevitable that *ter et* would follow suit.

6. 223–24

dextri gyro et uibrantibus hastis
hac redeunt, . . .

If Gronovius had wanted to spend his time profitably on these lines, he should have spared himself the trouble of defending *dextri* (which does not need defence) and concentrated rather on the jarring inelegance of *gyro et* . . . *armis* and the inscrutability of *hac* (translated by Mozley as though it were *sic*). I suggest that what Statius left behind him was:

dextri gyrant uibrantibus hastis
ac redeunt, . . .

6. 358–59

nam saepe Iouem Phlegramque suique
anguis opus fratrumque pius cantarat honores.

Often had Phoebus sung of Jove's victory at Phlegra and "his own victory o'er the serpent" (so Mozley translates), and that sentiment seems to me to call for *suumque*.

6. 563–66

nota parens cursu; quis Maenaliae Atalantes
nesciat egregium decus et uestigia cunctis
indepressa procis? onerat celeberrima natum
mater, . . .

If Parthenopaeus fell short of his mother Atalanta as a runner, it would be perfectly appropriate to say that her glory was a burden to him (*onerat*), but he himself is *procul fama iam notus*, and her fame, accordingly, can be no burden to him. What it can be is an adornment, and Statius here, I fancy, wrote *ornat*.

6. 661–63

uix unus Phlegyas acerque Menestheus
(hos etiam pudor et magni tenere parentes)
promisere manum.

Hippomedon's strength in handling the discus is so great that all the competitors bar Phlegyas and Menestheus opt out of the competition, and it is only a sense of shame and a consciousness of great ancestry that prevent them from following suit. *Etiam* here seems to suggest that these two considerations were additional to other constraints, when in fact they were the only ones. *Etenim* therefore?

6. 695-96

excidit ante pedes elapsum pondus et ictus
destituit frustraue manum demisit inanem.

Phlegyas is in mid-throw when the discus slips from his grasp. For the action of throwing a discus I should have said that the right word was not *ictus* but *actus*, and for the effect of losing the discus I should have said that the variant reading *dimisit* was preferable to *demisit*: relieved of the weight indeed, the hand is, if anything, more likely to fly up than down.

6. 751-52

tuto procul ora recessu
armorum in speculis, aditusque ad uulnera clausi.

We move on now to the boxing match between Capaneus and Alcidas. Both stand on tiptoe, with their guard up, their eyes on their opponent. "Safe withdrawn are their faces on their shoulders, ever watching, and closed is the approach to wounds," says Mosley, by some sort of double vision, it should seem, perceiving *scapulis* alongside *speculis*! *Tuto . . . recessu armorum*, "safe within the recess of their weapons"—since the boxers' gloves are reinforced with lumps of lead (732), *armorum* is perhaps just tolerable, but the expression is strained, I should say, even for Statius, and I am much drawn to the idea of replacing *armorum* with *ulnarum*, a word very well suited to represent the cradling effect of the fighters' uplifted and extended arms.

6. 765-66

doctior hic differt animum metuensque futuri
cunctatus uires dispensat.

Capaneus, being more experienced, husband his strength at the outset of the fight. Most manuscripts give *cunctatus*, but the Puteaneus offers *cunctatur*, from which Baehrens elicited *cunctator*, thus generalising about Capaneus' style of fighting. If, however, a particular tactic was here in Statius' mind, he might well have chosen to write *cunctanter*.

6. 779–81

leuat ecce diuque minatur
in latus inque oculos; illum rigida arma cauentem
auocat ac manibus necopinum interserit ictum . . .

“*Leuat* sc. *manus* (*uel* rigida arma . . .)” is Hill’s comment on 779, but the ellipse is exceedingly harsh, and the picture of what is happening is consequently difficult to visualise. I feel pretty certain that *leuat* conceals an original *l(a)eua* (sc. *manu*), and that Statius left behind him the following form of words:

laeua ecce diuque minatus
in latus inque oculos, illum rigida arma cauentem
auocat ac dextra necopinum interserit ictum . . .

No one who has ever watched a boxing match can fail to recognise this picture: the fighter first jabs with his left so as to distract his opponent’s attention, and then comes in suddenly with his right in the hope of a knock-out.

6. 802–05

ecce iterum inmodice uenientem eludit et exit
sponte ruens mersusque umeris: effunditur ille
in caput, adsurgentem alio puer improbus ictu
perculit euentuque impalluit ipse secundo.

Alcidamas, the subject of the first section, eludes Capaneus’ charge by dropping down (*ruens*: not rushing, as Mozley imagines) with his head tucked into his shoulders; Capaneus goes right over the top of him, falling head first, and as he gets up, is felled *alio* . . . *ictu*. Not at all surprisingly, Mozley was troubled by *alio ictu*, which he tried vainly to defend (“The word ‘*alio*,’ l. 804, seems to imply Capaneus’ fall as being the first blow”) when he would have done much better to resort to one of the easiest of all emendations, *alto* for *alio*. Finally, perhaps *expalluit* for *impalluit*?

6. 813–15

nec mora, prorumpit Tydeus, nec iussa recusat
Hippomedon; tunc uix ambo conatibus ambas
restringunt cohibentque manus ac plurima suadent.

The ignominy of his fall infuriates Capaneus, and Adrastus can see that he will not stop now until he has murdered the young Laconian. Tydeus and Hippomedon, accordingly, jump forward to restrain Capaneus. In line 814 *tunc* strikes me as an idle stopgap, and I suspect that it has taken the place of an original *tamen*, which followed *ambo*, thus:

Hippomedon; uix ambo tamen conatibus ambas
restringunt cohibentque manus ac plurima suadent.

6. 819-22

uociferans: "liceat! non has ego puluere crasso
atque cruore genas, meruit quibus iste fauorem
semiuiui, foedem, mittamque informe sepulcro
corpus et Oebalio donem lugere magistro?"

Capaneus' vociferation, as regularly now printed, changes tack with an abruptness difficult to register on the inner ear, shifting with one word from entreaty to blustering threat. I find myself wondering whether Statius did not settle for an easier run of words and couch the whole of Capaneus' outburst in the form of an entreaty:

| | |
|-------------------------------------------|-----|
| "liceat nunc has ego puluere crasso . . . | 819 |
| corpus et Oebalio donem lugere magistro!" | 822 |

6. 840-43

sed non ille rigor patriumque in corpore robur:
luxuriant artus, effusaque sanguine laxo
membra natant; unde haec audax fiducia tantum
Oenidae superare parem.

Agylleus has vast bulk, but he is flabby and sluggish, and his poor condition encourages Tydeus (Oenides) to hope for victory. That, surely, is the general sense intended, but particular problems of text prevent that sense from being intelligibly conveyed. Quite what the meaning of *sanguine laxo* may be, I am at a loss to tell; nor do I see what the force is of *effusa sanguine*. For *effusa* some manuscripts give *effeta*, and this may possibly be right, unless it in fact is an early conjecture. I myself incline to *suffusa*, with *lasso* in place of *laxo*. Finally, in 842, I fancy that Statius wrote, not *haec*, but *hunc*.

6. 864-69

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| non sic ductores gemini gregis horrida tauri bella mouent; medio coniunx stat candida prato uictorem expectans, rumpunt obnixa furentes pectora, subdit amor stimulos et uulnera sanat: fulmineo sic dente sues, sic hispida turpes proelia uillosis ineunt complexibus ursi. | 865 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|

Two matters need attention here, of which the first is the more important. That the concentration of each and every reader of a text is fitful is well known; but I can only say that I am amazed that no reader of this text has

spotted the idiocy of *non sic* in line 864: how could anybody assert that two bulls make war "less fiercely" than Tydeus and Agylleus? What, after all, would such an assertion mean? And how precisely did the bulls fight, if not with all the ferocity at their disposal? The idiocy, moreover, is made still more blatant by the absence of *non* from line 868, which must imply, as the text of this passage stands at present, that boars and bears have more ferocity than bulls when it comes to a fight. The word that offends here is *non*, and for *non sic* I would suggest the easy expedient *sic sibi*. The second matter concerns the noun *pectora* in line 867, where the participle *obnixa* tells rather for *cornua*, or for *tempora*, the beast's head, not its chest, serving it as a battering ram with which to attack its opponent.

6. 872-74

contra non integer ille
flatibus alternis aegroque effetus hiatu
exuit ingestas fluuio sudoris harenas . . .

The out-of-condition Agylleus is now in a bad way, breathing heavily and sweating profusely. His sweat indeed is now so profuse that it washes off the caked sand—and for that sense to be obtained, what we need is *eluit*, not *exuit*.

6. 906-10

"quid si non sanguinis huius
partem haud exiguam (scitis) Dircaeus haberet
campus, ubi hae nuper Thebarum foedera plagae?"
haec simul ostentans quaesitaque praemia laudum
dat sociis, sequitur neglectus Agyllea thorax. 910

The phrasing of line 909 would be appreciably improved, I think, if we read *has simul ostentat* . . .

6. 921-23

tum generum, ne laudis egens, iubet ardua necti
tempora Thebarumque ingenti uoce citari
uictorem: dirae retinebant omina Parcae.

The syntax of *ne laudis egens*, where a finite verb form is to seek, is rather strange. Did Statius perhaps write *ne laude egeat*?

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Statius *Silvae* 4. 9: *Libertas Decembris?*

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The last poem of Statius' 4th book of *Silvae* is generally taken to be a Saturnalia-inspired reproach directed at a well-connected *patronus* by a poet who has come off rather the worse in an exchange of gifts. The connections with Catullus' 14th poem—a poem in which Catullus commemorates a Saturnalia gift-book—and with Martial's complaints about meagre gifts from patrons have been noted.¹ It has even been argued that in *Silvae* 4. 9 Statius makes use of the license of the season to produce a poem in which "he accuses his addressee of a lack of literary taste."² A closer examination of the "parallels" in Martial, together with a glance at Statius' other poems in hendecasyllables (*Silvae* 1. 6, 2. 7, 4. 3), will reveal some of the problems which arise if one reads the poem this way. By defining the tone of *Silvae* 4. 9 in terms of the distance between it and the poems in which Catullus chaffs his literarily inclined friends one can get a better sense of the *délicatesse* that Statius applies in managing his relations with Plotius Grypus.

The epigrams in which Martial expresses a sense of injury at having received a gift of little market value, parallel to 4. 9 as they appear at first glance, are in fact all addressed to fictitious donors and celebrate the poet's ingenuity, not the receipt of real, if paltry, gifts. On the disappointing half-pound of pepper sent by the "Sextus" who had sent a pound of silver the

¹ In the commentaries of F. Vollmer (*P. Papini Stati Silvarum libri* [Leipzig 1898]) and K. M. Coleman (*Statius. Silvae IV* [Oxford 1988]), and in discussions by R. E. Colton ("Echoes of Catullus and Martial in Statius *Silvae* 4. 9," *AC* 46 [1977] 544–56) and H.-J. van Dam ("Statius, *Silvae*, Forschungsbericht 1974–84," in *ANRW* II.32.5, ed. by W. Haase [Berlin 1986] 2740 n. 50). References to Statius, Martial and Catullus are to the Oxford Classical Text editions by E. Courtney, W. M. Lindsay and R. A. B. Mynors, respectively.

² K. M. Coleman, "Silvae 4. 9: A Statian Name-Game," *PACA* 14 (1978) 9–10. She continues: "in addressing his accusation to a Grypus, Statius uses the associations of 'nasutus' to draw attention to sensibilities which are noticeably lacking in Plotius." In her more recent commentary (previous note) she is less precise about who the target of the poem, which she calls "a satire on poor literary taste and the absence of social graces," is. Her final remark on the tone of the poem, that "in all, the teasing note, familiar from Catullus (and also Cicero and Horace), is not meant to be taken seriously," is too much *ex cathedra*; it is my aim to show how Statius' teasing differs from that of Catullus.

year before, for example, he quips *tanti non emo, Sexte, piper* (10. 57. 2).³ And the long tirade in 11. 18 on the insufficiency of a rural property given the poet by "Lupus" only prepares for the joke at the end (25–27):

Errasti, Lupe, littera sed una:
nam quo tempore praedium dedisti,
mallem tu mihi prandium dedisses.⁴

On the other hand, the thank-you notes that Martial addresses to real people are always grateful, not to say effusive, in tone. Hyperbolic gratitude is perhaps to be expected in an epigram acknowledging the gift of a toga from the imperial freedman Parthenius (8. 28), but the toga from M. Antonius Primus is warmly received as well (10. 73):

Littera facundi gratum mihi pignus amici
pertulit, Ausoniae dona severa⁵ togae,
qua non Fabricius, sed vellet Apicius uti,
vellet Maecenas Caesarianus eques.
vilior haec nobis alio mittente fuisset;
non quacumque manu victima caesa litat:
a te missa venit: possem nisi munus amare,
Marce, tuum, poteram nomen amare meum.⁶

³ For more abuse of "Sextus" see 2. 3, 13, 44, 55, 3. 11, 38, 4. 68, 7. 86, 8. 17. The Sextus who is praised in 5. 5 is carefully differentiated from these disgraceful Sexti in the first line of his epigram: *Sexte, Palatinae cultor facunde Minervae*.

⁴ On the fictionality of this "Lupus" see P. White, "The Friends of Martial, Statius and Pliny and the Dispersal of Patronage," *HSCP* 79 (1975) 265–300, esp. 271 n. 14, and N. M. Kay, *Martial Book XI: A Commentary* (London 1985) 249. Other abusive thank-you notes are addressed to "Galla" (5. 84, she sent nothing), "Umbro" (7. 53, he sent along a variety of gifts, totaling only 30 *nummi* in value, however; cf. 12. 81, where despite his newly wealthy state he sends *alica*—barley water—when before he sent a cape—*allicula*) and "Postumianus" (8. 71, over the years his gifts have been shrinking in value). "Paulus," to whom the wry thanks of 8. 33 and the outright abuse of 2. 20, 4. 17, 5. 4, 22, 6. 12, 9. 85, 10. 10 and 12. 69 are addressed, may also be the addressee of the flattering poem 7. 72, or there may be more than one Paulus addressed in the collection (cf. 9. 31 for a poem seeking the favor of Velius [Paulus]). Among the more than 400 satirical epigrams in the *Greek Anthology* (Book 11) there are plenty of abusive poems, but none directed at givers of gifts and only a very small number directed at less-than-hospitable hosts (11. 14, 313, 314, possibly also 135 and 137).

⁵ *Superba*, Heinsius. Cf. *Ausoniae decora ampla togae*, Stat. *Silv.* 1. 4. 24.

⁶ This couplet is misleadingly mistranslated in the Loeb edition of W. C. A. Ker (Cambridge, MA 1920): "if I could not love your gift, I could love at least my own name." An exactly parallel construction is to be found at 10. 89. 4–5 (*Iunonem, Polyclitae, suam nisi frater amaret, Iunonem poterat frater amare tuam*), where Ker translates, correctly: "Did not her brother love his own Juno, Polyclitus, that brother might well have loved this Juno of thine." In 10. 73 the imperfect *possem* does duty in a past contrary-to-fact protasis, and the indicative *poteram* stands in the apodosis because the *possibility* of enjoyment of the *nomen* is in no way conditional (cf. the pluperfect subjunctive in 8. 30—the topic is the Scaevola-like fortitude of a criminal in the amphitheatre: *quod nisi raptam foret nolenti poena, parabat / saevior in lassos ire sinistra focos* 7–8). The translation of the couplet should read: "had I not been able to love your gift [which of course I was], I was

munere sed plus est et nomine gratius ipso
officium docti iudiciumque viri.⁷

10

Some of the gifts mentioned by Martial are more valuable than the volume of Brutus' *oscitationes* that Statius received⁸: an ornate cup from Istantius Rufus (8. 50), a carriage from Aelianus (12. 24), an estate from Marcella (12. 31), but the difference in tone between Martial's complaining epigrams and his grateful ones is, I think, due more to the value of the addressee than to the value of the gift.⁹

If Martial's recipe for these thank-you notes calls for a large measure of gratitude with wit admixed to taste (more wit for Istantius Rufus, the addressee of 8. 50 and a number of other high-quality epigrams, less for Aelianus and Marcella, each appearing twice only¹⁰), how is it that we find Statius, whose attitude towards his patrons in the *Silvae* is consistently more reverent than that of the epigrammatist, sending young Plotius Grypus a poem in which he draws attention "to sensibilities which are noticeably lacking in Plotius"?¹¹ Statius' thank-you, despite the dues of flattery paid with the résumé of Grypus' public career (lines 14–19), would seem to push at the boundaries of acceptable *libertas Decembris*, and that too in a poem not for Grypus' ears only, but one included in a *liber* intended for a broader public (*hunc tamen librum tu, Marcelle, defendes* 4 pr. 34). Can this reading of the poem's tone be right? Would Grypus have read it thus?

able to love my own name." On the meaning of the latter phrase, see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *CP* 73 (1978) 287.

⁷ Primus is also the addressee of 9. 99, 10. 23, 32.

⁸ On the importance of gifts to Martial's finances, see R. Saller, "Martial on Patronage and Literature," *CQ* 33 (1983) 246–57. Saller's paper is a response to the very different claims of P. White's paper, "Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome," *JRS* 68 (1978) 74–92.

⁹ Epigram 9. 72 might seem to constitute a counter-example: The boxer Liber, who is thanked for no more than a dinner, ought (Martial hints) to have paid heed to the suggestion inherent in his name and sent wine, too (5–6). The suggestion that the giver might make perfect his gift by supplementing it is used in epigrams prompted by more valuable gifts, too. Among the 21 epigrams addressed to Arruntius Stella is a poem acknowledging a gift of roof tiles: *plurima, quae posset subito effundere nimbo, / muneribus venit tegula missa tuis* (7. 36. 3–4). The epigram is capped by the couplet *horridus, ecce, sonat Boreae stridore December: / Stella, tegis villam, non tegis agricolam* (5–6), hinting that a winter garment would not have come amiss. I wonder, however, whether these "hints" were anything more than a convenient closing device, whether Martial really thought the supplemental gift might be forthcoming if only he made bold to ask. He uses the same tactic to conclude the thank-you note to Parthenius, an unlikely target, one would think, for carping ingratitude: *O quantos risus pariter spectata movebit / cum Palatina nostra lacerna toga!* (8. 28. 21–22), where the humor at his own expense is at least as emphatic as the "hint."

¹⁰ The other poem addressed to Marcella (12. 21) is even more unctuous than the thank-you note. Aelianus receives only a passing reference in 11. 40.

¹¹ See above, note 2.

One way to approach such questions is to examine generic precedents. The three other hendecasyllable poems in the *Silvae* provide a sense of what an ancient reader's expectations in approaching 4. 9 are likely to have been.

Silvae 1. 6 is perhaps the closest comparandum, being, like 4. 9, a Saturnalia poem (it has the *titulus* "Kalendae Decembres," and is addressed to Domitian). In this poem, too, Statius foregrounds the license of the season, seeking inspiration at the outset not from Apollo and company, but from *Saturnus, ridens Iocus* and *Sales protervi* (1. 6. 1–8; cf. 45 *libertas*). But it turns out that *ioci licentes*¹² (93) are among the features of the festival that surpass verbal expression (*quis canat . . . ? / iam iam deficio* 94–95). As such, they are reproduced nowhere in the poem, which remains thoroughly panegyric.¹³ Statius has another hendecasyllable poem addressed to Domitian, *Silvae* 4. 3, on the recently completed Via Domitiana from Sinuessa to Puteoli, and as the description that Statius provides for this poem in the epistle prefatory to Book 4 suggests—*tertio viam Domitianam miratus sum* (4 pr. 7)—its content, too, is praise and its tone lofty.¹⁴ His choice of the hendecasyllable meter for *Silvae* 2. 7, the *genethliacon Lucani ad Pollam*, was, Statius tells us, a gesture of respect for the dead (hexameter) poet: *laudes eius dicturus hexametros meos timui* (2 pr. 25–26). The poem is no less respectful towards its subject (cf. *reverentiam* 2 pr. 25) than are 1. 6 and 4. 3.¹⁵ My point, really, is that the meter of 4. 9 in and of itself ought not to create the expectation of Catullan or Saturnalian irreverence.¹⁶

¹² The phrase *locos licentes* which stands in the first impression of Courtney's OCT is a typographical error for *iocos licentes*.

¹³ During the imperial period praising the emperor was not so much an expression of approval as it was a public declaration (which might be true or false) that one was not subversive. The warmth of the praise necessary to make this declaration persuasive varied under different emperors—warmer under Nero, for example, and cooler under Trajan. In pronouncing *Silvae* 1. 6 panegyric I simply mean to say that Statius is taking a non-confrontational stance, and I leave open the possibility that he may have reserved for himself and perhaps a circle of friends a private laugh at the absurdities of contemporary panegyric and imperial posing. I would not go as far as F. M. Ahl does (in "The Rider and the Horse: Politics and Power in Roman Poetry from Horace to Statius," in *ANRW* II.32.1, ed. by W. Haase [Berlin 1984] 40–110) and say that Statius' purpose in flattering Domitian is "to hold the emperor up for the ridicule of later generations" (91), nor as far as J. Garthwaite does (in the analysis of *Silvae* 3. 4 which is appended to Ahl's article, pp. 111–24), when he suggests that there are elements of "satire against Domitian" in the *Silvae* and the *Thebaid*, and that Statius had to leave Rome in consequence (124).

¹⁴ Cf. Coleman (above, note 1) ad loc. on the high tone of the extended anaphora of lines 9–26, and note the lengthy speeches by divinities in 72–94, 124–64.

¹⁵ H.-J. van Dam (*P. Papinius Statius. Silvae Book II: A Commentary, Mnemosyne* Suppl. 82 [Leiden 1984] 453) remarks that "the other long and serious poem [sc. besides *Silvae* 2. 7] in this metre before Ausonius is *Silvae* 4. 3, *Via Domitiana*," and concludes his discussion of 2. 7 by saying, "Statius, in a way, deifies Lucan" (506).

¹⁶ On the tonal variety possible in poems of this meter, cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 4. 14. 3: "his [sc. in hendecasyllabis] iocamur ludimus amamus delemus querimur irascimur, describimus aliquid modo pressius modo elatius, atque ipsa varietate temptamus efficere, ut alia aliis quaedam fortasse omnibus placeant."

Of course Statius himself proclaims that both will be forthcoming (*hendecasyllabos quos Saturnalibus una risimus* 4 pr. 23–24), but forewarned by the example of 1. 6—that is to say by the overwhelming presence of panegyric in a poem which claimed to offer *libertas*¹⁷—we can perhaps reach a more satisfactory understanding of the Catullan and Saturnalian components of *Silvae* 4. 9.

The wit that Statius makes such a memorable characteristic of the addressee of 4. 9 is of a particularly Catullan variety (*quo soles lepore* 54; cf. *est sane iocus iste* 1),¹⁸ and while the poem's verbal debt to Catullus has been examined by Vollmer, Colton and Coleman, more can be said about its situational debt to the polymetra. The Catullan poems most strongly evoked by 4. 9 are 14, 44 and 50, with less prominent echoes of 22 and 38. The selection is significant. These are all poems in which Catullus' friendships and the closely connected topic of literary aesthetics occupy center stage. A number of Catullus' actions are mirrored by those which Statius ascribes to Grypus. Like the Catullus of Poem 22, Grypus is the recipient of a lavishly produced volume (*cartae regiae, novi libri, / novi umbilici, lora rubra membranae, / derecta plumbo et pumice omnia aequata* 6–8; cf. 4. 9. 7–9), and like the Catullus of 14, who promises to requite the favor of a dull gift-book with the worst things he can find in the booksellers' cases (*nam, si luxerit, ad librariorum / curram scrinia, Caesios, Aquinos, / Suffenum, omnia colligam venena* 14. 17–20), Grypus revenges himself on Statius by sending *Bruti senis oscitationes / de capsula miseri libellionis, / emptum plus minus asse Gaiano* (4. 9. 20–22). The Calvus who is to be punished in Poem 14 is the same man as the Licinius with whom Catullus enjoyed the poetical field-day so warmly recalled at the beginning of Poem 50 (*Hesterno, Licini, die otiosi / multum lusimus in meis tabellis, / . . . / reddens mutua per iocum atque vinum* 50. 1–6), a scene evoked not only by the *iocus* with which Statius begins his poem, but also by the words with which he presents the poem to the dedicatee of Book 4: *Plotio Grypo, maioris gradus iuueni, dignius opusculum reddam, sed interim hendecasyllabos quos Saturnalibus una risimus huic volumini inserui* (4 pr. 22–24).¹⁹ Catullus' Poem 50 is a hendecasyllabic working-off of the effects of that poetic colloquium, and Statius ends his poem in mock

¹⁷ The two are also combined in the verses of Martial to which Pliny took such a fancy (*adloquitur Musam, mandat ut domum meam Esquilis quaerat, adeat reverenter: "sed ne tempore non tuo disertam / pulses ebria ianuam, videto . . .," Ep. 3. 21. 5).*

¹⁸ If Coleman is correct in seeing in "Grypus," i.e. γρυπός, a calque on *nasutus*, it may reinforce the quality referred to here, not undercut it (see above, note 2).

¹⁹ A generation before Statius a Greek poet, Lucillius, took Catullus 50 as the starting point for one of his satirical epigrams (AP 11. 134), but the difficulty of identifying its addressee Heliodorus (cf. 11. 137) and even of determining whether he is real or fictional make one wary of using it to justify a satirical reading of *Silvae* 4. 9. (For an attempt to identify Heliodorus and the arguments against the idea see J. Geffcken, s.v. "Lukillios," *RE* XIII [1927] 1777.28–78.10.)

apprehension lest Grypus be similarly aroused: *irascor tibi, Grype. sed valebis; / tantum ne mihi, quo soles lepore / et nunc hendecasyllabos remittas* (53–55).²⁰ If the likelihood of his making a metrical retort aligns Grypus with Catullus, his *lepos* (54) and his oratorical prowess (14–16) are the virtues of Catullus' friend Calvus (*salaputium disertum* 53. 5, *tuo lepore* 50. 7). And not only does Grypus possess qualities which pass for virtues in the Catullan world, but he is also honored for his freedom from failings obnoxious to Catullus. By refraining from sending his own speeches for the delectation of his sometime dinner companion, for example, Grypus shows himself very unlike Sestius, the perusal of whose *oratio in Antium petitorem* caused such physical distress to Catullus (44. 13).²¹

There is still more to be learned from the Catullan poems evoked by Statius' *hendecasyllabi iocosi*, however. For while Statius describes Grypus in terms which Catullus would have used to praise someone of whom he approved, he does not arrogate to himself equal standing in that world. Where the Catullus of 44 seeks to turn the effect that Sestius' *malus liber* had on him back onto its author (44. 18–20), Statius professes to regret the fact that Grypus did not send his own writings (4. 9. 14–16). And where Catullus admits the motivating effect that Sestius' *sumptuosae cenae* had had on him (44. 9; cf. [*Sestius*] *tunc vocat me, cum malum librum legi* 21), the banquets with which Grypus has gratified Statius are kept entirely separate from the exchange of reading material (line 51). A similar restraint is observable in the way Statius adopts words that Catullus had used in a fond reproach to his friend Cornificius (*irascor tibi* 38. 6): Statius omits the note of intimacy which so pleases one in Catullus' protest, *sic meos amores?*, moving directly to his farewell: *irascor tibi, Grype, sed valebis* (4. 9. 53).

Statius, then, does not quite credit himself with the behavior worthy of Catullus that he ascribes to Grypus. Nor does he lay claim to the refined literary sensibilities of Catullus' world. Catullus begins Poem 14 by asking what he had done to deserve this horrible book (*quid feci ego quidue sum locutus, / cur me tot male perderes poetis?* 4–5), but Statius begins 4. 9 with the answer—he sent a volume of his writings to Grypus. His fancy book is thereby implicated with the awful poems forwarded to Catullus by Calvus (*di magni, horribilem et sacrum libellum* 14. 12; cf. *saecli*

²⁰ Catullus' use of hendecasyllables as a weapon of attack is well documented in the collection: *aut hendecasyllabos trecentos / exspecta aut mihi linteum remitte* (12. 10; cf. *adeste hendecasyllabi* 42. 1; Poems 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29 and 33 are attacks in hendecasyllables).

²¹ There is a parallel for his drawing of Grypus as a contemporary Catullus or Calvus in the fifth poem of this book (Statius' only surviving experiment with Horace's *Alcaics*), where he conjures up a modern-day Horace in Septimius Severus: *sed memor interim / nostri verecundo latentem / barbiton ingemina sub antro* (4. 5. 58–60; cf. *Odes* 1. 1. 34, 1. 32. 4, 3. 26. 4, the only previous appearances of *barbitos* in Latin, unless one counts the probably spurious poem [Ov.] *Her.* 15. 8).

incommoda, pessimi poetae 23), and, given the details of the description, with Suffenus' dreadful (but nice-looking) collection.²² Statius' reaction to the speeches of Brutus which Grypus selected for him may have a similarly modest point.²³ According to Coleman, the choice of these dull works reveals Grypus' poor literary taste,²⁴ yet it is surely not coincidental that in roughly contemporary discussions of oratory Brutus and Catullus' friend Calvus were repeatedly paired as the stylistic opposition to Cicero (Quintilian 12. 1. 24, 10. 12; Tac. *Dial.* 18. 4–5; cf. Cic. *Brut.* 280–84).²⁵

²² On the physical resemblance of Statius' volume and Suffenus', see the discussions of Colton and Coleman (above, note 1). And yet, I wonder just how fancy Statius' offering really was. Coleman thinks that the 10-*as* production-cost indicates "very costly materials," but her examples do not bear her out (esp. the 5-denarius, i.e. 80-*as*, edition of Martial's Book 1 [1. 117. 17]). Vollmer, on the other hand, sees the cost as a "niedrigen, aber auch so in der Scherz passenden Preis."

²³ The other Brutus who has been cumbered with the authorship of these *oscitationes* is the Gracchan-era jurist M. Iunius Brutus. H. Mattingly ("Nomentanus," *PCPhS* 181 [1950–51] 12–14), for example, sees a nest of references to the age of the Gracchi in Statius' poem: Brutus is the jurist, the *as Gaianus* is a reference to C. Gracchus' revaluation of coinage (16 *asses* to the denarius, instead of 10) and *decussis* to the 10-*as* piece which went out of use after this devaluation. However, the shift from a 10- to a 16-*as* denarius seems to have preceded Gracchus' tribunate by more than a decade (M. H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean Economy* [Berkeley 1985] 59–61) and is never elsewhere connected with the tribune. The 10-*as* piece, the *decussis*, was in fact rarely minted (10 *asses* being the equivalent of the silver denarius piece before the devaluation and an awkward denomination—2.5 sesterces or .625 denarius—after it). The only bronze coins with multiple-*as* values that were at all common were the *dupondius* (2 *asses*) and the *tricensis* (3 *asses*). And yet there are words, Varro tells us, for 4 *asses*, 5 *asses* and so on up to 9 *asses*, and also for 20 *asses* and 100 (*De ling. lat.* 5. 169–70, 9. 81–83; cf. Priscian, *GL* III 415.17 Keil). These words must refer not to coins, but to sums of money. This is easy enough to see in Festus' discussion of *peculatus*, for example: *ut bos centussibus, ovis decussibus aestimaretur* (237 M; cf. 54 M: *centussibus . . . id est centum assibus, qui erant breves nummi ex aere*), or when Horace's miser Opimius begrudges the eight *asses* his doctor spent on some soup for him (*octussibus*, *Sat.* 2. 3. 156). Lucilius seems to have created a metaphorical hundred-*as* piece, the *centussis misellus* of Fannius, the author of sumptuary legislation limiting expenditure on feast days to 100 *asses* (1173 M; cf. Gell. 2. 24. 3–6 for the context). Lucilius' *centussis*, in all likelihood, gave rise to that of Varro (*Men.* 404) and to the clipped hundred-*as* piece of Persius (*curto centusse* 5. 191).

²⁴ Coleman (above, note 1) 221. I would myself say that the rhetorical point of the two long lists which show that *Silvae* 4. 9 was written in the world which produced Martial rather than that which produced Catullus (lines 10–14, 23–45) is not to give vent to Statius' chagrin at the meagre value of the gift he received, but to show how modestly low he puts the value of his own offering: *sed certa velut aequus in statera / nil mutas, sed idem mihi pendis* (46–47).

²⁵ Vitorius Marcellus, the dedicatee of Book 4, ought to have understood the reference, at any rate, for he is also the dedicatee of Quintilian's *Institutio*. Interest in the matter seems to have inspired the composition of some spurious letters to Cicero from Calvus and Brutus, "ex quibus facile est deprehendere Calvum quidem Ciceroni visum exsanguem et aridum, Brutum autem otiosum atque diiunctum; rursusque Ciceronem a Calvo quidem male audisse tamquam solutum et enervem, a Bruto autem, ut ipsius verbis utar, fractum atque elumbem" (Tac. *Dial.* 18. 5). Ovid's phrase, *doctus et in promptu scrinia Brutus habet* (*Ex*

Perhaps Statius means to point up Grypus' pure standards of taste, and simultaneously display his own lack of refinement—he professes to have found them boring, after all. He can afford such gentle self-depreciation in this, the most pleasant and lively of the *Silvae*.

For all its wit, however, the poem illustrates well some of the real differences between Catullus' world and Statius'. The Saturnalia festival must in fact have posed a tricky problem of etiquette for someone in Statius' position. The festival itself condoned, even invited a certain degree of impudence, and the literary tradition offered *exempla* of perhaps exaggerated license, but what sensible dependent would fail to take thought for the day after the festival? The fictional Davus' forthrightness had to be checked by a threat (*ocius hinc te / ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino*, Hor. *Sat.* 2. 7. 117–18), but Statius was not so heedless. Lest even this carefully unassuming, subtly flattering Saturnalia-address seem too bold (at least to eyes not acquainted with both parties), he prefaced it with a disclaimer: *Plotio Grypo, maioris gradus iuueni, dignius opusculum reddam, sed interim hendecasyllabos quos Saturnalibus una risimus huic volumini inserui* (4 pr. 22–24). Statius never lost sight of the realities of his position.

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Ponto 1. 1. 24), can be read as further evidence of the esteem accorded Brutus' works with the aid of Martial 14. 37 (*selectos nisi das mihi libellos / admittam tineas trucesque blattas*, spoken by a *scrinium*): The *scrinia* served to protect valued rolls from damage.

"Thus Nature Ordains": Juvenal's Fourteenth Satire

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Satire 14 has long been neglected and misunderstood.¹ At first glance, it seems to be merely a catalog of immoral and avaricious activities in Roman society. Most critics have readily apprehended the surface meaning, but they have rarely understood the ironic and satiric subtext. In an effort to clarify its meaning, I will examine the ironic undertones and structural unities of *Satire 14*.

Juvenal presents a series of rhetorical examples which focus on the father-son relationship, avarice, and the ordering of nature.² The excesses enumerated progress from the *exempla domestica* of a simple Roman father to the crimes of the father of the entire Roman people, namely Claudius (330-31). As in *Satire 13*, Juvenal stands apart from the comic spectacle he describes.³ Not relying upon *indignatio* as in the earlier satires, he chooses subtle irony and deflation to make his point.⁴ Juvenal takes on the role of a pseudo-moralist whose opinions and arguments are suspect from beginning to end.⁵ In this way Juvenal exposes the bankruptcy of the Roman moral tradition.

¹ There has been a dearth of scholarship concerning *Satire 14*. Only V. D'Agostino, "La Satira XIV di Giovenale," *Convivium* 4 (1932) 227-44, G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford 1954) 145-48, E. N. O'Neil, "The Structure of Juvenal's Fourteenth Satire," *CP* 55 (1960) 251-53, and J. P. Stein, "The Unity and Scope of Juvenal's Fourteenth Satire," *CP* 65 (1970) 34-36, have attempted to analyze this problematical satire completely.

² J. Ferguson, *Juvenal. The Satires* (New York 1979) 315-16, believes that *Satire 14* is a unified attack on the family and its headlong search for the acquisition of wealth. The alternative to extreme avarice is a life of simplicity and moderation.

³ S. C. Fredericks, "Calvinus in Juvenal's Thirteenth Satire," *Arethusa* 4 (1971) 227, believes that Juvenal is aloof from *avaritia* and regards the pursuit of money as a comic spectacle.

⁴ M. P. O. Morford, "Juvenal's Thirteenth Satire," *AJPh* 94 (1973) 36, suggests that in *Satire 13* Juvenal deflates "popular philosophers, the literary genre of *consolationes*, and the recipient of the consolation himself" through subtle irony. Juvenal uses the same technique in *Satire 14*.

⁵ S. H. Braund, *Beyond Anger: A Study of Juvenal's Third Book of Satires* (Cambridge 1988) 111, recognizes the moralizing speaker in *Satires 8* and *14*. She states: "The presence of this philosophical or moralising material has tended to obscure the ironic element in Juvenal's so-called moralist, not least because of the links or overlaps often

Satire 14 is divided into four basic parts.⁶ Section one (1–106) gives multiple examples of the proposition, *sic natura iubet*, and shows how it controls the parent–child relationship in man as well as animal. The elements of “nature” and “ordering” run consistently throughout the satire. In the second section (107–255) Juvenal shows how avarice causes the undermining of the parent–child relationship, and as a result destroys the fabric of Roman society. The movement in the first two parts is from a general presentation of how parents teach their children all kinds of vices (1–106) to a specific examination of how parents by example teach their children avariciousness (107–255). However, the overriding principle in these first two sections remains *sic natura iubet*.

In the third section (256–316), in order to engage in a short digression on his satiric philosophy, Juvenal momentarily moves away from the parent–child motif. Finally, the epilogue (316–31) combines his statements on the ordering of nature, the absurdity of avarice, and his concern for the father–son relationship in Roman society. The image of the father as philosopher and king is central to this final passage. The mention of Epicurus, Socrates, Croesus, and Claudius points this out. Narcissus symbolically takes on the role of the evil son by willingly carrying out the orders of his emperor, the symbolic father of the entire Roman world. Through his mention of Epicurus, who turned his back on avarice, Socrates, who searched for the truth, Croesus and the Persian kingdoms, which are examples of extreme wealth, and Claudius, who ordered his freedman Narcissus to kill Messalina, Juvenal reinforces the unity of *Satire* 14 by intertwining and linking all the major themes: (1) father–son, (2) avarice, and (3) *sic natura iubet*. Thus, Juvenal moves from an exposition of the specific evils of Roman society to a general philosophical comment about the nature of man which is a common structure in *Satires* 11–15.⁷

perceived between satirists and moralists. But, Juvenal's so-called moralist is, in effect a parody of a moralist.”

⁶ For comments on the structure of *Satire* 14 see J. D. Duff (ed.), *D. Iunii Iuvenalis Saturae XIV*, rev. M. Coffey (Cambridge 1970) 413, who saw only a slight connection between the two major parts (1–106 and 107–331); M. Coffey, *Roman Satire* (London 1976) 134, who believed that the theme of bad parental examples gave a unity of structure until the sensational description of the merchants at sea (265–302); O'Neil (above, note 1) 252, who divided the satire into three parts (1–106, 107–316, and 316–331); Ferguson (above, note 2) 305 broadly follows O'Neil's account of the structure; E. C. Courtney, *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal* (London 1980) 561–89, also follows O'Neil's structure; Highet (above, note 1) 283–84 n. 4 was happy with a four-part structure (1–106, 107–255, 256–316, and 316–31). The arrangement chosen in this article borrows and alters structures from O'Neil and Highet in order to achieve a logical flow and movement to the satire.

⁷ *Satires* 11–15 consistently end on philosophic generalizations that pose some ironic problem for the critic. If we look at them all together, we can find a satirist who offers his audience a moderate way of living. But it is not simply moderation which must be our guide. Juvenal suggests that we must live a life tempered by *sapientia*. For further study of this comparison of *Satires* 11–15, see K. Weisinger, “Irony and Moderation in Juvenal

Satire 14 begins by recalling an idea that Juvenal set forth in *Satire* 1 (147–49): Posterity can add nothing further to our traditions (*nostris moribus*);⁸ the grandchildren will do the same things that their parents did; and vice is a recurring evil afflicting generation after generation. *Satire* 14 contains a similar theme (1–3): Parents demonstrate (*monstrant*) and hand down (*tradunt*) to their sons many things worthy of notoriety.

The examples which follow (4–30) show the perversion of the parent-child relationship and indicate how that relationship can be used to teach the vices of gambling, gluttony, cruelty, and promiscuity. First, Juvenal parodies epic as he details the consequences of a father who gambles (4–6). His son cannot help but brandish the “arms” (*movet arma*) his father uses.⁹ The tools of gambling are sarcastically referred to as weapons. The dinners which follow (6–14) to illustrate gluttony are a standard Juvenalian motif showing the degeneration of society.¹⁰

Next, the cruelty of Rutilus is revealed (15–24). These lines contain a wealth of philosophical and epic allusion, and hint at a humane view of slavery.¹¹ Rutilus does not teach his son to have a gentle mind, or to offer fair treatment for slight faults (15). Juvenal presents Rutilus as a total rejection of rational philosophy. He is motivated by anger and vengeance, just as Calvinus is in *Satire* 13.¹² Rutilus also rejects Lucretian philosophy, for he does not think that the minds and bodies of his slaves are made of the same elements as his own (16).¹³ Like Calvinus, he enjoys feeding his baser emotions and is happy (18 *gaudet*, 21 *felix*, and 23 *laetus*) only when he can brand someone with a burning iron for stealing a towel or two (21–22).

Rutilus is the very embodiment of cruelty and is compared to such epic villains as Antiphatas and Polyphemus. By this shocking comparison of mythological to contemporary characters, a horribly stark and bold image is created.¹⁴

XI,” *CSCA* 5 (1972) 227–40; E. S. Ramage, “Juvenal, *Satire* 12: On Friendship True and False,” *ICS* 3 (1978) 221–37; S. C. Fredericks, “Juvenal: A Return to Invective,” in E. S. Ramage, D. L. Sigsbee, S. C. Fredericks (eds.), *Roman Satirists and their Satire* (Park Ridge, NJ 1974) 157–65; A. M. Corn, *The Persona in the Fifth Book of Juvenal's Satires* (diss. Ohio State University 1975); Fredericks (above, note 3); and Morford (above, note 4).

⁸ M. M. Winkler, *The Persona in Three Satires of Juvenal* (Hildesheim 1983) 23–58, demonstrates how Juvenal debunks and mocks the *mos maiorum* as trite and stereotypical.

⁹ Duff (above, note 6) 126 n. 91; Ferguson (above, note 2) 306 n. 5; and Courtney (above, note 6) 563 n. 4.

¹⁰ Cf. 5. 114–19, 146–55, and 11. 1–23.

¹¹ Cf. 6. 474–96; Sen. *Ep.* 47.

¹² Fredericks (above, note 3) 219–31; Morford (above, note 4) 26–36.

¹³ Ferguson (above, note 2) 306 n. 17.

¹⁴ W. S. Anderson, “Imagery in the Satires of Horace and Juvenal,” *AJPh* 81 (1960) 225–60, fully discusses Juvenal's use of the epic allusion; and M. M. Winkler, “The

The effect of a sinful mother upon her daughter is illustrated next (25–30). Juvenal wonders how else than bad is a young girl to turn out who is unable to name the lovers of her mother without taking a breath at least thirty times? The prolific ability of Larga is contained in the obvious pun of her name, which means “generous.” Both girls and boys are subject to the wanton example of their parents.

Juvenal now briefly summarizes (31–37) the first thirty lines. The path of old blame pointed out by parents (*monstrata veteris orbita culpa* 37) brackets Juvenal’s opening statement in which he also used a form of the word *monstro* (3). The parents are teaching and demonstrating, but it is a perverted example. The idea of *monstrata* is significant and occurs again later in the satire. While the premise of *sic natura iubet* seems straightforward, the examples Juvenal uses to make his point undercut the argument through the grotesque and ludicrous images of parents such as Rutilus and Larga. Epic parody, learned philosophical allusions, mythological asides, and rampant promiscuity control the opening lines (1–37). All of this indicates that Juvenal does not want us to accept the literal complaints of his persona. The solemn *sic natura iubet* juxtaposed to such obvious humor is all the more compelling. The ordering of nature which occurs throughout the satire (31, 108, 212, 306, and 331) supports the notion that nature does order children to follow the example of their parents, but Juvenal deflates this solemn maxim by portraying it as being ridiculous.

Juvenal continues his exempla (38–106) and sets up guidelines for moral reform. The satirist says that it is easy to find a Catiline, an evil individual, in any society. The force of this statement is undercut by the repetition of *quocumque*. It would appear that it is a hopeless situation, since the presence of Catilinarian evil exists everywhere (*quocumque in populo videas, quocumque sub axe* 42). The satirist, at this point, grossly overstates his point. Both the repetition and the vague sense of *quocumque* serve to undercut this statement. The satirist contrasts two examples of Republican virtue (Brutus and Cato the Younger, 41–43) with Catiline, who tried to destroy the Republic. Not only are these examples so hackneyed and overused as to be meaningless,¹⁵ but they are confusing, for Brutus carries a double meaning: the Elder, who began the Republic, and the Younger, who assassinated Caesar, ending all semblance of a Republic. In this way, Juvenal suggests that the old models of traditional Roman morality can no longer be accepted unthinkingly.

Function of Epic in Juvenal’s Satires,” *Latomus* 206 (1989) 415, demonstrates that Juvenal is the “inheritor of the epic-vatic tradition.”

¹⁵ Winkler (above, note 8) 47 states: “By Juvenal’s time the old, stern *mores* appear shallow and hollow; they have become meaningless and finally absurd and ridiculous. What significance could the faded picture of an ancestor of hundreds of years ago, of a Brutus, Cato, Scaevola, or anybody else among those mentioned, possibly convey to anyone living in Juvenal’s days?”

The satirist continues: Do not allow foul words or sights to come into a house where there is a father (44). Keep all bad influences away. The use of *procul, a procul* (45) is particularly apt, since it was a proclamation that occurred before a sacrifice or on other religious occasions in order to keep away unholy persons and evil spirits.¹⁶ The sanctity of a child is surrounded with a religious aura. If a man has an evil deed in mind, Juvenal advises him to let the thought of his infant son stand in the way of the crime's commission.

As an elaboration of this idea, Juvenal examines parents' misplaced emphasis on the external appearance of a Roman household (59–73). The household, as far as the master is concerned, is only important with respect to its physical appearance. The master trembles lest his guest may see dog dung in his halls (64–65), yet he does nothing to insure that his son grows up in a house free from vice (*sine labe* 71) and without fault (*caurentem vitio* 71). Juvenal catches our attention with the phrase *ne stercore foeda canino / atria displiceant oculis venientis amici* (64–65). We are shocked by the image of the "dog's dung" befouling the hall. "Dog's dung" is more important than the moral well-being of the son.

The master of the household overlooks the spiritual and moral meaning of *domus*. Appearance is king. This is a Juvenalian theme which also occurs in *Satire* 7, where it does not matter what a man says or does, but only what he wears (105–49). The appearance of a man is glorified, and the man of real integrity, although shabbily dressed, is overlooked. *Satire* 14 contains a similar theme (59–69): Roman society has reached the height of moral turpitude when the appearance of a man's house is more important than the condition of his family.

Juvenal next presents another aspect of Roman morality which one generation was always passing on to the next (70–72):

gratum est quod patriae civem populoque dedisti,
si facis ut patriae sit idoneus, utilis agris
utilis et bellorum et pacis rebus agendis.¹⁷

The overwhelming use of sibilants makes these lines both sinister and comic. This idea, which is the stance of the traditional moralist, dates back to the time of the Elder Cato and before.¹⁸ It harkens back to a time before

¹⁶ Cf. V. Aen. 6. 258; Hor. Odes 3. 1. 1. A. Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus* (New Haven 1983) 8–9, comments on how Ovid uses this clearly religious expression in a complete reversal of its original intention. She states: "Here the warning is applied in reverse, to the emblems of chastity themselves . . ." Juvenal too uses this religious expression to indicate irony, for the vice-ridden Roman father is not capable of keeping evil far away from his son.

¹⁷ This was a common sentiment in Roman times. See J. E. B. Mayor (ed.), *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal* (London 1881) 299, who suggests that we look at Cic. Ver. 3. 161 and Sen. Suas. 2. 21 for the worthiness of giving a citizen to the fatherland.

¹⁸ W. S. Anderson, "Juvenal and Quintilian," YCS 17 (1961) 89–90.

the Punic Wars, and is advice that was so common and so nebulous as to be meaningless. When Cato the Elder denounced the ills of Roman society around 150 B.C. and offered his conservative view of education, people listened, but when Juvenal's satiric speaker does the same thing in the 2nd century A.D. it is banal. He makes this point about the Roman family and state trite, so that we may turn away from the glorification of the distant past and deal with the Roman present. The subversion of this idea appears later in the satire (161–72), where Juvenal contrasts the greed of the miser with the gratitude of ancient Romans who received very little for their services in the Pyrrhic and Punic wars.¹⁹ Through the juxtaposition of the pristine virtues of the early Romans with the blatant avariciousness of present-day Rome, Juvenal highlights corruption and decadence.²⁰ It is a common Juvenalian technique to glorify the past and belittle the present.²¹ However, this contrast is drawn to show that the past was not so glorious, but only a fantasy which exists in the Roman mind. *Turbam* (167) is a word which points to Juvenal's real intent. The ancients' life was one of hardship, crowded and uncomfortable, where the standard fare was generally *pultibus* (171), which was used at sacrifices and as food for the sacred chickens.²² Juvenal wants his audience to concentrate on the present.

Next, Juvenal compares humans to birds (73–85). The placement of *moribus instituas* (74), beside the description of how the stork, the vulture, and eagle care for their young, is a signpost to satire. The very picture of the vulture teaching his offspring to eat dead cattle, dogs, and human beings that have been crucified is grotesque (77–78). But it is even more shocking and ironic when we consider that a few lines before the satirist was exhorting a parent to make sure that he provides a citizen for the Roman state who is both useful in war and peace (70–72). The placement of such supposedly important thoughts next to vultures eating carrion is laughable. This image should shock us into the realization that the entire bird analogy is ironic. The portrayal of the noble eagles (*generosae . . . aves* 81–82) should make us understand that Juvenal's satirist uses a double standard. It seems normal for birds to follow the example of their parents, but when human children follow the example of their parents it is reprehensible. This

¹⁹ Anderson (previous note) 79 remarks that Juvenal exploits several standard moral antitheses which became popular with rhetoricians long before his time, especially the opposition of present to past.

²⁰ Cf. 6. 286–300; Sallust, *Hist. frag.* 11. 12, *Cat.* 10. 11, *Iug.* 41. 1. Sallust points to a period before the Second Punic War when the early Romans were more virtuous than the Romans who followed.

²¹ J. De Decker, *Juvenalis Declamans* (Ghent 1913) 34–35, gives further examples of this common Juvenalian technique; see Winkler (above, note 8) 23–58 for further discussion of this common Juvenalian motif.

²² Weisinger (above, note 7) 235 says, "when describing the virtue of the early Romans, Juvenal stretches his point until this rustic virtue becomes almost a parody of austerity."

comparison is certainly ludicrous, for animals function instinctively, repeating their daily patterns, while man through reason may alter his customs and habits.

Next, Juvenal portrays a human parallel (86–95) of his bird story. Not only do children follow the example of their parents, but the sins of the father are increased by the sins of the son. Caetronius' son improves on his father's excesses (86–95). The son in his mad rush (*amens* 94) to outdo his father foreshadows the madness of avarice (136, 284) which Juvenal expounds in the next two major sections. Through the juxtaposition of these two sections (73–85, 86–95) the satirist compares the willingness of a son to ape his father with a bird's natural instinct to follow his parents' example.

The last part (96–106) of the first section repeats this argument by illustrating that the son not only follows in his father's footsteps, but improves on his father's performance. However, these lines are ironic, for what would seem to be acts of a dutiful son are condemned by the satirist. Words and phrases such as *ediscunt et servant ac metuunt ius* (101), *tradidit* (102), and *monstrare* (103), are praised later in the satire (176–78) as very strong positive moral traits. But when they are juxtaposed with Jewish religious customs, they are condemned as anathema by the satirist. Juvenal is debunking Roman moral tradition, which cannot accept the *mores* unless they appear only in a Roman setting. Juvenal purposely gives the Jewish son praiseworthy Roman characteristics to highlight the inconsistency of his persona. Why, if the satirist can praise birds for following parental example, can he not praise the Jewish son? Is it all right for a bird to do what a bird does, but not a Jew? This is ludicrous and absurd. Again the ordering of nature is being ridiculed.

Thus, in the first section (1–106) Juvenal shows that the excesses of Roman life should be avoided. He seems to balance what nature should ordain with what nature really does ordain in the grotesqueness of life. Nature should offer *una potens ratio* (39) and *reverentia* (47). Instead, we get Catiline and Brutus, a man worried about the appearance of his house, vultures eating cadavers, Caetronius' son, and the Jew who follows Jewish law better than any Roman follows Roman law.

In the second section (107–255) the emphasis changes from a general discussion of all vices to the specific examination of *avaritia* (108).²³ The argument of the first section is focused and intensified. Avarice is particularly insidious because it seems to have the appearance of virtue (109). The inversion of the moral order, which we experienced earlier (59–

²³ Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1. 1. 41–42, who also uses a similar shift in emphasis in order to focus on avarice.

69), continues.²⁴ Juvenal draws attention to the conflict between virtue's appearance and reality: *specie* (appearance) and *umbra* (semblance) 109; and *habitu* (attire) and *vultu* (countenance) 110. He reveals this tension through the *exemplum* of the miser. Some people praise the miser for his thrift; others praise him because he is skilled in the art of money-making. He guards his fortune more tenaciously than if it were watched by the dragon of the Hesperides (112–14). The father copies the miser and urges his sons to do the same (119–23).²⁵ He starves his slaves in the name of thrift and causes himself to go hungry (124–28). A meal is described which would turn any man's stomach (129–33). Not even a beggar would accept an invitation to such a meal (134). This reinforced imagery of poverty proves that the frugal man is the poorest man.

Juvenal expands on this theme with examples of the outrages the miser commits to gain more property (138–51). His love of gain grows in direct proportion to the money he has. The more he accumulates, the more he wants. Even the ugly head of rumor does not deter him (152–55). He is unconcerned about what people think of him, if only he is able to keep his farm and land for himself. Juvenal, sarcastically (*scilicet* 152), states that the greedy man will live a happy life, if only he is the sole possessor of as many acres of land as the Roman people tilled in the days of Tatius (156–60).²⁶ The land of the entire Roman nation would not be enough for the greedy man. The only alternative would be moderation.

Juvenal continues to explain the causes of evil (173) and shows that the lust for money results in perverse deeds (173–209). The conflict between excess and right living is presented through Juvenal's technique of overstatement. Two alternatives are offered: on the one side, excess (175–76), wickedness (188), sacrilege (188), and on the other, reverence (177), fear (178), and shame (178). These two alternatives are offered so that moderation will seem plausible. This contrast recalls lines 101–02 where the satirist earlier condemned the fear and shame which led a young Jew to practice the rituals learned from his father. The inconsistency of the present praise with the earlier condemnation points strongly to the ironic nature of this passage (173–209).

Continuing to develop this irony, Juvenal's satirist again uses the tension between ancient Roman simplicity and present-day turpitude to

²⁴ Cf. 12. 111–20, where the legacy-hunter goes to the limits of morality in order to become the rich man's heir. He will even sacrifice his own daughter, for he is mad with greed. As in *Satire* 14, the moral order is upside down. No crime is too unthinkable.

²⁵ Clausen follows Housman's deletion of 119, but this line seems to make sense as it stands.

²⁶ Juvenal obviously wants us to recall Horace's *Satire* 1. 1 to closely associate himself with the Roman satiric tradition, but also to demonstrate that he wants the same things that Horace sought; see Hor. *Sat.* 1. 1. 92, 125, and 179; Winkler (above, note 8) 44 also finds this passage replete with irony. He focuses on the satirist's theme of old-time *parvitas*.

show the need for moderation. In days of old, fathers gave solid advice to their sons: "Live content with these cottages and hills. Let us seek bread with the plough, which is enough for our table . . ." (176–82). "The man who is not ashamed to protect himself against the cold and wind with the skins of animals will not be likely to commit a crime. It is the desire for purple raiment (*purpura* 188) that leads a man to crime and wickedness" (185–88). This is completely ludicrous, since this *purpura* is unknown to the *senex*. Martin Winkler supports the ironic nature of these lines when he states: "The fact that the old man warns against something which he has never even laid eyes on divests him of all credibility and reduces him to a state of utter idiocy. A mortal blow has been struck at this point at the stereotypical figures of the *maiores*."²⁷ The mention of the Marsian, Hernican, and Vestinusian fathers who once fought bravely against the Romans only to lose also points out the misdirection of this entire passage.²⁸ If these lines were serious, Juvenal would hardly mention the elders of three tribes who rose up against Rome only to be defeated. Juvenal does not want us to look for simple answers in the past, but wishes us to borrow some earthy philosophy of contentment (*vivite contenti*) and apply it to the present. But even this simple philosophy is questioned by the undercutting alliteration of *contenti casulis et collibus*.²⁹

Juvenal next addresses fathers in general and predicts what will happen to them and their sons in the future (210–55). These lines are a further elaboration of *Satire* 1. 148: *eadem facient cupientque minores*. As Juvenal proves his earlier prophecy of *Satire* 1, he builds a progression of deeds that ends in the destruction of the father. Juvenal warns fathers that the morality of money is a short-sighted rule (211–14). *Iubet* (212) recalls *iubentur* (108) and *sic natura iubet* (31), and foreshadows *iussus* (331). Juvenal is linking the beginning, middle, and end of his satire through the use of this verb. In this way Juvenal recalls the original motif of lines 1–37. But, whereas Ajax and Achilles surpassed their fathers in heroic deeds, the modern-day son outdoes his father in deeds of wickedness.

Now the sins of the fathers are visited upon the sons and finally return to destroy the father (215–55). Care and reverence are necessary, for as soon as a boy begins to grow a beard, he will swear falsely (216–18); the son will kill his wife for her dowry (220–21); the wealth which a father thinks should be found over land and sea a son will acquire by a shorter road (222–23). The son has become worse than his father, fulfilling the earlier prophecy of lines 211–14. The father will deny that he has taught his son to lie and cheat to gain wealth (224–25). And while this may be true, Juvenal insists that the father is the cause of his son's evil mind, for the

²⁷ Winkler (above, note 8) 46.

²⁸ Courtney (above, note 6) 577 n. 179.

²⁹ Winkler (above, note 8) 46.

father who teaches his son the love of wealth turns him into a greedy individual (226–27).

Lines 235–55 summarize what has occurred in the preceding section (210–34). The momentum that has been building comes to its horrible conclusion: The son will challenge the authority of his father and consider patricide (246–51). The father must protect himself from being poisoned, just as Mithridates protected himself (252–55).³⁰ The progression is now complete. The mention of the *pater et rex* (255) foreshadows the appearance of Claudius at the end of the satire, and the attempt at poisoning Mithridates reminds us of the death of Claudius by poisoning at the hands of Agrippina.

Thus, in the second section (107–255), Juvenal shows how the parent-child relationship can result in the murder of the parent. At this point in *Satire* 14 the crimes of society have reached their lowest point, for what could be worse than the murder of a father by a son?

In the third and fourth sections (256–316, 316–31) Juvenal tries to move away from this nadir and suggest some alternatives to the total avarice he has described. He makes a philosophical comment about the nature of his satire (256–67), and then he examines the nature of man's folly (268–316). He takes on the role of a parent/father with the word *monstro* (256), but what he teaches is not normal school curriculum. He teaches the folly of man with a touch of *voluptatem egregiam* (256). This is apparently a sarcastic statement, but there is an element of truth, for it represents the inherent ambivalence of Juvenalian satire.³¹ Juvenal deals with a love-hate relationship that is unique in satire. He castigates mankind severely, but cannot help laughing, loving, and enjoying its human foolishness. We can see this ambivalence in *Satire* 15. 71: *ergo deus, quicumque aspexit, ridet et odit*. The god who sees the follies of mankind both laughs and hates them.³² In the same way, *Satire* 14 reveals a similar ironic pleasure which

³⁰ Cf. 12. 111–20 for this typically Juvenalian progression. Just as the father will sacrifice the daughter for gain, so will the son kill the father. While the situation in *Satire* 12 is a little different, the common denominator is the grotesqueness of it.

³¹ W. C. Booth, *A Rhetoric of Irony* (Chicago 1974) 190, makes an interesting comment which relates directly to Juvenalian satire: "Where then do we stop in our search for ironic pleasures? Where the work 'tells' us to, wherever it offers us other riches that might be destroyed by irony. It takes a clever reader to detect all the ironies in a Fielding or a Forster. But it takes something beyond cleverness to resist going too far: the measured tempo of the experienced reader, eager for quick reversals and exhilarating turns, but always aware of the demands both of the partner and of the disciplined forms of the dance." The reader as well as the author walks a tightrope between what is ironic and what is not. In order to understand Juvenal we have to walk this fine line. This is where the meaning of Juvenalian satire lies. This is Juvenal's point in 14. 256–68. A. B. Kernan, *The Plot of Satire* (New Haven 1965) 83, asks a very important question: "Why is irony, which is what changes the serious to the ridiculous in satire, witty and amusing?" Again I would point out that lines 256–68 are both witty and amusing, and tinged with ironic delight.

³² Richlin (above, note 16) 209 states: "... it seems he [Juvenal's persona] also thought that God was to man what the satirist was to his victim (15. 69–71)." She goes on

Juvenal gets from observing the strange and magnificent excesses of Roman society. No theatre, no stage of a lavish praetor can compare to the games of life wherein men risk their lives to increase their fortunes (256–62). Real-life situations are far more delightful than the stage curtains of Flora, Ceres, and Cybele (262–64). In *Satire* 1. 22–80 the satirist also takes ironic delight in observing the foibles of Roman society: “Is it not pleasing to fill up spacious notebooks at the crossroads” when we see corruption and depravity all around (63–64)? Juvenal asks a similar question in *Satire* 14 (265–67): “Is there more pleasure to be gotten from watching men being hurled from a springboard, or walking down a tightrope, than from yourself?” The parallels between 1. 63–64 and 14. 265 are clear. *Libet* (1. 63) and *oblectant* (14. 265) have the same general meaning. They both introduce questions of an ironic nature which indicate some form of entertainment. The same desire that caused Juvenal to complain about always having to be only a listener to the rantings of others has impelled him to fill up notebooks at the crossroads, watch the folly of uncontrolled acquisition, and state that god must simultaneously laugh and hate the misdeeds of mankind.³³ It is an irony which is tinged with a perverse delight.

This irony continues as he suggests that the love of gain is a form of madness.³⁴ Madness as a cause of folly was already mentioned in conjunction with the accumulation of wealth (136). Now it takes shape in the minds of men who wish to become rich by means of sea trade. Madness (*furor*) is another standard Juvenalian technique, which appears in *Satire* 1 (*simplexne furor* 92), in *Satire* 13, where madness is a product of this depraved generation (28), and again in *Satire* 15, where a whole nation is driven to the point of cannibalism. Madness takes various forms. One man is terrified of the Furies, even as Orestes was after the murder of Clytemnestra. Another man strikes down an ox believing it to be Agamemnon or Ulysses, even as Ajax slew a flock of sheep.³⁵ But the man

to suggest that this is perfectly consistent with Juvenal's satire. I would take it one step further. I believe it is basic to an understanding of how Juvenal operates; Braund (above, note 5) 192 declares: “The invitation to laugh at the follies of mankind at 256–264—*tanto maiores humana negotia ludi* (264)—recalls the picture in *Satire* 10 of Democritus laughing at the crowd instead of watching the spectacles.” Juvenal is laughing at both the crowd and the spectacles.

³³ Richlin (above, note 16) 200 observes that “Juvenal [in *Satire* 1] closely unites a second-person address of the audience and/or an imaginary protagonist (*agnitus accipies*, line 99) with a depiction of himself as present at the scene (*nobiscum*, line 101). He has brought himself and his addressee physically into the poem together.” This is similar to what he does in *Satire* 14 at lines 256–68.

³⁴ Cf. 1. 111–16, where the worship of the goddess Money is so strong that the other Roman virtues are neglected. Although not specifically defined as such, this is a precursor of the mad rush for gain.

³⁵ Cf. 8. 215–21, where Juvenal shows that the modern day Nero committed more heinous crimes than Ajax and Orestes.

who is in need of a keeper is the merchant who loads his ship to the gunwales in the mad search for money. The untiring efforts of the merchant

symbolize the full range of irrelevance and destruction that *avaritia* imposes on one's life. To import raisin wine from Crete in jars of local pottery, to travel far, to risk one's life and one's property, all with the hope of gain, is the height of folly. His *spes lucri* (278) will ultimately leave the *mercator* destitute in a shipwreck or lead to paranoia if he becomes wealthy.³⁶

The madness of the search for profit is similar to Ajax's insanity, but Juvenal shows that the merchant's lunacy is greater. If only he could have been satisfied with what he had, the tragedy of his shipwreck would never have occurred. *Suffecerat* (298) and *sufficient* (300) prepare us for the anticlimax that is about to occur in the epilogue (*suffecit* 319). This progression will be played out again in the conclusion of *Satire* 14.

Lines 303–16 comment on the misery that accompanies the acquisition of great wealth. The millionaire Licinus orders (*iubet* 306) a troop of slaves to stand guard in his house with buckets of water in case of a fire, because he is worried about all his valuable possessions.³⁷ Again, *iubet* recalls the earlier uses of this verb, and prefigures what is about to occur (331). This ordering, as we have already seen, is used to achieve some wicked end. It is not what nature intends, but it seems to be the way humankind employs it.

Licinus is compared to the nude Cynic Diogenes (308–14), who does not fear that the fire will consume his tub. The satirist observes that when Alexander the Great saw Diogenes in his tub he realized how much happier a man was who had very little. Juvenal's concluding comment of this section sums up his point. "Had we but commonsense wisdom (*prudentia*), you would have no divinity, O Fortune; it is we who make you into a goddess" (315–16).³⁸ Juvenal's persona uses the exact same words at the end of *Satire* 10 (365–66). By recalling *Satire* 10 Juvenal is trying to end the satire on a positive note, but an ironic twist occurs at the end of *Satire* 14.

A similar point is made in *Satire* 13 (19–20): "Great indeed is wisdom, the conqueror of Fortune, who gives precepts in her sacred books." Juvenal is recommending a form of wisdom (*sapientia* or *prudentia*) against the powers of Fortune and madness (*furor*). He suggests that if man could be

³⁶ Stein (above, note 1) 36.

³⁷ Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1. 1. 76–78, where Horace shows how the anxiety of wealth and money is really not worth the trouble.

³⁸ See 7. 190–98 and 10. 51–58 for Fortune's effect upon the lives of men; Duff (above, note 6) 437 believed that these lines were decidedly irrelevant. Yet there is really no reason to think that these lines do not make good sense. They recall Seneca, *Ep.* 85. 2: "The man who is prudent is also temperate. The man who is temperate is also constant and calm. The man who is calm is without sadness. The man who is without sadness is happy; therefore, the prudent man is happy and prudence is enough for a happy life." Juvenal follows this line of reasoning in the conclusion of 14. 316–31, when he asks, "How much is enough?"

wise and sensible, then the troubles portrayed in his satires would cease; but he knows that is not possible. At the close of *Satire* 14 Juvenal offers his last bit of advice.

In this final section (316–31) he moves from generalization of the problem to a summation of the advice that has been inserted as the poem progressed. Juvenal suggests that moderation is the key to living, and attempts to define moderation by showing that the measure of wealth which is sufficient for man is “as much as thirst and hunger and cold demand, as much as sustained Epicurus in his little garden, as much as the followers of Socrates had in their homes” (318–20). Both Nature and Wisdom (*sapientia*) agree upon the course of action one’s life should take (321). Juvenal now addresses those people who are not satisfied with what he has just offered them: “Do I seem to enclose you within limits?” (322). The interjection of the first person, much as at line 256 (*monstro*), should be our guide to understanding the appearance of the author at this point. He lays down the mask of his persona and speaks directly to his audience. This refrain is similar to advice which Horace gave in *Satire* 1. 1: *est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines / quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum* (106–07). Horace states it simply and does not cloud the issue with extended examples.

If Juvenal confines his reader too greatly, he suggests mixing in something from our own Roman customs (*nostris moribus* 323) and making up a sum as big as that worthy of an *eques*, i.e. 400,000 sesterces. The phrase *nostris moribus* recalls 1. 147 (*moribus addat*) and 14. 74 (*moribus instituas*). Juvenal is still concerned with Roman *mores* and is still trying to teach by example. But, if we cannot learn from a good example, he then offers, facetiously, a bad example (327–31):

If I have not yet filled up your lap, if it is open further, neither the fortune of Croesus, nor the Persian kingdoms, nor the riches of Narcissus will ever be enough for you. This is the Narcissus whom Claudius Caesar greatly indulged, the one who killed the emperor’s wife, bidden to slay her by imperial command.

Through the comparison of Croesus and Narcissus, the scope of satire is expanded and the importance of what is being said about Roman society and its vices is enlarged. While the reference to Narcissus is actually anticlimactic, especially in relation to Croesus, it is significant by itself, for it points to the ultimate corruption of the Roman state, when a Greek can rise to such power and wealth. And it is doubly ironic, because Juvenal has just glorified the Greek moderation of Epicurus and Socrates. Juvenal inverts the order of society by having his satire end with the act of uxoricide committed by a Greek who was formerly a slave.

With this ironic and anticlimactic conclusion Juvenal draws *Satire* 14 to a close. He has rolled all the motifs of his satire into one clever finale. Yet, this epilogue (316–31) is entirely consistent with the themes of *Satire*

14. It completes and solidifies the unity by mention of the father (Claudius), the symbolic son (Narcissus), nature (321), and the need for moderation in the face of avarice which ultimately leads to murder by poisoning (317–31). Juvenal has examined Roman society and, as always, has found it wanting; but, in the process, he has shocked, entertained, and delighted his audience. We are amazed at his satiric virtuosity. Indeed, he treads the satiric tightrope more gracefully and subtly than any author before or since.

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Notes on Justin Martyr's *Apologies*

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The works of Justin Martyr are preserved virtually in a single and relatively late manuscript—the precious Parisinus gr. 450 (= A),¹ dated 11 September 1364 (f. 461^r bottom). The Parisinus is copied in an easy, neat and readable hand (probably by the monk Joasaph), but it is plagued with textual gaps, corruptions, scribal errors and intrusive marginal glosses. Back in 1883, Adolf Harnack estimated that A contained some 200–300 scribal errors in the text of the *Apologies* alone, as compared to a tenth-century manuscript (such as is the Arethas codex, Parisinus gr. 451, copied in A.D. 914).² But, apparently, no subsequent editor heeded Harnack's warning. The result is that we still do not have a critical edition of Justin. I present here a few remarks on the text and probable sources of the *Apologies*.³

Apologia Maior

1: Already the Address is typical of the textual problems involved (comprising inversion, omission and interpolation). It reads: Αὐτοκράτορι Τίτῳ Αἰλίῳ Ἀδριανῷ Ἀντωνίνῳ Εὐσεβεῖ Σεβαστῷ Καίσαρι, καὶ Οὐρηρσισίμῳ υἱῷ φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ Λουκίῳ φιλοσόφῳ, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῷ, ἐραστῇ παιδείας, ἱερᾷ τε συγκλήτῳ καὶ δῆμῳ παντὶ Ῥωμαίων, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων

¹ Cod. Claromontanus 82 (later belonging to the collection of Sir Thomas Phillipps [1792–1872], now in the British Museum, Loan Nr. 36), dated 2 April 1541, is an apograph of A (hence called by me “a”). It is of no value for the establishment of Justin's text.

² A. Hamack, *Die Überlieferung der griechischen Apologeten des 2. Jahrhunderts in der alten Kirche und im Mittelalter*, T.U. I.1–2 (Leipzig 1883) 79 n. 190.

³ Here are the principal editions of Justin's *Apologies*: R. Stephanus (Paris 1551); F. Sylburg (Heidelberg 1593); J. E. Grabe (*I Apology*, Oxford 1700) and H. Hutchin (*II Apology*, Oxford 1703); S. Thirlby (London 1723); P. Maran (Paris 1742 = PG VI [Paris 1857 = 1884]); C. Ashton (Cambridge 1767); J. W. J. Braun (Bonn 1830); J. C. Th. von Otto (Jena 1842; 2nd ed. 1847; 3rd ed. 1876); G. Krüger (Freiburg i. B. 1891; 4th ed. Tübingen 1915); L. Pautigny (Paris 1904); A. W. F. Blunt (Cambridge 1911); J. M. Pfäfersch (Münster 1912); E. J. Goodspeed (Göttingen 1914); S. Frasca (Turin 1938); A. Wartelle (Paris 1987). None of them is critical. I quote Wartelle's text as being the most recent.

ἀδίκως μισουμένων καὶ ἐπηρεαζομένων, Ἰουστίνος Πρίσκου τοῦ Βακχείου, τῶν ἀπὸ Φλαουίας Νέας πόλεως τῆς Συρίας Παλαιστίνης, εἰς αὐτῶν, τὴν προσφώνησιν καὶ ἔντευξιν πεποιήμαι.

First, the title Καίσαρι belongs to Marcus Aurelius, not to Antoninus Pius; consequently, read Σεβαστῶ, καὶ Καίσαρι Οὐηρισσίμῳ υἱῷ φιλοσόφῳ (as Sylburg had conjectured). Second, the words καὶ Λουκίῳ φιλοσόφῳ, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῶ, ἐραστῇ παιδείας are a later interpolation, introduced by a pedant interested in historical exactness (as Gustav Volkmar in 1855 had seen, only to be disregarded). For (a) the expression ἐραστῇ παιδείας is redundant in view of 2. 2 ἐρασταὶ παιδείας (which is the source of inspiration for the interpolator). (b) Neither Lucius Verus nor his father, the Caesar Lucius Aelius Verus, was a philosopher. (c) The explanation, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῶ, is tedious and out of place in an address. Finally, (d) the introduction of Lucius Verus destroys the entire thematic unity of both *Apologies*. They deal only with Εὐσέβεια, embodied in the person of Antoninus the Pious, and Φιλοσοφία, manifested in Marcus Aurelius the Philosopher—from I *Apology* 1 and 2. 1–2 down to II *Apology* 2. 16 and 15. 5.⁴

Third, the expression οἱ ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἄνθρωποι means in Justin either “the human race” (as in *Dial.* 95. 2 and 134. 5) or “the gentiles” (as in I *Apol.* 25. 1, 32. 4, 40. 7). Certainly, Justin is not speaking on behalf of either of them, but on behalf of the Christians. The most common synonym for “Christians” is οἱ θεοσεβεῖς.⁵ Consequently, read ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων <θεοσεβῶν>, ἀδίκως μισουμένων καὶ ἐπηρεαζομένων. Justin is speaking on behalf of the God-worshipping people coming from every nation, which is being unjustly hated and mistreated. The supplement is confirmed by Justin himself; compare *Dial.* 52. 4 οἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀπάντων . . . θεοσεβεῖς . . . , (ἡμεῖς) γενόμενοι, 91. 3 οἱ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν . . . εἰς τὴν θεοσέβειαν ἐτράπησαν, 131. 5 ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων θεοσεβεῖς . . . δείκνυσθαι εἶναι τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύοντας et alibi. Finally, at the end of the sentence read εἰς αὐτῶν <ᾧ> (with Eusebius *HE* 4. 12 cod. A, and with Grabe).

5. 3 (The evil demons arranged through wicked men that even Socrates be killed for telling the truth.): . . . καὶ αὐτὸν οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τῶν χαϊρόντων τῇ κακίᾳ ἀνθρώπων ἐνήργησαν ὥς ἄθεον καὶ ἄσεβῃ ἀποκτείνεσθαι. Ἀποκτείνεσθαι is Otto's emendation of the transmitted

⁴ Compare H. H. Holfelder, “Εὐσέβεια καὶ φιλοσοφία: Literarische Einheit und politischer Kontext von Justins Apologie,” *ZNTW* 68 (1977) 48–66 and 231–51.

⁵ Compare Melito ap. Eus. *HE* 4. 26. 5 νῦν διώκεται τὸ τῶν θεοσεβῶν γένος; *Ep. ad Diogn.* 6. 2 and 9; *Iren. Adv. haer.* 3. 11. 8; *Clem. Strom.* 6. 167. 3; *Tertull. Apolog.* 37. 4 et al.

ἀποκτεῖναι. Read ἀποκτ<αν>ῆναι instead. The chapter ends with a remark on the activity of the evil demons (5. 4): . . . κακοὺς καὶ ἀνοσίους δαίμονας, οἳ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρετὴν ποθοῦσιν ἀνθρώποις [such as was Socrates] τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἔχουσιν. Wartelle's translation will convince no one: "... des démons pervers et impies, eux dont les agissements n'équivalent même pas aux actions des hommes désireux de vertu." Obviously, there is a lacuna before ἔχουσιν. Judging by the fact that at the beginning of c. 5 Justin was speaking of the need for men to judge with reason the schemes of the evil demons (5. 2 τοὺς οἱ λόγῳ τὰς γινομένας πράξεις οὐκ ἔκρινον), I would expect the lacuna to contain, e.g., τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας <λόγῳ κρίνειν παρ>έχουσιν. The evil demons would not allow even the men longing for virtue to judge similar machinations with reason.

7. 5: Οὐ γὰρ τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας κολάζειν ὑμᾶς ἀξιώσομεν· ἀρκοῦνται γὰρ τῇ προσούσῃ πονηρίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ἀγνοίᾳ. I shall not demand that you punish the false accusers of the Christians. For, "le mal qui les habite et leur ignorance du bien leur sont une sanction suffisante," translates Wartelle. I would doubt, however, that this construction can yield such a sense. Read instead ἀρκοῦν γὰρ τὸ (for ἀρκοῦνται γὰρ) τῇ προσούσῃ πονηρίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ἀγνοίᾳ <συζῆν>. Justin is imitating Plato (compare, e.g., *Hippias Maior* 296a5, *Republic* 3. 411e1 ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ . . . ζῆ).

9. 2 (We do not worship the lifeless statues of gods, perishable works of men.): . . . καὶ ἐξ ἀτίμων πολλάκις σκευῶν διὰ τέχνης τὸ σχῆμα μόνον ἀλλάξαντες καὶ μορφοποιήσαντες θεοὺς ἐπονομάζουσιν [sc. οἱ τεχνῖται]. Obviously, the text is lacunose (as already Henri Estienne in 1592 had noticed). Read σκευῶν, διὰ τέχνης τὸ σχῆμα μόνον ἀλλάξαντες καὶ μορφοποιήσαντες, <ἀνδριάντας ποιήσαντες> θεοὺς ἐπονομάζουσιν and compare Isaiah 44. 13.

19. 2 (It is hard to believe that a full-grown human body could have developed from a little drop of the human seed, and yet it is true.): Εἴ τις ὑμῖν μὴ οὔσι τοιούτοις [sc. full-grown men] μηδ' ἐκ< > τοιούτων ἔλεγε, τὸ σπέρμα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον δεικνὺς καὶ εἰκόνα γραπτὴν, ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε οἶόν τε γενέσθαι διαβεβαιούμενος, πρὶν ἰδεῖν γινόμενον ἐπιστεῦσατε; Showing us a picture of what? Of a full-grown human body, of course. Thus read δεικνὺς καὶ <σώματος> εἰκόνα γραπτὴν and compare the context (19. 1 εἰ ἐν σώματι μὴ ὑπῆρχομεν and 19. 4 τὰ ἀνθρώπεια σώματα).

21. 2 (Bellerophon too, a mortal man, reportedly ascended into heaven.): καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐφ' ἵππου Πηγᾶσου Βελλεροφόντην [sc. ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς οὐρανόν]. Read instead καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δὲ

<γενόμενον> ... Βελλεροφόντην and compare 54. 7 τὸν Βελλεροφόντην καὶ αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἵππου Πηγάσου, ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἔφασαν ἀνεληλυθέναι.

31. 1 (The Jewish kings carefully kept the books of the prophecies by the prophets of God.): τὰς προφητείας ... τῇ ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν Ἑβραίδι φωνῇ ἐν βίβλοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν προφητῶν συντεταγμένας κτῶμενοι περιεῖπον. The prophets composed the books of prophecies, not the prophecies themselves. Thus read συντεταγμένα<ι>ς and compare 31. 3 τὰς βίβλους ... τῇ προειρημένῃ Ἑβραίδι αὐτῶν φωνῇ γεγραμμένας.

33. 7: τὸ δὲ Ἰησοῦς, ὄνομα τῇ Ἑβραίδι φωνῇ, σωτὴρ τῇ Ἑλληνίδι διαλέκτῳ δηλοῖ. "*Jésus est un nom hébreu, qui signifie en grec Sauveur,*" translates Wartelle. Obviously, the text is lacunose. Read τὸ δὲ Ἰησοῦς ὄνομα <ἄνθρωπος> τῇ Ἑβραίδι φωνῇ, σωτὴρ τῇ Ἑλληνίδι διαλέκτῳ δηλοῖ. "The proper name Jesus means in Hebrew Man, in Greek Savior." This is confirmed by II *Apology* 6. 4 Ἰησοῦς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ σωτῆρος ὄνομα καὶ σημασίαν ἔχει.

Justin derived the name Jesus from Hebrew *'ish* ("man") and from Greek Ἰάσων = Σωτήρ. Compare the inscriptions in the catacombs of Rome⁶ and II *Apology* 6. 6 πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀνθρώπων ... κατὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ... ἰάσαντο καὶ ἔτι νῦν ἰῶνται, 13. 4 ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν [sc. Christ], ὅπως ... ἴασιν ποιήσεται; Clem. *Paed.* 3. 98. 3 ὁ ἰώμενος ἡμῶν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ... Ἰησοῦς; Eus. *Dem. ev.* 4. 10. 19 ... καὶ Ἰησοῦς ὠνομάζετο, παρ' ὅσον τῆς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν ἰασεῶς τε καὶ θεραπείας χάριν τὴν ἀπαροδὸν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐποιεῖτο; Cyrill. *Hierosol. Catech.* 10. 4 Ἰησοῦς καλεῖται φερωνύμως, ἐκ τῆς σωτηριώδους ἰασεως ἔχων τὴν προσηγορίαν, 10. 13 Ἰησοῦς τοίνυν ἐστὶ ... κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν ὁ ἰώμενος, ἐπειδὴ ἰατρός ἐστι ψυχῶν καὶ σωμάτων καὶ θεραπευτὴς πνευμάτων; Eriphan. *Ancor.* 108. 7 Ἰησοῦς ... ἰατρὸς ἐρμηνευόμενος καὶ σωτήρ; Panar. 29. 4. 9 Ἰησοῦς γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἑβραϊκὴν διάλεκτον θεραπευτὴς καλεῖται ἥτοι ἰατρὸς καὶ σωτήρ.

35. 1 (It has been predicted by the prophets that Christ shall be ignored by the Jews.): Ὡς δὲ καὶ λήσειν ἔμελλε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους γεννηθεῖς ὁ Χριστὸς ἄχρις ἀνδρωθῇ, ὅπερ καὶ γέγονεν, ἀκούσατε τῶν προειρημένων εἰς τοῦτο. Delete ἄχρις ἀνδρωθῇ as a gloss. For Christ was never recognized as Messiah by the Jews, as is confirmed by 35. 6 Ἰησοῦς δὲ Χριστὸς ἐξετάθη τὰς χεῖρας, σταυρωθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἀντιλεγόντων αὐτῷ καὶ φασκόντων μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν Χριστόν.

⁶ Compare G. Kittel, *Th. Wb. zum NT III* (1938) 287 n. 24.

35. 5: Καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις δι' ἑτέρου προφήτου λέγει (there follows Ps. 21 [22]. 17c + 19b). Says who? The Holy Ghost, as throughout the treatise. Thus read δι' ἑτέρου προφήτου <τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα> λέγει.

36. 2 (One and the same divine Logos speaks in different persons—sometimes as a prophet, sometimes as in the person of God, or Christ, or the Jewish people.): ὁποῖον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν συγγραφέων ἰδεῖν ἔστιν, ἓνα μὲν τὸν τὰ πάντα συγγράφοντα ὄντα, πρόσωπα δὲ τὰ διαλεγόμενα παραφέροντα. Read πρόσωπα δὲ τὰ διαλεγόμενα <πλείω> παραφέροντα.

37. 7: Κἂν φέρητε σεμίδαλιν, θυμίαμα, βδέλυγμά μοί ἐστι. “Que vous m’apportiez fleur de farine ou encens, c’est pour moi une abomination,” translates Wartelle. Read instead Κἂν φέρητε σεμίδαλιν, <μάταιον> θυμίαμα βδέλυγμά μοί ἐστι = LXX Isaiah 1. 13.

39. 5 (oath of allegiance to the emperor by the Roman soldiers): . . . ὑμῖν μὲν τοὺς συντιθεμένους καὶ καταλεγόμενους στρατιώτας καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ζωῆς καὶ γονέων καὶ πατρίδος καὶ πάντων τῶν οἰκείων τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀσπάζεσθαι ὁμολογίαν . . . Wartelle translates: “... les soldats que vous enrôlez et dont vous exigez un serment sacrifier à l’engagement qu’ils ont pris à votre égard leur propre vie, leurs parents, leur patrie et tous leurs intérêts . . .” But Roman oaths of allegiance did not require the soldiers to place an emperor above the fatherland. Consequently, delete καὶ πατρίδος as a gloss and understand τῶν οἰκείων to mean “and the soldiers’ relatives.” Compare, e.g., Suet. *Calig.* 15. 3 . . . *ut omnibus sacramentis adicerentur: “Neque me liberosque meos cariores habebō quam Gaium habeo et sorores eius”*; Tertull. *De corona* 11 *Credimusne humanum sacramentum divino superduci licere et in alium dominum respondere post Christum et eierare patrem et matrem et omnem proximum, quos et lex honorari et post deum diligere praecepit . . . ?*

41. 3–4: Λάβετε χάριν καὶ εἰσέλθετε κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ προσκυνήσατε ἐν αὐλαῖς αὐτοῦ . . . Εὐφρανθήτωσαν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. Ὁ κύριος ἐβασίλευσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου. Read καὶ προσκυνήσατε <τῷ κυρίῳ> ἐν αὐλαῖς and Εὐφρανθήτωσαν <καὶ εἰπάτωσαν> ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, which is confirmed by LXX I Chron. 16. 29 and 31; Ps. 95 (96). 8b + 9a + 11a + 10a and by Justin’s *Dial.* 73. 4.

43. 2 (We agree with the prophecies about the punishments and rewards after death.): Τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ τὰς κολάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀγαθὰς ἀμοιβὰς κατ’ ἀξίαν τῶν πράξεων ἐκάστου ἀποδίδοσθαι διὰ τῶν προφητῶν μαθόντες καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαινόμεθα. Read μαθόντες <δίκαιον> καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαινόμεθα and compare 12. 11 (δίκαιά τε

καὶ ἀληθῆ ἀξιούμεν) and 43. 6. Incidentally, read ἐκάστω (with Thirlby and Ashton) for the transmitted ἐκάστου.

44. 8 (Plato borrowed wisdom from Moses.): "Ὡστε καὶ Πλάτων εἰπών· "Αἰτία ἐλομένου, θεὸς δ' ἀναίτιος,"⁷ παρὰ Μωυσέως τοῦ προφήτου λαβὼν εἶπε· πρεσβύτερος γὰρ Μωυσῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν "Ἑλλησι συγγραφέων.⁸ Read πρεσβύτερος γὰρ Μωσῆς (= A) <καὶ Πλάτωνος> καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν "Ἑλλησι συγγραφέων.

48. 2 (the miracles of Christ): Τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ . . . τυφλοὶ ἀναβλέψουσι καὶ λεπροὶ καθαρισθήσονται καὶ νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται καὶ περιπατήσουσιν. Read καὶ νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται καὶ <χωλοὶ> περιπατήσουσιν = Matthew 11. 5.

54. 6 (The evil demons imitated Moses' prophecies about Christ in their myth about Dionysus.): Τούτων οὖν τῶν προφητικῶν λόγων ἀκούσαντες οἱ δαίμονες Διόνυσον μὲν ἔφασαν γεγονέναι υἱὸν τοῦ Διός, . . . καὶ διασπαρχθέντα αὐτὸν⁹ ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐδίδαξαν. The important allusion to the resurrection of Christ is missing in the text. Thus read καὶ διασπαρχθέντα αὐτὸν <ἀναστήναι καὶ> ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς οὐρανὸν . . . This is confirmed by Justin's *Dial.* 69. 2 "Ὅταν γὰρ Διόνυσον μὲν υἱὸν τοῦ Διός . . . γεγενῆσθαι λέγωσι . . . καὶ διασπαρχθέντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα ἀναστήναι, εἰς οὐρανὸν τε ἀνεληλυθέναι ἱστορῶσι . . .

60. 5 (Plato misunderstood Moses' "sign of the cross" at Numbers 21. 6-9 and wrote in *Timaeus* that the first God placed Christ in the universe in the shape of the letter X [36b7-8 and 34b3].): <"A"> ἀναγνούς Πλάτων καὶ μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενος, μηδὲ νοήσας τύπον εἶναι σταυροῦ ἀλλὰ χίασμα νοήσας, τὴν μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν δύναμιν κεχιάσθαι ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἶπε. Read μηδὲ νοήσας . . . , ἀλλὰ χίασμα νομίσας, . . .

61. 4-5: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Χριστὸς εἶπεν· "Ἄν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθῃτε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν" (= John 3. 5 + Matthew 18. 3). "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἅπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι, φανερόν πᾶσιν ἐστὶ. The main purpose of baptism is regeneration, and it is missing in the second sentence. In

⁷ Plat. *Rep.* 10. 617e4.

⁸ The source is Aristobulus the Jew ap. Clem. *Strom.* 1. 150. 1-3; ap. Eus. *Praep. ev.* 11. 9. 4-5, 13. 12. 3-4 et al. Compare Philo *De spec. legg.* 4. 61; *Leg. alleg.* 1. 108; *Quis rerum div. heres* 214; *Quod omnis probus liber* 57; *Quaest. in Gen.* 3. 5 s.f., 5. 152; Ps.-Justin *Cohort.* 14. 2; Min. Fel. *Oct.* 34. 5 et al.

⁹ Compare Aristid. *Apol.* 10. 8; Clem. *Protr.* 17. 2; Orig. *C. Cels.* 3. 23; *Acta Apollonii* 22; Amob. *Adv. nat.* 1. 41, 5. 19; Ps.-Nonnus *Hist. Gregorii in Iulian.*: ad Greg. *Orat. II c. Iul.* 35 (PG XXXVI 1053C); *Alcestis Barcinon.* 62 ed. Marcovich.

addition, editors have not recognized that it is a free quotation of John 3. 4. Consequently, read "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ "ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἅπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι <καὶ ἀναγεννηθῆναι>," φανερόν πᾶσιν ἐστὶ. John 3. 4 reads: Πῶς δύναται ἄνθρωπος γεννηθῆναι γέρον ὦν; Μὴ δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι;

63. 10 (the Logos Incarnate): . . . νῦν δὲ διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος [sc. Λόγος] ὑπέμεινε καὶ παθεῖν ὅσα αὐτὸν ἐνήργησαν οἱ δαίμονες διατεθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνοήτων Ἰουδαίων. The word καὶ attests to a lacuna after ὑπέμεινε. This is confirmed by 63. 16 . . . νῦν δ' . . . διὰ παρθένου ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βουλήν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας τῶν πιστευόντων αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξουθενηθῆναι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέμεινε . . .

65. 3 (the Eucharist following a baptism): "Ἐπειτα προσφέρεται τῷ προεστῶτι τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ κράματος . . . Since τὸ κράμα usually means "wine mixed with water," Ashton deleted the word ὕδατος, while Harnack followed Ottobonianus gr. 274, which omits καὶ κράματος, strangely believing that the early Eucharist consisted of bread and water alone.¹⁰ The simplest solution is to read ποτήρια for ποτήριον. A deacon brings bread and *two* chalices, one with wine, the other with water. The word κράμα means here οἶνος, as is confirmed by 65. 5 μεταλαβεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐχαριστηθέντος ἄρτου καὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος and 67. 5 ἄρτος προσφέρεται καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ.

As for the equation κράμα = οἶνος, compare Song of Solomon 7. 2 (3); Plut. *Praec. coniug.* 20 (140f) τὸ κράμα, καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος, οἶνον καλοῦμεν; Theodoret. *Eran.* 1 (PG LXXXIII 56A) σῶμα τὸν ἄρτον ἐκάλεσε, καὶ αἷμα τὸ κράμα; Modern Greek κρασί = οἶνος.

For the use of "wine mixed with water" in the early Eucharist compare Iren. *Adv. haer.* 1. 13. 2 ποτήριον οἶνῳ κεκραμένον (versio Lat. et Hippol.): ποτήρια οἶνῳ κεκραμένα (Epiphan.—the same error is in our text), 4. 33. 2 καὶ τὸ κράμα τοῦ ποτηρίου ἴδιον αἷμα διεβεβαιούτο [sc. ὁ Κύριος], 5. 2. 3 τὸ κεκραμένον ποτήριον; Clem. *Paed.* 2. 20. 1 κίρνεται ὁ μὲν οἶνος τῷ ὕδατι . . . ; Cyprian *Ep.* 63. 13 *Sic autem in sanctificando calice Domini offerri aqua sola non potest, quomodo nec vinum solum potest* . . . ; *Constit. apost.* 8. 12. 37 Ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτήριον κεράσας ἐξ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος . . .

¹⁰ A. Hamack, T.U. VII.2 (1891) 117–44, esp. 130. But Ottobonianus is an unreliable manuscript. For example, at 67. 8 it omits one whole line of its exemplar. The fact that the initiates of Mithra offered to their god bread and water (*CIL* VI 3722a; compare M. Clauss, *Mithras: Kult und Mysterien* [Munich 1990] 117–22) proves nothing. Two out of three elements common to the Christians and Mithra were a sufficient reason for Justin to proclaim that Mithra was a copy of Christ (*I Apology* 66. 4).

Apologia Minor

1. 1 (Willy-nilly you Romans are our brothers.): ... ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὁμοιοπαθῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀδελφῶν, κἂν ἀγνοῇτε καὶ μὴ θέλητε ... Read καὶ <εἶναι> μὴ θέλητε.

1. 2 (We Christians are being exterminated by incorrigible criminals, instigated by the evil demons.): Πανταχοῦ γάρ, ὅς ἂν σωφρονίζεται ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἢ γείτονος ἢ τέκνου ἢ φίλου ἢ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικὸς κατ' ἑλλειψιν, ... καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι δαίμονες, ... φονεῦειν ἡμᾶς παρασκευάζουσιν. Wartelle translates: "Partout, en effet, les gens qui devraient apprendre ce qui leur manque de sagesse auprès d'un père, d'un voisin, d'un fils, d'un ami, d'un frère, d'un mari, d'une épouse ..." But σωφρονίζεσθαι means here "to be corrected (castigated)," as it does at 2. 2 (a sinful woman ἐπει<δὴ> δὲ τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδάγματα ἔγνω, αὐτὴ <τε> ἐσωφρονίσθη ...). Consequently, read ὅς<τις> (Ashton) ἂν <μὴ> σωφρονίζεται ὑπὸ πατρὸς ..., i.e., any incorrigible sinner becomes a servant of the evil demons.

3 (8). 6 (Crescens the Cynic and Socrates): ... διὰ τοὺς ἀκούοντας δὲ οὐ τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὁμοίως Σωκράτει ..., ὅς γε μηδὲ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἀξιέραστον ὃν τιμᾷ. "Ἄλλ' οὐτι γέ προ τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ." Read <ἀν>ομοίως Σωκράτει. Unlike Socrates, Crescens is too afraid to tell the truth (about Christ), disregarding Socrates' admirable words: "No man should be put above the truth" (Plato *Rep.* 10. 595c2-3).

6 (5). 3 (another etymology of the name Christ): Χριστὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ κεχρίσθαι καὶ κοσμηῆσαι τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν θεὸν λέγεται. Wartelle translates: "il est appelé Christ, parce qu'il a reçu l'onction et que Dieu a mis l'ordre dans l'univers par lui." The etymology, Christ or Messiah, the anointed One, is out of place here. Κεχρίσθαι is medial here and means "to caulk." Christ is called so because through Him God "caulked" and arranged all things. Compare Theophilus *Ad Autol.* 1. 12 Ποῖον γὰρ πλοῖον δύναται εὐχρηστον εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον χρισθῇ; Ἡ ποῖος πύργος ἢ οἰκία εὐμορφος καὶ εὐχρηστός ἐστιν, ἐπὶ οὐ κέχρισται; ... Ποῖον δὲ ἔργον ἢ κόσμιον δύναται εὐμορφίαν ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ χρισθῇ καὶ στιλβῶθῃ; (Of course, εὐχρηστος alludes to Χρηστός.)

7 (6). 1 (It is for the Christians' sake that God delays the end of the world.): "Θθεν καὶ ἐπιμένει ὁ θεὸς τὴν σύγχυσιν καὶ κατάλυσιν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου μὴ ποιῆσαι ..., διὰ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν Χριστιανῶν, ὃ γινώσκει ἐν τῇ φύσει ὅτι αἰτίον ἐστιν. "De là vient que Dieu retarde la réalisation du bouleversement et de la destruction du monde entier ..., en

vertu de la famille des chrétiens qu'il reconnaît dans la nature pour être la cause de ce dé lai," translates Wartelle. The words ἐν τῇ φύσει speak against the interpretation αἵτιον τῆς ἐπιμονῆς. Read instead ὁ γινώσκει ἐν τῇ φύσει ὅτι <τοῦ ζῆν> αἵτιόν ἐστιν and compare Justin's source, Aristid. *Apol.* 16. 1 and 6, "wegen des Flehens der Christen die Welt besteht" (Geffcken 92 f. and 94).

8 (7). 1 (Thanks to the seed of the Logos, implanted in all mankind, the philosophers were able to grasp a part of the truth. And that is why the evil demons hated them so much.): Καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δὲ δογμάτων ... διὰ τὸ ἔμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ Λόγου, μεμισῆσθαι καὶ πεφονεῦσθαι οἶδαμεν· Ἡράκλειτον μὲν ... καὶ Μουσώνιον δὲ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλους οἶδαμεν. Heraclitus and Musonius may have been hated, but they were not killed. Thus delete the words καὶ πεφονεῦσθαι as a gloss inspired by the death of Socrates. The subsequent text speaks only of μισεῖσθαι (8. 2 and 3). Incidentally, delete the second οἶδαμεν as a dittography.

11. 4 (Heracles at the crossroads): Καὶ τὴν μὲν Κακίαν, ἀβρᾶ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐρωτοπεποιημένῳ καὶ ἀνθοῦντι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων προσώπῳ ..., εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἡρακλέα ... Read ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων <χρωμάτων> προσώπῳ and compare Prodicus (fr. 2 D-K) ap. Xenoph. *Memorab.* 2. 1. 21-28.¹¹

11. 8 (Death is inevitable for any born man.): ὁ καὶ περὶ Χριστιανῶν ... ὑπολαβεῖν δεῖ πάντα <ν>ουνεχῇ,¹² ἐκ τοῦ καὶ τοῦ φευκτοῦ καταφρονεῖν ἡμᾶς θανάτου λογισμὸν ἔλκοντα. "... tout esprit sensé doit le concevoir en tirant argument du mépris que nous manifestons pour la mort que, justement, tout le monde fuit," translates Wartelle. But Justin's argument is this: "Every man who is born must die: Death is an inevitable debt for everyone, and we Christians pay it with gratitude." Consequently, read ἐκ τοῦ τοῦ μὴ φευκτοῦ καταφρονεῖν ἡμᾶς θανάτου λογισμὸν ἔλκοντα and compare 11. 1 ... εἰ μὴ πάντως παντὶ γεννωμένῳ καὶ θανεῖν ὠφείλετο· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ὄφλημα ἀποδιδόντες εὐχαριστοῦμεν.¹³

12. 4 (Our enemies impute to us the crimes they themselves commit.): Φονεύοντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ τινὰς ἐπὶ συκοφαντίᾳ τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ εἰς βασιάνους εἵλκυσαν οἰκέτας τῶν ἡμετέρων ἢ παίδας ἢ γυναῖκα, καὶ

¹¹ Also in Philo *De sacrif. Abel.* 20-34; Max. Tyr. *Or.* 14. 1a-d; Clem. *Paed.* 2. 110. 1; Themist. *Or.* 22. 280a; Cic. *De officiis* 1. 18 et al.

¹² <ν>ουνεχῇ Thirlby: οὖν ἔχει A.

¹³ At I *Apology* 11. 2 Justin alludes to Eurip. *Alc.* 419, 782 (βροτοῖς ἅπασι κατθανεῖν ὀφείλεται), *Androm.* 1271 f., as does Philo *De aet. mundi* 27.

δι' αἰκισμῶν φοβερῶν ἐξαναγκάζουσι κατεπειν ταῦτα τὰ μυθολογούμενα, ἃ αὐτοὶ φανερώς πράττουσιν. Read instead Φονεύ<σ>αντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ τινες ἐπὶ συκοφαντία τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, <συνέλαβον> καὶ εἰς βασάνους εἴλκυσαν οἰκέτας τῶν ἡμετέρων ... , καὶ δι' αἰκισμῶν φοβερῶν ἐξαναγκάζουσι κατεπειν <ἡμῶν> ταῦτα ... , and compare Eus. *HE* 5. 1. 14 συνελαμβάνοντο δὲ καὶ ἔθνικοί τινες οἰκέται τῶν ἡμετέρων ... οἱ ... φοβηθέντες τὰς βασάνους ... κατεψεύσαντο ἡμῶν Θυέστεια δεῖπνα καὶ Οἰδιποδεῖους μίξεις ...

14. 2 (By punishing us for the crimes they themselves commit our enemies only condemn themselves.): ἐκ τοῦ [καὶ *delevi*] ἡμῖν, ὡς τοιαῦτα πράττουσι, θάνατον ἢ δεσμὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον προστιμᾶν [Thirlby: πρόστιμον A] ἑαυτοὺς κατακρίνειν ... Read ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πρόστιμον <κρίνειν> ἑαυτοὺς κατακρίνειν.

15. 3 (Our doctrine is far away from the works of Sotades, Philaenis, Archestratus or Epicurus; and yet you persecute us while allowing everyone to read their works.): ... εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν Σωταδεῖσι καὶ Φιλαινιδεῖσι καὶ Ἀρχεστρατεῖσι καὶ Ἐπικουρεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιητικοῖς διδάγμασιν οὐχ ὅμοια [*sc.* ἡμῶν τὰ διδάγματα], οἷς ἐντυγχάνειν πᾶσι ... συγκεχώρηται. E. Leutsch emended the transmitted ὀρχησ(τ)ικοῖς to Ἀρχεστρατεῖσι.¹⁴ Fr. Buecheler defended ὀρχηστικοῖς¹⁵ but I think it is defenseless in view of the fact that the group Archestratus, Philaenis and Epicurus appears together in Athenaeus 3. 104b, 8. 335b, 10. 457d-e. His source is Chrysippus, which may suggest that Justin is using a Stoic source here.

Appendix:

Marcus Aurelius to the Senate: A Christian Legend (A f. 240^r-41^r)

In Germany Marcus Aurelius is besieged by 77,000 Quads and Sarmats:

Wartelle (p. 222.2-11):

Φανερά ὑμῖν ἐποίησα τὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ σκοποῦ μεγέθη, ὅποια ἐν τῇ Γερμανίᾳ ἐκ περιστάσεως διὰ περιβολῆς ἐπακολουθήματα ἐποίησα ἐν τῇ μεθορίᾳ καμῶν καὶ

Read:

Φανερά ὑμῖν ποιήσω τὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ σκοποῦ μεγέθη, <δείξας> ὅποια ἐν τῇ Γερμανίᾳ ἐκ περιστάσεως διὰ περιβολῆς ἐπακολουθήματα [5] ἐποίησα, ἐν τῇ μεθορίᾳ

¹⁴ *Philol.* 20 (1863) 465.

¹⁵ *Rhein. Mus.* 35 (1880) 285.

παθών, ἐν Καρνούντῳ καταλαμ-
βανομένου μου ὑπὸ δρακόντων
ἐβδομήκοντα τεσσάρων ἀπὸ μι-
λίων ἑννέα. Γενομένων δὲ αὐ-
τῶν ἐγγὺς ἡμῶν ἐξπλωράτωρες
ἐμήνυσαν ἡμῖν καὶ Πομπηϊανὸς
ὁ ἡμέτερος πολέμαρχος ἐδήλωσεν
ἡμῖν ἅτινα εἶδομεν (καταλαμ-
βανόμενος δὲ ἡμῖν ἐν μεγέθει
πλήθους ἀμίκτου, καὶ στρατευ-
μάτων λεγεῶνος πρίμας, δεκάτης,
γεμίνας, φρεντησίας μῖγμα κατη-
ριθμημένον), πλήθῃ παρεῖναι
παμμίκτου ὄχλου χιλιάδων ἑνα-
κοσίων ἐβδομήκοντα ἑπτά.

Κ<ου>άδων καὶ Σ<αρ>ματῶν ἐν
Κοτινοῖς καταλαμβανομένου μου
ὑπὸ δρακόντων ἐβδομήκοντα ἑ-
πτὰ * ἀπὸ μιλίων ἑννέα. Γενο-
[10]μένων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐγγὺς ἡμῶν
ἐξπλωράτωρες ἐμήνυσαν ἡμῖν
καὶ Πομπηϊανὸς ὁ ἡμέτερος
πολέμαρχος ἐδήλωσεν ἡμῖν ἅτινα
εἶδομεν (καταλαμβανόμενος γὰρ
[15] ἡμῖν ἐν μεγέθει πλήθους ἀ-
μίκτου καὶ στρατεύματ<α ἔχ>ων
λεγεῶνος πρίμας, δεκάτης γεμί-
να<ς> <καὶ> Φρεντησία<ς> μῖγμα
κατηριθμημένον)· πλήθῃ παρεῖ-
[20]ναι παμμίκτου ὄχλου <τῶν>
ἐναντίων χιλιάδων ἐβδομήκοντα
ἑπτά.

1 ποιήσω scripsi: ἐποίησα A (cf.
5) || 2 δειξας supplevi || 6 Κουάδων
καὶ Σαρματῶν Sylburg: καμῶν καὶ
σπαθῶν A: καμῶν καὶ παθῶν
Lange et Scaliger || 7 Κοτινοῖς
Harnack¹⁶: κοτίνῳ A: Καρνούτῳ
Panuiinius¹⁷ || 8-9 ἑπτὰ scripsi (cf.
22): τεσσάρων A | ante ἀπὸ lacunam
statuit Geffcken¹⁸ (nomen oppidi
desideratur) || 14 γὰρ scripsi: δὲ A ||
16 στρατεύματ<α ἔχ>ων scripsi:
στρατευμάτων A || 17-18 γεμί-
να<ς> <καὶ> Φρεντησία<ς> scrip-
si: γεμιναφρεντησια A, corr.
Panuiinius (qui legit: legiones
primam Geminam et decimam
Fretensem) || 20-21 <τῶν> ἐναν-
τίων χιλιάδων scripsi conl. Greg.
Nysseni *Or. Ib in XL martyres*, p.
146 s. Lendle (*PG XLVI* 757 s.):
χιλιάδων ἑνακοσίων A

We learn from Lucian (*Hist. conscrib.* 29) that "dragon" is a military unit consisting of 1,000 men (χιλίους γὰρ οἶμαι ὁ δράκων ἄγει). Consequently, in lines 8-9 we should read "seven" for the transmitted

¹⁶ A. Hamack, "Die Quelle der Berichte über das Regenwunder im Feldzuge Marc Aurel's gegen die Quaden," *SBBA* (1894) 2. 835-82. Cotini is mentioned in Xiphilinus (Dio Cass. 71. 12).

¹⁷ Onuphrius Panuiinius, *Fastorum libri V* (Venetiis 1558) 349 f. and in Sylburg 439 f.

¹⁸ J. Geffcken, *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum* 2 (1899) 253-69.

"four," and in line 21 ἐναντίων for the transmitted ἐννακοσίων. The total number of Quads and Sarmats facing Marcus is 77 dragons = 77,000 men.

The text of lines 16–19 means, "and I had with me the armies of the legions First and Tenth-Gemina, in addition to a limited detachment of the legion Fretense."¹⁹

Abandoned by the Roman gods, Marcus appeals to his Christian soldiers:

Wartelle (p. 222.14–19):

... παρεκάλεσα τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένους Χριστιανούς· καὶ ἐπερωτήσας εὖρον πλῆθος καὶ μέγεθος αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐμβριμησάμενος εἰς αὐτούς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔπρεπε διὰ τὸ ὕστερον ἐπεγνωκέναι με τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν. "Ὅθεν ἀρξάμενοι οὐ βελῶν παράρτησιν οὔτε ὅπλων οὔτε σαλπίγγων, διὰ τὸ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸν Θεόν, ὃν φοροῦσι κατὰ συνείδησιν.

Read:

... παρεκάλεσα τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένους Χριστιανούς, καὶ ἐπερωτήσας εὖρον πλῆθος παμμέγεθες αὐτῶν, καὶ <ἐβόων> ἐμ[5]βριμησάμενος εἰς αὐτούς (ὅπερ οὐκ ἔπρεπε διὰ τὸ ὕστερον ἐπεγνωκέναι με τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν). "Ὅθεν <οὖν ὁρμᾶν> ἀρξάμενοι<ς> οὐ βελῶν παράρτυσις οὔτε [10] ὅπλων οὔτε σαλπίγγων διὰ τὸ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸν Θεόν, ὃν φοροῦσι κατὰ συνείδησιν.

3–4 παμμέγεθες H. O. Hirschfeld: καὶ μέγεθος A || 4 ἐβόων supplevi || 8 οὖν ὁρμᾶν supplevi || 8–9 ἀρξάμενοι<ς> scripsi: ἀρξάμενοι A || 9 παράρτυσις scripsi (παράρτυσιν iam Geffcken): παράρτησιν A || 10 post σαλπίγγων lacunam statuit Harnack

There are two lacunae in the text, ἐβόων in line 4 and οὖν ὁρμᾶν in line 8. The closest parallel seems to be Gregory of Nyssa *Or. Ib in XL martyres*, p. 146. 22 Lendle (= PG XLVI 760): τότε καταλιπόντες οἱ γενναῖοι [sc. οἱ Χριστιανοὶ] τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων βοήθειαν ἔγνωσαν τὴν ἄμαχον καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστον ἐν τοῖς φοβεροῖς συμμαχίαν.

The Christians pray to God for rain:

¹⁹ Compare E. Ritterling, *RE* XII (1925) 1686.

Wartelle (pp. 222.20–224.26):

ῥίψαντες γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑμοῦ μόνον ἐδεήθησαν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παρόντος στρατεύματος, παρήγορον γενέσθαι δίψης καὶ λιμοῦ τῆς παρούσης. Πεμπταῖοι γὰρ ὕδωρ οὐκ εἰλήφειμεν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι· ἡμεν γὰρ ἐν τῷ μεσομαλάῳ τῆς Γερμανίας καὶ τοῖς ὄροις αὐτῶν. Ἄμα δὲ τῷ τούτους ῥίψαι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ εὐχεσθαι Θεῷ, ᾧ ἐγὼ ἡγνόουν, εὐθέως ὕδωρ ἠκολούθει οὐρανόθεν . . .

Read:

ῥίψαντες γοῦν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑμοῦ μόνον ἐδεήθησαν <θεοῦ>, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς στρατεύματος, παρ[5]ήγορον γενέσθαι δίψης [καὶ λιμοῦ] τῆς παρούσης. Πεμπταῖοι γὰρ ὕδωρ οὐκ εἰλήφειμεν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι· ἡμεν γὰρ ἐν τῷ μεσομαλάῳ τῆς Γερμανίας κὰν τοῖς [10] ὄροις <Σαρμ>ατῶν. Ἄμα δὲ τῷ τούτους ῥίψαι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ εὐχεσθαι θεῷ, ᾧ ἐγὼ ἡγνόουν, εὐθέως ὕδωρ ἠκολούθει οὐρανόθεν . . .

1 γοῦν scripsi: γὰρ A || 3 θεοῦ addidi (cf. 12) post Ios. Scaligerum || 4 παντὸς Panuinius: παρόντος A (cf. 6) || 4–5 παρήγορον Scaliger: παρήγοροι A || 5–6 καὶ λιμοῦ seclusi || 9 κὰν scripsi: καὶ A || 10 <Σαρμ>ατῶν Hirschfeld: αὐτῶν A || 11 τούτους Sylburg: τούτοις A

The words καὶ λιμοῦ are a gloss: The Roman army suffered from thirst alone. Compare Iul. Capitol. *M. Anton.* 24. 4 (*suis pluvia impetrata, cum sibi laborarent*); Apollinaris ap. Eus. *HE* 5. 51–56 (. . . ὄμβρον δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τὸ θεῖον παρακεκληκότων στρατιὰν <ἀναρραγέντα supplevi>, πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ δίψους μέλλουσιν ὅσον οὐπω διαφθεῖρεσθαι, ἀνακτώμενον); Tertull. *Apolog.* 5. 6 (*illam Germanicam sitim*); Xiphilinus (Dio Cass. 71. 8. 1–10. 5 = III 259–61 Boissvain); *Orac. Sibyll.* 12. 194–200 et al.

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Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff
on Wilhelm Dilthey:
His Letters to Georg Misch (1914–1928)

WILLIAM M. CALDER III and SVEN RUGULLIS

I. Introduction

The Hamburg Ordinarius for Philosophy, Klaus Oehler, has written of Wilamowitz' letters and *Erinnerungen*, "Wo in seinen Briefen und in seinen 'Erinnerungen' der Name Dilthey Erwähnung findet, ist Karl Dilthey,¹ der Archäologe, gemeint. Von Wilhelm Dilthey und dessen Gedanken findet sich bei Wilamowitz keine Spur."² In principle it is bold to rule on what lies in a man's letters when only some five percent of the letters are published and many still in private collections. With Goethe or Nietzsche it would be different. In fact Wilamowitz in his published works easily available to Oehler mentions Wilhelm Dilthey.³ And the letters of Wilhelm Dilthey to Wilamowitz survive.⁴ In general Oehler is right. Wilamowitz had no time for philosophical speculation. Werner Jaeger, his student and successor, acutely observed:⁵ "Dem Geiste von Wilamowitz lag das

¹ For Karl Dilthey's (1839–1907) opposition to Wilamowitz' appointment at Göttingen see W. M. Calder III, "Wilamowitz' Call to Göttingen: Paul de Lagarde to Friedrich Althoff on Wilamowitz-Moellendorff," *SIFC* 3 (1985) 136–60. He was the second-rate brother and brother-in-law of great men and he despised and feared younger men of ability. For a generous presentation of Dilthey's contribution see K. Fiischen, "Von Wieseler bis Thiersch (1839–1939): Hundert Jahre Archäologie in Göttingen," *Die Klassische Altertumswissenschaft an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen: Eine Ringvorlesung zu ihrer Geschichte*, ed. by C. J. Classen = *Göttinger Universitätschriften Serie A: Schriften* 14 (Göttingen 1989) 87–89.

² See K. Oehler, "Dilthey und die Klassische Philologie," in *Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert: Zur Geschichte und Methodologie der Geisteswissenschaften*, ed. by H. Flashar, K. Gründer and A. Horstmann (Göttingen 1979) 190.

³ See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Kleine Schriften* VI, ed. by W. Buchwald (Berlin 1972) 141: "Die Biographie, wie sie Justi und Dilthey uns geschenkt haben, leistet viel." Cf. *ibid.* 120.

⁴ Publication by W. M. Calder III and S. Rugullis is underway.

⁵ W. Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* I (Rome 1960) xiv = *Five Essays*, transl. by A. M. Fiske (Montreal 1966) 30.

eigentlich Philosophische fern. Insbesondere hatte er kein intimes Verhältnis zu denjenigen Autoren, die wie Aristoteles und die Männer der exakten Wissenschaft oder die griechischen Väter seit Origenes ein vieljähriges systematisches Eindringen und völliges Vertrautsein erfordern."

In a revealing Latin intellectual autobiography written 6 March 1928 Wilamowitz writes:⁶ "Philosophorum recentiorum tantum Spinozam eatenus legi, adulescens, ut ipse suspicere possem. Kantium ariditate et rationalismo deterritus celeriter abieci. Γόητες, Schopenhauer et sequaces, ne tantum quidem valere, ut odissem, sensi statim rationis debilitatem. sensi 'ils ne sont pas sérieux.'" This view is anticipated in a letter written by him in mid-October 1905 to Anton Thomsen (1877–1915), Professor of Philosophy at Copenhagen and husband of the editrix of Suidas, Ada Adler. Thomsen had sent him a copy of a book on Hegel. Wilamowitz politely replies:⁷ "Dabei sehe ich, dass die Betrachtungen, die Sie über Hegel anstellen, mich wohl reizen würden; ich stamme aus einer Generation, die sich mit dieser speculativen Philosophie gar nicht abgab, und mein Bedürfnis nach dieser Seite ist durch die Griechen reichlich befriedigt worden. Aber der geschichtliche Zusammenhang mit der Goetheschen Bewegung des modernen Denkens müsste mich stark interessiren." Plato was different. Wilamowitz believed Plato.⁸

The letters here are of interest because they provide the rare occasion where Wilamowitz writes about *philosophi recentiores*, in particular his Berlin colleague, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911).⁹ But for these letters and the three preserved of Dilthey to Wilamowitz we are almost uninformed of their acquaintance. Wilamowitz' unpleasant experience with Wilhelm's brother Karl would not have made matters easier. That Wilhelm Dilthey had married the sister of Hermann Usener (1834–1905) need not have brought them close. Wilamowitz' view of Hermann Usener was not uncritical.¹⁰ On the other hand at Basel Dilthey was befriended by Adolf Kießling, Wilamowitz' friend and *collega proximus* at Greifswald and, when a student

⁶ W. M. Calder III, "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: An Unpublished Latin Autobiography," *Antike und Abendland* 27 (1981) 42–43 = *Studies in the Modern History of Classical Scholarship*, Antiqua 27 (Naples 1984) 155–56.

⁷ *Studies* (previous note) 155 n. 43.

⁸ See Wilamowitz *apud* E. Norden, *Kleine Schriften zum klassischen Altertum*, ed. by B. Kytzler (Berlin 1966) 668: "Fidem profiteor Platoniam."

⁹ For a brief authoritative recent life with a bio-bibliography, see T. Kornbichler, "Wilhelm Dilthey," *Berlinische Lebensbilder 4: Geisteswissenschaftler: Einzelveröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin* 60 (Berlin 1989) 195–208. For a sound informative introduction in English, see H. P. Rickman, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies* (Berkeley 1979).

¹⁰ See J. N. Bremmer, "Hermann Usener," in *Classical Scholarship: A Biographical Encyclopedia*, ed. by Ward W. Briggs, Jr. and W. M. Calder III (New York/London 1990) 462–78, with extensive bio-bibliography. Of especial interest is H. Dietrich and F. von Hiller (edd.), *Usener und Wilamowitz: Ein Briefwechsel 1870–1905* (Leipzig/Berlin 1934) with Calder's indices at *Quaderni di storia* 32 (1990) 229–32.

at Berlin, had heard the lectures of Wilamowitz' father-in-law, Theodor Mommsen. They were also united in an admiration for things Greek.¹¹ Dilthey had noticed in May 1897 with approval Wilamowitz' arrival in Berlin:¹² "Wilamowitz noch nicht gesehen. Diels sagt daß seine Gesundheit schwerlich Berlin aushalten werde. Seine öffentliche Vorlesung über das griechische Drama hat durch die anthropologische Grundlegung über Drama der Naturvölker usw.[?] große Begeisterung der Studenten erregt. Er nimmt mit Diels die Position einer ganz modernen Psychologie ein." This is praise indeed.

Georg Misch (1878–1965), a Berliner, had married the daughter and biographer of Dilthey.¹³ He took the doctorate in philosophy at Berlin in 1900 under Dilthey. His chief contribution to ancient studies is the first volume of his monumental history of autobiography, reviewed by Wilamowitz¹⁴ and in the English version by Werner Jaeger.¹⁵ He was deeply influenced in this by Wilamowitz' friend and earlier Göttingen colleague, Friedrich Leo (1851–1914), whose *Griechisch-römische Biographie* appeared in 1905, two years before Misch's first volume.¹⁶ His indebtedness to Leo did not go unnoticed by Wilamowitz. In his last preserved letter to Friedrich Althoff, dated 1 August 1908, Wilamowitz alludes to "mein hochgeschätzter College Misch."¹⁷ Misch, then aged thirty, was Privatdozent for Philosophy at Berlin. Wilamowitz did not apply such epithets in such places casually. The five documents that follow are evidence for their friendship.

The originals are in the possession of Professor Dr. W. Rüegg (Institut für Soziologie, Universität Bern).¹⁸ We are greatly indebted to him for generously providing copies of the letters and owner's permission for

¹¹ See A. Bork, *Dilthey's Auffassung des griechischen Geistes* (Berlin 1944). He had been deeply influenced, not least through his father, by August Boeckh (Bork 72 ff.).

¹² S. von der Schulenburg (ed.), *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877–1897* (Halle 1923) 239.

¹³ See J. König, *Georg Misch als Philosoph = Nachrichten der Akad. Wiss. Gött., Phil.-hist. Klasse 7* (Göttingen 1967). There is a portrait, valuable bibliography and a too brief biography (238).

¹⁴ Wilamowitz (above, note 3) 120–27.

¹⁵ W. Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* II (Rome 1960) 455–62. Note especially (455): "Its characteristic feature is the combination of the author's philological thoroughness with his searching philosophical mind."

¹⁶ See Jaeger (previous note) 456 after Wilamowitz (above, note 3) 123, who notes Ivor Bruns as Misch's other great predecessor. Jaeger's statement that Misch "taught for many years in Göttingen" with Leo is untrue. Leo died in 1914. Misch became Extraordinarius at Göttingen in 1916, Ordinarius in 1919. They never taught together.

¹⁷ See *Berufungspolitik innerhalb der Altertumswissenschaft im wilhelminischen Preußen: Die Briefe Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff an Friedrich Althoff (1883–1908)*, ed. by W. M. Calder III and A. Košenina (Frankfurt a./M. 1989) 161.

¹⁸ Wilamowitz' revealing letter to Ernst Howald on the Nietzsche controversy is also in the Rüegg Collection; see J. Mansfeld, "The Wilamowitz–Nietzsche Struggle: Another New Document and Some Further Comments," *Nietzsche-Studien* 15 (1986) 41–58.

publication (*per litt.* 4 December 1981 to Prof. Dr. Jaap Mansfeld). We are further indebted to Prof. Dr. Jaap Mansfeld (Utrecht) for first transcriptions and selected exegetical notes as well as permission to publish the documents that had first been entrusted to him. The late Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald, the greatest modern expert on Wilamowitz' handwriting, during the Wilamowitz Conference at Bad Homburg in September 1981 controlled the transcriptions and first deciphered a number of difficult passages. We are grateful to all three of these distinguished scholars.

II. The New Texts

1. 10 January 1914

U. von WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF
WESTEND-CHARLOTTENBURG
EICHENALLÉE 12
10 I 14

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Dilthey II¹⁹ liegt mir als ihr freundliches Geschenk vor und ich habe sogleich nicht nur eine der besternten Novae²⁰ sondern grosse Stücke der Geistesgeschichte seit saec[ulum] XV gelesen, die mir bei ihrem Erscheinen starken Eindruck gemacht hatten. Es ist ein imponirendes Buch, und ich gratulire zu diesem Anfange der grossen Ausgabe;²¹ Diltheys stärkste Wirkung wird vermutlich in der Zukunft liegen, falls die Historiker sich dazu herablassen die Konsequenzen in sich aufzunehmen. Sehr gefreut habe ich mich, Shaftesbury²² noch mehr zu seinem Rechte kommen zu sehen, für den ich, vielleicht weil er im Gegensatz zu Spinoza und Leibniz ein Schriftsteller ist, bei gelegentlicher kurzer Lectüre eine ganz gewaltige Neigung gefasst habe—ohne sie, wie manche andere, pflegen zu können.

Für mich, der ich das auf mein Reich beziehe, ist doch bedeutsam, daß der vage Begriff Römische Stoa, auch wohl Stoa und Akademie, nun schon ganz klar sich fassen lässt; die Macht des Poseidonios²³ über die ganze Zeit,

¹⁹ W. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* II: *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, ed. by G. Misch (Leipzig/Berlin 1914).

²⁰ Additions to Dilthey's published works taken from his manuscript notes; see Dilthey (previous note) ix–xi, 493 ff.

²¹ Volume I of the collected works of Wilhelm Dilthey was edited by Bernhard Groethuysen and appeared first in 1922.

²² W. Dilthey, "Aus der Zeit der Spinozastudien Goethes," in *Gesammelte Schriften* II 391 ff. For Wilamowitz' admiration for Shaftesbury (1671–1713), see Calder (above, note 6) 49 = 162 and Wilamowitz, *Platon* I² (Berlin 1920) 747.

²³ W. Dilthey, "Auffassung und Analyse des Menschen im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert," in *Gesammelte Schriften* II 1 ff., esp. 1–16. For Wilamowitz' views on Poseidonius, see most easily "Die Griechische Literatur des Altertums," in *Die Griechische und Lateinische Literatur und Sprache* III³ = *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* I.8 (Leipzig/Berlin 1912) 144–45.

sei es durch Cicero de nat[ura] deor[um] und Seneca, sei es durch die Kirchenväter praevalirt. Aber daneben das Rationelle, das viel mehr Hellenische durch Cic[ero] de off[iciis] und de leg[ibus]: das ist Panaitios²⁴; und das sind zwei im Grunde entgegengesetzte Weltanschauungen, obgleich das Etikett gleichermaßen Stoa lautet. Und im Ganzen ist das echtste Hellenische doch, was sich als ganz neu fühlen darf: die exacte Forschung, Galilei würde wohl allein in Platons Akademie anerkannt sein.²⁵ Doch das führt ins Unendliche—Die Editionsarbeit wird ihnen [*sic*] gewiß Freude und Dank bringen; aber sie darf Sie nicht vom Eignen ganz fernhalten. Im übrigen genießen Sie hoffentlich mit Ihrer verehrten Frau Gemalin [*sic*]²⁶ die Ländlichkeit und die Landschaft.

Mit unseren²⁷ schönsten Grüßen
und Wünschen
Ihr dankbar ergebener
UWilamowitz

2. 18 May 1924

Charlottenburg 18 V 24

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Es ist mehr als ich verdiente, daß Sie mir etwas schicken, von dem Sie wissen, daß ich es nur sehr zum Teil verstehe;²⁸ aber die Arbeit, die Sie daran gewandt haben, kann ich wohl schätzen, und auch daß sie viel Selbstverleugnung forderte, denn der Ort gestattete nicht, was solche Entwicklungsgeschichte so nötig hat wie die Suppe das Salz, die Kritik, zwar nicht die absolute, aber wohl die viel interessantere, wie ein Plan immer den andern gekreuzt hat. "die Windeln auf die Leine," sagte Merck.²⁹

²⁴ For a similar sentiment see Wilamowitz (previous note) 143; for the fragments, see M. van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta* (Leiden 1952).

²⁵ Presumably a reference to the inscription on Plato's door: see Elias, *in Cat.* 118. 18 and compare Phlp. *in de An.* 117. 29. Nietzsche failed math at Pforta, a fact recalled by Wilamowitz at *Erinnerungen 1848–1914*² (Leipzig 1929) 129, earlier and less subtly at *Zukunftsphilologie! Eine Erwiderung* (Berlin 1872) 13.

²⁶ Georg Misch was married to Wilhelm Dilthey's daughter Clara, author of the fundamental *Der junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern 1852–1870*² (Stuttgart/Göttingen 1960).

²⁷ An unusual close. Marie Mommsen is included.

²⁸ G. Misch, "Die Autobiographie der französischen Aristokratie des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 1 (1923) 172 ff.; see further his *Geschichte der Autobiographie* IV.2 (Frankfurt a./M. 1969) 739 ff.

²⁹ Johann Heinrich Merck (1741–1791), writer and critic.

Mir hat von Dilthey der Beitrag zur Kultur der Gegenwart³⁰ sehr imponiert, und hier finde ich sehr schön und tief, befreiend, was er S. LXV über die Metaphysik sagt.³¹ Sonst ging und geht mich an, was er zu dem getan hat, was er Anthropologie nennt,³² und natürlich zur Poetik. Beides wirkt ja sehr stark, aber die Halbwisser verderbens. Bei den gotischen und Renaissance- und romantischen etc. Menschen, die jetzt herumgezeigt werden, wird mir übel. Und das 'Erlebnis'³³ (wie mich dünkt, kein glücklicher Singular) stiftet auch Verwirrung. Ich glaube nicht, daß ein wirklicher Dramatiker das Erlebnis in irgend einer Bedeutung nötig hat. Er belebt aus sich einen Stoff, aber in dem muß er das latente Leben erwecken, oder besser eins, denn die Erfahrung lehrt, daß in manchen mehrere Leben gefunden werden können. Und es gibt auch Poesie genug, unverächtliche, an der nicht mehr Dichtererlebnis ist als an einem Geschmeide, das ein wirklicher Künstler fertigt.

Dilthey hat das Große erkannt, daß und wie Geistesgeschichte im weitesten Umfang erforscht und geschrieben werden muß. Darin wird, wenn die Wissenschaft ernsthaft weiter getrieben wird, noch das Wichtigste getan und erzielt werden. Ich gestehe aber, je älter ich werde, desto weniger befriedigt mich dies Allgemeine, das ich doch als junger Mensch mit Leidenschaft trieb und mir viel darauf zu Gute tat, denn meine Fachgenossen ahnten so was nicht. Aber immer mehr engt sich ein, einen Menschen, ein Kunstwerk, oder auch eins, das kaum so heißen darf, und einen Menschen, der auch ein Esel sein darf, wirklich zu verstehen ist mir das Liebste³⁴—und Schwerste.

generalia et facilia et levia.

So habe ich doch etwas reagiert, um meine Dankbarkeit zu zeigen.

³⁰ W. Dilthey, "Das Wesen der Philosophie," in *Kultur der Gegenwart* I.6 (Leipzig/Berlin 1907) and Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* V, ed. by G. Misch (Leipzig/Berlin 1924) 339–416. For Paul Hinneberg and the *Kultur der Gegenwart*, a project encouraged by Friedrich Althoff and to which Wilamowitz was a leading contributor, see I. Goldammer, *Paul Hinneberg und die Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1880 bis 1900: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Deutschland* (diss. Humboldt-Univ. Berlin 1966) 63 ff. We owe the reference to Prof. Dr. Bernhard vom Brocke. The first volume appeared in 1905.

³¹ G. Misch, "Vorbericht des Herausgebers," in W. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* V (Leipzig/Berlin 1924) lxv.

³² "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie," in *Schriften* (previous note) 139–240; "[Über vergleichende Psychologie.] Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität," *ibid.* 241–316. Compare (above, note 12) Dilthey's praise of Wilamowitz' interest in anthropology.

³³ Misch sent to Wilamowitz: W. Dilthey, *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*⁹ (Leipzig/Berlin 1924).

³⁴ See Wilamowitz' letter to the philosopher, Julius Stenzel, of 26 February 1931 at *Antiqua* 23 (Naples 1983) 278: "Wenn das Historismus ist, daß man die Menschen als Individuen in ihrer Zeit fassen will, so bekenne ich mich zu der angeblich victa causa." We have been unable to identify the Latin that follows. It is not attested in the *TLL*.

Empfehlen Sie mich Ihrer Gattin und freuen Sie sich in Göttingen, nicht in Berlin zu sein.³⁵

In alter Ergebenheit
Ihr
UWilamowitz

3. 4 July 1926

Charlottenburg 9 4 VII 26

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Sie sind so freundlich gewesen, mir zuzutrauen, daß ich Ihr Buch³⁶ verstehen könnte, und ich wollte, Sie hätten Recht. Denn die Neigung dazu ist stark, ich habe auch vielerlei gelesen, so weit die durch viele Arbeit und Geschäfte zerrissene Zeit es gestattete, aber ich muß gestehen, daß ich in das Ganze noch nicht eingedrungen bin, also in den Aufbau, die Gliederung der verschiedenen Ansätze zum Stellen der philosophischen Probleme und ihrer Lösung auf noch nicht wirklich wissenschaftlichem Wege. Ob man Demokrit noch mitrechnen darf, ist mir fraglich, aber vielleicht haben Sie ihn auch nur noch hierherstellen müssen, weil er sich neben Sokrates nicht gut ausnimmt. Daß Sie den Demokrates aussondern und so die philologische Analyse inhaltlich bestätigen, war mir besonders erfreulich.³⁷ Die Entdeckung war mir geradezu befreiend. Das Indische lese ich mit starkem Anteil, freilich nur des Verstandes, abgesehen von Buddha, aber mit Ihren Chinesen kann ich noch nichts anfangen.

Die Übersetzungen von Diels haben Sie mit vollem Rechte bei Seite gelassen.³⁸ Ich fürchte, sie richten viel Unheil an, wenn sie statt des Originals genommen werden. Ich bin aber auch oft mit seinem Verständnis der archaischen Sprache nicht einverstanden. Darüber ließe sich viel reden.³⁹

So wünsche ich Ihnen viele Leser, die philosophisch weiter und tiefer sehen als ich, aber ein fleissiger und dankbarer Leser bin ich auch und bleibe

Ihr ganz ergebener
UWilamowitz

³⁵ For Wilamowitz' despair at leaving Göttingen for Berlin, see *Erinnerungen*² 239.

³⁶ G. Misch, *Der Weg in die Philosophie: Eine philosophische Fibel* (Leipzig/Berlin 1926); a second, considerably expanded edition appeared in 1950 in Bern.

³⁷ Misch (previous note) 407.

³⁸ H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch*, 2 vols. (Berlin 1903–1906 and later revisions). On Diels' edition and translation see Misch (above, note 36) 401, 406.

³⁹ Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald notes: "z.B. im *Hermes* 61 (1926) 278 f. (= *Kl. Schriften* IV 405 f.); übrigens vom selben Jahre wie dieser Brief."

4. 15 April 1927

Charlottenburg 9

15 IV 27

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Sie haben mir reichlich zu denken gegeben durch Ihre neue wertvolle Gabe.⁴⁰ Ich habe nämlich nie zu Wolfram ein Verhältnis gewonnen, vielleicht weil ich ihn zu früh in S. Martes Übersetzung⁴¹ in die Hand bekam und später, als ich Mhddeutsch gelernt hatte,⁴² so viel um Iwein und Tristan zu lesen, für Wolfram nicht genug konnte. Und dann erstarb ich in dem was der gewöhnliche Ritterroman ist—Iwein hatte mich tödlich gelangweilt. Eindruck hatte mir freilich die Kindheit und das Duell mit Feirefiz gemacht.

Nun lehren Sie so tiefe Untergründe und dabei ganz einleuchtende Querbeziehungen kennen, daß man sich am liebsten an das Werk machte—wozu doch das Alter von einem, der sein Haus bestellen muß,⁴³ doch nicht die Musse gibt. Mein Lebtage habe ich nie so wenig Zeit gehabt. Aber Ihre Abhandlung habe ich mit voller Aufmerksamkeit gelesen. Erst hatte ich Angst, fragte, was hat das mit Autobiographie zu tun.⁴⁴ Dann ward ich erleichtert; aber Sie haben zwar mit Recht Ihre Aufgabe erweitert, und zu sehen, wie die Menschen es dazu bringen, eine innere Entwicklung zu beobachten oder im Geiste schaffend zu verfolgen, das ist freilich etwas Höheres, und von da wird erst klar, daß es so gar spät dazu kommt.

Ob ich Ihr Geschenk verdiene, ist hiernach gar nicht sicher, aber daß es mich sehr gefreut hat, werden Sie heraushören. Eigentlich ist es jene Philologie, von der ich glaube, daß sie am sichersten zum Ziele führt.

Mit herzlichem Danke

in alter Ergebenheit

Ihr

UWilamowitz

⁴⁰ G. Misch, "Wolframs Parzival. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Autobiographie," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 5 (1927) 213 ff.

⁴¹ Wolfram von Eschenbach, *Parzival*, aus dem Mittelhochdeutschen übersetzt von San Marte (Albert Schulz) (Magdeburg 1836; 2nd ed. Leipzig 1858).

⁴² He learned it at Pforta from August Koberstein (1797–1870); see *Erinnerungen*² 77 and for his reading at Bonn ("Gottfried von Straßburg und die kleinen Erzählungen in v.d. Hagens Gesamtabenteuer, die ich mir gekauft hatte") *ibid.* 85. By 4 December 1869 he had lost interest in Germanistik in order to devote himself wholly to Greek; see *GRBS* 11 (1970) 146–47 = *Antiqua* 23 (1983) 36–37.

⁴³ Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald compares Wilamowitz' citation of Varro, *de re rustica* 1. 1. 1 in his letter of 8 January 1928 to Stenzel (*Antiqua* 23 [1983] 275): "Ich stecke so tief in der Arbeit und bin gezwungen für die letzte Reise sarcinas colligere."

⁴⁴ In the end Misch omitted this article from his *Geschichte der Autobiographie*.

5. 29 April 1928

Charlottenburg 9
29 IV 28

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Sie können versichert sein, daß Ihre Fortsetzungen der Autobiographie in mir immer einen nachdenklichen und dankbaren Leser finden.⁴⁵ Parzival neben Roethe⁴⁶ durch Sie beleuchtet zu finden war mir von hohem Werte. Wolframs Deutsch ist mir zu schwer, und ich weiss doch, daß er zu denen gehört, die sich nicht übersetzen lassen. Nordisch kann ich auch nicht und gerade das sollte ein Hellenist gut kennen.⁴⁷ Aber so viel hat mich doch Ohnke[?]⁴⁸ gelehrt, daß ich Ihren Egil⁴⁹ würdigen kann. Das Gedicht des Greises ist wirklich ergreifend; ein Greis, ein Deutscher, der sich in dieser Welt auch überständig findet, kann ihm nachfühlen.

Ihre Aufgabe hat sich dazu erweitert, daß Sie durch alle Zeiten verfolgen, wie die Menschen in einzelnen seltenen Vertretern zum Bewusstsein und zum Ausdruck der Eigenpersönlichkeit kommen. Da müsste eigentlich noch herangezogen werden, wie sie sich im Spiegelbilde der Poesie verborgen äussern. Und zum andern wie die Fähigkeit hervortritt, einen individuellen bestimmten Menschen in der bildenden Kunst darzustellen, so darzustellen, daß seine Seele sich offenbart.

Sie ziehen Parallelen, zu Archilochos zumal.⁵⁰ Da habe ich diese Fragen mir öfter gestellt und bin weiter, als ich es wohl früher⁵¹ dargestellt habe. Aber das ist zu viel für einen Brief, zumal ich zur Zeit recht müde bin.

Nur meinen Dank wollte ich aussprechen und meine Freude an Ihrem Werke auch

in alter voller Ergebenheit
UWilamowitz

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

⁴⁵ Misch's *Die Geschichte der Autobiographie* appeared between 1907 and 1969 in four volumes, of which the fourth appeared posthumously.

⁴⁶ For Wilamowitz' friend and Charlottenburg neighbor, the Germanist Gustav Roethe (1859–1926), see *Berufungspolitik* (above, note 17) 79 n. 340.

⁴⁷ Wilamowitz may be thinking of the early history of Indo-European meter and his correspondence in 1921 with the Altgermanist, Andreas Heusler.

⁴⁸ The name is uncertain: Ohnke, Glinke and Ehmke have been suggested. Professor Marianne Kalinke suggests Axel Olrik, but the name does not fit the traces.

⁴⁹ See G. Misch, "Egil Skallagrímsson. Die Selbstdarstellung der Skalden," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 6 (1928) 199 ff. and *Geschichte der Autobiographie* II.1 (Frankfurt a./M. 1955) 131 ff.

⁵⁰ G. Misch, "Egil Skallagrímsson" (previous note) 199 ff., esp. 211 f., 216 and 228.

⁵¹ Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald cites Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin 1913) 9 f.

The Political Use of Antiquity in the Literature of the German Democratic Republic¹

BERND SEIDENSTICKER

For W. M. Calder III on his 60th birthday

Peter Huchel:

Der Garten des Theophrast

meinem Sohn

Wenn mittags das weiße Feuer
Der Verse über den Urnen tanzt,
Gedenke, mein Sohn. Gedenke derer,
Die einst Gespräche wie Bäume gepflanzt.
Tot ist der Garten, mein Atem wird schwerer,
Bewahre die Stunde, hier ging Theophrast,
Mit Eichenlohe zu düngen den Boden,
Die wunde Rinde zu binden mit Bast.
Ein Ölbaum spaltet das mürbe Gemäuer
Und ist noch Stimme im heißen Staub.
Sie gaben Befehl, die Wurzel zu roden.
Es sinkt dein Licht, schutzloses Laub.²

¹ A slightly shorter version of this paper was read at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, McMaster University, the University of Toronto, the University of California at Berkeley and Harvard University; the original lecture-format is preserved; notes are kept to the minimum. I am grateful to James Porter for correcting my English.

² Peter Huchel, "Der Garten des Theophrast," in *Chausseen, Chausseen* (Frankfurt a.M. 1963) 81; Engl. transl. by M. Hamburger (Peter Huchel, *Selected Poems* [Chatham 1974] 21):

The Garden of Theophrastus

to my son

When at noon the white fire of verses

Where are we? In Athens, as the garden of Theophrastus and the olive tree seem to suggest? Or in the Berlin of 1962, where the poem was written, first published and read? And what is the meaning of the twelve lines? I will come back to Huchel's poem at the end of my paper, in the hope that the interpretation of a number of other texts may help us to better understand his enigmatic memento.

For centuries the imaginative reception and creative transformation of Greek and Roman antiquity has played a significant role in German literature (as of course in other European literatures too). It is widely known that this tradition of "Antikerezeption"³ has lived on well into the 20th century. Authors such as Hofmannsthal, Rilke and George, Benn or Brecht, Hermann Broch, Gerhart Hauptmann or Thomas Mann attest to its continuous importance. What is much less well known, however, is the fact that the adaptation of classical material—whether it comes from myth or literature, history or art—still is a major source of inspiration and a much-used form of expression for contemporary German writers. It was not until the extraordinary success of Christa Wolf's *Kassandra*⁴ and Christoph Ransmayr's poststructuralist novel about Ovid, *Die letzte Welt*,⁵ that a broader literary public became aware of this interesting aspect of modern German literature. In the last decade great strides have been made in the scholarly work on the subject,⁶ but much is still to be done—and relevant new texts come out every year.⁷

Flickering dances over the urns,
Remember, my son. Remember the vanished
Who planted their conversations like trees.
The garden is dead, more heavy my breathing,
Preserve the hour, here Theophrastus walked,
With oak bark to feed the soil and enrich it,
To bandage with fibre the wounded bole.
An olive tree splits the brickwork grown brittle
And still has a voice in the mote-laden heat.
Their order was to fell and uproot it,
Your light is fading, defenceless leaves.

³ Since there seems to be no convenient short English term for the phenomenon I will, throughout the paper, use the German term "Antikerezeption" to avoid clumsy English paraphrases.

⁴ Christa Wolf, *Kassandra* (Darmstadt 1983; Engl. transl. New York 1984).

⁵ Christoph Ransmayr, *Die letzte Welt* (Nördlingen 1988).

⁶ Comprehensive surveys exist only for the Antikerezeption in the literature of the GDR: E. G. Schmidt, "Die Antike in Lyrik und Erzählliteratur der DDR," *WJZ* 18.4 (1969) 123–41 and *WJZ* 20.5 (1971) 5–62; V. Riedel, *Antikerezeption in der Literatur der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Akad. der Künste (Berlin 1984); cf. my review in *Arbitrium* (1988) 87–91.

⁷ I have recently started to build up a computer-based archive for the reception of classical antiquity in contemporary German literature, where we try to collect and analyze all relevant texts by German, Austrian and Swiss authors, and I hope that it will soon be possible to answer inquiries about e.g. Heracles or Orpheus, Sappho, Augustus or the Parthenon in contemporary German literature.

In an article published less than a year ago⁸ I tried to give a brief comparative survey about Antikerezeption in East and West German literature, a summary of which may serve as an introduction to the one specific aspect of the phenomenon which I want to address in this paper. Perhaps the most surprising result of the survey was the clear difference between the two German literatures: The extent, variety and socio-cultural impact of Antikerezeption in the West, i.e. in the Federal Republic of Germany, is comparatively limited. Theoretical statements by poets or critics are rare; and a general theory (or, rather, ideology) about the importance of classical antiquity does not exist. Besides Walter Jens, classicist and professor of rhetoric at the University of Tübingen, as well as critic, essayist and poet, for a long time there has been no author for whom classical antiquity proves to be of central importance, if only for certain parts of his work or for a certain phase in his creative life. Only recently have there been significant indications of a change in attitude. I mentioned Christoph Ransmayr's novel about the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid, and I could add Peter Handke⁹ and Botho Strauss,¹⁰ two of the most important contemporary German authors, both of whom in the eighties began to experiment with ancient material (Strauss) and to confront ancient texts, ideas and ideals (Handke).¹¹

On the other hand, the importance of Antikerezeption for the literature produced and consumed on the other side of the Elbe River is astounding. There is hardly anyone among the major figures of East German literature who has not (intensely and in some cases quite extensively) worked with classical material. This is true for the dramatists Heiner Müller and Peter Hacks, for the poets Peter Huchel and Johannes Bobrowski, Volker Braun and Günter Kunert, and for the prose writers Franz Fühmann and Christa Wolf, to mention only the best-known authors.¹²

Whereas in the West classical antiquity enjoyed continuous political support, the regime in the East drastically reduced classical education, first at the high school and then at the university. In view of this fact, the

⁸ B. Seidensticker, "Antikerezeption in der deutschen Literatur nach 1945," *Gymnasium* 98 (1991) 420–53, to be followed in *Gymnasium* 100 (1993) by "Exempla: Römisches in der deutschen literarischen Antikerezeption nach 1945."

⁹ Cf. B. Schnyder, "Ja, das sind so die seltsamen Abenteuer des Übersetzens—zu Peter Handkes Prometheus-Übersetzung und seiner Begegnung mit der Antike," *Poetica* 20 (1988) 1–31.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. "Park" (Trojan War); "Die Zeit und das Zimmer" (Medea); "Die Fremdenführerin" (Atridae et al.).

¹¹ Cf. also Peter Weiss, *Ästhetik des Widerstands* I–III (Frankfurt a.M. 1975–81) and H. Fichte, *Geschichte der Empfindlichkeit* (Frankfurt a.M. 1987–): "Mein Freund Herodot" (I 381–407); "Wer war Agrippina" (I 477–82); "Ein neuer Martial" (II 61–74); "Männerlust und Frauenlob: Anmerkungen zur Sapphorezeption und zum Orgasmusproblem" (II 75–105); "Patroklos und Achilleus: Anmerkungen zur Ilias" (II 143–81) and minutiae in the novels (cf. e.g. XV 32 ff.).

¹² For other authors and texts, cf. the literature cited above, note 6.

difference between East and West German literature may appear paradoxical and demands an explanation:

A first reason, I believe, can be found in the person and work of Bertolt Brecht, the great father-figure for most authors of the German Democratic Republic. Brecht, throughout his life, worked critically and creatively with ancient history, literature and art.¹³ There is not a single area of his rich literary production, from lyric poetry to drama and literary and theoretical prose, that does not show the impact of his study of the ancient world. If one does not forget that besides Brecht other influential authors of the early German Democratic Republic—e.g. Johannes R. Becher and Georg Maurer,¹⁴ Anna Seghers¹⁵ or Erich Arendt¹⁶—have repeatedly used ancient material to express their experiences and views, it is perhaps no wonder that the next generations of authors would follow in the footsteps of this established and successful tradition of socialist literature.

A second, complementary explanation for the astonishing importance of Antikerezeption in the literature of the GDR may be derived from the core of the official cultural (or rather ideological) policy of the regime which was based on Lenin's fourth thesis about proletarian culture, according to which "Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture."¹⁷

The program that is outlined in this thesis was taken up by the leading cultural ideologists of the GDR and developed into the official concept called "Kulturelles Erbe" or "Erworbene Tradition." At the ninth meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (SED) Walter Ulbricht, then president of the GDR, proclaimed "that in view of the decadence of late capitalism it is necessary that we diligently preserve the great tradition of our humanistic heritage for the benefit of our people."¹⁸

Ulbricht and his followers in the Ministry of Culture were, of course, talking about the affirmative socialistic interpretation and utilization of the literary and artistic achievements of the great periods of our European past,

¹³ P. Witzmann, *Antike Tradition im Werk Bertolt Brechts* (Berlin 1964); H. Mayer, *Bertolt Brecht und die Tradition* (Pfullingen 1961); W. Miitenzwei, *Brechts Verhältnis zur Tradition* (Berlin 1972).

¹⁴ For Johannes R. Becher and Georg Maurer, cf. D. Gelbrich, *Antikerezeption in der sozialistischen deutschen Lyrik des 20. Jhdts.: Die Begründung einer neuen Rezeptionstradition im lyrischen Schaffen Bechers, Brechts, Maurers und Arendts* (typewritten diss. Leipzig 1964).

¹⁵ Anna Seghers, *Ges. Werke in Einzelausgaben* (Berlin 1961-): "Sagen von Artemis" (IX 231-58); "Der Baum des Odysseus" (IX 275 f.); "Das Argonautenschiff" (X 126-43).

¹⁶ For Erich Arendt, cf. *Text und Kritik* 82/83 (1984) esp. 71-110.

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow 1966) XXXI 317.

¹⁸ Cf. G. Zinserling, "Einleitung zur Arbeitskonferenz: Das klassische Altertum in der sozialistischen Kultur," *WJZ* 18.4 (1969) 6.

but it is obvious that under the wide umbrella of this ideology and further protected by the Brechtian paradigm authors could put the hallowed classical tradition to quite different uses. It is here that I feel we may find some of the deeper reasons for the unexpected importance of Antikerezeption in the literature of the GDR. First, Antikerezeption allowed authors (and artists) to evade the aesthetic constraints of "Socialist realism," the official artistic concept of the regime; second, the creative use of ancient material opened up interesting political possibilities: It could be used as a vehicle of more or less open criticism aimed against political or cultural developments; socialistic utopias could be sketched as a contrast with a much shabbier reality of the contemporary GDR; the history or the present state of the Communist Party could be discussed; one's own position and situation as an intellectual within the regime could be defined. It is this political aspect of the Antikerezeption in the GDR that I will try to illustrate in my paper.

Brecht, as is well known, made extensive use of antiquity for political statements. He critically analyzed ancient literature and history, a technique he called "durchrationalisieren" and "entmythologisieren" and which usually consisted in looking at antiquity from a materialistic Marxist point of view and adding the ignored or suppressed proletarian perspective, as e.g. in his famous poem, "Fragen eines lesenden Arbeiters":

Wer baute das siebentorige Theben?
In den Büchern stehen die Namen von Königen.
Haben die Könige die Felsbrocken herbeigeschleppt?
Und das mehrmals zerstörte Babylon
Wer baute es so viele Male auf? In welchen Häusern
Des goldstrahlenden Lima wohnten die Bauleute?
Wohin gingen an dem Abend, wo die chinesische Mauer fertig war
Die Maurer? Das große Rom
Ist voll von Triumphbögen. Wer errichtete sie? . . .¹⁹

Over and over again, Brecht used mythological, literary and historical figures, stories, or processes as paradigms for modern personalities, events

¹⁹ Bertolt Brecht, *Poems*, ed. J. Willett and R. Manheim (London 1979), transl. by N. Replansky:

Questions from a worker who reads

Who built Thebes of the seven gates?
In the books you will find the names of kings.
Did the kings haul up the lumps of rock?
And Babylon, many times demolished
Who raised it up so many times? In what houses
Of gold-glittering Lima the builders lived?
Where, the evening that the wall of China was finished
Did the masons go? Great Rome
Is full of triumphal arches. Who erected them? . . .

and developments, as e.g. in his unfinished novel, *Die Geschäfte des Herrn Julius Cäsar*, an attack on ancient and contemporary capitalism. Two short examples of the political use of Roman history may serve as a reminder of this important aspect of Brecht's work.

After the Reichstag fire in 1934 Brecht sarcastically drew a parallel between Hitler and Nero:

Der römische Kaiser Nero, der ebenfalls
 Als großer Künstler gelten wollte, soll angesichts
 Des auf sein Geheiß brennenden Rom auf einem Turm
 Die Harfe geschlagen haben. Bei einer ähnlichen Gelegenheit
 Zog der Führer angesichts eines brennenden hohen Hauses
 Den Bleistift und zeichnete
 Den schwungvollen Grundriß
 Eines neuen Prachtbaus. So in der Art ihrer Kunst
 Unterschieden sich die beiden.²⁰

And during the heated debate about the rearmament of West Germany in the fifties he issued the crisp warning: "Das große Carthago führte drei Kriege. Es war noch mächtig nach dem ersten, noch bewohnbar nach dem zweiten. Es war nicht mehr auffindbar nach dem dritten."²¹ The main targets of Brecht's political Antikerezeption were fascism and capitalism. But, of course, this poetic technique of indirect critical comment could be (and was) used not only against external enemies but could equally well be turned inward against events or processes within the GDR. An instructive example is Christa Wolf's *Kassandra*. The author presents the Trojan war as paradigm for the East-West conflict, and although the main part of her criticism is directed against the Greeks (i.e. the West), she at the same time criticizes certain developments in Troy (i.e. in the East). The book, first published in West Germany, could not be published in the East without major cuts.

Another more personal example is Volker Braun's poem "Die Treulose":

²⁰ Bertolt Brecht, Werkausgabe Suhrkamp (1967) IX 525 (my transl.):

The Roman emperor Nero, who also
 wanted to pass for a great artist, is said
 to have played the harp on a tower
 looking down on Rome as it burned at his command.
 On a similar occasion
 the Führer watching a high house burn
 took out his pencil and briskly drew a
 plan for a splendid new building. So—in the manner of their art—
 the two differed.

²¹ Bertolt Brecht, "Offener Brief an die deutschen Künstler und Schriftsteller," in *Schriften zur Literatur und Kunst* (Berlin-Weimar 1966) II 294: "Great Carthage waged three wars. It was still powerful after the first, still habitable after the second. It was not to be found after the third."

Was denn, Valerius, laß nicht den Kopf hängen.
 So haltbar sind die Sätze zweitausend Jahre
 Und mein Gefühl noch wiegt sich in den Versmaßen
 Das wie Laub abfällt und ich lebe kahl weiter.
 Immer wieder der Zorn die Scham Nachdichtung
 Aus einer schlechten Gesellschaft in die andre.
Ich liebte sie, wie keine wird geliebt werden!
Da war das Leben heiter etc

Laß die laufen
 Nach ihrem Planziel, Volker, jetzt heißt's hart bleiben.
Wer wird noch zu ihr gehn, für den sie schön aussieht?
Wen wird sie lieben, wessen Liebste sich nennen?
 Soll sie sehen, wo sie bleibt, mit ihren Fortschritten
 Fort fort. Sie wird mir nicht mehr die Lippen wundbeißen.
 Dank für den Zuspruch, Römer aus dem Weltreiche
 Oder wovon sprachst du. *Jetzt mußt du durchhalten*
 Bis sie sich bessert die Treulose:
 Sag ich, meine sei schlechter? Ich bin es auch nicht
 Ich bleibe hart bis zum letzten Hinkiambus.²²

Braun plays with one of Catullus' most famous poems²³:

Miser Catulle, desinas ineptire
 et quod vides perire, perditum ducas . . .

The poem is Catullus' desperate attempt to free himself from the destructive and degrading love of a woman who does not deserve his love. Braun, who directly addresses Catullus and calls his use of Catullus 8 "an adaptation from one bad society into the other," uses the poem, parts of which he integrates into the text,²⁴ to make a bitter renunciation of his allegiance to the socialist society he had believed in for a long time.

In the following I want to focus on Heiner Müller, the most prominent dramatist of East Germany. Müller, born in 1923, began his career with realistic plays about social and economic problems in the early GDR. After difficulties with political censorship that increasingly hampered or prevented the production of his plays and forced him into extensive rewriting²⁵ he turned to antiquity which, ever since, has been a major source of inspiration for his work.

Müller first produced translations of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Aeschylus' *Prometheus* and then wrote "Philoktet" based on Sophocles' *Philoktetes*, followed by a satyr-play-like farce about Heracles' cleaning of

²² Volker Braun, "Die Treulose," in *Langsamer knirschender Morgen: Gedichte* (Frankfurt a.M. 1987) 8; for Braun's lyric poetry, cf. Chr. Cosentino and W. Erbe, *Zur Lyrik Volker Brauns*, Hochschulschriften Literaturwiss. 59 (Königstein/Ts. 1984).

²³ Catullus 8.

²⁴ As metre Braun uses a free adaptation of the Catullan choliambus.

²⁵ Heiner Müller, *Krieg ohne Schlacht: Leben in zwei Diktaturen* (Köln 1992); J. Tismar, "Herakles in der DDR-Dramatik," *Text und Kontext* 11 (1983) 56-72.

the stables of Augias, "Herakles 5," and a short didactic play in the Brechtian tradition called "Horatier," which I will introduce shortly.²⁶

A closer look at Müller's Antikerezeption²⁷ can show that in turning to a different subject-matter he did not change his political convictions or

²⁶ The acme of Müller's Antikerezeption was in the sixties; but he has continued to work with classical material; cf. e.g. "Zement" (1972), "Verkommenes Ufer Medeamaterial Landschaft mit Argonauten" (1982), "Anatomie Titus Fall of Rome" (1984).

²⁷ For Müller's Antikerezeption, cf. H. A. Arnold, "On myth and Marxism: The case of Heiner Müller and Christa Wolf," *Colloquia Germanica* 21 (1988) 58–69; R. Bernhardt, *Antikerezeption im Werk Heiner Müllers* (Halle 1979); H. Domdey, "Mythos als Phrase: Zur Funktion des Dionysosmythos in Texten Heiner Müllers," *Michigan Germanic Studies* 8 (1982) 151–68; N. O. Eke, *Heiner Müller: Apokalypse und Utopie* (Paderborn 1989); W. Emmerich, "Das Erbe des Odysseus: Der zivilisationskritische Rekurs auf den Mythos in der neueren DDR-Literatur," *Studies in GDR Culture and Society* 5 (1985) 173–88; id., "Der vernünftige, der schreckliche Mythos: Heiner Müllers Umgang mit der griechischen Mythologie," in *Heiner Müller Material: Texte und Kommentare*, ed. F. Hörmigk (Leipzig 1988; repr. Göttingen 1989) 138–56; H. Fehervary, "Introduction to 'The Horatian'," *The Minnesota Review* 6 (1976) 40–42; B. Gruber, *Mythen in den Dramen Heiner Müllers: Zu ihrem Funktionswandel in den Jahren 1958 bis 1982* (Essen 1989); R. Herzinger, *Masken der Lebensrevolution: Vitalistische Zivilisations- und Humanismuskritik in Texten Heiner Müllers* (München 1992); P.-G. Klusmann and H. Mohr (edd.), *Spiele und Spiegelungen von Schrecken und Tod: Zum Werk von Heiner Müller: Sonderband zum 60. Geb. des Dichters*, Jahrbuch zur Literatur in der DDR 7 (Bonn 1990); C. Klotz, "Heiner Müllers 'Horatier' in der Werkstatt des Berliner Schiller-Theaters uraufgeführt," *Literatur für Leser* 5.1 (1982) 23–32; M. Kraus, "Heiner Müller und die griech. Tragödie: Dargestellt am Beispiel des Philoktet," *Poetica* 17 (1985) 299–339; C. v. Maltzan, *Zur Bedeutung von Geschichte: Sexualität und Tod im Werk Heiner Müllers* (Frankfurt a.M. 1988); W. Mitenzwei, "Die Antikerezeption des DDR-Theaters: Zu den Antikestücken von Peter Hacks und Heiner Müller," in *Kampf der Richtungen: Strömungen und Tendenzen der internationalen Dramatik*, RUB 716 (Leipzig 1978) 524–56; J. Munzar, "Zur Rolle der Adaptionen und der Bearbeitungen älterer Stoffe in der Dramatik der DDR," *Brünner Beiträge zur Germanistik und Nordistik* 2 (1980) 91–99; id., "Zur Rolle klassischer Stoffe bei Heiner Müller," *Brücken: Germanistisches Jahrbuch DDR—CSSR* (1987/88) 193–291; U. Profitlich, "Heiner Müller. Der Horatier," in *Deutsche Dramen: Interpretationen zu Werken von der Aufklärung bis zur Gegenwart II: Von Hauptmann bis Botho Strauss*, ed. H. Müller-Michaels (Königstein/Ts. 1981) 205–19; id., "'Dialektische' Tragik im DDR-Drama?," in *Drama und Theater im 20. Jhd.: Festschr. W. Hinck*, ed. H. D. Irmischer and W. Keller (Göttingen 1982) 317–32; id. (ed.), *Dramatik der DDR* (Frankfurt a.M. 1987); K. Sauerland, "Notwendigkeit, Opfer und Tod: Über [Heiner Müllers] Philoktet," in *Heiner Müller Material: Texte und Kommentare*, ed. F. Hörmigk (Leipzig 1988; repr. Göttingen 1989) 183–93; A. Schalk, *Geschichtsmaschine: Über den Umgang mit der Historie in den Dramen des technischen Zeitalters: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung* (H. Müller, Hildesheimer, H. H. Jahn, Brecht, P. Weiss, Pirandello, Gombrowicz) (Heidelberg 1989); J. R. Scheid (ed.), *Zum Drama in der DDR: Heiner Müller und Peter Hacks* (Stuttgart 1981); W. Schivelbusch, *Sozialistisches Drama nach Brecht: Drei Modelle Peter Hacks—Heiner Müller—Hartmut Lange* (Darmstadt-Neuwied 1974); G. Schulz, *Heiner Müller* (Stuttgart 1980); id., "Medea: Zu einem Motiv im Werk Heiner Müllers," in *Weiblichkeit und Tod in der Literatur*, ed. R. Berger and I. Stephan (Köln-Wien 1987) 241–64; M. Silberman, *Heiner Müller, Forschungsberichte zur DDR-Literatur* 2 (Amsterdam 1980); H. C. Stüllmark, "Erfahrungen kann man nur kollektiv machen: Zu Heiner Müllers Lehrstück 'Der Horatier,'" *Wiss. Zeitschr. der pädagogischen Hochschule Potsdam* 34.2 (1990) 331–40; K. Teichmann, *Der verwundete Körper: Zu Texten Heiner Müllers*, 2nd ed. (Freiburg 1989); E. Wedel, "Medea, meine Schwester?," *Sinn und Form* 40 (1988) 248–54; E. Wendt, *Moderne Dramaturgie* (Frankfurt a.M. 1974) 39–64; id., "Über Heiner Müllers Lehrstücke und Endspiele," in *Wie es euch gefällt geht nicht mehr: Meine Lehrstücke und Endspiele* (München-Wien 1985) 114–31; G. Wieghaus, *Heiner Müller, Autorenbücher* 25 (München 1981); id. (ed.), *Heiner Müller, Text und Kritik* 73 (München 1982); id., *Zwischen Auftrag und Verrat: Werk und Ästhetik Heiner Müllers* (Frankfurt a.M. 1984).

intentions. He just adapted a different, and perhaps safer, mode of expression for his critical analysis and assessment both of the world in general and of the particular society in which he lived.

Three quite different examples will demonstrate Müller's political use of classical material. Let me begin with a quite unusual form of political Antikerezeption, an almost literal translation of a famous Latin text:

Horaz, Satiren II 1

Horaz, Trebatius

- H. Ich hör da welche sagen (laut, Trebatius!)
 Ich wär zu scharf in der Satire, frech
 Über die Schranken setzend, die gesetzt sind.
 Anderen gilt, was ich zusammenfüg
 Entnervt. Die reden so: derlei Verse
 Macht einer tausend auch an einem Tag.
 Rat mir, Trebatius, Freund. Was soll ich machen?
- T. Schweig.
- H. Das heißt: keinen Vers mehr künftig.
- T. Keinen.
- H. Hol mich der Zeus! Ja, schweigen wär das beste.
 Doch find ich keinen Schlaf, wenn ich nicht schreib.
- T. So salb dich und durchschwimm den Tiber dreimal
 Vor Nacht. Spül dich mit Wein. Und kannst du nicht
 Ganz lassen, sei so kühn, besing des Cäsar
 Sieg und Trophäen! Ich wett, das wird bezahlt.
 Der Krug, der nicht zum Wasser geht, bleibt leer.
- H. Gern, alter Freund, wenn ich dazu die Kraft hätt.
 Nicht jedem ist gegeben, schön zu schildern
 Die lanzenstarrenden Schlachtreihn Roms. Den Gallier
 Ausblutend am Geschoß, das in der Brust
 Ihm steckt. Oder den Parther, der vom Pferd fällt
 Stückweis.
- T. Besing den Fürsten selber, den
 Allzeit gerechten, wie Lucilius
 Besang den Scipio, damals.
- H. Gern, Freund, gern
 Wenn sich ein Anlaß bietet. Nicht allzeit
 Hat Cäsar für Horaz ein offnes Ohr.
 Wird er verkehrt gestreichelt, schlägt er aus.²⁸

Borrowing the voice of Horace for a personal political statement, Müller translates the first 20 lines of the programmatic poem with which Horace opened the second book of his satires. Müller—without adding any

²⁸ Heiner Müller, "Horaz Satiren II 1," in *Die Umsiedlerin, oder Das Leben auf dem Lande* (Berlin 1975) 113 f.

comments or explanations²⁹—counts on his readers to grasp the paradigmatic quality of the conversation between Horace and his legal adviser Trebatius and to understand that the ancient verses about poetry, criticism and power have preserved their validity over two thousand years. Pointedly, Müller ends his translation at line 20 with the acknowledgment that the powerful when stroked in the wrong way will lash out. What at first sight could appear as a mere exercise in translation by Müller turns out to be a poignant programmatic statement about his poetry and a topical comment on the relation of art and power.

In the second example Müller uses a well-known passage from the *Iliad*³⁰ for a personal statement:

Geschichten von Homer

1

Häufig redeten und ausgiebig mit dem Homer die
Schüler, deutend sein Werk, ihn fragend um richtige Deutung.
Denn es liebte der Alte immer sich neu zu entdecken
Und gepriesen geizte er nicht mit Wein und Gebratnem.
Kam die Rede, beim Gastmahl, Fleisch und Wein auf Thersites
Den Geschmähten, den Schwätzer, der aufstand in der Versammlung
Nutzte klug der Großen Streit um das größere Beutestück
Sprach: Sehet an den Völkerhirten, der seine Schafe
Schert und hinmacht wie immer ein Hirt, und zeigte die blutigen
Leeren Hände der Söldner als leer und blutig den Söldnern.
Da nun fragten die Schüler: Wie ist das mit diesem Thersites
Meister? Du gibst ihm die richtigen Worte, dann gibst du mit eignen
Worten ihm unrecht. Schwierig scheint das uns zu begreifen.
Warum tatst du? Sagte Homer: Zu Gefallen den Fürsten.
Fragten die Schüler: Wozu das? Der Alte: Aus Hunger. Nach Lorbeer?
Auch. Doch schätz er den gleich hoch wie auf dem Scheitel im Fleischtopf.

2

Unter den Schülern, heißt es, sei aber einer gewesen
Klug, ein großer Frager. Jede Antwort befragt er
Noch, zu finden die nicht mehr fragliche. Dieser nun fragte
Sitzend am Fluß mit dem Alten, noch einmal die Frage der andern.
Prüfend ansah den Jungen der Alte und sagte, ihn ansehend
Heiter: Ein Pfeil ist die Wahrheit, giftig dem eiligen Schützen!
Schon den Bogen spannen ist viel. Der Pfeil bleibt ein Pfeil ja
Birgt wer im Schilf ihn. Die Wahrheit, gekleidet in Lüge, bleibt Wahrheit.
Und der Bogen stirbt nicht mit dem Schützen. Sprachs und erhob sich.³¹

²⁹ Müller's text is a free translation which, however, stays fairly close to Horace's text.

³⁰ Homer, *Iliad* 2. 222 ff.

³¹ Heiner Müller, "Geschichten von Homer," in Müller (above, note 28) 114 f.; Engl. transl. in *The Battle: Plays, Prose, Poems*, ed. and transl. by C. Weber (New York 1989):

In the first part of Müller's hexametric poem Homer is asked by his pupils why he puts the bitter truth about the Trojan war into the mouth of Thersites and then discredits this truth by having Thersites criticized, whalloped and derided; and Homer answers: "to be liked by the princes" and "from hunger"; i.e. the poet cannot write as he pleases, at least if he wants to publish and to eat. Political circumstances and power-structure can prevent the open advocacy of the political truth.

Already here the topicality is obvious, but Müller in the second part of the poem goes one step further: The most intelligent of Homer's disciples is not satisfied by the answers of his master and repeats the question when the two are alone. And now Homer/Müller gives a second and more profound justification for his attitude: It is not only that the truth leaves pot and pan empty and that it does not provide any laurel; the truth is dangerous, and just to bend the bow in order to shoot the arrow of truth is an accomplishment. Even if the author hides the truth among his lies, as the truth of Thersites is hidden among the lies of the context, it still remains a potentially deadly weapon that can be understood and used by others. Müller thus, practicing the lesson of his fable in his poem, gives an eminently political comment on the situation of poets, or intellectuals in general, who live and work under a totalitarian regime.

Tales of Homer

1

Often and in abundance his pupils were talking with Homer
 Elucidating his work and demanding correct explanation.
 Because the old poet loved to discover himself afresh
 And when extolled wasn't stingy with wine and a roast.
 During a feast, the meat and the wine, the talk once turned to
 Thersites, the much despised one, the gossip, who rose in assembly
 Cleverly using the war lords' quarrel for the size of their spoils
 Said he: Look at the people's shepherd who is shearing and killing
 Like any shepherd does with his sheep, and he showed the bloody
 Empty hands of the soldiers to the soldiers as empty and bloody.
 And then the pupils asked: How is that with this Thersites
 Master? You let him say the right words but then with your own words
 You prove him wrong. This seems to be difficult to understand.
 Why did you do it? Said the old man: To be liked by the princes.
 Asked his pupils: Why that? The old man: From hunger. For laurel?
 Too. But he liked it as much in his fleshpot as on his head.

2

One of the pupils, however, they say was uniquely bright
 A great one for questions. He always questioned each answer he got
 In his search for the one, the definite answer. He asked
 Sitting at the riverside with the old man the question again
 As once the others. The old man looked at the youngster and said
 Calmly: Truth is an arrow, poisoned to all hasty archers!
 Even bending the bow is much. The arrow will still be an
 Arrow if found among rushes. Truth dressed as a lie is still truth.
 And the bow won't die with the archer. Said it and rose.

After the two poems I want now, for my third example, to turn to a dramatic text. In the sixties and seventies especially the dramatists of the GDR made extensive use of Antikerezeption. Peter Hacks, the most important East German dramatist beside Müller, wrote no fewer than six plays in which he worked with ancient history or literature: "Amphitryon," "Numa," "Omphale," "Prexaspes," "Rosie träumt" and "Senecas Tod," to which must be added his highly successful adaptation of Aristophanes' *Peace*.³² Beside Müller and Hacks, the two most important dramatists of the former GDR, there is the interesting Antikerezeption of younger dramatists like Hartmut Lange³³ and Stefan Schütz,³⁴ both of whom were strongly influenced by Müller and both of whom left the GDR (Lange already in 1968; Schütz in 1981) after encountering serious problems with the cultural bureaucracy.

Müller wrote "The Horatian" in 1968.³⁵ As subject-matter he chose the famous story from Rome's mythical past, told by Livy in Book 1, chapters 22–26, and already used by Brecht for his play "Die Horatier und die Kuriatier." Müller turned Livy's story into a short epic-dramatic text in the tradition of the Brechtian "Lehrstück." The narrative form (the story is told in the third person and in the past tense) creates epic distance; the rhythmical language, the detailed description of gestures and movements of the characters, the composition by scenes and the ample use of direct speech give the text a distinct dramatic quality. Syntax, word-order and rhetoric are obviously adapted to the ancient subject-matter.

Livy opens his narrative with a detailed report of the cause of the conflict between Rome and Alba (chapter 22); he then describes the preparations for war on both sides (chapter 23) and the formal agreement to decide the issue not by battle but by single combat between three brothers from each side (chapter 24). In chapter 25 he gives a full description of the fight between the three Horatians and the three Curiatians, anxiously watched by both armies and ending with the victory of the last of the three Horatians, the sole survivor. In chapter 26 follow the triumphant homecoming of the victor, the slaying of his sister, who had been engaged

³² For Hacks, cf. H. Laube, *Peter Hacks* (Hannover 1972); P. Schütze, *Peter Hacks: Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik des Dramas, Antike und Mythenaneignung* (Kronberg 1976); J. R. Scheid, *Enfant Terrible of Contemporary East German Literature: Peter Hacks and his Role as Adaptor and Innovator* (Bonn 1977); Ch. Trilse, *Peter Hacks: Leben und Werk* (Berlin 1980); R. Heitz, *Peter Hacks: Théâtre et Socialisme* (Berlin-Frankfurt-New York 1984); A. Jäger, *Der Dramatiker Peter Hacks: Vom Produktionsstück zum Klassikerzitat*, Marburger Studien zur Literatur 2 (Marburg 1986); cf. further notes 6 and 27 above.

³³ Hartmut Lange, "Herakles," "Die Ermordung des Aias oder Ein Exkurs über das Holzhacken," "Staschek oder Das Leben des Ovid," in *Vom Werden der Vernunft und andere Stücke fürs Theater* (Zürich 1988).

³⁴ Stefan Schütz, "Laokoon," "Odysseus Heimkehr," "Antiope und Theseus" ("Die Amazonen") and his prose-trilogy "Medusa" (Hamburg 1986).

³⁵ Heiner Müller, "Horatier," in *Mauser*, Rotbuch 184 (Berlin 1978) 45–54; cf. the literature cited in note 27 above, esp. Fehervary; Klotz; Maltzan 90–96; Profitlich (1981); Schivelbusch; Schulz (1980) 93–98; Stüllmark; Wendt (1974, 1985); Wieghaus (1981) 64–70.

to one of the Curiatians and now laments his death, his trial, first before the duumviri, then before the people who, finally, after an emotional plea by his old father, acquit the Horatian.

Whereas Brecht in his "Lehrstück" about revolutionary cunning ("Die Horatier und die Kuriatier") accentuates the fight between the three Horatians and the three Curiatians, Müller concentrates on the aftermath. He condenses the first four chapters of Livy's report—from the beginning of the war to the victory of the Horatian—into a short exposition which, while preserving the gist of Livy's narrative, comprises only about a tenth of the text. In the second scene, of about equal length, the killing of the Curiatian is immediately followed by the killing of the sister. Müller here also takes over the most important details from his ancient source: The homecoming of the victor with the mantle of the Curiatian draped over his shoulder, which is immediately recognized by his sister as the "work of her hands," the lamentations of the girl, the anger of the Horatian, his reprimands and the murder of the sister and its rationale are almost literally taken from Livy.

Müller stresses the close parallelism between the two deeds of the one doer no fewer than three times; it is the same thrust, the same sword, the same death:

Und der Horatier, im Arm noch den Schwertschwung
Mit dem er getötet hatte den Kuriatier
Um den seine Schwester weinte jetzt
Stieß das Schwert, auf dem das Blut des Beweinten
Noch nicht getrocknet war
In die Brust der Weinenden
Daß das Blut auf die Erde fiel.³⁶

With the next lines Müller prepares for the ensuing controversy: When the Horatian raises the twice-bloodied sword the crowd falls silent. The father covers his daughter's body with the mantle of her dead fiancé and embraces the victor; but his attempt to reduce his son's two deeds to one, to his victory for Rome, instead of covering up the inseparability of the two deeds, exposes it:

Und der Vater des Horatiers
Sah das zweimal blutige Schwert an und sagte:
Du hast gesiegt. Rom
Herrscht über Alba.

³⁶ And the Horatian—his arm still felt the sword's thrust
He had killed the Curiatian with in combat,
The man he saw his sister weeping for now—
Thrust the sword—the blood of the man she wept for
Wasn't yet dry on it—
Into the breast of the weeping girl
So that her blood dropped to the earth.

Er beweinte die Tochter, verdeckten Gesichts
 Breitete auf ihre Wunde das Schlachtkleid
 Werk ihrer Hände, blutig vom gleichen Schwert
 Und umarmte den Sieger.³⁷

The little scene has no counterpart in Livy, who confines the role of the father to the great defense-speech before the assembly. The scene thus serves as a signal for the deviation from Livy which begins here. Müller uses Livy's narrative primarily to constitute the problem which in the following he discusses in much greater depth and which comes to a quite different solution. In Müller's presentation of the story the murder is also followed by a trial of the "doer of two different deeds," which is to say with the debate over whether "the Horatian should be honored as a conqueror or as a murderer tried," but the execution, the result, and the function of the trial have little in common with the ancient source.

Before the assembly the trial is opened with the question as to whether, despite the threat that the Etruscans could attack Rome at any moment,³⁸ the legal debate within should be continued. The answer is yes. The argument to put the common good, in view of the danger, above the right of the individual and the proposal to postpone the trial because it would only divide the people and thus weaken Rome are both rejected.

In the first part of the proceedings the insoluble antithesis of merit and guilt leads to a deadlock:

Und das Volk blickte auf den unteilbaren einen
 Täter der verschiedenen Taten und schwieg.³⁹

But then the people decide with one voice to divide the identity of conqueror and murderer and to give "to each one his own: to the conqueror the laurel, to the murderer the sword." Thus the Horatian is first honored for his victory over Alba and then punished for the murder of his sister.

In the second part of the trial the assembly faces the question of how to treat the corpse of the victor/murderer. Here too the Romans vote "with one voice" to preserve the double truth. The corpse of the victor is laid in state on the shields of the army and all Romans honor him:

³⁷ And the Horatian's father
 Looked at the twice bloodied sword and said:
 You have conquered. Rome
 is ruling Alba.
 He wept for his daughter, hiding his face,
 Covered her wound with the warrior's mantle
 Work of her hands, bloodied by the same sword
 And embraced the conqueror.

³⁸ Müller has strengthened this motif of Livy's story considerably.

³⁹ And the people looked at the one undivided
 Doer of two different deeds and were silent.

andeutend

Daß nichts versehren solle den Leichnam
Des Horatiers, der gesiegt hatte für Rom
Nicht Regen noch Zeit, nicht Schnee noch Vergessen
Und betrauten ihn mit verdecktem Gesicht.⁴⁰

Then, however, the corpse of the murderer, despite the intercession of the old father, is thrown to the dogs:

Damit sie ihn zerreißen
Also daß nichts bleibt von ihm
Der einen Menschen getötet hat
Ohne Notwendigkeit.⁴¹

In the answer to the father's supplication not to punish his son beyond death Müller for the first time stresses the paradigmatic character of the event:

Länger als Rom über Alba herrschen wird
Wird nicht zu vergessen sein Rom und das Beispiel
Das es gegeben oder nicht gegeben
Abwägend mit der Waage des Händlers gegeneinander
Oder reinlich scheidend Schuld und Verdienst
Des unteilbaren Täters verschiedener Taten
Fürchtend die unreine Wahrheit oder nicht fürchtend
Und das halbe Beispiel ist kein Beispiel
Was nicht getan wird ganz bis zum wirklichen Ende
Kehrt ins Nichts am Zügel der Zeit im Krebsgang.⁴²

Whereas Müller here stresses the idea that only the radical analysis and documentation of the historical truth can set an example, the short last part of the text develops the question (only alluded to here) of the preservation of the event for posterity. When one of the Romans asks, "What shall we call

40

pointing

Out that nothing was to harm the corpse
Of the Horatian who had conquered for Rome
Neither rain nor time, neither snow nor oblivion
And they covered their faces and mourned him.

41

That they shall tear him to shreds
And nothing will remain of him
Who has killed a human being
Without necessity.

42

Longer than Rome will rule Alba
Rome won't be forgotten and the example
That it once set or didn't set
Measuring with the merchant's balance
Or neatly sifting guilt and merit
Of the indivisible doer of different deeds
Afraid of the impure truth or not afraid
And half an example is no example
What isn't done fully to its true ending
Returns to nothing at the leash of time in a crab's walk.

the Horatian for those after us?" the people answer, for the third time with one voice:

Er soll genannt werden der Sieger über Alba
 Er soll genannt werden der Mörder seiner Schwester
 Mit einem Atem sein Verdienst und seine Schuld.⁴³

And the reasoning added in support of the decision shows that Müller is aiming at the preservation of historical truth in words, whether this be through literature, historiography, or journalism:

Nämlich die Worte müssen rein bleiben. Denn
 Ein Schwert kann zerbrochen werden und ein Mann
 Kann auch zerbrochen werden, aber die Worte
 Fallen in das Getriebe der Welt uneinholbar
 Kenntlich machend die Dinge oder unkenntlich.
 Tödlich dem Menschen ist das Unkenntliche.⁴⁴

The epilogue is given to the actors who have narrated and enacted the events and now add the closing commentary:

So stellten sie auf, nicht fürchtend die unreine Wahrheit
 In Erwartung des Feinds ein vorläufiges Beispiel
 Reinlicher Scheidung, nicht verbergend den Rest
 Der nicht aufging im unaufhaltbaren Wandel.⁴⁵

This conclusion once again underlines the thesis of Müller's paradoxical paradigm. The solution propagated by Müller's Romans is paradigmatic because by the clear distinction of merit and guilt they do not cover up, but uncover the "impure truth," i.e. the ambivalent truth of political reality in which positive and negative, necessary and unnecessary violence are indivisibly intertwined, both in individuals and in historical processes. The irritating solution of the problem not only stresses its provisional character but at the same time points to the need to change the very conditions of its existence.

The topicality of the text is obvious; and since—as Brecht in the introduction to his "Antigone" puts it—"philological interests are not to be

⁴³ He shall be called the conqueror of Alba
 He shall be called the murderer of his sister
 Within one breath his merit and his guilt.

⁴⁴ Since the words must be kept pure. Because
 A sword may be broken and also a man
 May be broken, but words
 They fall into the wheels of the world, irretrievably
 Making things known to us or unknown.
 Deadly to humans is what they can't understand.

⁴⁵ Thus, expecting their foe, they set—not afraid
 Of the impure truth—a provisional example
 Of neat distinction, and didn't hide the rest
 That wasn't resolved in the unceasing change of things.

served,"⁴⁶ the question arises why Müller used Livy to present his thesis about historical truth. A number of answers suggest themselves: First, the use of a story of Rome's mythological past serves to produce what Brecht called "alienation"; the historical distance allows for a rational and unprejudiced reception. Second, it is important (and this also is part of Brecht's dramatic theory) that the relative simplicity of ancient social structures provides for simple models that can be much more easily understood than the complexity of modern reality. Third, the ancient story serves as a foil against which the new version and its intentions can be seen more clearly. All these common aesthetic and didactic functions of Antikerezeption are evident here. But there is more to Müller's choice of the ancient story. As discussed and practiced in "Tales of Homer," Müller is using Antikerezeption to express something in an indirect way that could not be expressed as easily in the direct form. He talked openly about this technique in an interview as early as 1982: "In the early sixties one could not write a play about Stalinism; one had to use a kind of model, if one wanted to ask the real questions. The people here understand that quite quickly."⁴⁷ Müller is talking about his "Philoktet" here, but many critics have felt that the moral of "The Horatian," to bear and preserve the impure truth of the inseparable mingling of merit and guilt, is yet another contribution by Müller to the Stalin-debate of the sixties. I agree; but, as a recent statement by Müller shows, there was a more specific political impulse behind the conception of this text. In his autobiography published this summer⁴⁸ Müller reveals: "The text was my reaction to Prague. 'The Horatian' could not be staged. There was an attempt by the Berlin Ensemble to put it on stage, but it was prohibited by the political secretary in charge. The argument was that the text reflected the Prague-position, the claim to give the power to the intellectuals."⁴⁹ In this sense the insidious adjective "vorläufig" (provisional), used by Müller to limit the validity of the example the Romans tried to set, unveils its true meaning. The text is a presentation of the Czechoslovak "provisional" attempt to set an example; at the same time it is Müller's appeal not to suppress the truth about the events in Prague in the necessary debate about the merits and guilt of communist socialism.

The insidious adjective "vorläufig" bears yet another hidden sense: Critics⁵⁰ have pointed to a number of barbed hooks in the text that prepare the audience for Müller's final assessment of the Roman example as provisional. There is e.g. the wild ideological fervor with which the Horatian kills the Curatian, who is already overcome and asks for mercy;

⁴⁶ Bertolt Brecht, *Materialien zur "Antigone" des Sophokles* (Frankfurt a.M. 1974) 70.

⁴⁷ Heiner Müller, in *Rotwelsch* (Berlin 1982) 77.

⁴⁸ Heiner Müller, *Krieg ohne Schlacht* (Köln 1992).

⁴⁹ Müller (previous note) 258 f.

⁵⁰ Cf. above, note 27, esp. Profitlich; Stillmark; Wendt (1974, 1985).

there is the inner link between the one deed of the Horatian that is necessary for the society and the other deed that is "without necessity," a close inner link suggested by Müller's formulation when the Horatian kills his sister: "in his arm still the thrust he had killed the Curatian with in combat"; there is also the fact that the Horatian does not only appear as the agent but also as the victim of his ideological education, and finally there is the paradoxical solution adopted by the Romans, a solution that is bound to create irritation. Thus "provisional" points not only to the defectiveness of the example but also to the defectiveness of the social conditions in which even the best possible solution of the problem can only be considered provisional.

But what Müller has stressed with regard to the action of his "Philoctetes" appears to be valid for "The Horatian" also: "What happens is necessary only if the whole system is not called into question." The provisionality of the example points to the necessity to do just this, and this imperative to criticism is, of course, directed not against the imperfect Roman past but against the imperfect socialistic present that it stands for.

A number of further texts of Müller and numerous texts from other poets could be added. Here I want to conclude with a poem by Günter Kunert,⁵¹ which shows how Antikerezeption in the GDR was used not only for the critical analysis and assessment of political events and processes of general importance but also for more personal political statements:

Märkischer Konstantin

Lautlosigkeit plus Reglosigkeit
Der morgendliche Garten im August

Frühe Hitze des Tages
nördlich Berlin der verhoffte Süden

Zarte Rauchvertikale vom Nachbarhaus:
der Vesuv

Tau leckt die nackten Füße
grüne Zungen von Sklaven

Dein Imperium umfaßt
1470 Quadratmeter
Barbaren klingeln schon am Gartentor:
Hier

bist du nicht mehr sicher. Wechsle
den Glauben und errichte

⁵¹ There are more than 150 poems and a number of short prose-texts in which Kunert works with classical material.

dein Reich anderswo.⁵²

In a monologue with himself the lyrical persona envisages himself far away in time and place. In the early heat of a summer day, the smoke rising from the neighbor's chimney becomes the smoke-trail of Mount Vesuvius and the medium-sized garden north of Berlin turns into the imperium Romanum.

Up to this point the poem could be read as an ironical comment on the unfulfilled travel-dreams of many East German citizens ("north of Berlin the long hoped-for South"). But suddenly the poem takes on a new existential dimension. The small imperium in the Mark Brandenburg is, like the imperium Romanum, threatened by barbarians. The ringing at the garden gate evokes political control and the threat of arrest. The green empire does not provide security any longer. The last lines of the poem finally unveil the real point of the title. Like Constantine the Great our East German poet at a critical moment in his life considers changing his creed. The poem was written in 1975. One year later Wolf Biermann was expatriated and Kunert's protests made his own situation even more difficult, so that he finally decided to take the advice of his own poem and to change his creed: In 1978 he left the GDR and founded his empire elsewhere.

On the basis of the various forms of biographical and political use of Antikerezeption we have encountered, the enigmatic poem of Peter Huchel which I used as motto for my paper will, at least partially, release its hidden

⁵² Günter Kunert, "Märkischer Konstantin," in *Das kleine Aber* (Berlin-Weimar 1975):

Constantine in the Mark Brandenburg (my transl.)

Silence and stillness:
the morning garden in August

early heat of the day:
north of Berlin the hoped-for South

a delicate vertical line of smoke from the neighbor's house:
Mount Vesuvius

dew licks the naked feet
green tongues of slaves

Your empire consists of
1470 square meters
barbarians ring at the garden door
here

you are no longer safe, change
your creed and found

your empire elsewhere.

meaning. As Robert Lüdtke⁵³ and Peter Hutchinson⁵⁴ have pointed out, it is a personal political statement with a specific historical context.

Peter Huchel was not only one of the most distinguished German lyric poets after the second world war. For fourteen years (1949–1962) he was also the highly respected editor of *Sinn und Form*, undoubtedly the best literary journal in both Germanies, distinguished by its liberal editorial policy and practice, which brought together the best authors and critics, philosophers and political thinkers of East and West. As a result of the mounting tensions of the cold-war fifties Huchel met with increasing pressure to streamline the journal according to the official politics and ideology of the GDR, and after serious problems with the party he finally had to retire in 1962. "The Garden of Theophrastus" was published as the first of six poems in the last fascicle of the journal edited by Huchel.

Theophrastus, pupil, collaborator and successor of Aristotle, researched, lectured and wrote extensively on a wide variety of subjects, among which botany played a prominent role. Diogenes Laertius tells us that, although he was not an Athenian citizen, Theophrastus was able to acquire a garden for the Peripatetic school, which he in his preserved will dedicated "to such of his friends as may wish to study literature and philosophy there in common, so that they might hold it like a temple in joint possession." Against this political and philological background the garden of Theophrastus and the threatened olive tree unveil their specific biographical and political connotations: By choosing Theophrastus as mask, as persona, Huchel likens his editorial policy and its intended effects to a gardener, who tries to enrich the soil and to heal the fractures and wounds of the trees (as prescribed in Theophrastus' *De historia plantarum*) and this, as Lüdtke was the first to recognize, is a metaphorical but rather precise description of the role which Peter Huchel and his journal have played in the GDR. The olive tree that "splits the brickwork" is an image that evokes wisdom and peace; very probably, then, it refers to the periodical which, indeed, tried to split the spiritual and (since 1961) physical walls between the two Germanies. The author knows that his days as editor and gardener are numbered. They—his unidentified, but now easily identifiable critics—have already given the order to totally destroy the tree. At this moment the poet, in a memento that reads like a last will, tells his son not to forget what he and others tried to achieve "planting conversations like trees."⁵⁵

⁵³ R. Lüdtke, "Über neuere mitteldeutsche Lyrik im Deutschunterricht der Oberstufe," *Der Deutschunterricht* 20 (1968) 38–51.

⁵⁴ P. Hutchinson, "'Der Garten des Theophrast'—An Epitaph for Peter Huchel," *German Life and Letters* (1971) 125–35 (repr. in German in *Über Peter Huchel*, ed. H. Mayer [Frankfurt 1973]).

⁵⁵ For the interesting intertextual connections with one of Brecht's most famous poems, "An die Nachgeborenen," cf. Hutchinson (previous note); for a totally different reading of Huchel's poem, cf. A. Kelletat, "Peter Huchel, 'Der Garten des Theophrast,'" in *Peter Huchel*, ed. H. Mayer (Frankfurt a.M. 1973) 96–100. Neither Kelletat's criticism of the

In 1902 in his essay "What is to be done" Lenin wrote: "In a country ruled by an autocracy, in which the press is completely shackled, and in a period of intense political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is suppressed, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the censored literature, written in Aesopian language but understood by the 'interested'."⁵⁶ And in his study "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" he justifies his own use of "Aesopian language" in 1916: "I had to speak in a 'Slavish' tongue . . . In order to show with what cynicism they screen the annexations of their capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example—Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan, and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians, for Korea."⁵⁷ It is the paradoxical irony of history that fifty years later many authors in the GDR resorted to Lenin's tactical concept of Aesopian language, and turned it not only against the traditional capitalist enemy, but also against their own socialist society.

In conclusion I would like to point out that the political aspect of Antikerezeption I have singled out here is by no means the only one that is important for understanding the phenomenon, but it seems to me that it is particularly significant, and it will be interesting to see what is going to happen to Antikerezeption in the work of East German writers after the fall of the communist regime which has been so instrumental for the political use of antiquity in the literature of the German Democratic Republic.

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political reading of the poem by Lüdtké and Hutchinson nor his own interpretation is convincing.

⁵⁶ *Lenin Reader*, ed. S. T. Possony (Chicago 1966) 466.

⁵⁷ Lenin (previous note) 468.

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
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